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ABSTRACT 
 
This theoretical study adopted a qualitative research approach to explore how crisis 
leadership influenced crisis management readiness in an increasingly volatile global 
tourism environment in the context of the 2010 Thai Red Shirt crisis.  The main 
objective of the study was to derive a substantive theory that explained the social 
influence processes associated with crisis readiness.  A single, multi-unit hotel business 
operating in Thailand was used as the case organisation for the research context.  Since 
the contextual issues of crisis management and crisis leadership heavily influenced the 
choice of research methodology, Grounded Theory design was chosen as the most 
relevant and robust methodology to achieve theory generation from this study. While 
the primary data source involved in-depth interviews, multiple secondary data sources 
were also incorporated to augment the research findings; including, company reports, 
correspondence, television interviews and an online survey. 
 
Empowering Readiness was the basic social psychological process that emerged as the 
core category from this study and responded to the concerns of the staff community that 
a state of crisis readiness needed to exist in the organisation.  The lower order categories 
identified the most important properties that the participants considered to be key to 
being crisis ready.  These interrelated dimensions explained the higher order categories; 
Crisis Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning, which contributed to the 
emergent core category.  The interrelatedness of each of the basic social processes has 
been described in the proposed theoretical model of Empowering Readiness.  The 
model depicts a set of scales to explain how Crisis Readiness is moderated or influenced 
by institutional memory loss or retention, and its effect on the scale’s balance beam 
between Crisis Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning.  
 
In conclusion, this study posits a newly developed substantive theory that identified the 
core category of Empowering Readiness as key to improving an organisation’s crisis 
readiness.  The significance of this study lies in its contribution to the field of crisis 
leadership research and the social processes of Empowering Readiness.  Drawing from 
the extant literature and the study’s emergent theory, the research findings propose a 
Living Manual to prepare organisations for crisis readiness and ultimately contribute 
positively to crisis management efficacy. 
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter One outlines the purpose of this thesis by providing the background to the 
study in the context of the 2010 Red Shirt Crisis in Thailand, and the subsequent 2012 
Phuket earthquake.  This chapter will introduce the purpose, aims and objectives of the 
study. The research question addressed in this thesis is: How does crisis leadership 
influence crisis management readiness in the Thai hotel industry? The research 
methodology used to explore this question will be introduced with a more detailed 
explanation provided in Chapter Three.  The study’s contribution to the body of 
knowledge will also be covered in this chapter, together with a discussion of the study’s 
scope and limitations.  The chapter will conclude with a diagrammatic overview of the 
thesis.    
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis explored the influence of Crisis Leadership on Crisis Management 
Readiness within the Thai hotel industry.  The researcher’s keen interest in this topic 
was brought about by a desire to learn why organisations affected by crisis are not better 
prepared, and how they can implement a crisis-ready culture.  The Thai Red Shirt crisis 
in May 2010 and the ongoing political crises provided the substantive context for this 
study.  During the data collection phase an even more recent catalytic event with the 
Phuket earthquake on April 11th, 2012, brought to light complacencies that existed in 
the case study organisation and illustrated how crisis leadership efficacy is accelerated 
when institutional memory is formalised.  
 
Crisis and risk management practices within the hospitality industry were a relatively 
new phenomenon when the tragic circumstances of the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon attacks on September 11th, 2001 sent shock waves around the world (Chong, 
2004; Evans & Elphick, 2005; James, Wooten, Dushek, 2011; Ritchie, Bentley, Koruth 
& Wang, 2011; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty, 2009; Rousaki & Alcott, 2006). As 
world economies have become more interconnected (Northouse, 2007) and the tourism 
industry becomes more dependent upon global networks (Blackman, Kennedy & 
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Ritchie, 2011) this shock proved to be a wake-up call for the hospitality sector. Other 
crises including SARS (2003), the Bali bombings (2002 and again in 2005), the Jakarta 
bombings (2003 and 2009), the Marriott Islamabad bombing (2008), the Taj Mumbai 
terrorist attack (2008), the tsunami of South and SE Asia (2004), as well as the H1N1 
and Bird Flu pandemic threats have had a profound impact on tourism operators within 
the Asia Pacific region.  
 
Given the author’s thirty years of experience in tourism and hospitality management, 
with the last ten years based in South East Asia, she is intimately familiar with the 
international hotel industry and passionate about improving leadership competencies, as 
well as systems and processes with regard to crisis readiness. With today’s global travel 
patterns, there is growing interest in crisis management; however, how hotels cope with 
crises has received little attention. Crandall, Parnell & Spillan (2010) identified the 
growing body of research about crisis management with evidence that there was a 
dramatic increase in the number of publications related to crisis management between 
2002 and 2006. Notably, most articles have surfaced in mainstream publications rather 
than in academic journals (Crandall et al., 2010).   
 
Whether it be in the path of more frequent extreme weather events, or a soft target for 
terrorists, from natural disasters to man-made crises, the hotel and tourism industry has 
faced a growing wave of crisis events.  Wang & Ritchie (2010) state that “there is a 
distinct lack of research about strategic crisis planning in the hotel sector, as well as on 
the factors that may influence hotel crisis planning” (p.313). To date, there has been 
limited research that has focused on hotel managers’ decision-making processes when 
handling crises (Israeli & Reichel, 2003, Israeli, Moshin & Kumar, 2011).  
 
This study responded to the need for further research in crisis management leadership, 
specifically in the context of the hotel industry where relatively little research has been 
conducted.  The literature on crisis management practices within the hospitality industry 
is relatively sparse (Israeli & Reichel, 2003). Henderson (2007) suggests “there is a lack 
of quantitative and qualitative data about the extent, composition and effectiveness of 
formal crisis management planning within the tourism industry” (p.12). The present 
study responded to the need for further academic research that identifies how hotel 
managers respond in a crisis situation and what factors influence their approach to crisis 
management readiness.   
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1.2 CRISIS IN CONTEXT 
 
The Thai Red Shirt crisis in 2010 provided the substantive context for this research. 
Therefore, it is important to establish the background of the political protests, which 
culminated in a violent government crackdown on May 19th, 2010.  During the course 
of this research study, the 2012 Phuket earthquake incident also uncovered further crisis 
leadership issues within the case study organisation and provided a new research 
opportunity for a comparative study between the different business units.  These two 
crisis incidents became the contextual foundation of this research and are explained in 
the following sections. 
 
1.2.1 THE THAI RED SHIRT CRISIS 
 
Thailand’s history has been beset with no less than 18 successful and attempted military 
coup d’états since Thailand abolished absolute monarchy in 1932 (Streckfuss, 2010). 
The context for this study focuses on the events that most recently led to the 2010 Red 
Shirt crisis. The military coup d’état of September 19th, 2006, which ousted the 
popularly elected Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, created a political landscape 
with cavernous divides between the Red Shirts representing the low-income rural and 
urban populations and the Yellow Shirts who represent the previously ruling elites, 
represented by the military, bureaucracy, royalists, middle class and wealthy 
populations (Chanlett-Avery, 2010).  The military government administered the 2007 
general elections when the popular pro-Thaksin party, officially known as the PPP 
(People’s Power Party) and supported by the Red Shirts, were returned to govern.    
 
The road to reinstate democracy was less than stable and the ensuing struggle between 
the Yellow Shirts’ PAD (People’s Alliance for Democracy) and Red Shirts’ PPP only 
worsened, with the Yellow Shirts taking over Government House in August 2008.  This 
was followed by the mass sit-in of the country’s main two international airports between 
25 November to 2 December 2008, in protest against the governing PPP with its 
continuing involvement by Thaksin in exile (Campiranon, 2010; Dalpino, 2011).   The 
PPP PM was forced to resign and Abhisit Vejjajiva, as leader of the Democrat Party, 
became the replacement PM with the support of the military.   The PPP was dissolved 
and replaced by the UDD (United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship) which 
continued the pro-Thaksin ideologies. 
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The Red Shirts protested against the ruling elites for refusing to recognise the 
democratically elected PPP Parliament by storming the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya 
during 11-12 April 2009, and fuelling the ensuing protests in Bangkok.  This led to a 
State of Emergency being called by Abhisit (Su Yin & Walsh, 2011).  The Red Shirt 
Crisis of May 2010 was the bloody culmination of months of political protest against 
the incumbent non-elected government, under the leadership of Abijist Vejjajiva 
(Bouckaert, Adams, Ross & Hass, 2011; Chanlett-Avery, 2010; Cohen & Neal, 2010; 
Dalpino, 2011, Forsyth, 2010; Taylor, 2012).  The Red Shirt protest group made camp 
in the heart of Bangkok’s prime shopping and entertainment district, fortressed behind 
bamboo stakes and mountains of tyres from April 3.  The protest camp brought the 
city’s business precinct to a standstill and forced the closure of some of the city’s 
leading hotels, such as the Four Seasons, Grand Hyatt and Intercontinental hotels, 
eventually encompassing the city’s main central park, Lumpini Park.   
 
The Red Shirts held their ground until the police and army besieged the camp from 14 
May, the day after the Red Shirt leader was shot (and died on May 17th).  The violence 
escalated and the streets around the Red Shirt enclosure became a ‘live fire’ warzone 
(Chanlett-Avery, 2010). The army invaded the Red Shirt camp on May 19th, leaving a 
final death toll of ninety people from the two month long protest camp.  A number of 
the city’s major buildings including; the Stock Exchange of Thailand, some Bangkok 
Bank branches and CentralWorld the city’s largest shopping centre were attacked and 
burned.  Curfews followed and a State of Emergency was in force throughout the 
country (Dalpino, 2011). 
 
The case study organisation’s head office building and flagship hotel were in close 
proximity to the Red Shirt encampment.  The Red Shirt activity and the subsequent 
police and military actions negatively impacted the day to day operations of both the 
office building and hotel. At the height of the violent clashes the office and hotel were 
physically targeted and forced to temporarily close for eleven days, from May 14th to 
May 25th 2010. 
 
The 2010 Thai Red Shirt crisis had a significant negative impact on Thailand’s social 
and economic environment.  It is still regarded as unresolved and further discontent may 
see a return to clashes of the political parties (Barnes, 2009; Bouckaert et al., 2011; 
Campiranon, 2010; Chanlett-Avery, 2010; Cohen & Neal, 2010; Dalpino, 2011).  This 
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research study sought to explore the lessons learnt from the Red Shirt crisis and 
examine the state of crisis readiness that now exists within the case study organisation.  
Faulkner (2001) posited “By studying past events, the response of those affected and the 
recovery measures adopted, and retrospectively evaluating the effectiveness of these 
responses, we can develop strategies for coping with similar events in the future” 
(p.146). 
 
1.2.2 THE 2012 PHUKET EARTHQUAKE 
 
On April 11th 2012, an earthquake registering an 8.6 magnitude occurred off the coast of 
the Indonesian island of Sumatra (USGS, 2012) and was reported by the Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Centre.  The earthquake was felt in regions as far away as India and 
Singapore and tsunami alerts prompted fear and panic throughout the South Asian 
region.  On Phuket Island, earthquake tremors were experienced and after some delay 
the tsunami sirens commenced and alerted residents to move to higher grounds.  The 
devastating memories from the 2004 tsunami were still fresh in the minds of many 
locals and their response was one of immediate evacuation to safer locales (Muttarak & 
Pothisiri, 2013).  The Phuket International airport was also closed for a short time on 
that day.   
 
While the Red Shirt Crisis provided the substantive context for this research, the 
serendipitous discovery of the April 11th, 2012 Phuket earthquake incident provided 
another rich layer to this multi-dimensional case study.  The researcher had enlisted 
interviewees from a variety of locations within the case study organisation, including 
from one of the group’s resort based hotels to explore their feelings and perceptions 
about how the organisation’s head office is perceived in terms of crisis readiness.  In the 
course of the interviewing, one of the Phuket resort’s senior management detailed a 
recent earthquake incident that brought to light the inadequacies of their own crisis 
readiness and how they were forced to urgently re-evaluate their procedures and 
systems to meet the demands of a major client in house.   
 
This incident provided a new level to the research and allowed for comparisons between 
different types of hotel properties, a city based hotel and a resort hotel, with the systems 
and procedures of the corporate head office.  The Phuket hotel’s earthquake response 
also indicated the various levels of crisis readiness within the case study organisation 
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and the corresponding debriefings and learned lessons as a result of a crisis event in the 
separate business units of the company.  The organisation under research provided 
multi-unit components that extended the comparative analysis of crisis leadership 
actions and added further depth to the single case study that was employed. 
 
1.3 AIMS & OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
 
It is widely recognised that the tourism industry is susceptible to crises, necessitating the 
need for strategic and proactive measures to counteract future crisis events.  Crises are 
now seen as an inevitable part of the tourism business, and, as a consequence, the 
tourism sector has recognised the need for effective crisis and risk management 
strategies at both the property and organisational levels (Anderson, 2006; Avraham & 
Ketter, 2006; Beirman, 2003; Boniface & Cooper, 2009; Henderson, 2007; Henderson 
& Ng, 2004; Pforr & Hosie, 2008, 2010; Prideaux, 2009; Robertson, Kean & Moore, 
2006).  In order to mitigate negative impacts of potential crises, these strategies require 
leadership to have the foresight and drive to establish a culture of crisis readiness. 
 
A key objective of the research was to determine how Crisis Leadership impacts the 
crisis management workflow and success outcomes.  Given the natural and political 
crises that have beset the Thai tourism industry (Cohen & Neal, 2010; Rittichainuwat 
and Chakraborty, 2009; Su Yin & Walsh, 2011), the priority for hotel operators is to 
mitigate the negative impacts of such crises and identify successful crisis management 
strategies in order to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the Thai hotel 
industry and establish best practices for the future.  
 
Based on the Literature Review in Chapter Two of this thesis, it is evident that gaps 
exist in our understanding of the effects of crisis leadership on a hotel company’s crisis 
management readiness.  The gaps identified in the extant literature include firstly, 
emergent tourism-related Crisis Management frameworks have not focused specifically 
on the Crisis Readiness stage. While Faulkner’s (2001) highly cited Tourism Disaster 
Management Framework provided a systematic approach to assessing the different 
phases of a crisis incident and recommended the management responses and strategies 
to be adopted, it failed to detail the necessity of organisational learning from the 
disaster.  The more strategically-holistic framework of Ritchie’s (2004) Crisis and 
Disaster Management Framework has been referenced for this study in exploring crisis 
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management efficacy.  One of the main contributions of Ritchie’s (2004) framework is 
the ‘Resolution, Evaluation and Feedback’ phase which enhances the Crisis Prevention 
and Planning phase through organisational learning and feedback.  This research study 
undertook to better understand how managers prepare their organisation for crisis 
readiness based on the lessons learnt from past crisis events. 
 
Second, Crisis Leadership attributes and their relationship with Crisis Management 
readiness was not considered within Ritchie’s (2004) framework and its crisis 
prevention stage.  In addition, James & Wooten’s (2004 & 2008) Crisis Leadership 
Competency Model has no linkage either to a Crisis Management model or framework 
in order to identify the leadership competencies required at the different stages of a 
crisis event. Although Wooten & James’ (2008) study endeavoured to identify the 
phases of leadership competencies, it was limited in its application to each phase and 
based the findings only on a content analysis of media reports.  Therefore, based on the 
limitations of Wooten & James’ (2008) study, this research study explores the 
leadership skills adopted specifically during the crisis readiness phase and the recovery 
and resolution period. 
 
Third, minimal research has focused specifically on the substantive context of how the 
Thai hotel sector approaches crisis readiness. The majority of crisis management studies 
to date have been dedicated to a Western environment or reflect US centricity (James et 
al., 2011; Muttarak & Pothisiri, 2013).  This study addresses crisis leadership within an 
Asian context and an Asian based organisation, specifically the Thai context. 
 
Fourth, experience with crisis events enhances the Crisis Leader’s Sense-making 
abilities of the situation, and their learned lessons contribute to a more confident and 
trusting leader-follower relationship.  Therefore, understanding the impact of the 
manager’s prior experience in a crisis situation, or how followers react to a leader’s past 
experience, was explored to understand how hotels approach Crisis Readiness and how 
this impacts on crisis management efficacy. 
 
Finally, the use of Grounded Theory has not been employed previously as a research 
methodology for Crisis Leadership studies in the context of hotel crisis management and 
is limited in its use in qualitative tourism research studies.  Grounded Theory was 
deemed most appropriate and most sensitive to the contextual nature of crisis 
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management.  Therefore as outlined in more detail in Chapter Three, Grounded Theory 
was adopted to explore the richness of the data and to generate substantive theory.  
 
The primary research objective of this study is to:  Explore how management’s crisis 
leadership capabilities influence crisis management readiness for future crisis events in 
the Thai hotel industry.  While the research was set in a hotel context, the findings of 
this study are beneficial to Crisis Leadership theory across a broad spectrum of industry 
sectors.  Given the identified gaps, this research study aimed to investigate the 
following research questions. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Based on the aforementioned aims and objectives of this study, the primary research 
question guiding this study was: 
How does crisis leadership influence  
crisis management readiness in the Thai hotel industry? 
 
This question raised further questions that were considered, including; what level of 
importance do hotel managers place on crisis management planning, response and 
evaluation, how does organisational culture influence crisis management planning and 
response,  and how applicable are Western based Crisis Management frameworks to the 
Thai Crisis Leadership context? Addressing these questions provided further insights 
into how crisis leaders influence the crisis management readiness phase.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The study adopted Grounded Theory methodology based on a single case study to 
examine the phenomenon of Crisis Leadership and its influence on an organisation’s 
state of Crisis Readiness.  A single case study was employed to explore this crisis event 
using multi business units for comparison within the case study organisation and will be 
further discussed in more details in Section 3.1.5. Grounded theory methodology 
provides a means to explore rich data and tease out the underlying social processes of 
this leadership phenomenon in the case study organisation. The richness of the 
empirical data contributed to generating substantive crisis leadership readiness theory.   
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1.6 CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
This research contributes to the field of crisis leadership readiness by addressing the 
gaps in the research on crisis leadership, specifically in the phase that constitutes crisis 
readiness.  While the body of research surrounding crisis readiness has evolved, it has 
yet to adequately identify relationships with past crisis experiences, crisis leadership 
typologies, organisational and cultural attributes, and more specifically, factors related 
to crisis readiness within the context of a non-Western hotel company.   
 
Previous Crisis Management research has failed to place adequate emphasis on Crisis 
Leadership or the Crisis Readiness phase, having instead concentrated on frameworks 
for each Crisis Management phase rather than on the preparedness of managers, or the 
organisations involved.  To date, there has been a failure to integrate Crisis Leadership 
capabilities in delivering the Crisis Management frameworks, specifically during the 
pre-crisis event phase.  The Thai hotel industry has been beset by crisis fatigue over the 
past decade and their readiness for future events will determine their recovery outcomes 
and overall long term competitiveness.  Because of their unfortunate crisis experiences 
in recent years, the Thai hotel industry has become an important context in which to 
research this phenomenon. 
 
This study contributes to extant theory and practice, adding to the body of knowledge 
by providing a platform for further research related to the field of Crisis Leadership and 
Crisis Readiness.  The research contributes a new theoretical model which outlines the 
factors required to prepare leaders for the crisis readiness phase and subsequently 
contributes to the positive efficacy of the crisis management recovery and post crisis 
phases. 
 
1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis was based on a case study of an international hotel group, headquartered in 
Bangkok with hotels throughout Thailand, China, Philippines, Maldives, India, United 
Arab Emirates and Egypt, and representative offices in Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai, 
London and Berlin.  The data were collected via face to face and Skype interviews, 
email responses, an online survey, and document analysis between October 2010 and 
September 2013.  In selecting a qualitative grounded theory approach, a single case 
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study with multiple business units for comparative purposes provided a rich in-depth 
examination of the substantive context for this thesis.  The Thai Red Shirt crisis event of 
2010 defined the scope and limitations of this study.  However, during the data 
collection a catalytic event, the 2012 Phuket earthquake, provided further data and 
evidence to explore and answer the research questions.  In effect, an unplanned, yet 
inevitable crisis occurred in this geo-physically challenged region.  
 
The interview participants all agreed to participate, except for two managers; one 
particular manager declined due to her close working relationship with the case study 
organisation’s CEO.  This is regrettable due to the theoretical sampling technique 
employed and the expectation that she was considered to be a key informant.  However, 
she was prepared to anonymously contribute to feedback in an online survey, which 
provided further collaboration to the interview data as the primary data source.  
 
Since the researcher had been employed by the case study organisation for four years 
during the period 2007 – 2011, the issue of researcher bias was carefully considered and 
required an open, objective approach with the interviewees and secondary data 
collection.  However, this past tenure can also be considered an advantage as the 
researcher was given permission by the organisation’s CEO to contact the entire staff 
body and access records that would not have been provided to an outside researcher.  In 
addition, the researcher’s previous relationships with the interviewees allowed for 
efficient interview techniques, since long rapport building sequences were not required.   
 
Researcher bias was constantly at the forefront of the researcher’s mind and she strived 
to insulate her own biases, opinions and worldview throughout the study so that the true 
meaning of the data could reveal its common themes.  However, it cannot be ignored 
that the researcher could not be totally objective since she had been employed with the 
case study organisation at the time of the crisis event.  One way that this issue was 
addressed was through non-verbal behaviours, such as keeping the tone of the 
interviewing techniques without noticeable inflection variation that might influence the 
responses (Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, 2009) and avoiding any unnecessary comments 
or remarks that may influence the responses.   
 
The position of power and any negative influence that may be considered as a result of 
the researcher’s previous tenure was minimised since the researcher clearly explained 
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her status as a research student and her quest to seek a positive outcome for the 
organisation through this study.  The repeated assurances of anonymity at the time of 
inviting subjects to participate in writing, then in follow up emails and finally at the start 
of each interview, reinforced the confidentiality of their responses so that they could 
feel confident in their responses and not be concerned for any retribution from 
management.  Although the researcher was familiar with the case study community she 
was not fully conversant with crisis management systems at all levels of the 
organisation, nor all the business units. Therefore, researcher bias was reduced by 
systematically selecting participants that would best elucidate what was happening at 
the time of the crisis event. 
 
Since the research question sought to examine the organisation’s crisis readiness, the 
multi-level and multi-property management participants provided far greater insight 
than was anticipated.  Substantive theory was generated in the context of a major 
political crisis event for an international Thai hotel group.  This theory is expected to be 
applicable to a range of other crisis management typologies and industry sectors.  The 
Thesis Flow Summary in the next section provides a synopsis of this thesis as illustrated 
in Figure 1.1.  The summary visually describes the seven chapters of this thesis and 
provides an introductory overview of each chapter. 
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1.8 THESIS FLOW SUMMARY  
 
  • Background  
• Crisis in Context  
• Aims and  Objectives of the Study 
• Research Question  
• Research Method 
• Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
• Scope and  Limitations of the Study 
 
   
• Crisis Definition 
• Crisis Management 
• Leadership and  Crisis Leadership 
• Role of Culture 
• Theory Development   
 
   
• Study Design Philosophy - Grounded Theory 
• Primary and  Secondary Data Collection 
• Data Analysis 
• Data Coding 
• Ethical Considerations and  De-limitations 
 
 
  
• Influencing Leadership 
• Active Sense-making 
• Managing the Crisis  
• Crisis Leadership Influencers 
 
   
• Preparing for the Unthinkable 
• Learning from Experience 
• Learning Routineness 
• Retaining Institutional Memory 
• Experiential Learning  
 
  • Empowerment 
• The Emergent Core Category 
• Empowering Readiness: Influencing Crisis 
Management Success Outcomes 
• Empowering Readiness: The Proposed Model 
• Validating the Core Category 
• Contribution to New Knowledge 
• Developing Substantive Theory 
 
  • Summary of the Research Process  
• Summary of the Key Findings 
• Limitations of this Study 
• Recommendations and  Implications for 
Management Practice  
• Implications for Further Research 
• Final Words 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis Flow Summary 
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1.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter One has introduced the background of this study, noting the importance of 
crisis readiness for crisis leaders within the hotel sector.  The 2010 Thai Red Shirt crisis 
provided the substantive context for the research.  It was within this contextual frame 
that the researcher sought to understand the relationship between crisis leadership and 
crisis management readiness in the hotel industry.  The context also guided the primary 
research question; How does crisis leadership influence crisis management readiness in 
the Thai hotel industry? 
 
This chapter has provided the foundation for this study by explaining the aims and 
objectives and identifying the gaps that existed in the extant research literature.  These 
literature gaps strengthened the purpose for this study and included previous crisis 
management frameworks that were designed with little attention to the Crisis Readiness 
or Preparation phases. Furthermore Crisis Leadership competencies have not been 
applied within these frameworks. In addition, Western and U.S. centric studies have 
previously ignored non-Western contexts. Also, learned lessons from crisis events and 
their influence on hotel management’s crisis readiness have been largely ignored.  
Finally, the use of grounded theory to explore data and generate substantive theory in 
the tourism sector is uncommon; therefore, this study also contributes to this field of 
research from a methodological perspective. 
 
The qualitative approach used was briefly introduced in the research methodology 
section and will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three.  This chapter also 
highlighted the significance of this research to the body of knowledge and its 
contribution to improved business management practices, specifically in the context of 
the international hotel sector.  The scope and limitations of the study were explained 
and framed the research project for this thesis.  Nevertheless, this study was 
underpinned by the pursuit of a grounded theory in order to explain the social process 
involved in crisis leadership and an organisation’s state of crisis readiness. 
 
Chapter Two will now review the extant literature relevant to this research topic and 
discuss issues crucial to Crisis Leadership in the international hotel sector. 
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CHAPTER 2   CRISIS LEADERSHIP IN REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The objective of this chapter is to identify relevant prior research related to tourism 
crisis management and Crisis Leadership, and evaluate the theoretical frameworks that 
have been posited to date. Fundamental issues related to Crisis Management Readiness 
and hotel management Crisis Leadership strategies for alleviating and minimising the 
negative impacts of a crisis are considered. While it is evident that Crisis Management 
has become increasingly more topical, research to date has generally been US-centric 
(James et al., 2011) or focused on a Western context rather than an Asian context 
(Elsubbaugh, Fildes & Rose, 2004; Kim, Cha & Kim, 2008).  Cultural attributes are an 
important variable in Crisis Management success outcomes (Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney 
& Pearson, 1989; Pearson & Clair, 1998).  This study sought to understand how these 
cultural differences affect crisis leadership readiness from an Asian perspective rather 
than a Western context and thereby contribute to the body of knowledge in regard to the 
nascent literature within an Asian context.   
 
First, salient definitions of crisis and the term crisis management will be provided, 
followed by a discussion of the Crisis Management theoretical frameworks and models 
that have been developed for application within the tourism sector.  This will be 
followed by evaluating the literature and positing a definition for Crisis Leadership, and 
considering the importance of effective leadership in Crisis Management decision-
making.  The literature review will also investigate Crisis Leadership theory, 
frameworks and models. Next, previous research which examines the role that national 
culture, along with the effect of organisational culture, has on managing crisis situations 
is also considered. A gap analysis identifies areas for further research and its application 
to the Thai experience with regard to the May 2010 Red Shirt crisis, as well as the 
ongoing political crises and the 2011 floods.  Finally, the study’s theory development 
will be discussed. 
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2.1 CRISIS DEFINITION 
 
In order to present the definition of crisis management and crisis leadership, it is 
essential to commence with a definition of the term: crisis.  According to Fink (1986) 
one of the earliest scholars of crisis management:  
 A crisis is an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is 
impending – either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable 
outcome or one with the distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely 
positive outcome. It is usually a 50-50 proposition, but you can improve the 
odds (Fink 1986; p.15). 
 
Faulkner (2001) in his study of the Katherine floods, distinguished between the terms 
crisis and disaster, specifically targeting tourism disaster management. He argued that 
the term crisis should be used to describe a situation where the root cause of an event is, 
to some extent, self-inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and 
practices or a failure to adapt to change. Disaster, on the other hand, should be used to 
refer to situations where an enterprise (or collection of enterprises in the case of a tourist 
destination) is confronted with sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it 
has little control. As cited by Faulkner (2001), Booth’s (1993) definition of crisis placed 
a similar emphasis on the necessity of ‘exceptional measures’ in the community's 
response by referring to the necessity of non-routine responses. He added that stress is 
created by the suddenness of the change and the pressure it places on adaptive 
capabilities. He described a crisis as, “a situation faced by an individual, group or 
organisation which they are unable to cope with by the use of normal routine procedures 
and in which stress is created by sudden change” (p. 86). 
 
While the terms crisis and disaster can be considered distinctly different, they are often 
used synonymously and their use is interchangeable (Jaques, 2007). This is evident 
when a crisis event is often referred to as a disaster for an organisation, or vice versa.  
Ritchie et al., (2011) suggested that there is no universally accepted definition of a 
crisis, whereas Jaques (2007) suggests that there “appears to be a good level of 
agreement in the management literature about the definition of a crisis” (p.147).  There 
is no doubt that a multitude of definitions exists but it is important to note that one of 
Asia’s leading tourism industry bodies, the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA, 
2011) described a crisis as: “an event or set of circumstances which can severely 
compromise or damage the marketability and reputation of a tourism business or an 
entire tourism destination region” (p.1).  PATA have been instrumental in providing 
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travel industry-wide training, workshops, webinars and manuals for Crisis Management 
readiness. 
 
On the other hand, Crandall et al.’s (2010) definition deals with crisis as a low 
probability. However, in the context of Thailand’s state of crisis fatigue from its litany 
of crisis events the definition is redundant due to the expectation of further political 
turmoil; nevertheless it is restated here for comparison:  
 A crisis is an event that has a low probability of occurring, but should it occur, 
can have a vastly negative impact on the organisation. The causes of the crisis, 
as well as the means to resolve it, may not be readily clear, nonetheless, its 
resolution should be approached as quickly as possible. (p.4).  
 
Prewitt, Weil & McClure (2011) provide a more succinct and proactive interpretation of 
a crisis and its consequences, should an organisation fail to act quickly, with their 
definition:  
“Crisis is defined as an unexpected, dramatic, and unprecedented event that 
forces an organisation into chaos and may destroy the organisation without 
urgent and decisive action” (p.60).   
Prewitt et al.’s (2011) definition was adopted for this study as the most appropriate due 
to its focus on approaching the resolution as quickly and as efficiently as possible, 
requiring urgent and decisive action to be taken by the organisation’s management. This 
view is further expanded in the following section on how crisis management has been 
approached to date. 
 
2.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
The emergent body of Crisis Management research continues to develop as the ‘global 
village’ becomes even more connected and crises impact a wider group of communities, 
across regions, borders, and continents (Blackman et al., 2011; Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 
2008; Rego & Garau, 2007).  Crisis events now cover a broad spectrum of political, 
environmental, technological and health issues as a result of both man-made and natural 
events. These events can quickly gather an uncontrollable momentum on a global 
platform of communication interconnectivity (Hajkowicz, Cook & Boughen, 2013).  
There has never been a greater need to provide insights and create theory in the field of 
Crisis Management in order to prepare society, organisations and individuals with the 
tools to effectively deal with a crisis event. 
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 2.2.1 DEFINITION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
 
Following on from the challenges of defining crisis, many scholars concur that there is 
no widely accepted definition of the term crisis management. Fink (1986) described 
Crisis Management as: “planning for a crisis, a turning point – is the art of removing 
much of the risk and uncertainty to allow you to achieve more control over your own 
destiny” (p.15).  
 
Racherla and Hu (2009) adopted Pearson and Clair’s (1998) definition of Crisis 
Management in their study related to knowledge-based crisis management in the 
hospitality and tourism industry: ‘Crisis Management is a systematic attempt by an 
organisation and its stakeholders to manage or prevent crises from occurring, such that 
key stakeholders believe the success outcomes outweigh the failure outcomes’ (p.563).   
 
While the knowledge-based Crisis Management definition provides a systematic 
approach, it relies on stakeholders’ perceptions of the outcomes, whereas, Glaesser’s 
(2006) definition provides a more strategically focused definition: “Crisis Management 
is understood as the strategies, processes and measures which are planned and put into 
force to prevent and cope with crisis” (p.22).  Glaesser’s (2006) definition will be 
adopted for this study as the most appropriate explanation since it deals with the act of 
planning, prevention and coping with a crisis event; actions that are central to this study 
and exploring the crisis-readiness phase.  This definition aligns with the Crisis 
Management frameworks, due to their insight into strategic planning and prevention to 
address potential crises.  Existing Crisis Management models and frameworks will now 
be evaluated.  
 
 2.2.2 CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODELS  
 
Crisis Management models and frameworks are now considered to determine the most 
appropriate theoretical model given the context of the hotel industry. These models and 
frameworks are used to identify the stages of a crisis event and the components 
specifically related to the crisis-readiness phase. The following section provides a brief 
overview of the key models and frameworks within the crisis management literature. 
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(i) FINK (1986)  THE ANATOMY OF A CRISIS  
 
One of the first models related to Crisis Management, the “Anatomy of a Crisis” was 
developed by Fink (1986), who believed that a crisis should be treated as a 
communicable disease requiring crisis resolution at each of the three anatomical stages: 
Prodromal, Acute and Chronic, followed by a Crisis Resolution stage. Based on the 
findings of a survey of Fortune 500 companies, Fink concluded that fifty percent of 
businesses did not have a Crisis Management plan and that the Chronic phase lasted two 
and a half times longer in companies without a Crisis Management plan. He also argued 
that the longer the Chronic phase lasts, the longer the damage lasts.  
 
Effective decision-making is a technique, and high quality decision-making in the midst 
of crisis-induced stress is a process which requires specific mechanics applied to it 
(Fink, 1986).  Fink’s view is also supported by other Crisis Management researchers 
who tested the hypothesis that implementing strategic crisis management planning will 
minimise negative social or economic outcomes (Anderson, 2006; Mitroff, Shrivastava 
& Udwadia, 1987; Pearson, Misra, Clair & Mitroff, 1997).  
 
Fink (1986) also argued that organisations should plan and prepare for the inevitability 
of a crisis because he believed that with proper advance planning there can be a positive 
side to a crisis. He was of the opinion that “preparation is necessary for capitalising on 
crises and creating achievement out of adversity, inspiration out of humiliation and 
opportunity out of danger” (p.1).  However he failed to recognise the importance of 
organisational learning from crisis experience but instead focused his theory on the state 
of preparedness and the crisis event.  Organisational learning entails the modification of 
an organisation’s knowledge-base from a crisis experience as a result of lessons learnt 
(Madsen & Desai, 2010; Lampel, Shamsie & Shapira, 2009).  The present study 
explored the state of Crisis Readiness based on the case study organisation’s learned 
lessons from the Red Shirt crisis and their ability to deal with future crises. 
 
Organisations can manage crises more effectively by being better prepared in assessing 
the risk and the impact of a crisis occurring. Fink (1986) created a “Crisis Forecasting 
Scale” based on the following formula: crisis impact scale + probability factor = crisis 
barometer scale.  He highlighted the importance of having a strategic Crisis 
Management plan in place and a Crisis Management Team comprised of individuals 
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who bring different strengths required for different types of crises. He argued that an 
effective Crisis Management plan presets certain decisions on the mechanical portions 
of the crisis allowing the Crisis Management Team to be free to manage the content 
portion of the crisis. Fink posited that crisis communication is about controlling the 
message and the need for the communicator to have the authority or access to authority.  
However, in today’s digital media environment, controlling the message has become 
even more challenging and current research needs to take into account new technologies 
related to the new phenomena of social media’s ‘digital whispers’ (Barnes, 2009; 
Hajkowicz et al., 2013; James, Crane & Wooten, 2013). 
 
(ii) MITROFF (1987)   
 
A Model of Crisis Management was developed by Mitroff et al. (1987) as shown in 
Appendix 1. It illustrated effective Crisis Management as a continual process which is 
dynamic rather than static. According to Mitroff et al. (1987) this model “can be entered 
at, and exited from, any point, and the action can proceed in any direction” (p.285); 
therefore, it is a non-linear model.  Mitroff et al.’s (1987) model can be explained by 
commencing from the Detection phase, where an organisation scans the internal and 
external environment to identify impending crises. Prior to reaching the Crises phase, 
the organisation will systematically and comprehensively assume the prevention and 
preparation status. Constant testing and revision of crisis plans allow organisations to 
cope better and move into the Repair phase, leading to the recovery of the organisation 
and the final phase, Assessment. At this point, the organisation evaluated its 
performance and identified areas for improvement.  
 
In order to ensure a state of crisis preparedness, Mitroff et al.’s (1987) suggestion that 
the Crisis Management process can be entered at any point does not engender 
confidence in an organisation’s Crisis Readiness proactivity and ability to respond in an 
efficient and effective manner.  Mitroff et al.’s (1987) and Fink’s (1986) models provide 
a basic introduction to understanding Crisis Management through simplified processes, 
but are too simplistic for the complexity of crisis events today, as compared to the more 
strategically focused Crisis Management models to be discussed in Section 2.2.3 on 
Crisis Management in Tourism.  The earlier models developed by Mitroff et al., (1987) 
and Fink (1986) describe the phases of a crisis but do not articulate the strategies that 
are required in each of the phases.  Almost a decade after Fink (1986) and Mitroff et 
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al.’s (1987) frameworks were published, the field of crisis management research 
provided further operational processes and models for consideration as explained in the 
next sections. 
 
(iii) HEATH (1995)  CASCADED STRATEGIC PRIORITY PROFILE  
 
In his analysis of the Kobe earthquake Crisis Management process, Heath (1995) 
suggested that the strategic preparedness of an organisation will ultimately determine 
the success of the Crisis Management process.  Heath referred to his Cascaded Strategic 
Priority Profile (CSPP) which established mission and task priorities and involved 
ranking the tasks and activities that need to be undertaken. The CSPP included three 
areas of response management in the event of an earthquake. The first priority is to 
identify sources and sites of resource demand required where damage has been most 
serious.  The second priority is to prioritise tasks that will enable response operations to 
render immediate assistance through emergency services.  The third priority is to 
contain sub event threats to life and property, such as fire containment. A cascaded 
decision tree system was utilised for profiling priorities and provided managers with the 
ability to check each allocated priority throughout the process.   
 
At the same time as the CSPP, the emergency services also undertake Operational 
Management Triage (OMT) which uses similar principles as an emergency medical 
triage (Heath 1995). Response times are further improved when CSPP and OMT are 
combined.  However, Heath (1995) suggested that the Kobe earthquake’s response 
management was less than optimal due to a lack of clear communication lines and the 
inability to efficiently deploy resources. The author posits that this was due to Japanese 
cultural norms and the lack of crisis leadership and ineffective decision making 
strategies. Heath’s (1995) study recommended both CSPP and OMT as the strategies to 
improve strategic preparedness, however his recommendations ignored cultural issues 
and did not make allowance for addressing these challenges.   
 
Moreover, Crisis Management models presented thus far have failed to incorporate 
double-loop organisational learning processes sufficiently to improve the organisation’s 
knowledge-base and prioritise the Crisis Readiness of the organisation.  Carmeli & 
Schaubroeck (2008) suggested that many organisations undertake single-loop learning 
by simply detecting and correcting errors to carry on with the business at the risk of 
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repeating the error.  In contrast, double-loop learning detects and corrects the error by 
modifying the organisation’s norms, policies and objectives.  Carmeli & Schaubroeck 
(2008) recommended double-loop learning’s second-order problem-solving behaviours 
to resolve problems and identify new opportunities. They posited that there is a positive 
relationship between second-order problem-solving and crisis preparedness.  
 
(iv) JAQUES (2007)  ISSUE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT MODEL 
 
Moving forward twenty years from Mitroff et al.’s (1987) model, the Issue and Crisis 
Management Relational model developed by Jaques (2007) provided a more integrated 
non-linear relational construct, which clearly identified the pre-crisis phase.  Moreover, 
it included a post-crisis management phase that included ‘Evaluation’ and 
‘Modification’ which adopted an organisational learning component as can be seen in 
Figure 2.1.   
Issue and Crisis Management Relational model 
Jaques (2007) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Issue and Crisis Management Relational Model 
Source: Jaques (2007), Issue management and crisis management: An integrated, non-linear, relational 
construct, p.150. 
 
This model assisted in setting the scene for the necessary Crisis Leadership core 
competencies required during the crisis preparedness phase. The interchangeability of 
the terms preparedness and readiness will be explained in further detail in Section 2.2.4.  
In comparison to the previous models, Jaques (2007) described the Crisis Preparedness 
phase in more detail.  This model improved upon Mitroff et al., (1987) and Fink’s 
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(1986) frameworks; however, the Crisis Prevention activities suggested as ‘early 
warning signals’ and ‘issue and risk management’ should be factors for the Crisis 
Preparedness phase.   
 
While a number of Crisis Management models have been developed across a range of 
disciplines, there has been limited research which explored managers’ attitudes about 
Crisis Management or the factors that influence managers’ attitudes and responses 
towards Crisis Management.  Jaques (2007) noted the strong academic focus on the 
typology of crisis response strategies. He also acknowledged that a discrepancy exists 
between practitioner driven tactical response approaches and the academic models, 
highlighting the need for these models to be more in sync with management practices. 
In his research of the evolution of Crisis Management, Jaques identified studies that 
argue that Crisis Management should be integrated into strategic management. Jaques’ 
(2007) Issue and Crisis Management Relational Model emphasised clusters of related 
and integrated disciplines aimed at delivering improved financial impacts in a crisis 
situation.  It is with this argument in mind that the researcher undertook to establish the 
need for academic research to relate even more closely to the quest for answers on how 
crisis leadership can improve crisis management efficacies.  It became apparent that 
Crisis Management is a unique capability for an organisation. 
 
The frameworks discussed to this point have provided an introduction to the 
development of Crisis Management frameworks.  However, since the present study 
focused specifically on the tourism industry, crisis management frameworks which have 
been developed specifically for the tourism industry are now evaluated for this study. 
 
2.2.3 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN TOURISM  
 
(i) FAULKNER (2001)  TOURISM DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
Prior to 2000, there was little Crisis Management research related to the tourism sector. 
Faulkner’s (2001) Tourism Disaster Management Framework was one of the first Crisis 
Management models created to address crisis situations within the tourism industry 
(Racherla & Hu, 2009). Faulkner drew on existing disaster management research to 
produce a generic model for analysing and developing tourism disaster management 
strategies.  
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Communication, both internally and externally, plays a key factor in the success of a 
Crisis Management Plan. Faulkner (2001) cited Fink (1986) and Keown-McMullan 
(1997), by noting that “the role of the media in disaster management strategies can be 
crucial to the extent that it might make the difference between whether or not a difficult 
situation evolves into a disaster” (p.141). Riley and Meadows (1997) also advocated the 
necessity of developing a media communication strategy that involves the early 
establishment of a centralised communication source in order to ensure that misleading 
and contradictory information is not disseminated.  
 
As shown in Appendix 2, the Tourism Disaster Management Framework (Faulkner, 
2001) consisted of six phases commencing at the Pre-event phase when action can be 
initiated to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters. Followed by the 
Prodromal phase, where it is obvious that a disaster is imminent; then the Emergency 
phase becomes the third phase that marked the effects of the disaster being felt and 
when action is required to protect people and property.  The Intermediate phase is the 
stage where the short-term needs have been addressed and the main focus shifts to 
restoring the community and services to normal.  The fifth phase is the Long-term 
Recovery, which continued on from the previous phase with a long-term outlook of 
reconstruction and reassessment.  Finally, the sixth is the Resolution phase and marks 
the routine being established.  
 
While a useful framework, Faulkner’s (2001) model failed to adequately incorporate 
Crisis Leadership activities into the framework or any organisational learning aspect.  
Faulkner & Vikulov (2001) refined Faulkner’s original framework when they applied it 
to the Katherine flood event by adding in ‘Activate the communication tree’ in the 
Prodromal phase, as well as a more detailed ‘Review’ in the Resolution Phase.  
Although this fine-tuned the organisational learning component of Crisis Management 
the Crisis Leadership activities were still ignored.   
 
(ii) RITCHIE (2004)  CRISIS AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT: A STRATEGIC AND 
HOLISTIC MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK  
 
Ritchie (2004) created the Crisis and Disaster Management: a Strategic and Holistic 
Management Framework for the purpose of planning and managing crises and disasters 
in public or private sector tourism organisations. In his study of the strategic and holistic 
approaches used to manage crises within the tourism industry, Ritchie (2004; p.671) 
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reviewed previous research by Parsons (1996) who established three types of crises: 
immediate, emerging and sustained. Parsons’ anatomy of a crisis advocated different 
strategies to deal with various situations and was dependent upon factors including: time 
pressure, extent of control and the magnitude of the incident.  
 
Ritchie also critiqued Burnett’s (1998) crisis classification matrix (Figure 1, p.671) 
which is made up of a 16 cell matrix based on threat level (high/low), response options 
(many/few), time pressure (intense/minimal) and degree of control (high/low). This 
matrix does not, however, provide a clear road map on how to respond to the varying 
degrees of the matrix criteria. At the time of a crisis, classifying the various levels will 
not necessarily add value to the decision-making process. However, it is understanding 
the relationship between cause and effect, combined with the implications of decisions 
and actions that make Crisis Management a complicated process (Ritchie, 2004).   
 
Ritchie described strategic planning and management as being concerned with four 
main elements: strategic analysis, strategic direction and choice, strategic 
implementation and control, and strategic evaluation and feedback. He devised a 
framework for the planning and management of crises and disasters with a more holistic 
strategic management and planning approach as shown in Figure 2.2 below. Ritchie’s 
model covers three primary stages involved with strategically managing crisis and 
disasters: prevention and planning, implementation, evaluation and feedback.   
 
Figure 2.2: Ritchie (2004) Crisis and Disaster Management  
Note : spelling error in original   
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The public and private sector’s ability to control and manage complex crisis incidents 
were the focus of Ritchie’s framework, rather than addressing for example, the 
management or planning functions to increase market share or profitability, or Crisis 
Leadership roles and responsibilities. While leadership styles and employee 
empowerment have been mentioned in Ritchie’s (2004) framework as part of ‘Resource 
Management’, it has not been incorporated into the Crisis Prevention and Planning 
phase, which limits the state of crisis readiness of the organisation.  Although Ritchie’s 
(2004) framework has been widely cited in the Crisis Management research literature, it 
failed to provide any linkage to the leadership competencies required to deliver the 
framework’s strategies.     
 
Nevertheless, Ritchie’s (2004) framework was more conducive to a strategic holistic 
approach for managing crises rather than Faulkner’s Tourism Disaster Management 
Framework (Racherla & Hu, 2009), as it incorporated the Anatomy of a Crisis/Disaster 
within the strategic management framework. Ritchie’s model provided for flexibility, 
evaluation and modification of the strategy throughout the entire crisis management 
process.  It also incorporated crisis communication plans within the initial strategic 
implementation, and completed the process with a detailed Resolution, Evaluation and 
Feedback stage.  Ritchie’s framework presented organisational learning and feedback as 
one of the key aspects to reassess and evaluate the effectiveness of strategies and 
responses undertaken during a crisis, which distinguished it from Faulkner’s model 
(Andari, 2007).   
 
Scott, Laws & Prideaux (2010) also identified a research gap in market recovery as a 
result of a tourism-related crisis and provided a collection of marketing strategy studies 
to assist in stimulating demand for a destination. However, there is limited discussion 
on Crisis Management practices and strategies related specifically to the hotel sector or 
how leadership should address their organisation’s Crisis Readiness.  
 
In contrast, Wang & Ritchie’s (2010) Onion Model for Strategic Crisis Planning 
(OMSCP) elevated the crisis planning intention phase to a new priority by synthesising 
Mitroff & Anagnos’s (2001) Onion Model and posited the influencing factors.  The 
OMSCP synthesized an integrated systems approach with three sections; firstly, the 
Onion Model of Crisis Management became the foundation from which to examine an 
organisation’s crisis planning behavior (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001).  The OMSCP then 
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connected three influencing factors comprising; environmental contextual, 
organisational, and individual psychological factors, to influence the final section at the 
initial CP intention phase of the strategic crisis management process.  
 
Even though ‘Learning and Feedback’ is suggested to go throughout the whole process 
the OMSCP model failed to display this necessary iterative process.  The OMSCP 
model linked ‘Learning and Feedback’ to organisational systems, but failed to 
incorporate double-loop learning which could have recommended that ‘Learning and 
Feedback’ should occur at each phase of the Crisis Management framework. 
 
In summary, interest for Crisis Management in tourism has gathered momentum and 
specific crisis management frameworks have become more strategically integrated in 
their approach.  However, the Crisis Readiness phase and incorporating the lessons 
learned from past crises has been given insufficient attention in the literature.  It is 
evident that Crisis Leadership efficacies can mitigate and minimise the negative impacts 
of a crisis event. 
 
(iii) CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AN ASIAN CONTEXT 
  
As noted earlier, little research has addressed Crisis Management models as applied 
within an Asian context. An important research gap has been identified in that previous 
Crisis Management studies have focused predominantly on Western management 
environments. Faulkner (2001) based his theoretical model initially on an Australian 
perspective, e.g. Katherine, NT, floods, while Ritchie (2004, 2008 and 2009) focused on 
a more global outlook, with the UK foot and mouth outbreak, Bali bombings, and 
Canberra bushfires. Cultural attributes have the potential to influence crisis management 
strategies in an Asian context and will be explained in more detail in Section 2.5.1 titled 
‘National Culture’. 
 
Previous studies to date have not taken into account crisis management experiences 
within the Asian hotel sector.  Although Campiranon’s (2010) study into the Thai 
political crisis suggested a number of critical success factors for effective crisis 
management in the tourism sector.  These success factors included; first, existence of a 
crisis management plan, with a crisis management leader and a team to manage the 
activities. Second, targeted marketing strategies to feeder markets prepared to travel to 
Chapter 2 – Crisis Leadership in Review 
 
27 | P a g e  
Thailand.  Third, human resource strategies to reduce staff turnover and redeployment 
of human capital. Fourth, communication strategies that reach all stakeholders in an 
honest, caring and regular communication flow; and finally, learned lessons become a 
key component in the organisation’s continuous learning processes.  However, this 
study did not provide a comparison of organisations that utilised these critical success 
factors or confirm their adoption. 
 
Campiranon & Arcodia’s (2010) study investigated how the Meeting, Incentive, 
Convention, and Events (MICE) sector within Thailand was affected as a market 
segment and the marketing strategies employed as a consequence of the various crises 
since 2001. They concluded that the MICE market is highly sensitive to crises and 
highlighted the importance of market segmentation to attract tourists back to the 
destination. They did not specifically assess the applicability of existing Crisis 
Management models in relation to Thai national or organisational culture. Barnes 
(2009) made recommendations to address negative media reports with regard to the 
Thai political crises; however, none of these studies dealt directly with the hotel sector’s 
leadership actions during a crisis situation, or in the preparation of a crisis.  
 
Notably, there has been limited empirical testing of the previously mentioned theoretical 
models. Faulkner (2001) argued that these models need to be tested further with the aim 
of either supporting or disproving the posited theories. Faulkner (2001) also suggested 
that a logical step would be to extend the research and use his framework as a basis for 
examining and analysing actual tourism disasters. Ritchie (2004) also argued that new 
approaches are needed to test models and concepts with regard to Crisis Management in 
the tourism industry, as well as utilising phenomenological approaches to explore 
attitudes and opinions of managers about Crisis Management.  Therefore it was evident 
that further studies on crisis management in a non-western environment would be 
invaluable to extending the global reach of this topic.    
 
(iv)  HOTEL MANAGEMENT  
 
The nature of the hotel business is extremely labour-intensive, typically entailing a 
complex organisational structure of divisions and consisting of departments within 
divisions as part of an extensive hierarchical and complex management structure 
(Blayney & Blotnicky, 2010; Tracey & Hinkin, 1994, 1996) However, as a result of 
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new business practices altered by technology and downsizing (Hinkin & Tracey, 2000), 
current hotel management formations have seen a flattening of organisational structures 
with an increase of empowering management philosophies (Blayney & Blotnicky, 
2010).  
 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned descriptions of crisis management, the 
delivery of strategies, processes and measures are the responsibility of managers on 
different levels.  Crisis management should be considered a component of strategic 
management in which goals and objectives are established by the manager for the 
individual department, for their divisions, and for the organisation’s overall mission, 
vision and goals (Taneja, Pryor & Zhang, 2010). 
 
Since the present study is focused on the effect of leadership actions in preparing an 
organisation for a potential crisis event, Crisis Readiness will be addressed in the next 
section. 
 
2.2.4 THE STATE OF CRISIS READINESS OR PREPAREDNESS  
 
(i) A DEFINITION OF INTERCHANGEABILITY  
 
Crisis Readiness has been adopted as a key concept for this research study, however this 
section will address the interchangeability of Crisis Readiness and Crisis Preparedness 
terminologies. The Oxford Dictionary (Stevenson, 2001) defines preparedness as 
readiness or from the verb ‘prepare’ which is described as ‘get ready to do, or deal with 
something’.  Conversely, readiness is described as a noun from ready which is described 
as being ‘prepared for an activity or situation’.  Therefore, the shared interpretations of 
these definitions, together with the extant literature combined to present interchangeable 
descriptions that assist in explaining the study’s research question in Crisis Readiness 
and supports the approach of using both terms together and with equal application in the 
Pre-crisis phase.   
 
This interchangeability is also reflected in Ritchie’s (2008) study with the heading 
‘Disaster Readiness’ which recommended the development of preparedness strategies in 
the form of emergency plans, warning systems, contingency plans and simulations 
exercises.  Ritchie’s (2008) study also highlighted the fact that most research has 
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focused on the response and recovery phases rather than the reduction or readiness 
phases.  This supported the need for further research into the crisis readiness phase and 
illuminated the paucity of research on this specific phase of a crisis. 
 
In the field of crisis management research Reilly (1987) posited one of the first 
definitions of Crisis Readiness by defining it as ‘the readiness to cope with the 
uncertainty and change engendered by a crisis” (p.80).  Rousaki & Alcott (2006) argued 
that ‘readiness’ is evident in the state of mind of both people and the organisation, as 
well as a planned process of resource allocation and deployment.  Sheaffer & Mano-
Negrin (2003) described crisis preparedness as “a state of corporate readiness to foresee 
and effectively address internal or exogenous adversary circumstances with the potential 
to inflict a multidimensional crisis, by consciously recognising and proactively 
preparing for its inevitable occurrence” (p.575). It is this state of readiness that was the 
focus of this study and how leadership influences the organisation’s crisis readiness.  
The research objectives sought to understand how leadership of the organisation 
prepares for a crisis so that future events can be managed as efficiently as possible.  
 
(ii) CRISIS READINESS SURVEYS 
 
The Crisis Readiness Construct posited by Reilly (1987) measured the perceptions of 
US bank managers about their organisation’s level of Crisis Readiness.  Reilly (1987) 
proposed the construct to consist of six core competencies: 
1. The organisation’s ability to respond quickly to a crisis  
2. How informed the managers are about the organisation’s crisis management 
repertoire 
3. Managers’ access to the organisation’s crisis management plans, resources and 
tools 
4. How adequate the firm’s strategic crisis planning is 
5. The organisation’s media management ability in a crisis  
6. The perceived likelihood of crisis striking the organisation 
 
In Reilly’s study these components were operationalised to assess managers’ 
perceptions of each dimension, utilising 26 items for scaling.  Reilly posited that this 
instrument was useful in identifying an organisation’s crisis management readiness 
weaknesses.  One of Reilly’s (1987) conclusions was that prior experience with a crisis 
and higher job levels are associated with higher crisis readiness scores.   
  
Chapter 2 – Crisis Leadership in Review 
 
30 | P a g e  
In their study of UK hotel managers, Rousaki & Alcott (2006) condensed Reilly’s 
(1987) six core competencies into the following three dimensions which provided a 
more concise framework for the present study’s semi-structured in-depth interviews.  
The first dimension was the organisation’s ‘internal functionality’, which consisted of 
speed of response, how informed managers felt, access to crisis management resources 
and adequate strategic crisis planning.  This dimension combined the first four core 
components of Reilly’s (1987) Crisis Readiness Construct.  The second and third 
dimensions are derived directly from Reilly’s construct, namely the organisation’s 
‘media management ability in a crisis’; and the ‘perceived likelihood of a crisis striking 
the organisation’.   
 
Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) Crisis Readiness data found strong support that hotel 
managers’ prior experience with a crisis event will influence their crisis readiness.  
Their study concluded that “being an organisation which has crisis experience will show 
higher perceived crisis readiness scores than an organisation that has not experienced a 
crisis” (p.31).  Ritchie et al., (2011) also compared their study of Australian 
accommodation managers with Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) UK hotel sector study and 
found similar results with regard to their perceptions of crisis readiness in their 
organisation.  Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) dimensions will be utilised in combination 
with James and Wooten’s (2004) Crisis Leadership competencies in gathering data, 
specifically in regard to Decision-making, to be outlined in Section 2.4.4 on Crisis 
Leadership Models.  As outlined in previous models, Crisis Readiness is a component 
of Crisis Management planning.  It is important therefore that this construct receives 
greater attention in an organisation’s strategic planning process.   
 
Cloudman and Hallahan (2006) identified the following indicators as a means of 
assessing the level of crisis communications preparedness among U.S. organisations: 
with the presence of a written plan, tactical preparedness, training, maintenance of 
contact lists (for media) and media monitoring.  However, their study focused only on 
the crisis communications activities of the company.  It was limited in its scope as it did 
not take a holistic approach to the company’s entire crisis management strategies. 
Nevertheless, Cloudman and Hallahan (2006) identified some additional key variables 
positively related to crisis preparedness activities including the size of the organisation, 
as well as the organisation’s cultural aspects of autonomy, authority delegation, and 
process orientation (p.374).  These indicators were also considered as potential variables 
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for this study but were finally discounted in order to focus on and better understand 
Crisis Leadership’s decision making and preparedness actions. 
 
Typically, management is more concerned with day-to-day business activities, with 
deadlines and pressures, and crisis planning is more often than not the least important 
pressing matter (Crandall et al., 2010; McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Schoenberg, 2004).  
Yet, pre-crisis planning can ensure the response and recovery phases have a greater 
probability of achieving their objectives (Malhotra & Venkatesh, 2009; Sheaffer & 
Mano-Negrin, 2003). Senior management needs to be committed and fully involved in 
pre-crisis planning, and staff need to be empowered to make decisions as part of the 
organisation’s crisis planning.  This needs to be embraced and understood on all levels 
of the organisation.  According to Malhotra and Venkatesh (2009), “The knowledge, 
understanding and competence regarding this state of preparedness amongst employees 
and then guests will consequently increase goodwill in the market, employees will feel 
well-prepared and guests will feel confident about the level of professionalism they 
experience” (p.72).  A commitment by management to Crisis Readiness will ensure the 
organisation is viewed confidently within its stakeholder community. 
 
Ritchie et al.’s (2011) study on proactive crisis planning in the Australian 
accommodation industry found that an organisation’s size influences the 
implementation of crisis planning and in turn, their crisis preparedness.  His findings 
concur with similar studies by Reilly (1987), Rousaki and Alcott (2006) and Sheaffer 
and Mano-Negrin (2003).  However, Ritchie et al.’s (2011) study also recommended the 
need for further research in areas such as individual psychological and environmental 
contextual factors, as well as highlighting the need for further research into factors 
including past crisis experience, knowledge and executives’ attitudes and perceptions 
towards crisis planning.  The present thesis also explored Ritchie et al.’s (2011) 
recommendations for further empirical investigation and included the influence of 
contextual factors in regard to the 2010 Red Shirt crisis, and the role past crisis 
experience has on an organisation’s leaders.   
 
Crisis management frameworks to date have largely ignored Crisis Leadership as a key 
influencing factor in Crisis Management Readiness.  Management can minimise the 
negative impacts of a crisis event on their organisation by creating a sense of 
preparedness at all levels by increasing staff confidence and reducing reactive 
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timeframes.  Management’s actions and reactions cannot be underestimated in the build 
up to, during, and post a crisis event.  Therefore the role of Leadership and specifically 
Crisis Leadership will be explored in the following section. 
 
2.3  LEADERSHIP  
 
Leadership literature is extensive and varied and is not just limited to processes.  It is 
complex, multi-level as well as multi-dimensional, especially when considering such 
areas as relationships, traits, power influence, internal and external environments, and 
situations (Jackson & Parry, 2011; Yukl, 2010).  The leadership process exists on all 
levels of an organisation, and regardless of position within the organisation, is 
characterised by several key skills, including integrity, strategic thinking, 
communications, persuasion and decisiveness (Schoenberg, 2005).   
 
A discussion of leadership warrants a brief history of the development of the key 
leadership theories and models.  The business environment post-GFC (Global Financial 
Crisis 2008-2010) has recalibrated key performance indicators, and the corporate global 
office is even more intensely focused on the financial sustainability of its organisations.  
The speed of change has never been greater with dynamic organisational re-engineering 
at all levels, which when combined with the speed of new technology and today’s social 
media communication tools, is establishing the “new norm” (Armstrong & Ritchie, 
2008; Crandall et al., 2010; Heifetz, Grashow & Linsky, 2009; Kitchin, 2010).   
 
At the same time, the emerging economic powerhouses of China and India are rewriting 
global business models.  Where the once revered Western economies led the post WW2 
economic growth, these positions are fast being eroded by the rapid economic growth in 
Asia described by Hajkowicz et al., (2013) as the ‘Orient Express’ megatrend.  The 
changing forces in the world economy is best explained by Quah (2011) with the 
‘Centre of World Gravity’ shifting from the mid-Atlantic ocean in 1980 to a point in 
between India and China by 2030.  Business leaders today need to be even more 
conscious of both internal and external environments and adapt with greater levels of 
flexibility and agility to an ever-changing global business world where the digital smart 
economy is setting an exponentially faster pace for business processes and 
communication (Hajkowicz et al., 2013).  It is with these dramatic changes that the 
stage has been set for further leadership research and the ongoing development of 
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leadership theory, albeit with a more vigorous and robust pace required to meet these 
demands of change. 
 
2.3.1 DEFINING LEADERSHIP  
 
A working definition for the process of leadership needs to be established in order to 
build the foundation for a Crisis Leadership study.  Leadership methodology has 
evolved from reliance on a distinctly quantitative theoretical approach in earlier 
research to a qualitative grounded theoretical approach in more recent studies 
(Kempster, 2009; Parry & Meindl, 2002).  Since the present study sought to explore the 
relationship between Crisis Leadership and an organisation’s Crisis Management 
Readiness, the researcher undertook to establish a definition of leadership most relevant 
to this approach. 
 
(i) THE DEFINITION DEBATE 
 
The extant leadership literature provides numerous definitions of leadership.  Yukl 
(2010) identified the contention in defining leadership and how leadership scholars 
differ dependent upon such factors as who exerts the influence, the intended purpose of 
the influence, and the way in which the influence is applied.  At the same time, there is 
considerable disagreement and debate about the leadership process (Jackson & Parry, 
2011; Ladkin, 2010).  Yukl (2010) stated: “How leadership is defined should not 
predetermine the answer to the research question of what makes a leader effective” 
(p.22), which only fuels the debate on the challenge of defining leadership.   
 
Hackman and Johnson’s (2009) definition was limited in its scope and emphasised the 
role of communication in the leadership process: “Leadership is human (symbolic) 
communication, which modifies the attitudes and behaviours of others in order to meet 
shared group goals and needs” (p.11).  Kempster (2009) described leadership as a 
process of sense-giving, which seeks to shape the Sense-making process of others and 
therefore, embrace the leader, follower, and the situational perspective of the term 
leadership (p.30).   
 
Whereas Erkutlu’s (2008) study of the Turkish hotel industry adopted Yukl’s (1994) 
research and described leadership to support his study on transformational leadership as: 
Chapter 2 – Crisis Leadership in Review 
 
34 | P a g e  
“…a social influence process. It involves determining the group or organisation’s 
objectives, encouraging behaviour in pursuit of these objectives, and influencing group 
maintenance and culture” (p.709).  While this definition provided the most 
comprehensive definition of leadership in relation to the context of crisis situations for 
the hotel sector, Yukl’s later revised definition was adopted for this research study.  
Sixteen years later, Yukl (2010) defined leadership as:  
“the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to 
be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective 
efforts to accomplish shared objectives” (p.26).   
 
The researcher has proposed this definition as it reflects the most common 
characteristics of leadership definition exemplars and draws together the notions of 
leadership influence and a shared influence process for the group.  This definition also 
provides the foundation for discussion on the most relevant leadership theory in the 
context of crisis situations, which will be discussed in Section 2.3.2.  The present study 
also explored if managing and leading are actions that are mutually exclusive in the 
leadership process and will be discussed in the next section.   
 
(ii) DOES MANAGEMENT EXIST WITHOUT LEADERSHIP? 
 
The present study distinguished between a specialised leadership role and the notion of 
a shared influence process.  This study included informants in different management 
positions for a variety of business units within hotels and a corporate head office and 
did not rely on the CEO position.  While previous literature acknowledges that a leader 
performs the specialised leadership role for followers, these followers can also 
participate in a specialised leadership role within their business unit, making it a shared 
influence process (Yukl, 2010).  Shared leadership is also attributable to the evolution 
of the new organisational structures of the past decade, as downsizing increased the 
flattening of hierarchical structures (Paraskevas, Altinay, McLean & Cooper, 2013; 
Yukl, 2010). Downsizing has occurred with increased empowerment, resulting in the 
shared influence process as a managerial norm.  Another distinction is the difference 
between leadership and management.  Presently, the symbiotic relationship between 
leaders and managers has become a central topic of discussion. 
 
Jackson and Parry (2011) noted that past research identified leadership and management 
as two different functions, characterised by both different skill sets and different types 
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of people.  They argued that leadership is one of the key tasks of management and 
therefore cannot be considered mutually exclusive; rather, it is a simultaneous process.  
Leadership can also be attributed to additional management tasks such as human 
resources, budgeting and finance, planning and operational functions.  Hackman and 
Johnson (2009) posited that management is often equated with leadership, even though 
Yukl (2010) stated that this was never proposed previously. Moreover, the leadership 
versus management debate acknowledged a person can be a leader without being in 
management, and there are managers who do not lead (Yukl, 2010).   
 
In contrast, Hubbard and Beamish (2011) concurred that considerable dispute exists 
between the concepts of leadership and management, which may lead to confusion and 
incorrect use of the terms.  They compared the two terms by defining leadership as: 
“The ability to develop and articulate a vision of the future for the organisation or a unit 
of the organisation, to motivate others to buy into that vision and to get it 
implemented”; and management as: “the ability to efficiently and effectively implement 
existing policies and procedures through other people” (Hubbard & Beamish, 2011, 
p.358).    
 
However the authors were focused on a strategic perspective of leadership and argued 
their case by dividing leadership and management roles by title. For example, leadership 
roles are described as CEO, director or manager, whereas management roles consist of 
titles such as manager, administrator or supervisor.  Hubbard and Beamish (2011) noted 
that the titles do not have the term ‘leader’ included except for ‘team leader’.  This 
suggests that leadership is a shared influence and can be initiated at different levels and 
by different positions. It is a simultaneous process of managing and leading.  Yukl 
(2010) suggested that most scholars agree that in today’s business environment, the 
success of a manager will be dependent upon his or her leadership skills.  Therefore for 
the purposes of this study, management is acknowledged to incorporate leadership 
activities.  
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2.3.2 RELEVANT LEADERSHIP THEORY  
 
A plethora of leadership theories and models have emerged since the 1980s from an 
already existing wealth of leadership literature, delivering an extensive and complex 
taxonomy of leadership theory typologies (Northouse, 2012).  To date there has been 
limited research specifically on leadership in relation to crisis management readiness 
(Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008).  Despite the limited research, leadership theories most 
appropriate to crisis situations, as well as reflecting the contextual perspectives relevant 
in today’s environment, are addressed in the following section.   
 
The leadership theories referenced herein were chosen based on their relevance and 
appropriateness to crisis events for this study, their recognition of being widely-cited 
and their sustainability even with new leadership theories appearing on the leadership 
literature landscape.  Leadership theories developed in the 1980s are relevant and still 
widely cited today and provide the foundation for this section of the literature review.   
 
Even though new leadership theories have emerged in recent times and are evolving, the 
seminal leadership thinker, Yukl (2010) suggested there is not yet conclusive research 
on the new leadership theories.  A review of the leadership literature details the many 
new emergent leadership theories (Jackson & Parry, 2011; Ladkin, 2010) including; 
servant leadership, collaborative leadership, distributed leadership, spiritual leadership 
and authentic leadership theories.  The challenge was to identify leadership theories 
applicable to Crisis Leadership research.  In order to develop the leadership theory foci 
for this study in the context of crisis events, the following section evaluated leadership 
theory in terms of Crisis Leadership with first; Charismatic Leadership, followed by 
Transformational Leadership and finally, Leadership in Context was also considered.   
 
(i) CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP  
 
In a volatile environment or crisis situation, leaders often emerge and contribute 
positively to the unfolding crisis.  For example, Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New 
York, in the aftermath of the World Trade Centre attacks of 911 and Premier Bligh 
during the Queensland floods and cyclones of 2011.  Charisma theory was first mooted 
by the sociologist, Max Weber soon after World War II.  Charismatic leadership 
according to Weber (1947) occurs during a social crisis when a leader puts forward a 
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radical vision to solve the crisis and attracts followers who believe in that vision.  The 
leader is applauded on the success as perceived by the followers.  Since Weber’s 
introduction of this theory, charismatic leadership has been developed further.  Neo-
charismatic leadership is described by Yukl (2010) where the leader’s motives and 
behaviours determine the psychological processes that illustrate how they influence 
followers. 
 
House (1976) contributed to the study of Charismatic Leadership theory by identifying 
the relationship between the process of influence and the effect on followers’ 
motivations and their relationship with the leader.  House (1976) brought together a 
comprehensive theory based on traits, behaviour, influence and situational conditions, 
thereby highlighting the significance of the situation and the link to crisis events 
(Kempster, 2009).  Jackson & Parry (2011) argued that Charismatic Leadership 
comprised the entire situation, brought together by the leader’s identity and behaviour, 
follower identity, the socio-cultural context and the organisational setting.  They 
recommended that the whole situation needs to be researched to understand what is 
going on in the case of charismatic leadership.   
 
Although charismatic leadership has been attributed mainly to political leaders and 
heads of state, it can also be applied to the business environment on all levels and not 
just senior management roles (Hackman & Johnson, 2009; Jackson & Parry, 2011).  
There is also a negative aspect to charismatic leadership.  This occurs when charismatic 
leaders use unethical pursuits to achieve personal objectives (Howell & Avolio, 1992). 
This thesis will only consider ethical charismatic leadership traits in relation to crisis 
events.  Hackman and Johnson (2009) suggested that charismatic leadership requires 
instability or a crisis to exist. They evaluated the differences in the behaviouralist 
approach and the attribution research approach to charismatic leadership with their 
insight into the communication approach, with which they attribute “charisma is the 
product of communication” (p. 127).  In saying this, they identified three core functions 
of communication for charismatic leaders: relationship builders, visionaries and 
influence agents.   
 
In a crisis event, Charismatic Leadership can set the stage for the actors of a hotel 
company by encompassing the components of the entire situation.  The communication 
competencies of charismatic leadership can be employed by managers on all levels and 
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provide the basis for influencing the group in a positive direction.  Charismatic leaders 
can inspire employees to achieve the group’s goals.  Therefore, it is important to 
consider charismatic leadership and its positive influence on dealing with the 
uncertainty of an unfolding crisis within a highly stressful and emotive context.  A 
review of leadership theory relevant to crisis events also needs to include 
Transformational Leadership, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
(ii) TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
 
The hospitality sector is a service based industry which relies on the performance 
capabilities of its actors interacting with their guests or clients twenty-four hours a day 
in order to exceed the KPI’s (key performance indicators) of the business (Blayney & 
Blotnicky, 2010; Clark, Hartline & Jones, 2009; Tracey & Hinkin, 1994, 1996).  In an 
industry that is constantly seeking to maximise guest satisfaction levels and empower 
their actors to deliver service excellence, management practice has continually evolved 
to identify the most appropriate form of leadership practice to achieve business 
objectives.   
 
Bass and Avolio (1994) provided a description of the eight factors that described their 
leadership theory, which combines Transactional, Transformational Leadership and 
Laissez-faire factors based on their revised Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire 
(MLQ).  Transformational leaders are described by Bass and Avolio (1990) as 
encouraging individuals with increased awareness of the key issues for the group and 
organisation “while increasing the confidence of followers and gradually moving them 
from concerns for existence to concerns for achievement, growth and development” 
(p.22).  
 
Tracey and Hinkin (1994, 1996) posited that transformational leadership has proven to 
be more effective than transactional leadership.   Tracey and Hinkin (1994, 1996) 
recognised the competitive business environment in which the hotel sector operates and 
dismissed traditional hotel management practices in favour of transformational 
leadership.  They described the hotel industry as having a hierarchical management 
structure requiring strict adherence to rules and regulations, lacking in creativity and 
innovation, and a ‘painfully’ slow decision-making environment. Whereas 
transformational leaders holistically examine their organisation, use vision to identify 
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necessary changes, and implement those changes based on the organisation’s objectives.  
When the leader’s vision and action are congruent with his or her followers’ beliefs and 
values then the organisation’s change process can be achieved.  
 
Transformational leadership is most appropriate at the time of a crisis event in dealing 
with the environmental and psychological changes that management faces (Hadley, 
Pittinsky, Sommer & Zhu, 2011).  DuBrin (2013a) posited that transformational 
leadership is the ‘intervention of choice’ at the time of a crisis in the immediate crisis 
stage and post crisis.  Leadership research data has identified transformational 
leadership as the most comprehensive approach to helping an organisation chart its way 
through a crisis (DuBrin, 2013b).  Pillai (2013) advocated that there is still much to 
learn about the effectiveness of transformational leadership across cultures. Pillai (2013) 
posited that leaders in a collectivist culture can channel the followers’ sense of loyalty 
and obedience to guide the organisation out of a crisis.  
 
The key components of managing a crisis through transformational leadership are 
described by DuBrin (2013b) and include; effectively managing emotions, having a 
communication strategy plan that reflects the culture of the organisation, and having 
highly developed self-awareness skills and the ability to learn from the crisis.  DuBrin 
(2013b) argued that the value of transformational leadership in a crisis is that followers 
develop confidence and trust in management and develop psychological resilience and 
commitment to the organisation’s goals. 
 
Shahin and Wright (2004) identified ‘Factors of Transactional and Transformational 
Leadership’ was adapted by from Bass and Avolio’s (1994) monograph on “Improving 
Organisational Effectiveness” to explain the key features of Transactional and 
Transformational leadership:   
 
The attributes of Transformational Leadership including; Idealised Influence, 
Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation and Individualised Consideration as 
depicted in Table 2.1 below, assisted the researcher in understanding how 
Transformational Leadership would strengthen Crisis Leadership efficacy in the hotel 
sector. 
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Table 2.1: Factors of Transactional and Transformational Leadership 
 
Source : Shahin & Wright (2004) Leadership in the context of culture sourced from Bass & 
Avolio’s (1994) “Improving Organisational Effectiveness” 
 
It is difficult to introduce Transformational Leadership in isolation as the extant 
literature abounds with arguments that Transformational and Charismatic Leadership 
can be considered either: similar and compatible, equivalent or distinct, or overlapping 
(Yukl, 2010).  Evidence exists that it is possible to be both transformational and 
charismatic (Yukl, 2010), a combination that should be considered in relation to Crisis 
Leadership. 
 
Popper and Zakkai (1994) posited that different situations that are conducive to the 
leadership patterns of Transactional, Transformational and Charismatic Leadership as 
outlined in Table 2.2 below.  Transactional leadership is described as the leadership 
pattern least applicable in a crisis situation.  Popper and Zakkai (1994) suggest 
Charismatic Leadership as the most effective style to adopt in a crisis event. 
Transformational Leadership is best suited to the organisational learning process of a 
crisis event.  However, since this theory was posited, leadership theory has focused 
more frequently on transformational leadership as the most effective leadership style 
during a crisis.  
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Table 2.2: Transactional, Charismatic and Transformational Leadership: 
Conditions conducive to their predominance 
 
Source: Popper & Zakkai (1994) Transactional, Charismatic and Transformational Leadership: 
Conditions conducive to their predominance (p.7) 
 
These leadership traits can be used simultaneously during progressive stages of a crisis 
event.  For example, Charismatic Leadership could be adopted at the height of a crisis 
and Transformational Leadership should be considered throughout, especially in the 
post crisis and crisis readiness stages.  
 
The synergies between Transformational and Charismatic Leadership have not gone 
unnoticed.  Transformational Leadership cannot often be described without reference to 
some form of Charismatic Leadership. Erkutlu’s (2008) study of Turkish hotel 
leadership described transformational leadership as:  
“It elevates the follower’s level of maturity and ideals as well as concerns for 
achievement, self-actualisation, and the well-being of others, the organisation, 
and society. Idealised influence and inspirational leadership are displayed when 
the leader envisions a desirable future, articulates how it can be reached, sets an 
example to be followed, sets high standards of performance, and shows 
determination and confidence. Followers want to identify with such leadership” 
(p.709-710). 
 
There is clearly a gap in the extant Crisis Management literature about the most 
appropriate leadership strategy at the time of a crisis event.  Nevertheless, the emerging 
literature suggests transformational and charismatic leadership as an important positive 
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influence and a basis for further Crisis Leadership research.  Charismatic Leadership 
theory also provides an alternative insight into situational leadership and influence, 
which can be either positive or negative during a crisis.  Yukl (2010) recognised the 
similarities between these two leadership styles and highlighted how Transformational 
Leadership results in a greater level of empowerment of followers and creates a culture 
of autonomy, communication, and building the base to support empowerment strategies.  
Charismatic Leadership requires extraordinary competence and personal risk taking, 
which is not uncommon at a time of crisis. 
 
While the combination of Transformational and Charismatic Leadership presents a 
synthesising foundation for Crisis Leadership, it is evident that leadership theory lacks 
clarity for relevance to all situations.  Conger (1999) identified a lack of research about 
the leader’s thought processes with regard to the situational context of these models and 
theories.  He argued that contextual aspects such as: cultural influences, organisational 
life cycles, and facilitating environments such as times of stress and turbulence are all 
factors that can create a conducive environment for Charismatic Leadership and 
therefore needs to be addressed.  The following section describes the important role of 
the crisis context in which the leadership role exists.  
 
(iii) LEADERSHIP IN CONTEXT 
 
The present study sought to understand how context affects leadership functions in a 
crisis situation. The factors that need to be considered by management in the context of 
a crisis situation include: the follower’s abilities, confidence and motivations; the 
organisation’s structure and culture; the severity of the crisis; and the resources 
available to manage the impact.  Hannah and Parry (2012) advocated that in an extreme 
context such as a crisis, contextualising the leadership process is even more pronounced.  
They highlighted the need for a deeper understanding of the relationships between 
leadership and the contextual factors.  The implications of this research could provide 
leaders with the tools to prepare and operate in extreme contexts.   
 
Klenke (2008) described the scholarship of leadership as context-dependent, which 
reinforced the need for Crisis Leadership research to be grounded in the context of the 
Crisis Management process.  Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, Cavarretta (2009) identified 
the need for leadership research foci into contextual factors and undertook to examine 
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leadership in extreme contexts.  They argued that extreme contexts should be 
differentiated from crisis situations due to the intolerable magnitude of an extreme event 
and its ability to be assessed by High Reliability Organisations (HRO).  For example, 
emergency fire services are able to deal with a fire episode since they can assess its size, 
potential to spread and resolution optimisation.  A crisis situation will also present 
unique contingencies, constraints and causations similar to an extreme event; therefore, 
Hannah et al.’s (2009) ‘extreme context’ definition is also considered appropriate to the 
Red Shirt crisis as follows:  
“an environment where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to 
occur that may exceed the organisation's capacity to prevent and result in an 
extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material 
consequences to—or in close physical or psycho-social proximity to—
organisation members” (p.898). 
 
In addition to the context of a crisis situation, cultural context is also an important 
variable to consider.  The vast array of leadership theories have predominantly been 
devised in relation to Western cultures and were initially developed with little regard for 
context or the situation (Kempster, 2009).  National culture will be further discussed in 
Section 2.5.1.  The context is crucial to establishing the relevance and effectiveness of 
the leadership process that is demonstrated during a crisis event.   
 
Due to the limited research on Crisis Management leadership, the literature review 
focused on the main theories most relevant to Crisis Leadership and their role in 
managing crises.  The two key theories were identified for this thesis as Charismatic and 
Transformational Leadership.  While earlier research suggested that Charismatic 
Leadership can be effective in times of crisis, the more recent nascent research identifies 
Transformational Leadership as the most appropriate leadership style should an 
organisation befall a crisis event.  There is clearly a need for further Crisis Leadership 
research based on the minimal amount of literature available. The following section will 
now explain the notion of Crisis Leadership utilising the relevant leadership studies that 
have been examined. 
 
2.4 CRISIS LEADERSHIP  
 
Effective leadership is necessary during a crisis, not only from the leader of the Crisis 
Management Team, but also from the organisation’s top management (Wooten & 
James, 2008). Since the Crisis Management Team is responsible for dealing with the 
Chapter 2 – Crisis Leadership in Review 
 
44 | P a g e  
crisis at hand, Crandall et al. (2010) suggested that there are three components that 
make Crisis Leadership successful: the right leadership, a structure and resources in 
place to address the crisis, and broad public support for the organisation. Fink (1986) 
stressed that all crisis managers should practice vigilant decision-making, whereby the 
manager will seek and analyse all of the relevant information in an objective manner, 
assimilate the information, and then after analysing all the options available, make a 
decision.  However, Fink’s theory may be unrealistic as there may be a wide spectrum 
of influencing factors that will affect the decision-making process. 
 
2.4.1 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CRISIS LEADERSHIP AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
Leadership actions at the time of a crisis event can contribute to eliminating or 
mitigating a crisis (Fall & Massey, 2005; Klann, 2003).  In one of the few published 
books specifically dedicated to Crisis Leadership, Mitroff (2004a) described the 
difference between Crisis Leadership and Crisis Management as: “Crisis Management is 
primarily reactive.  It addressed crises only after they have happened.  On the other 
hand, Crisis Leadership is proactive. It attempted to identify crises and prepare an 
organisation systemically, i.e., as a whole system, before a major crisis has happened” 
(p.10).   
 
Despite the existing literature, Mitroff (2004) ignored the fact that most Crisis 
Management frameworks incorporate a pre-event phase for planning; therefore, it is 
evident that Crisis Management cannot be considered as only a reactive strategy.  
Mitroff (2004) advocated that organisations need to proactively plan for crises, think the 
unthinkable, and think critically, which he described as a key component of crisis 
leadership. He argued that crises can be avoided if leaders have the ability to think the 
unthinkable. Although managers have the ability to think critically, the challenge is 
whether leaders have the conviction, ability and foresight to engage in crisis planning 
when faced with the demands of their daily business operations.  The notion of planning 
for the unthinkable was explored as a priority for this study. 
 
The phenomenon of crisis encourages even more attention on leadership activities. It is 
only natural that in times of distress an organisation or the community looks to its 
leaders to fix the problem (Boin & Hart, 2003).  At times of crisis people are anxious 
and concerned about how it will affect them and they expect their leaders to take 
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decisive action before the situation worsens (Yukl, 2010). Today’s digital environment 
also exacerbates the pressures facing an organisation and adds another dimension to 
crisis leadership (James et al., 2013; Pang, 2013). Not only is management faced with 
the internal functions of the organisation such as human resource, financial, and 
operational issues, but it must also satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, including 
employees, owners or shareholders, partners, suppliers and the media in a twenty-four-
seven global environment. 
 
During a crisis event, time efficient decisions are critical and often involve decisions 
outside the scope of an organisation’s normal operations.  Reilly (1993) found that 
“numerous scholars have argued that decision-making in crisis differs from routine 
decision-making” (p.119), and there is a significant body of research related to 
organisational crisis response.  Bonn & Rundle-Thiele (2007) posited that decision-
making in a stable environment differs from decision-making during a crisis event, 
where the challenge is to make decisions quickly and accurately. Their findings 
suggested that a more intuitive, less analytical and less consultative approach is more 
likely to characterise strategic decision-making following a crisis event, compared to a 
more co-operative, formal and analytical approach during a stable environment. Pforr 
and Hosie (2010) also argued that unexpected events result in crises requiring specific 
arrangements or actions by the organisation. They cite Reilly (1993) who noted that: 
“effective Crisis Management requires organisational responses which are outside a 
firm’s ordinary repertoire of management activities” (p.255).  
 
2.4.2 CRISIS LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES 
 
In contrast to Bonn & Rundle-Thiele’s (2007) less-consultative approach, Klann (2003) 
utilised the example of the US military’s post-Vietnam war leadership renaissance as 
the solution to effective crisis leadership. The US military identified three key themes: 
communication, clarity of vision and values, and caring relationships.  The ability to 
assess a situation based on past experiences and learned outcomes will enable a 
manager to make more informed decisions. Chatterjee & Pearson (2008) believed that 
past experience in crisis situations can only benefit crisis managers, as they are able to 
address the crisis in a systematic approach and consider options and their strategic 
viabilities. In order to assess a crisis situation, it is imperative that information is shared 
and an existing knowledge base is available. They advocated that information for 
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knowledge building in Crisis Management required a leadership culture that encouraged 
knowledge based Crisis Management preparedness.  
 
A company’s Crisis Management preparedness requires a specific skill set and training 
to address crisis situations.  Hosie (2008) suggested that international businesses are 
more prone to external shocks and therefore require a Crisis Management plan to be 
fully integrated within the company’s operations. The author stressed the need for Crisis 
Leadership competency levels to be developed through the human resource 
management discipline of the company.  Gruman, Chhinzer and Smith (2011) also 
noted the lack of literature related to disaster preparedness in their study of the Canadian 
hospitality industry and recommended further research into the impact of organisational 
characteristics on disaster preparedness.   
 
Yusko and Goldstein (1997) suggested that organisations can avert potentially 
devastating outcomes of a crisis in fostering leadership by selecting and training crisis 
leaders through crisis simulations developed from a Behavioural Crisis Analysis (BCA), 
which identifies: 
1. A crisis leader’s critical tasks and activities in a crisis situation 
2. The competency level and skill set required to successfully address these 
activities 
3. The context in which these activities will be activated 
 
However, crisis simulations cannot fully replicate the full context of some crisis events 
and may provide a misjudged sense of comfort and not address the full extent of the 
crisis or future crisis events.  Yusko and Goldstein (1997) posited that the single most 
critical factor in the successful resolution of a crisis is an effective leader who can 
manage the crisis leadership process.  This process includes preparing the organisation 
for potential crises, identifying the crisis, making decisions, managing the crisis, and 
implementing organisational learning processes to ensure preparation for the next 
possible crisis.  The use of crisis simulations should not be limited to selecting and 
training leaders but should be an integral component of the organisation’s strategic plan, 
training and development. 
 
In response to the paucity of crisis leadership efficacy research, Hadley et al., (2011) 
developed the ‘Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing and Deciding’ scale or C-LEAD 
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scale.  The authors advocated that the C-LEAD scale can predict decision-making levels 
of difficulty and leader confidence better than general leadership and crisis preparedness 
scales.  Their research focused on characteristics that influence crisis leadership 
performance and included two main areas of focus: prior leadership success and 
vicarious crisis experience.  In addition, the study examined outcomes of crisis 
leadership efficacy that included the leader’s motivation to lead in a crisis and their 
performance as measured by their role-taking and decision-making.  C-LEAD is an 
instrument that can assist in evaluating the abilities of the crisis leaders; however its 
self-reporting nature may contribute to self-reporting bias and could weaken the 
effectiveness of this newly posited research tool.  Hadley et al., (2011) have suggested 
that the self-analysis results could be further strengthened by measuring the self-
reporting data with business results and peer or supervisor ratings. 
 
In summary, this section introduced the phenomenon of Crisis Leadership which clearly 
requires a different skill set from the normal day-to-day operations of a business 
environment.  These specific skills required to manage a crisis include such 
competencies as vigilant and time-efficient decision-making, constant two-way 
communication, and advanced Sense-making.  The literature review has highlighted the 
paucity of previous research on Crisis Leadership and the need to investigate this 
phenomenon further.  The researcher investigated the leadership implications of 
preparing (or not preparing) for crises that were inevitable yet predictable. For the 
purpose of advancing the study’s exploration of the research question, the following 
section will review limited extant definitions of Crisis Leadership. 
 
2.4.3 DEFINITION OF CRISIS LEADERSHIP  
 
The successful outcome of a crisis event cannot be attributed to the Crisis Management 
plan alone; it is also determined by an organisation’s Crisis Leadership capabilities, a 
factor that has received little attention in Crisis Management research to date.  
Numerous Crisis Management studies in the extant literature have established the 
phases of a crisis but there is limited research on the Crisis Leadership capabilities 
required (Schoenberg, 2005; Wooten & James, 2008). 
 
Crisis Leadership is not just a Public Relations activity.  Crisis Leaders are the face of 
an organisation and should not rely solely on the corporate communications perspective. 
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Crisis Leadership has to be able to positively influence both internal and external 
stakeholders (James & Wooten, 2005).  James and Wooten (2005) described Crisis 
Leadership as a “process” which requires six core competencies:  
1. Building a foundation of trust 
2. Creating a new corporate mindset 
3. Identifying the (not so) obvious firm vulnerabilities 
4. Making wise and rapid decisions 
5. Taking courageous action 
6. Learning from crisis to effect change 
 
James and Wooten’s (2005) model will be further discussed in Section 2.4.4 in Crisis 
Leadership models; however, it is important to note at this stage that these six core 
competencies had not been linked to the five crisis phases that the same authors utilise 
from Pearson and Mitroff’s (1993) study.  In their 2008 study Wooten and James detail 
Crisis Leadership through a comprehensive approach to dealing with a crisis by defining 
it as: 
“Crisis leadership demands an integration of skills, abilities, and traits that allow 
a leader to plan for, respond to, and learn from crisis events while under public 
scrutiny. In its most ambitious form, Crisis Leadership is also about handling a 
crisis in such a way that the firm is better off after a crisis than it was before” 
(p.353). 
 
Based on their earlier research, Wooten and James (2008) used this definition in 
developing the Phases of Leadership Competencies in Times of Crisis model by linking 
leadership competencies to the crisis event phases.  This leadership flow chart and other 
relevant Crisis Leadership models are analysed in further detail in the next section. 
 
2.4.4 CRISIS LEADERSHIP MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS 
 
As Crisis Leadership research has only recently gained the attention of researchers, the 
extant literature provided limited theoretical models.  Nevertheless, the following 
models and frameworks have been reviewed in order to determine an appropriate model 
for the study of Crisis Leadership in the context of the Thai hotel industry. 
 
Schoenberg’s (2005) Crisis Leadership model identifies four external factors: 
information gathering, external conscience, preparation and experience, and the leader’s 
personal and leadership attributes and values.  These factors are built on a foundation of 
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communications, supported by authenticity and influence.  While this framework 
provides a useful description of a leader’s personal attributes and values, it has been 
developed externally to a Crisis Management framework and bears no relationship to 
the phases of a crisis. As such it is not a relevant model for the present study.  Please 
refer to Appendix 3 for Schoenberg’s (2005) Crisis Leadership model. 
 
It is the leader’s ability to adapt from one environment to another that determines the 
successful outcome of a crisis.  The Crisis Leadership Continuum developed by Muffet-
Willett and Kruse (2009) illustrated the difference required in decision-making between 
normal day-to-day operations and in a crisis situation.  Although the Crisis Leadership 
Continuum in Figure 2.3 depicted the decision-making required in normal and crisis 
situations, it is limited in its adaptability as it fails to relate to specific crisis event 
stages.  Therefore, its application to a study of Crisis Leadership competencies and their 
relationship to a specific stage of a crisis such as Crisis Readiness is limited in its ability 
to integrate into a framework that reflects the crisis stages.   
 
Figure 2.3: Muffet-Willett & Kruse, (2009), Crisis Leadership Continuum 
Source : Muffet-Willett & Kruse, (2009), “Crisis leadership : past research and future directions”  
 
The leader’s crisis experience will create a personal knowledge base so that the leader 
may initiate both reactive and proactive responses with confidence. Wooten & James 
(2008) highlighted the fact that while “prior crisis management research has described 
how crises unfold across various phases, there is virtually no research that identifies the 
knowledge, skills, or abilities necessary to lead an organisation through these phases” 
(p.372).  This reinforced to the researcher that a gap existed in the Crisis Management 
research field in regard to the Crisis Readiness phase and subsequent leadership actions. 
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James and Wooten (2004) first proposed the Crisis Leadership Competency Model, 
which identified six core competencies for effective Crisis Leadership.  Their study also 
incorporated a checklist, “Asking the Right Questions for Each Crisis Phase, Questions 
leaders ask” (see Appendix 4), and provided key questions associated with each crisis 
phase to assist Crisis Leadership in focusing on the actions required to address crisis 
events.  However, these competencies were not linked to specific crisis phases as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4, but they were addressed in their later study.  They have 
therefore failed to use this opportunity to integrate their model with the required 
competencies for the crisis phases. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Crisis Leadership Competency Model 
Source : James and Wooten, (2004), “Leadership in turbulent times; Competencies for thriving 
amidst crisis” 
 
Wooten and James (2008) developed linkages between leadership competencies and 
Crisis Management phases as depicted by the following diagram in Figure 2.5.  
However, their Crisis Leadership competencies from the original model in 2004 were 
not adequately identified in this later model.  Therefore, the present study will adopt the 
combined Crisis Leadership competencies and apply to the Crisis Readiness phases 
noted by Jaques (2007) and Ritchie (2004) as described in Sections 2.2.2 (iv) and 2.2.3 
(ii) respectively. 
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Figure 2.5: Phases of Leadership Competencies in Times of Crisis 
Source: Wooten and James, (2008), “Linking Crisis Management and Leadership Competencies: 
The Role of HR Development” 
 
The present study will provide a linkage between the leadership competencies theory of 
James and Wooten (2004) and Wooten and James’ (2008) studies to the Crisis 
Management models of Jaques (2007) and Ritchie (2004).  The aim is to provide a new 
theoretical model appropriate to the crisis readiness phase.  In addition, the present 
study is grounded in the substantive context of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis in the hotel 
sector.  An examination of the nascent literature with regard to Crisis Leadership in 
tourism will be addressed in the next section. 
 
2.4.5 CRISIS LEADERSHIP IN TOURISM 
 
While the current level of research in business and management studies in the field of 
Crisis Leadership is limited, it is even more so in the tourism sector as evidenced by a 
review of the literature.  The tourism industry is one of the fastest growing industries 
globally and a key growth industry for many developing countries (Robertson et al., 
2006; United Nations, 2013).  It was one of the more resilient industries during the 
Global Financial Crisis with a recorded growth in global tourist arrivals of 4.8% from 
2010 to 2011 (Hajkowicz et al., 2013).  The growth in travel is also expected to increase 
the impacts of the growing crisis events.  Due to the limited body of research and theory 
in the extant literature on Crisis Leadership in tourism, the current study has been 
designed to develop and posit a new theoretical model for managing crises.  The 
substantive theory generation is directed by the need to better understand the influence 
of Crisis Leadership on preparing hotel organisations for potential crisis events. 
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It is evident from the literature review that Crisis Management has been the focus of 
considerable research since the events of September 11th, 2001; however, little attention 
has been given to Crisis Leadership (Klann, 2003), or a linkage with Crisis Management 
models and frameworks. The present study addresses these gaps in the literature and 
will make a positive contribution to the body of knowledge.   
 
The next section considers the role of culture on Crisis Management, specifically 
national and organisational culture and its impact on management processes. 
 
2.5 THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
 
Factors that influence managers’ responses to Crisis Management also include national 
culture and organisational culture. Although national and organisational culture are not 
the focus of this study, they cannot be ignored.  The role of national and organisational 
culture and its influence on management behaviours will be addressed in the following 
section. 
 
Although Crisis Management may be regarded as a reactive process by some (Mitroff, 
2004a), there is clearly evidence that when integrated into an organisation’s strategic 
planning cycle it becomes more of a proactive measure aimed at instilling confidence in 
the managers to be able to deal positively with a crisis event.  However, there is 
evidence that Crisis Management is also influenced by the culture of both national 
characteristics (Campiranon & Scott, 2007; Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008; Elsubbaugh 
et al., 2004; Heath, 1995; Schmidt & Berrell, 2007) and the organisation’s values and 
beliefs (Crandall et al., 2010; Evans & Elphick, 2005; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Preble, 
1997; Pollard & Hotho, 2006).  The role of national and organisational culture and their 
dimensions will be examined further in the next section.  
 
2.5.1 NATIONAL CULTURE 
 
The management of cultural diversity is now a key issue for organisations as a result of 
economic and industrial globalisation, the homogenisation of companies and the 
internationalisation of their organisational cultures (Campiranon & Scott, 2007; 
Elsubbaugh et. al., 2004; Northouse, 2007; Schneider & Meyer, 1991; Wang & Ritchie, 
2010).   
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Based on a review of previous research, the need for an in-depth analysis of the 
influence of national culture on Crisis Management models in developing countries is 
evident (Huang, Lin & Su, 2005). Due to a predominantly western-centric approach to 
Crisis Management, the research to date does not include Crisis Management models 
and strategies developed in the context of Asian countries (Huang et al., 2005). Kim et 
al. (2008) suggested that Crisis Management models “should be tested in order to 
accommodate cultural variations and to revise those components to suit the applicable 
cultures” (p.334). In their study on executive orientation indicators in Crisis 
Management policies and practices, Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin (2003) also 
recommended that extending the scope of future studies to include multicultural 
contexts could contribute significantly to our understanding of how cultural differences 
affect crisis preparedness.  
 
In the event of a crisis, the preparedness and response can differ from one country to 
another. Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney and Pearson (1989) and Pearson and Clair (1998) 
found that culture is perhaps the most important variable in making organisations better 
prepared to manage a crisis. In Middle Eastern cultures, shame and failure are very 
often attached to the notion of crisis, making change to business culture crucial for 
progress in Crisis Management. Elsubbaugh et al. (2004) investigated Crisis 
Management strategies used in the Egyptian cotton textile industry and found that the 
cultural context needs to be considered in order to fully understand an organisation’s 
response to the threat of crisis. Based on empirical evidence, Elsubbaugh et al. (2004) 
proposed a Crisis Management model that integrated elements of Pearson and Mitroff’s 
(1993) and Reilly’s (1993) Crisis Management models.  It also identified new 
dimensions to explain and accommodate behaviour related to Crisis Management in 
non-western countries. The Crisis Preparedness Model (Elsubbaugh et al., 2004) 
identified the General Preparedness Phase, representing the infrastructure of any Crisis 
Management process, where without a supportive culture and strategic preparedness, the 
detection of signals and the Crisis Management phases will not work effectively.  
 
Effective leadership is a key component in managing crises. Ritchie (2009) 
acknowledged that leadership in Crisis Management may be influenced by an 
individual’s cultural background and cites Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) research regarding 
how motivation affects one’s ability to lead. It is widely recognised that cultural 
differences may be responsible for differences in how effective leaders make decisions 
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(Campiranon & Scott, 2007; Elsubbaugh et al., 2004; Wang & Ritchie, 2010).  
However, crisis management and leadership research is derived mainly from Western 
studies and it is evident that national culture has a role to play in crisis leadership 
studies.  As the present study is contextually based in a Thai organisation and 
concentrates on the 2010 Red Shirt crisis, national culture is a dimension that needs to 
be addressed.   
 
(i) HOFSTEDE’S CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 
To understand how a Thai based company reacts to a crisis, it is essential to review the 
literature with regard to cultural influences. As the seminal study in this field, Geert 
Hofstede’s™ Cultural Dimensions (1980) is the natural starting point in this analysis. 
Hofstede (1980) is renowned for his pioneering research on national and organisational 
cultures which began during his employ as an organisational psychologist with IBM.  
He analysed a database of employee’s national values scores between 1967 and 1973, 
collecting 116,000 questionnaires. His research established a framework to understand 
cultural differences and for defining work related values and their influence in the 
workplace, based on the four dimensions: power distance, individualism/ collectivism, 
masculinity/ femininity, and uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede devised the Values Survey 
Model (VSM) to measure if national cultural differences exist.  
 
The first VSM dimension (Hofstede, 1994) is Power Distance which is described as the 
degree to which people accept inequality within a population.  Second, Uncertainty 
Avoidance is described as the degree to which a population prefers structure versus the 
lack of structured situations or ambiguity.  The third dimension, Individualism referred 
to the degree that people prefer to acts as individuals versus as group members. Fourth, 
Masculinity described the degree to which a population prefers male related values such 
as assertiveness, performance, success and competition versus female related values 
such as quality of life, warm close relationships and concern for the vulnerable.  A fifth 
dimension, Long Term Orientation versus Short Term Orientation, was added after 
conducting further research utilising a questionnaire, designed by Chinese scholars. 
 
Hofstede (1980) defined culture as being collective but often intangible. It is what 
distinguishes one group, organisation, or nation from another. Hofstede argued that 
culture consists of two elements: the internal values of culture, which are invisible and 
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external elements of culture, which are more visible and are known as practices. The 
latter included rituals (such as greetings), heroes (such as people or television shows) 
and symbols (such as words and gestures). The cultures of different organisations can be 
distinguished from one another by their practices, while national cultures can be 
differentiated by their values. (Hofstede, 2002).  This is an important factor to consider 
for the purpose of this study, as the Thai national culture will exert an additional 
influence over the activities of the group.  
 
(ii) THAILAND’S CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS  
 
Hofstede (1980) found that Thailand is culturally unique as its two highest rankings are 
equal at 64 (out of 100) on the dimensions of Power Distance (PDI) and Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAI). High PDI reflects a high level of inequality of power and wealth 
within a society (See Figure 2.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 : Geert Hofstede’s™ Cultural Dimensions for Thailand 
 
Thais’ willingness to adhere to norms surrounding seniority and hierarchy is part of 
Thailand’s cultural heritage. At the same time, the equally high UAI dimension suggests 
that Thai society has a low level of tolerance for uncertainty; consequently, they value 
the implementation of strict rules, laws, policies and regulations to minimise risk and 
uncertainty. Based on Hofstede’s theory, Thai society does not accept change easily and 
is very risk adverse (Hofstede, 2009). The lowest finding of the indexes is that of 
Individualism (IDV) at only 20, indicating that Thai society is collectivist as compared 
to individualist. Although Hofstede continued to explain that this manifests in a close 
long term commitment and therefore loyalty to the group, he did not discuss how this 
affects effective and strong leadership.  
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The difficulties of a collectivist culture, as suggested by Heath (1995), are seen in crisis 
and disaster response management where time is too limited for consensus driven 
decision-making processes. He pointed to the response to the Kobe earthquake on 17 
January 1995, which can be understood by analysing the cultural dimensions inherent in 
Japanese community and organisational cultures. Hofstede’s (1980) posited that 
Japanese culture is likely to be collectivist in nature with a large power distance and a 
high need to avoid uncertainty.  As such, fewer individualist actions are likely to be 
made at the time of a crisis event and many leaders/ managers would wait for group 
based responses.  
 
Heath (1995) also deduced that based on Hofstede’s indicators, a Japanese response 
may be slower due to the need for more certainty in the situation.  In his analysis of the 
Kobe earthquake Crisis Management process, Heath (1995) referred to the slow and less 
than optimal Japanese management response to the crisis.  Heath believed that this 
response could be better understood by reviewing Japanese cultural dimensions using 
Hofstede’s theory. According to Heath (1995), Hosfstede’s findings identified a high 
level of collectivism, combined with a high power distance and the need to avoid 
uncertainty in the workforce. These indicators suggest that Japanese bureaucrats 
typically wait until consensus is achieved to make a decision.  Face saving is crucial 
and, as a consequence, response time to a crisis may be slow and time lags may be the 
norm.  
 
Geert Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions also highlighted the fact that Thailand has the 
lowest Masculinity ranking among the Asian countries at 34, compared to the Asian 
average of 53 and the world average of 50 (Hofstede, 2009). This low ranking indicates 
a society that is less assertive and less competitive, in comparison to those countries 
where these values are more important and significant and is illustrated in Figure 2.6.  
 
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimension theory has not gone without critique. One consideration 
about using Geert Hofstede’s™ Cultural Dimensions, as applied to the Thai context, is 
the assurance that Hofstede’s theory is relevant for this case study organisation and 
participants. Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson (2006) reviewed 180 studies related to 
Hofstede’s cultural values framework used in empirical research in management and 
applied psychology fields. While they suggested that Hofstede’s research is fragmented, 
redundant and overly reliant on certain levels of analyses, they ultimately urge future 
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researchers to improve their usage of Hofstede’s framework by looking beyond this 
paradigm and breaking new ground in cross-cultural investigations. Kirkman, et al. 
(2006) posited that large scale studies published since Hofstede’s (1980) work have 
supported, rather than contradicted, Hoftede’s findings.  
 
Campiranon and Scott (2007) examined the socio-cultural and organisational concepts 
that influenced Crisis Management in tourism destinations.  Their research indicated 
that researchers who have used Hofstede’s survey instrument have verified it as being 
valid and reliable and that most of the national differences identified by Hofstede were 
supported. Research by Campiranon and Scott (2007) confirmed the reliability of 
Hofstede’s dimensions of national cultural differences because of its cited reliability and 
validity. They also suggested that further research is needed to investigate the 
relationship between national culture and Crisis Management, and recommended the 
use of case studies based on Hofstede-like analytical frameworks to investigate if 
national culture affects decision-making. 
 
(iii) GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR EFFECTIVENESS 
(GLOBE) 
 
In addition to Hofstede’s (1980) study, one of the most extensive studies focusing on 
culture and leadership was the Project GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organisational 
Behaviour Effectiveness) model, compiled based on a dataset of 17,000 managers from 
61 countries (House, Javidan, Hanges & Dorfman, 2002, Yukl, 2010) utilising 170 
Country Co-investigators.  
 
GLOBE researchers defined organisational leadership as “the ability of an individual to 
influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute towards the effectiveness and 
success of the organisations of which they are members” (House et al., 2002, p.5).  
GLOBE was initiated by House, Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, Dorfman, Javidan, Dickson 
and Gupta (1999) and morphed into 9 cultural dimensions from Hofstede’s (1980) 
cultural dimensions, which provided the foundation for the first six GLOBE cultural 
dimensions.  It is one of the most ambitious leadership studies ever undertaken and is 
still considered a work in progress (Jackson & Parry, 2011). 
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The GLOBE dimensions comprised of nine cultural dimensions and six leadership 
dimensions (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2009): Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, 
Collectivism I: Societal Collectivism, Collectivism II: In-Group Collectivism, Gender 
Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Performance Orientation and 
Humane Orientation.  While the aim of GLOBE was to develop empirically based 
theory which described relationships between societal and organisational culture and 
leadership using an extensive dataset, the findings have not been replicated to the same 
degree as Hofstede’s (1980) original study. 
 
GLOBE combined Implicit Leadership Theory with Hofstede’s work and identified 
effective leader attributes that rated similarly across cultures: Visionary, Decisive, 
Dynamic, Dependable, Encouraging and Positive, Excellence-oriented, Honest and 
Trustworthy, Skilled Administrator and Team Integrator.  It also identified leadership 
attributes that varied across cultures: Ambitious, Cautious, Compassionate, 
Domineering, Formal, Humble (self-effacing), Independent, Risk taker and Self-
sacrificing (Yukl, 2010).   
 
In an increasingly global business environment socio-cultural phenomena can be 
predicted by using GLOBE’s cultural dimensions. Javidan & Dastmalchia (2009) 
identified managerial implications based on the GLOBE leadership dimensions: cultural 
sensitivity, HR practices and managing under uncertain conditions with the aim to 
develop global leader-managers. 
 
Yukl (2010) argued that one of the most important findings of the GLOBE project was 
the effective leader attributes and the extent to their uniformity and variance across 
cultures.  The cultural beliefs about leadership attributes were categorised by their 
uniformity and variance across cultures and are shown in Table 2.3.   
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Table 2.3: Cultural Beliefs about Ideal Leader Attributes 
Cultural Beliefs about Ideal Leader Attributes 
Rated effective in most cultures Ratings varied across cultures 
Visionary Ambitious 
Decisive Cautious 
Dynamic Compassionate 
Dependable  Domineering 
Encouraging and positive Formal 
Excellence-oriented Humble (self-effacing) 
Honest and trustworthy Independent 
Skilled administrator Risk Taker 
Team integrator Self-sacrificing 
 
 Source: Yukl (2010) Leadership in Organisations (p.459) adapted from Dorfman et al., (2004) 
 
Jackson and Parry (2011) outlined the ongoing debate between the GLOBE researchers, 
their critics and Hofstede. They argued that there are issues with the survey instrument 
and the findings including sampling representativeness and cross-cultural translation 
challenges.  A discussion on cross-cultural leadership research cannot ignore the 
GLOBE project; however, it is criticised due to its US centricity with regard to the 
survey format and content.  This reduces its relevance within the Asian context (Jackson 
& Parry, 2011). 
 
An important element in crisis planning is the recognition that national culture provides 
the foundation from which responses to crises can be studied (Prideaux, 2009). Schmidt 
and Berrell’s research (2007) confirmed Hofstede’s theory that Western societies tend 
to place greater value on universal principles and short term relationships. Alternatively, 
decision-making in an Asian context is hierarchical and based on seniority, leading to 
barriers for junior staff to make rapid independent decisions when faced with a crisis. In 
contrast, in Western cultures and low context countries such as the U.S.A. or Australia, 
independent decision-making is more acceptable and there is less need for approval 
from senior management (Heath, 1995; Schmidt & Berrell, 2007).  Yukl (2010) also 
highlighted the increasing cultural diversity in the workforce today. 
 
National culture and Crisis Management have only recently become a focus of tourism 
based Crisis Management research. Campiranon and Scott (2007) suggested that even 
though organisational culture is often believed to be homogeneous; in fact, regional and 
national cultural factors influence how individuals react to crises. Schmidt and Berrell 
(2007) posited that utilising Western Crisis Management practices in an Eastern context 
can be problematic.  They put forward an argument to support the discussion that crisis 
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responses are influenced by one’s national culture. For example, Schmidt and Berrell 
(2007) referred to the status-bound decision-making processes in many Asian countries 
where seniority typically determines responsibility for making decisions in times of 
crises. This hierarchical model may be valued, but it can impede efficient responses to 
an emergency (Campiranon & Scott, 2007; Heath, 1995; Schmidt & Berrell, 2007).  It is 
important to highlight a research gap with regard to a lack of Crisis Management studies 
in an Asian context.  This lack of research is also compounded specifically with regard 
to hotel companies, which employ a cross-section of managers from various cultural 
backgrounds.  
 
A review of Crisis Management research suggests that little previous research has 
focused on Crisis Management strategies used within the international hotel industry. 
Mwaura, Sutton and Roberts’ (1998) study investigated the influence and effects of 
national culture on the work environment of an international hotel company, ITT 
Sheraton, operating in the People’s Republic of China. They studied the effects of 
western corporate culture assimilation and concluded that a strong national culture will 
have a major influence on the workplace. Mwaura et al., (1998) identified a divergence 
in national and corporate culture based on the influence of Confucianism in Chinese 
culture, which resulted in challenges for management. However, this research did not 
address Crisis Management issues and further highlights the need for research in Crisis 
Management in the Asian context.  
 
In addition to national culture, the organisation’s culture must also be considered and 
will now be discussed in the following section.  Although this is an extensive subject to 
introduce at this stage and while it is not the focus of this study; it is a component that 
needs to be addressed before moving forward since the study is based on a multi-level 
and multi-location business organisation. 
 
2.5.2 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
 
In order to investigate the influence of national culture on Crisis Management, it is 
important to also understand the impact of organisational culture in the context of Crisis 
Management decision-making. Hofstede (1994) posited that there is a distinct difference 
between national culture and organisational or corporate culture. He argued that 
organisational membership can be short-term, but national membership is permanent. 
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He further argued that employees’ national values cannot be changed; however, their 
organisational culture can change as it is comprised of practices rather than values.  
 
The culture of an organisation reflects the emotional belief system of its management; 
this can either facilitate or hinder Crisis Management planning and operation (Pearson 
& Mitroff, 1993). Mitroff et al. (1989) defined the culture of an organisation as: “the set 
of articulated largely unconscious beliefs, values, norms and fundamental assumptions 
that the organisation makes about itself, the nature of people in general and its 
environment” (p.271). Mitroff et al.’s (1989) study was designed to investigate the 
effects of corporate culture on Crisis Management. They advocated that the culture of 
an organisation is one of the most important variables in analysing an organisation’s 
Crisis Management actions and determining their crisis prone or crisis preparedness 
status. Kim et al. (2008) argued that organisational culture plays a central role in 
affecting the way that members in an organisation behave. Even though organisational 
culture may influence the internal environment, organisations are heavily influenced by 
the societal culture in which they operate (Sriramesh & White 1992). Implications from 
Kim et al.’s study (2008) suggested that Crisis Management models need to be further 
tested to accommodate cultural variations.  
 
Crisis Planning is an important resource in the strategic management toolkit for 
managers; however, this is not a priority shared by all managers.  A cultural shift may 
be required in order for an organisation to adopt an organisational culture of crisis 
preparedness (Crandall et al., 2010). Crandall et al. (2010) posit that each organisation 
has its own unique culture and companies within the same industry may approach 
situations differently. They recommended that managers focus on developing and 
supporting crisis-prepared cultures in their organisations.  They found that innovative 
firms undertake the planning necessary to prevent a crisis through the creation of Crisis 
Management Teams, Crisis Management Plans, and emergency drills to help the 
organisation prepare and manage crises in the most effective manner. 
 
Organisational culture has been discussed only briefly in the literature review as there 
are more pre-eminent issues that have been considered for this study.  However, it 
cannot be ignored entirely in regard to the setting for this study since organisational 
culture has been established as having an influence on crisis management efficacy. 
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2.6 THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Based on a review of the extant literature, one aim of the present study is to posit a new 
theoretical contribution to explain the Crisis Leadership core capabilities required 
during the Crisis Readiness and Prevention stages of the Crisis Management process.  
The theoretical development draws from Jaques (2007) and Ritchie’s (2004) 
frameworks.  While James and Wooten (2004) and Wooten and James’ (2008) Crisis 
Leadership Competency Model identifies specific competencies, it has no linkage to any 
Crisis Management model or framework in relation to the identification of the 
leadership capabilities required at different stages of a crisis event. Taking into account 
the aforementioned theoretical models developed by Jaques (2007) and Ritchie (2004), 
this study provides a linkage to Wooten & James’ (2004 & 2008) Crisis Leadership 
competencies models to create a new model appropriate during the Crisis Readiness 
phase. 
 
Minimal research has focused specifically on the substantive context of how the Thai 
hotel sector approaches crisis readiness with the majority of studies dedicated to a 
Western environment.  The present study analyses Crisis Leadership from an Asian 
perspective, specifically the Thai business context.  At the same time, additional 
exploration of the impact of the hotel manager’s prior experience is needed to 
understand how hotel managers approach their Crisis Readiness.   While the research 
focuses on the Crisis Readiness of one hotel company, the findings of this study will 
offer implications for Crisis Leadership across a broad spectrum of industry sectors.  
The present study responded to the identified need for further academic research about 
how hotel managers respond in a crisis situation and what factors influence their 
approach to crisis management readiness.  
As discussed previously, we know little about how Crisis Leadership influences its 
Crisis Management readiness. In order to close this gap, the primary research question 
guiding this study was: 
 
How does Crisis Leadership influence Crisis Management readiness in the  
Thai hotel Industry? 
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The sub-questions underpinning the primary question are:  
 What level of importance do hotel managers place on crisis management 
planning, response and evaluation? 
 How does organisational culture influence crisis management planning and 
response? 
 How applicable are Western based Crisis Management frameworks to the 
Thai Crisis Leadership context? 
 
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter Two sought to identify relevant literature related to the primary research 
question; How does crisis leadership influence crisis management readiness in the Thai 
hotel industry? While the extant literature provided a better understanding of the issues 
under consideration, it also highlighted theoretical gaps and encouraged the researcher 
to pursue issues pertaining to Crisis Readiness and Crisis Leadership with the potential 
to develop new substantive theory.  The key topics underpinning this thesis examined in 
this chapter included, defining crisis, crisis management theoretical frameworks, crisis 
leadership and relevant leadership theory, as well as the role of national and 
organisation culture and its relationship to crisis leadership. 
 
The interchangeability of the terms crisis and disaster was addressed.  The selected 
definition of crisis is “an unexpected event for an organisation that resulted in chaos and 
required urgent and decisive action”.  Crisis Management theory was examined and 
relevant tourism crisis management models were discussed, with a focus on the crisis 
readiness phase.  It is evident in previous studies that the crisis prevention and 
preparation phases have received minimal attention in comparison to the crisis incident 
and post crisis phases.  Moreover, the extant literature is characterised by US or 
Western-centric studies. 
 
This chapter also provided an overview of relevant leadership theory and illuminated 
the nascent state of current crisis leadership research. Charismatic and Transformational 
Leadership were identified due to their positive influence at a time of crisis.  While 
examples of crisis leadership theory were identified in the literature review, they failed 
to provide a link between crisis management frameworks, or describe their importance 
to successful crisis event outcomes.  In addition, the role of national culture was 
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identified as influencing factors on Crisis Leadership efficacies; however, it has 
received little consideration in the existing Crisis Leadership research studies.  
 
Chapter Three will now outline the research design adopted with an explanation of the 
research methodology including; the research philosophy from a grounded theory 
perspective, the setting for the study, data collection methods, ethical considerations and 
the de-limitations of the present study.   
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CHAPTER 3   RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA 
COLLECTION  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The review of the extant literature on Crisis Leadership in Chapter Two concluded that 
there is a gap in our current knowledge about Crisis Leadership and its influence on 
Crisis Readiness.  Chapter Three will provide an outline of the research methodology 
used in this empirical study that guided the data collection and analysis.  To accomplish 
this, the chapter includes an introduction of qualitative research design in leadership 
studies, followed by a discussion on the rationale for employing a Grounded Theory 
single case design.  This will provide an introduction for the next section which 
incorporates the justification for a single, multi-dimensional case approach within a 
multi-unit organisation. In addition, an explanation about the setting and access for the 
study will be provided. The chapter will also provide an outline of the methods utilised, 
specifically highlighting the use of in-depth interviews as the primary data collection 
method; secondary data sources will also be discussed.    
 
By embracing a predominantly qualitative study design, an interpretivist philosophy has 
been adopted utilising an exploratory design strategy. Data triangulation was achieved 
through qualitative analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews, an on-line survey 
and secondary data sources.  Detail relating specifically to the interview and online 
survey data collection and analysis will be outlined in this chapter with the study’s 
findings presented subsequently in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  A more in-depth 
explanation and justification of the research design and philosophy is provided in this 
chapter. 
 
This chapter will also describe Grounded Theory’s data coding process, which begins 
with substantive coding and progresses to higher level abstract theoretical coding.  The 
key principals of Grounded Theory were employed throughout the data collection and 
analysis processes and included the constant comparative method, theoretical sampling, 
theoretical coding, theoretical memos and theoretical sorting.  The purpose of using 
Grounded Theory was to explore the basic social processes involved in crisis leadership 
and an organisation’s state of crisis readiness and to identify substantive theory in the 
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field of crisis leadership.  This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the ethical 
considerations and de-limitations of this study.   
 
IN CONTEXT: CRISIS LEADERSHIP RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Since the research enquiry focused on leadership, the researcher sought the most 
appropriate research methodology which would provide the key to unlock rich insights 
and perspectives.  The study focused on leadership in the context of both a specialised 
role and a shared influence process in the context of a hotel company, its business units 
and the corporate headquarter offices across all management levels.  Popper (2002) 
described leadership as being comprised of leaders, followers and the context in which 
relationships are formed.  The leadership relationship is characterised by the conscious 
and unconscious desires of leaders and followers in their interactions, in a dynamic 
timeline of events, and within a diverse context dependent upon the social, ideological, 
cultural and technological environments.  
 
It is this dynamic context that required the research to go beyond the laboratory’s 
experimental design bias to a contextually based research design.  A quantitative 
approach generalises a dataset’s frequency to satisfy a hypothetical need; in contrast a 
qualitative approach was adopted as the most significant part of this research, aimed at 
developing theory from the Crisis Leadership phenomenon in order to answer the 
research question. 
 
Traditional leadership research has been dominated by statistical studies that are 
published as valid research because of their robustness (Kempster, 2009).  Quantitative 
methods require large sample sizes, but they provide the development of causal models 
and the convenience of replicability; however, they do not provide an in-depth 
understanding of the leaders’ or followers’ perceptions during significant events and the 
success or failure of those event outcomes (Klenke, 2008).   
 
Due to the unique nature of crisis events, situational leadership highlights the necessity 
to assume a specific contextually-based qualitative research approach.  By using a 
qualitative methodology, the research will uncover the social processes that operate 
within a crisis situation and provide valuable insight into the relatively new field of 
Crisis Leadership research.  Kempster (2009) argued that “through qualitative research 
we can begin to reveal how contextualised leadership practice develops and understand 
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how individual leaders and followers learn how to enact these leadership processes” 
(p.47). 
 
Context is crucial in determining the relevance and effectiveness of the leadership 
process being demonstrated.  It cannot be assessed in a vacuum, or by seeking empirical 
results from a group of university students in order to satisfy a ‘scientific’ result, or for 
further replication purposes.  Liden and Antonakis (2009) suggested that:  
“given the dynamic and multi-faceted socio-environmental context in which 
leadership occurs, one cannot simply study leadership as one would simple 
chemical reactions, where ingredients can be added and subtracted at will and 
where there is complete experimental control” (p.1594).  
 
It is evident from the literature that Crisis Management research requires a greater 
insight into the contextual experiences of the crisis phenomenon.  From these 
experiences, leadership processes can be analysed and explained, and as a consequence 
provide a basis for the study’s theoretical development.  Since the contextual issues of 
Crisis Management and Crisis Leadership heavily influence the choice of research 
methodology, Grounded Theory design was selected as most relevant to achieve theory 
generation (Parry, 1998).  The value of Grounded Theory will be explained in more 
detail in Section 3.1.1. 
 
Grounded Theory guided the study using semi structured in-depth interviews as the 
main data source in the first iteration phase of data collection.  This was followed by a 
second iteration of interviews based on theoretical sampling and follow up interviews 
with key informants from the first iteration phase of interviews.  At the same time, the 
constant comparative method of Grounded Theory encouraged constant reflection and 
induction of the primary and secondary data sources to tease out thematic concepts as 
the emergent theory developed.  The data collection phases and concurrent analysis will 
be further described in more detail in Section 3.1.4 on Grounded Theory methodology.  
 
This research study utilised a single case study of a multi-unit, multi-level hotel 
organisation based on the substantive context of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis to explore the 
research question.  The justification for a single case study is explained in Section 3.1.5.  
The research methodology explanation now commences with an introduction of the 
study design philosophy.  
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3.1 THE STUDY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
 
The research philosophy embraced for this study can be described as the development 
of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Saunders, et.al, 2009).  This research 
was viewed concurrently through ontological and epistemological lenses at the 
beginning of the research journey.  From the perspective of the ontological lens, where 
we view the nature of reality, this study took a position of subjectivism whereby a social 
phenomenon is created from the perceptions and consequent actions of the participants 
or actors (Jennings, 2010; Saunders et al., 2009).  Looking through the epistemology 
lens where we view what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study, this 
research adopted an intrepretivist view.   
 
The debate between the value of qualitative versus quantitative research has been well 
documented, especially in the formative years of developing sound and rigorous 
qualitative research techniques (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004; Klenke, 2008; Kumar, 2011; Losch, 2006; Veal, 2006).  Quantitative loyalists 
maintain a negative attitude about qualitative research.  They often fail to acknowledge 
that rich and compelling findings can be derived from a qualitative approach (Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
 
DeLyser, Herbert, Aitken, Crang and McDowell (2010) described qualitative 
researchers as being the research instrument that collects data, filters feelings, 
experiences and analyses field activities and challenges personal understandings.  They 
work with (not on) the communities that they study, giving voice to those being 
researched. Qualitative research which is theoretically and methodologically 
sophisticated has now challenged the quantitative episteme paradigm (DeLyser et al., 
2010).  Although the debate continues, qualitative research is no longer seen as 
exceptional or in need of special justification. Its acceptance is growing steadily (Veal, 
2006).   
 
The present study on Crisis Leadership explicitly explored the emic view from an 
insider’s perspective. In describing their comparative view of the qualitative versus 
quantitative researcher DeLyser et al. (2010) stated that “qualitative research places the 
researcher in and amongst the findings, rather than deploying the scientised rhetoric of 
the disembodied, neutral and detached observer” (p.6).  Research in the social sciences, 
and specifically in leadership, has been historically based on the objectivist, positivist, 
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quantitative paradigm and the academic discipline of leadership has accounted for a 
myriad of empirical studies, theory, texts and journal articles.   
 
While quantitative research includes numeric explanations, it does not provide a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenonological structures under study (Klenke, 2008).  It is 
this approach to leadership studies through which the researcher embraced a qualitative 
research design for the present study’s methodology.  The researcher was influenced by 
Klenke’s (2008) position that: “Qualitative leadership studies, when conducted with the 
same degree of rigour and concern for validity and quality, have several distinct 
advantages over quantitative approaches by offering more opportunities to explore 
leadership phenomena in significant depth” (p.5). 
 
As the context of this study was the phenomenon of Crisis Leadership, one of the aims 
was to seek to understand reality, and build theory.  Since this research study sought to 
understand how leadership capabilities and experience in crises influences Crisis 
Readiness, the inductive approach of Grounded Theory is accepted as a common 
strategy to explore management issues (Saunders et al., 2009).  The following section 
will detail the study’s Grounded Theory design. 
 
3.1.1 GROUNDED THEORY  
 
Qualitative research shares the inductive approach with research methods that include; 
ethnography, oral history and participant observation.  These methods deal with people, 
places and events and the explanations derived through the extant literature.  In contrast, 
Grounded Theory seeks to discover emergent theory from reality and conceptualises 
data, taking the level of thought to a higher level (Glaser, 1978).  For this reason, 
Grounded Theory was selected as a key differentiator from other qualitative methods in 
establishing theory and contributing to the body of knowledge.   
 
Many scholars of leadership research have elevated Grounded Theory as a research 
technique due to its ability to produce a social theory from leadership’s social, 
contextual, processual and relational elements (Kempster & Parry, 2011).  Grounded 
Theory design was applied in the current research based on the premise that theory 
emerges and is extrapolated from ‘grounded’ data which is collected from field research 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2005) and includes the perspectives and voices of those being 
studied.  Kempster and Parry’s (2011) critical realist perspective using Grounded 
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Theory generated credible descriptions through Sense-making of actions and words to 
build theory.  The critical realist approach to Grounded Theory research by Kempster 
and Parry (2011) has been cited and often supported in subsequent research (Mabey, 
2013; Whitely, 2012; Zhang, Fu, Xi, Li, Xu, Cao & Ge, 2012)  The backstory debate to 
Grounded Theory and the particular methodology chosen is further explained in this 
section.   
 
The use of Grounded Theory methodology delivers a level of authenticity to leadership 
research from which new theoretical perspectives can be uncovered.  It is with this 
approach in mind that a successful theoretical outcome was anticipated.  Eisenhardt 
(1989) found that “intimate interaction with actual evidence often produces theory 
which closely mirrors reality” (p.547).  Locke (1996) described the characteristics of 
Grounded Theory as: closely fitting the substantive topic being researched; being 
understandable and usable by the organisation being studied; and being sufficiently 
complex to explain a significant portion of the variation in the area of study.  
 
Although classic Grounded Theory commences with no pre-formed notions in mind, it 
seeks to uncover patterns and contradictions throughout the data gathering phase (Veal, 
2006).  Grounded Theory requires the researcher to be familiar with the data, the 
participants and the cultural context of the research (Hardy, 2005).  As Veal (2006) 
suggested, “The process is a complex and personal one” (p.197). In this context the 
researcher is in a unique position as an applied expert in this discipline to study the 
research topic and provide new insights.  The researcher’s passion and inspiration to 
discover a theoretical concept for the chosen research question can be best explained by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) who stated; “the touchstone of one’s own experience might 
be a more valuable indicator of a potentially successful research endeavour than another 
more abstract source” (p.38). 
 
The role of the researcher as the primary data collection instrument dictates full 
disclosure of any biases, personal opinions and assumptions at the beginning of this 
study in Chapter 1, Section 1.7.  Rather than being a negative influence, the researcher’s 
personal experiences are valuable in identifying concepts based on a higher level of 
theoretical sensitivity.  Perceptions of Crisis Readiness and the influence of Crisis 
Leadership have shaped the personal experiences of the researcher, who lived through 
crisis events in Asia from 2001-2011 including; tsunamis, SARS, Bali bombings and 
Thai political protests.  The senior management roles held by the researcher in 
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Singapore and Bangkok during this period provided first-hand knowledge of Crisis 
Leadership expertise.  Due to the researcher’s previous experience working in the case 
study organisation at a senior level, biases are inevitable but the researcher made every 
effort to ensure objectivity in the way the data were collected and interpreted.  The use 
of multiple data sources with Grounded Theory’s constant comparative method 
enhanced the validity of the substantive theory (Parry 1998).  In addition, the researcher 
invited the informants to review the developing emergent theoretical concepts, which 
assisted in mitigating researcher bias. 
 
The researcher engaged in critical, personal self-reflection.  This process allowed the 
researcher to create new perspectives when chronicling her own “Reflections and 
Recollections” of the May 2010 Red Shirt crackdown; this narrative process of 8,000 
words also assisted in identifying additional subjects, thematic concepts and core 
categories for the final phase of interviews.  It was also a cathartic review that ensured 
the researcher’s insider position was kept as objective as possible and delivered an 
honest account of the events and relationships as they unfolded.  The following 
narrative by the researcher highlighted the emotional turmoil of the responsibilities 
undertaken at the time of the Red Shirt crisis; “There were no preparations for any 
contingencies should the violence escalate, which seemed to be an unthinkable 
possibility, but now in hindsight, how wrong we all were.”   
 
Grounded Theory also encourages self-learning and self-reflection of the actors during 
the interview data collection process.  It allows the participants an opportunity to 
consider issues that may need addressing and provides a means to create value for the 
individuals and the organisation as a whole (Roberts, 2002).  One of the interviewees 
responded to the question on the company’s crisis plan explaining that by engaging in 
the interview process it had alerted her to the need for a simple crisis plan and raised 
other questions in her mind:  
“I think looking at the crisis management, what we have right now and just 
talking to you right now, I feel that there should be a communication, easy, 
simple, one page plan that should be shared within the team..…… again while 
I’m talking I’m questioning how does it relate to the staff?  ......... how did it 
relate to the whole staff, 700 staff, I don’t know.  They have to rely on the 
department managers or the Excoms.” 
The notion of self-learning and self-reflection by both the actors and the researcher 
became an important unanticipated outcome of the research study.  It also reinforced the 
researcher’s quest to explore how Crisis Leadership influences successful Crisis 
Management outcomes.  
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Grounded Theory has been subject to criticism related to the labour intensity of the data 
collection process, analysis and its inability to predict (Hardy, 2005; Saunders et al., 
2009).  However, the iterative, inductive nature of the methodology encouraged the 
generation of new theory which was one of the main aims of this study.  The researcher 
chose Grounded Theory by using a substantive context that could examine the nature of 
Crisis Leadership to generate theory.  From a personal viewpoint, the researcher sought 
to bridge the substantive community with a theoretical concept that could be applied to 
future crisis management situations.  Egan (2002) identified a salient link existed 
between theory and practice, which further enhanced the study’s contribution to the 
body of knowledge.  Utilising a substantive context involved the participant’s own lived 
experiences, reflections and world views; building a rich and compelling case for the 
theoretical concepts as they developed.  Involving the participants in validating the core 
themes was integral to the Grounded Theory process and added to the inclusiveness and 
engagement of the research participants.   
 
In addition, Parry (1998) highlighted an important component of Grounded Theory is 
the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher towards emergent theory.  In essence, “one 
must know what it is that one is observing or quoting” (Parry, 1998, p.93).  This was a 
key element of the researcher’s immersion in this topic based on the insider approach, 
having lived the experience and therefore sensitive to the developing themes from the 
study. 
 
Due to the lack of Crisis Leadership research and theory in Crisis Management studies, 
Grounded Theory was deemed the best fit to explore and uncover the influence of Crisis 
Leadership on an organisation’s Crisis Readiness (Hardy, 2005; Kensbock & Jennings, 
2011).  Kempster and Parry (2011) posited that Grounded Theory was most relevant to 
researching leadership processes within distinct or unique processes, such as extreme 
crisis events.  Having introduced Grounded Theory, it is noted that this method has not 
been without controversy. As such some of the issues associated with Grounded Theory 
are now addressed in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 GROUNDED THEORY CHALLENGES AND STRENGTHS  
 
Grounded Theory as a methodological approach is portrayed as confusing, conflicting 
and complicated in some academic circles (Egan, 2002; Locke, 1996; Suddaby, 2006; 
Thomas & James, 2006).  While some of these issues were considered when choosing 
the research methodology, Grounded Theory was selected as the most practical method 
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to conduct research that was aimed at exploring and analysing the social processes at 
play for the purpose of generating substantive theory.  Egan (2002) supported this 
direction since the connection between theory and practice is one of the most salient 
links of Grounded Theory research. 
 
As described earlier, Grounded Theory is inductive and as its title implies, it is built 
from the ground up; exploring, understanding and conceptualising theory generation.  In 
contrast to a deductive approach that applies established theory on the data.  The 
researcher’s insider position provided the platform to study what is really going on and 
how the actors see the world in the context of a unique crisis event.  This motivated the 
researcher further to discover emergent theory to explain the problem of crisis 
readiness.  Therefore, Grounded Theory was determined to be the most practical method 
for this research problem. 
 
Within the Grounded Theory literature there are conflicting views about when the 
literature review should be conducted.  This research study adopted an integrated 
approach between the empirical data and the extant literature to ensure the theory 
development was contributing to new knowledge. Connell and Lowe (1997) argued that 
the substantive literature should not be reviewed first but at a point when the inductive 
process has largely been completed.  Suddaby (2006) argues that this is a serious 
misreading of the seminal texts on Grounded Theory and advises researchers to be 
careful not to be influenced by pre-existing conceptualisations in the field, or force the 
researcher into hypothesis testing.  Suddaby (2006) identified six misconceptions about 
Grounded Theory as follows:   
1. It is not an excuse to ignore the literature,  
2. It is not a presentation of raw data but elicits information to take the data to a 
higher level of abstraction of theoretical concepts,  
3. It is not theory testing, content analysis or word counts.  
4. It is not a mechanical technique but has a clear creative component in its 
interpretative process and uses the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity to tease out 
theoretical concepts, 
5. It is not perfect but is a pragmatic approach to assist researchers in examining 
complex social processes, 
6. It is not easy and it depends on the researcher’s sensitivities through the 
interpretative process.   
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High-quality Grounded Theory research is attributable to a number of factors including 
a commitment to developing the theoretical concept and the empirical site (Suddaby, 
2006).  Employing a Grounded Theory methodology for the present study was an 
insightful experience that allowed the researcher’s intuitive skills and insider’s 
knowledge to become an important component of the research process. The researcher’s 
past tenure with the case study organisation also provided a smooth introduction to the 
interview plan, commencing from the introductory rapport-building of the interview, to 
explaining the purpose of the research study.  Based on this insider approach, the 
subsequent dialogue on the research topics for discussion with the interviewees flowed 
openly and freely in a non-threatening environment.  
 
In adopting a Grounded Theory approach, the researcher needs to ensure a coherent 
practice of inquiry by utilising its key operational indicators and processes (Locke, 
1996).  Otherwise it will be difficult to evaluate the research processes and findings.  
Although Connell and Lowe (1997) highlighted the challenges for novice Grounded 
Theory researchers, they recommended that first-time researchers consider the time, the 
cumbersome data analysis techniques, and the intuitive sensitivities that are required 
before they select this method. Charmaz (2006) argued the benefits of Grounded Theory 
methods, highlighting their potential for flexibility and versatility.  Charmaz (2006) also 
suggested that evaluating Grounded Theory entails Glaser’s (1978) key criteria’s of fit, 
work, relevance and modifiability, as well as evaluating by credibility, originality, 
resonance and usefulness and the study’s scholarly contribution.   
 
When these challenges were taken into consideration, the researcher concluded that the 
advantages of Grounded Theory methodologies far outweighed the alternative 
qualitative or quantitative methodologies.  The advantages included; the intuitive nature 
of Grounded Theory, its flexibility, the systematic approach to data analysis, using rich 
and in-depth data sources and ultimately theory generation.   The substantive Grounded 
Theory presented in the present study will be judged with confidence on its fit with 
reality and how the social processes explain variations in behaviour (Connell & Lowe, 
1997). However, Grounded Theory is not without its controversy; it has polarised 
qualitative researchers who take either the classical ‘Glaserian’ or the revised neo 
‘Straussian’ approach.  The well-documented debate about the two key approaches is 
briefly explained in the next section. 
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3.1.3 DIVERGENT DIRECTIONS – GLASER VERSUS STRAUSS 
 
The divergent views and ensuing debate about Grounded Theory methodology has 
divided the domain of grounded theorists for more than twenty-five years (Charmaz, 
2006; Egan, 2002, Hardy, 2005; Locke, 1996).  Glaser and Strauss were credited with 
discovering and formulating Grounded Theory in their seminal work titled “The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory” (1967).  However, their researching partnership 
deteriorated with Strauss’ publication of “Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists” 
(1987) followed by Strauss and Corbin’s follow-up book “Basics of Qualitative 
Research” (1990).   
 
The Strauss and Corbin work reinforced the divergent perspectives of Glaser and 
Strauss.  In response, an enraged Glaser refuted their version of Grounded Theory in 
“The Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis” (1992) which reinforced the original 
Grounded Theory methodology (Jones & Alony, 2011).  Glaser used this publication to 
implore Strauss to rescind his version and return to the original philosophies of 
Grounded Theory (Ng & Hase, 2008).  In the interim, the debate has stimulated a 
plethora of publications on the acrimonious split between the co-authors, and a number 
of researchers have sought to reinvent the original Grounded Theory (Thomas & James, 
2006).   
This present study does not permit a complete analysis of the conflicting views.  
Nevertheless, these divergent views compel the researcher to state the Grounded Theory 
approach selected.  The two fundamental schools are described as either ‘Glaserian’ or 
‘Straussian’, and the key differences in Grounded Theory methodology are summarised 
by Onions (2006) in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Onion’s (2006) “Key differences in Grounded Theory approaches” 
 
 
Glaserian  
 
 
Straussian 
Beginning with general wonderment (an 
empty mind) 
Having a general idea where to begin 
Emerging theory, with neutral questions Forcing the theory, with structured questions 
Development of a neutral theory Conceptual description (description of 
situations) 
Theoretical sensitivity (the ability to 
perceive variables and relationships) 
comes from immersion in the data 
Theoretical sensitivity comes from methods 
and tools 
The theory is grounded in the data  The theory is interpreted by an observer 
The credibility of the theory, or 
verification, is derived from its 
grounding in the data 
The credibility of the theory comes from the 
rigour of the method 
A basic social process should be 
identified  
Basic social processes need not be identified 
The researcher is passive, exhibiting 
disciplined restraint 
The researcher is active 
Data reveals the theory Data is structured to reveal the theory 
Coding is less rigorous, a constant 
comparison of incident to incident, with 
neutral questions and categories and 
properties evolving. Take care not to 
‘over-conceptualise’, identify key points 
Coding is more rigorous and defined by 
technique.  The nature of making comparisons 
varies with the coding technique.  Labels are 
carefully crafted at the time.  Codes are 
derived from ‘micro-analysis’ which consists 
of analysis data word-by-word. 
Two coding phases or types, simple 
(fracture the data then conceptually 
group it) and substantive (open or 
selective, to produce categories and 
properties)  
Three types of coding, open (identifying, 
naming, categorising and describing 
phenomena), axial (the process of relating 
codes to each other) and selective (choosing a 
core category and relating other categories to 
that 
Regarded by some as the only ‘true’ 
Grounded Theory 
Regarded by some as a form of qualitative 
data analysis (QDA) 
 
Source: Onions, P. E. (2006). Grounded theory applications in reviewing knowledge management 
literature. Methodological Issues and Ethical Considerations' Conference, Leeds Metropolitan University 
Innovation North Research Conference, Leeds, 24 May    
 
A predominantly Glaserian approach has been adopted for this study based on its 
original Grounded Theory design and remaining ‘true’ to one of its guiding principles 
that theory will emerge from the data through a constant comparative method.  In 
essence Glaser’s approach is interpretive, contextual and emergent, whereas Strauss and 
Corbin’s approach is to force the data to meet pre-conceived notions (Ng & Hase, 
2008).   
 
As Thomas and James (2006) suggested, it is difficult for researchers to distance 
themselves from the data and allow theory to emerge.  The researcher took into 
consideration some of the Straussian approach which acknowledges the influence of the 
insider perspective’s knowledge base and “having a general idea of where to begin”.  
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There are even more polarising opinions between Glaser’s classic Grounded Theory and 
Strauss and Corbin’s position.  Nevertheless, the Glaserian method and its process of 
Grounded Theory data analysis and theory generation was adopted for this study.  The 
researcher also considered Charmaz’s (2006) monograph on constructing Grounded 
Theory.  Charmaz (2006) contributed significantly to the evolving development of 
Grounded Theory (Thomas & James, 2006) and argued that theory is not discovered but 
instead constructed from reality through the researcher’s interpretive portrayal of the 
phenomenon being studied.  The predominantly Glaserian methodology chosen will be 
explained in the next section, with some adaptations that support emergent theory 
generation.  
 
3.1.4 GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY – THE PROCESS 
 
The Grounded Theory journey undertaken by the researcher required commitment to the 
explicit method of the theory’s central doctrines (Kensbock & Jennings, 2011).  This 
provides a road map to achieve the final destination of emergent theory.  The set of 
procedures employed in operationalising Grounded Theory methodology are non-linear 
and overlapping (Connell & Lowe, 1997) and are embedded in an iterative process of 
constant comparison (Ng & Hase, 2008).  Charmaz (2006) described Grounded Theory 
methods as; “consisting of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and 
analysing qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data themselves” (p.2).  
 
The five main components of Grounded Theory’s methodology provided the direction 
for this study and are summarised by Connell and Lowe (1997), based on Glaser’s 
(1978) less prescriptive methodology (Jones & Alony, 2011).  These procedures 
include: the constant comparative method, theoretical sampling, theoretical coding, 
theoretical memos, and theoretical sorting.  The Grounded Theory principles will now 
be explained along with the process that guided the research in its data collection, 
analysis and theory generation.  
 
(i) THE CONSTANT COMPARISON METHOD 
 
The constant comparison method is a hallmark of Glaserian Grounded Theory. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is a tool to support the researcher “in 
generating a theory that is integrated, consistent, plausible, close to the data” (p.103).  
As the name implies, this method seeks to constantly compare the data throughout the 
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conceptual development of theory, refining and redirecting the emerging themes and 
concepts as findings become apparent.  Connell and Lowe (1997) posited:  
“A well-defined category should have explicitly stated properties which help to 
delineate inherent causes, conditions and consequences. As categories become 
saturated by evidence, they form a foundation on which to ask further questions 
about the underlying process. At this stage the researcher can compare category 
to category and check meaningful literature to see whether what has emerged fits 
or confounds existing theory” (p.169). 
 
However, as noted by Jones, Kriflik and Zanko (2005), Glaser (1967) acknowledged 
that the Constant Comparative method does not provide tested theory but instead 
establishes a general or substantive theory (Jones & Alony, 2011).  According to Glaser, 
the usefulness of this theory is attributed to the fact that it can be used to create 
plausibly induced categories and thematic concepts that have been validated through 
data saturation.  It can also be used to address real social problems (Jones et al., 2005).  
Charmaz (2006) advocated that constant comparison along with the researcher’s 
engagement constitutes the core methodology of Grounded Theory.   
 
In the current research, constant comparison was applied as the emergent findings from 
interviewee data were compared with internal meeting minutes, internal and external 
correspondence, as well as corporate crisis manuals and media reports and the 
researcher’s Reflections and Recollections.  The iterative process of comparing the 
findings of the Red Shirt Crisis incident, to the Phuket earthquake also refined and 
redirected the emerging themes. This was also supported and developed further by the 
findings on the 2011 flood crisis event. 
 
In addressing the research question, the researcher found the constant comparison 
method gathered momentum as the data revealed itself and theoretical concepts began to 
emerge. The constant comparative technique compared findings including; incidents 
and actions undertaken during the 2010 Red Shirt crisis at the hotel operational level 
and the corporate head office level compared with resort operations during the 2012 
Phuket earthquake; email conversation threads; memos or even interviewee perceptions, 
feelings and experiences.  The differing levels of the company and separate incidents 
provided the researcher with unique contextual data, which provided contextually-rich 
findings that contributed to the developing themes.  With the constant comparative 
method introduced, the following explanations are provided for the theoretical 
processes. 
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(ii) THEORETICAL SAMPLING  
 
Qualitative research is distinguished by smaller samples of participants, who are studied 
in-depth under the lens of a phenomenological context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Random sampling was not considered as an option since this can prove to be biased 
with smaller samples (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  One of the key components of 
Grounded Theory methodology is theoretical sampling, which refers to the systematic 
selection of participants or data by the researcher.  This ensures the most appropriate 
sample is reflective of developing theoretical concepts (Jones et al., 2005) and that the 
data’s emergent explanation is maximised as valid and reliable (Kempster & Parry, 
2011).  Draucker, Martsolf, Ross and Rusk (2007) described sampling in Grounded 
Theory as being a sequential process, which begins with selective sampling and then 
moves to theoretical sampling as thematic concepts emerge.  
 
Ng and Hase (2008) suggested that a Grounded Theory researcher would not commence 
their study without some understanding of the discipline and some perspectives from 
which to explore the research question.  The researcher’s past experience of Crisis 
Leadership and Crisis Management practices in the international hotel industry provided 
this knowledge.  The data sample was selected based on the interviewee’s management 
position and exposure to the 2010 Red Shirt crisis in relation to the case study 
organisation.     
 
Through the Grounded Theory constant comparative method, the emerging themes and 
concepts provided the basis for ongoing sample selection.  An initial pilot interviewee 
was selected for the pilot study based on his objectively analytical approach, combined 
with his articulate and expressive conversational delivery style.  The pilot interviewee 
was a key participant in the crisis management activities from the Crisis Command 
Centre (CCC) during the Red Shirt crisis.   At the time of the interview he no longer 
worked in the case study organisation and had relocated to Australia to take a senior 
management role. He was therefore open to discussing the events without any concern 
of retribution from his employer.  This participant provided an in-depth assessment of 
what was going on, and he became one of the key informants. 
 
From the first in-depth interview, the researcher formulated how to approach subsequent 
interviews by probing for insights that further elaborated the emergent themes and 
concepts.  Miles and Huberman (1994) interpreted Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) 
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theoretical sampling explanation as not referring to a concern for ‘representativeness’ 
but for addressing the conceptual question.   Jones et al. (2005) recommended the 
researcher target participants with minimal differences on the subject matter being 
investigated. By so doing, the similarities of the initial sample can encourage thematic 
categories from the earliest phase of the data collection process.  As the sampling 
expands and the differences between participants achieves maximisation, data saturation 
can occur.  This process was clearly evident in the present research in the pilot 
interview, and also in both Phase One and Phase Two interviews. These phases will be 
explained in further detail in Section 3.2.6.  A list of the interviewees, their roles and 
responsibilities and their participation in the two phases is provided later in this chapter 
in Section 3.2.5 (see Table 3.2).   
 
The list of potential interviewees for Phase One interviews were established from those 
actors who participated in, and were conversant with, the Crisis Command Centre from 
the Corporate Head Office, as well as the key EXCOM from the city hotel.  In addition, 
resort property interviewees were also selected to explore any potential new themes in 
respect to their understanding of the crisis management processes at corporate level.  
However, the researcher serendipitously discovered the Phuket earthquake incident and 
the subsequent crisis management processes implemented at the resort level, 
unbeknown to the corporate head office.  This also created another dimension to the 
study for comparative purposes.  
 
Theoretical Sampling is an ongoing process that systematically selects participants and 
data samples that are most relevant to the research question (Jones et al., 2005).  In the 
present research study, the researcher was familiar with the contextual situation and was 
able to select the initial interviewee knowing their active participation in the crisis 
event. As the data were collected, coded and analysed, the data began to reveal thematic 
concepts and directed the researcher to gain insights via new data (Connell & Lowe, 
1997).  Kensbock and Jennings (2011) noted that theoretical sampling is a purposive 
sampling technique.  This technique does not seek to provide a representative sample set 
but seeks to involve informed participants who are able to provide the richest of data on 
the research topic.  With the selection of participants established, the next stage was the 
data coding process which is outlined in the following section. 
  
Chapter 3 – Research Method and Data Collection 
 
 
81 | P a g e  
(iii) THEORETICAL CODING  
 
By embracing the flexibility of Grounded Theory with its accompanying structural 
guidelines, the research path to uncover a basic social process was an enlightening 
discovery of what was really happening and how.  Charmaz (2006) described theoretical 
codes as explaining possible relationships between the categories that have initially 
emerged from substantive coding (Glaser, 1978, 1998).  This is explained in more detail 
in Section 3.6 on ‘Data Coding’ which explains the steps undertaken by the researcher 
in data coding, with the preliminary analysis initially determining the substantive coding 
through a manual system of summarising the interview data and secondary data.  This 
was then followed by theoretical coding which takes the data analysis to a more abstract 
level.    
 
While the initial substantive coding assisted in understanding and identifying the 
variables of interest, theoretical coding further developed the variables’ dimensions 
(Kempster & Parry, 2011).  Theoretical coding is a concurrent process that employees 
the Constant Comparative method and begins immediately at the commencement of the 
data collection stage and continues throughout the iterative phases of data collection and 
analysis (Connell & Lowe, 1997; Glaser, 1978; Hardy, 2005; Jones et al., 2005).  
 
Theoretical codes emerged as the researcher analysed the data, compared similarities 
and eventually linked the codes together.  The theoretical codes continued to develop 
through constant comparison until higher order theoretical categories were formed. The 
process of creating Theoretical Memos is now explained. 
 
(iv) THEORETICAL MEMOS  
 
Another important concept of Glaserian Grounded Theory is the integration of 
Theoretical Memos throughout the data collection, coding and analytic phases.  Connell 
and Lowe (1997) borrow from Glaser’s description of Theoretical Memos which is 
defined as: “the theorising write up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they 
strike the analyst while coding” (Glaser, 1978, p. 83).  Thematic concepts were 
illuminated as Theoretical Memoing encouraged the researcher to reflect and distil the 
data through note-taking and recording conceptual thoughts.  Ng and Hase (2008) 
suggested that “memos are vital as they provide a bank of ideas that map the emerging 
theory and are used to identify categories and their properties” (p.161). 
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In some instances the researcher’s data interrogation identified new areas of enquiry or 
inconsistencies in the data, which ultimately contributed to the development of thematic 
concepts (Glaser, 1978, 1998; Charmaz, 2006).  Examples of memos about interviews 
in this research study that highlighted a thematic development for the researcher and led 
to exploring the area of institutional memory loss included the following from two 
different interviewees:   
“If leaders change, knowledge is lost on that experience which is evident with 
institutional memory loss.  This interview helped me formulate my thinking on 
best practice for crisis leaders and one of the most valuable interviews.”  
 
“Concerned about leadership continuity and the knowledge being lost as 
leadership changes: institutional memory loss – reduces confidence levels?” 
 
These ideas became memos and from these memos thematic indicators emerged. These 
memos helped explain emergent themes and became the basis for the write up of results.  
The constant comparative method continued to stimulate the emergent thematic 
concepts and led to the final analytic stage of Theoretical Sorting. 
 
(v) THEORETICAL SORTING  
 
Theoretical Sorting is the final component of Glaserian Grounded Theory and one of the 
keys to theory formulation and presentation (Glaser, 1978; Ng & Hase, 2008).  It is at 
this point that the hierarchy of relationships are determined and the core category is 
identified in order to establish an explicit theoretical concept.  Theoretical Sorting built 
on the iterative nature of the Constant Comparative method and explained the theory 
conceptualisation stage of the research.  Connell and Lowe (1997) described this phase 
as sorting memos and creating links for a theoretical outline and focusing on the final 
outcome to generate new theory.  This is the final phase which reduces the hierarchy of 
categories to a core category (or variable) which then operationalises the basic social 
process (Connell & Lowe, 1997).  Chapters Four, Five and Six will provide further 
insight into Theoretical Sorting as it relates to the research question based on data 
collected for this study. 
 
3.1.5 A SINGLE CASE APPROACH 
 
Grounded theory single case research is focused on developing theory whereby the 
notion of theoretical sampling is applied to a single case. Through Grounded Theory 
methodology a single case provides the opportunity to investigate a significant 
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phenomenon under rare or extreme circumstances (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
While Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) acknowledged the benefits of multiple case 
study research, they also recognised that single-case researchers can fit their theory 
exactly to the many details of a particular case (p.30).  Furthermore, the resulting theory 
from a single case is more parsimonious, robust and generalisable, which characterises 
superior theory. 
 
A single case approach was therefore used in this study as it was considered to be a 
qualitative methodology extremely well suited to crisis research (James et al., 2011).  
The single case study design provided a viable method to investigate unique 
phenomena, such as Thailand’s crisis fatigue from the ongoing political crises, and other 
crisis events.  James et al., (2011) argued that case study design is appropriate to crisis 
research as crises are unique events that occur without warning.  Researchers are able to 
explore the phenomena in-depth and “capture significant detail and insight into 
underlying relationships that can lead to theory development” (p.482).  Even more 
significantly James et al., (2011) posited that crisis research using case studies provides 
an opportunity to connect theory with practice and uncover meaningful organisational 
outcomes.  Evans and Elphick (2005), who conducted research pertaining to an 
organisation in a time of crisis, also supported a single case study design noting the 
information and relevancy of the lessons that can be learnt from a single case. 
 
Case study research does not seek to provide findings that are generally or universally 
representative of a population.  Instead, case study conclusions provide validation in 
relation to theory in the case of explanatory research and in relation to policy in the case 
of evaluative research (Saunders et al., 2009; Veal, 2006).  Klenke (2008) 
acknowledged the debate about the lack of generalisability of single cases, but argued 
that “we can learn much that is general from a single case” (p.65).    
 
Although single case study design and small samples may be viewed with some 
suspicion (Siggelkow, 2007), Buchanan and Denyer (2012) argued that single case 
studies can build theory and their findings can be generalisable by citing seminal works 
of single case study design such as Weick’s (1988) crisis Sense-making, based on the 
Bhopal disaster.  Buchanan and Denyer (2012) outlined four modes that support case 
study generalizability: moderatum generalisations, naturalistic generalisations, 
analystical refinement and isomorphic learning. They argued that the merit of using 
single case studies to develop theory has been established and recommended crisis 
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researchers to continue to promote and elevate case study methods to mainstream 
research.  Furthermore, case study design can be used to challenge existing theory 
(Saunders et al., 2009) and is vital to the development of new theoretical concepts. 
 
Siggelkow (2007) advanced that a single case can be a very powerful example because 
case data empowers the researcher to develop theoretical constructs and provide a more 
persuasive argument on causation than broad empirical research studies.  Single case 
researchers are also able to better fit theory to the rich data from the many details 
generated from a single case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  In the current study, the 
need to gain a deep understanding of the complex issues of a crisis event, using 
Grounded Theory methodology based on a single multi- dimensional case was deemed 
most applicable when dealing with the impact of shock events on strategic decision-
making (Bonn & Rundle-Thiele, 2007). Thomas’ (2011) definition of case study 
methodology highlighted the rich analytical detail that can be elicited:  
“Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or 
more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a 
class or phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within which 
the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates” (p.23). 
 
Since one of the key objectives of the study was to derive new theory from the extant 
emergent theory, the steps outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) for the process of building 
theory from case study research were adopted for their succinct and systematic approach 
for a successful theoretical outcome (refer to Appendix 5 for the complete process).  
Eisenhardt’s (1989) case study approach is a flexible one whereby “the flexibility is 
controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the uniqueness of a 
specific case and the emergence of new themes to improve resultant theory” (p.539). 
 
Building upon the strengths of a Grounded Theory single case methodology for theory 
development, the contextual nature of the case study method also contributed 
significantly to the adoption of this form of research design.  As Klenke (2008) argued, 
“Many leadership problems are defined and shaped by the context in which they 
manifest themselves” (p.63).  In relation to the case of the Crisis Leadership 
phenomenon, the case study approach set the scene for the most appropriate means to 
analyse the variables which impacted the leadership process. As explained in Section 
3.1.1, Grounded Theory method based on a single case multidimensional organisation 
was selected as the most appropriate method in light of the unique contextual aspects of 
Crisis Management and the Crisis Readiness phase. 
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The Grounded Theory single case approach involved multiple data sources: 
documentary evidence, in-depth interviews and an online survey distributed to a cross 
section of staff from non-managers to senior executives in a hotel company. It sought to 
relate theoretical perspectives and concepts to the research question. Whilst the 
qualitative interview data provided in-depth descriptive analysis, the online survey 
allowed for integration of data (Reilly 1993) and a means to reduce researcher bias.   
The Grounded Theory single case design provided a rich source of primary and 
secondary data which combined to assist in data triangulation.  Data triangulation will 
now be explained, followed by explanations of the primary and secondary data 
collection methods. 
 
3.1.6 DATA TRIANGULATION 
 
The single case approach was used for data collection and provided the background 
from which to explore the organisation’s Crisis Management processes and future 
potential best practices. Like Fink (1986), who employed a case study approach in his 
original Crisis Management research, the researcher triangulated multiple sources of 
data; thus a more rigorous investigation was assured. Triangulation involved the use of 
multiple data collection techniques in order to ensure reliability and validity. Veal 
(2006) advocated that in using both qualitative and quantitative approaches for the 
purpose of triangulation, the methods used will be complementary due to the 
weaknesses of one being complemented by the strengths of the other method.  While 
this study draws from primary and secondary data to validate data triangulation, it does 
not adopt mixed methods as a methodological approach.  
 
Herman and Egri (2002) analysed the use of data triangulation and highlighted the 
importance of qualitative research and the sensitivity to the context that it provides.  
They posited that research is not just about making results meaningful for their 
contribution to the academic body of knowledge, but also for the respondents, the 
organisation and the industry at large.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative methods can achieve synergies and complementarity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Parry, 1998; Ghauri, Pervez, Gronhaug, 2005).  Quantitative results 
can corroborate findings from qualitative research and uncover relationships that may 
not be obvious in the qualitative data.  A triangulated approach was adopted for the 
present study from both a data and theoretical perspective; predominantly qualitative 
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methods were employed. The use of data triangulation enhances data validity. The data 
generated was integrated to provide rich, well-grounded data and provided evidence of 
internal consistency from the different data sources (Reilly, 1993, p.121). It was 
anticipated that a broader or more complete understanding of the issues would be 
achieved with the use of more than one data source (Veal 2006).  
 
The researcher is confident that the data triangulation procedure chosen achieved more 
insightful and robust findings from a Grounded Theory single case design utilising 
primary and secondary data collection.  A predominant data-analytic method (grounded 
theory method) guides the study while multiple concurrent methods are nested or 
embedded within the overall predominant data-analytic method.  Since the overriding 
grounded theory research methodology was identified for its ability to provide an in-
depth exploration of a contextual phenomenon, qualitative data collection was the 
predominant data-gathering method utilised in the present study.    
 
The aim to embed quantitative data into the study design was twofold: firstly, to gain a 
broader perspective rather than relying on one single method; and secondly, to assist in 
analysing data from individuals at different levels within the organisation (Creswell, 
2009).  The appropriateness of this methodology for this study is reflected in the 
strengths of collecting data concurrently through data triangulation, providing both 
qualitative and quantitative data to gain different perspectives from different data and 
from a multi-level aspect. The following section will now outline the primary data 
collection undertaken for this study. 
 
3.2 PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION 
 
As previously mentioned, the aim of this study was to determine how Crisis Leadership 
influences a company’s Crisis Readiness. The study employed semi-structured in-depth 
interviews as the predominant research instrument. An online survey was also 
incorporated into the study to uncover any further insights. In addition, document and 
media analysis occurred concurrently to provide another avenue to explore what was 
happening in the crisis event.  The primary data collection rationale and process will be 
explained in further detail in the following section.  
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3.2.1 SETTING FOR THE STUDY AND ACCESS 
 
The corporate headquarters and business units of a large publicly listed international 
hotel company in Thailand served as the setting for this research at the time of the Red 
Shirt crisis. The company operated 20 hotels in six countries with approximately 8,000 
employees.  It is not named here to maintain confidentiality.  The company is 
considered to be one of the iconic Asian hotel groups, with international business units 
also located in the Middle East (UAE, Egypt), China, India, Maldives and the 
Philippines. They also have regional sales offices in London, Berlin, Dubai, Hong Kong 
and Singapore.  
 
The case study organisation was located in the vicinity of the Red Shirt encampment in 
the central business district of Bangkok.  The buildings were physically targeted during 
the Red Shirt activity and were forced to close for more than a week at the height of the 
violence during the Red Shirt demonstrations in May 2010.  As a consequence, a Crisis 
Command Centre (CCC) was set up at their airport hotel and adjacent hospitality 
college.  The researcher was a member of the company’s senior executive management 
team for more than four years. While she was no longer employed by the company at 
the time of undertaking the research, she received written permission from its Chief 
Executive Officer to access records and contact employees to invite them to participate 
in the study. 
 
3.2.2 INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY  
 
Since leadership is a process that influences followers’ perceptions and motivations, the 
optimal source of data are the followers and the best way of learning about their 
experiences is through interviewing (Parry, 1999).  Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also 
advocated interviews as being highly efficient in gathering rich, empirical data when 
researching phenomena that are highly episodic and infrequent. Throughout the 
interviewing process the researcher was able to explore the research question, as well as 
identify and understand the social processes at play.  This section will provide an 
overview of the interview methodology, data collection and analysis.  
 
Even though the researcher was familiar with the context of the crisis event and the case 
study organisation, new avenues of thought from the interviewee’s feedback enriched 
the data even further.  As a consequence, the interview process directed the researcher 
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to investigate additional data which provided new insights into the research topic.  This 
was evidenced by serendipitously uncovering the 2012 Phuket earthquake incident and 
the subsequent Crisis Management, Crisis Leadership and Crisis Readiness issues that 
emerged from one of the key informant’s experiences.  It also directed the interview 
questions through theoretical sampling.  Charmaz’s (2006) use of constructivist 
Grounded Theory recommends the researcher follow leads that emerge from the data 
and ‘try to make everyone’s vantage points and their implications explicit” (p.184). 
 
The personal contact in face-to-face interviews also contributed to rapport building 
between the researcher and the interviewee.  As a result, the trust between the two “will 
be enhanced, and that the corresponding understanding and confidence between the two 
will lead to in-depth and accurate information” (Kumar, 2011, p.160).  The researcher’s 
listening skills became one of the most valuable assets of this research journey.  Veal 
(2006) recommended the researcher not be afraid of silence as the interviewer’s main 
role was to listen and encourage the interviewee to speak openly.   
 
The seminal work of Rubin and Rubin (2005) was an additional compass in navigating 
this study’s interview road map.  Rubin and Rubin (2005) described qualitative 
interviewing as “like night-vision goggles, permitting us to see that which is not 
ordinarily on view and examine that which is often looked at but seldom seen” (p.vii).  
They posited that the responsive interviewing model detailed a technique for the 
researcher to choose interview subjects who are knowledgeable about the research 
problem.   
 
The researcher obtained information from the interviewee after listening to their 
responses and continued to question until a greater understanding of the topic was 
achieved.  Although this technique refrains from utilising a structured set of questions, 
this study employed a semi-structured method with the flexibility to explore new 
avenues of thought as data revealed itself.  An interview protocol of open-ended 
questions also gave the researcher the ability to focus on the study’s primary research 
question and create a time efficient process for both the interviewer and interviewees 
(Charmaz, 2006; Kumar, 2011; Yin, 2011). A copy of the interview protocol is provided 
in Appendix 6. 
 
Interviews are considered one of the methods used in the toolkit to gather empirical data 
within the qualitative research field (Jennings, 2010) and are the primary research 
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instrument for this study.  The researcher was able to understand the experiences and 
perspectives of the participants and to probe further when their experiences helped 
address the research question (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  However, the researcher was 
able to select from a number of interview options for qualitative research studies and 
investigated the most appropriate interview method for this study before commencing 
the data collection. 
 
(i) TYPES OF QUALITATIVE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS  
 
The interview taxonomy is characterised by a number of interview types.  This section 
begins with an evaluation of two qualitative interviewing techniques; unstructured and 
semi-structured interviews.  Rubin and Rubin (2005) developed a matrix of qualitative 
interviews which identified two dimensions; breadth of focus and subject of focus.  
They described in-depth qualitative interviews as being characterised by the scope of 
the interviewer’s questions with either a narrow or a broad focus.  In addition, the 
interview method is also characterised by whether it seeks to elicit “understandings or 
meanings or whether their purpose is to describe and portray specific events or 
processes” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.5).  
 
The Grounded Theory approach led the researcher to consider Rubin and Rubin’s 
(2005) qualitative interview typology and concur with their observation that researchers 
can use more than one style to elicit data.  In saying this, the researcher engaged in 
theory-elaboration research which is described by Rubin and Rubin (2005) as 
examining a specific issue from which themes are extrapolated with broader 
significance.  As a result, when applied to the present study it referred to the enquiry 
into the case study organisation’s Crisis Readiness preparations and how Crisis 
Leadership influences Crisis Readiness.  In “The Variety of Qualitative Interviews” 
matrix this interview type is described as an ‘in-between’ on the narrow-broad scope of 
focus, while also being focuses mainly on meanings and frameworks (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005). 
 
Having noted the focus of the interviews, it is important to also consider the type of 
interview to be conducted. Jennings (2010) described the differences between three 
types of interviews: structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews according to 
each one’s ontological, epistemological, methodological, and axiological views.  
Jennings’ (2010) overview of the two qualitatively focused interview methods of 
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unstructured and semi-structured provided the basis for the evaluation of the 
interviewing method selected for the present study.  Structured interviews are utilised in 
quantitative research and can comprise for example surveys, opinions polls, and 
standardised interviews.  The semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used in 
accordance with their ability to explore the multiple realities of the substantive 
contextual frame and are explained in the following sections. 
 
(ii) THE UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
The fundamental nature of the unstructured interview is that it is flexible and does not 
have a formal interview schedule (Jennings, 2010; Kumar, 2011; Veal, 2006).  
Although, Jennings (2010) suggested that the researcher, as the interviewer, has a 
purpose in mind in regard to the research topic as well as the themes or issues under 
investigation.  Nonetheless, the flow of an unstructured interview is a fluid one and the 
researcher’s interview management skills may require some redirection of the 
participant should the discussion go off topic.  Although in Grounded Theory this 
divergence may encourage new ideas and thoughts providing even richer empirical data, 
it could also waste valuable research time.  Jennings (2010) suggests that rapport and 
trust between the researcher and the interviewee facilitates an even greater depth of 
discussion. 
 
However, the disadvantages of the unstructured interviews as described by Jennings 
(2010) reduced the strength of the interview method for the present study.  One 
disadvantage is that the findings cannot be applied to the wider population, although this 
is often an argument by qualitative research critics and leads to the positivists’ claims 
regarding lack of validity and reliability (Jennings, 2010; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004).   Furthermore, the time frame for each interview can be longer and therefore not 
time efficient, which could be problematic for the interview participants.  The 
unstructured interview was rejected in favour of the semi-structured in-depth interview, 
which will now be discussed in the next section.   
 
(iii) THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
 
In comparison to the unstructured interview, the main difference between a semi-
structured interview and the unstructured interview is that some form of structure is 
utilised to prompt the researcher with a list of topics and issues to direct the 
conversation (Saunders et al., 2009).  While a degree of flexibility existed, a list of 
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issues or questions established the context of the interview and provided a level of 
comfort for the interviewee (Jennings, 2010) so that they knew where the interview 
thread was leading.   
 
While there are similar disadvantages to the unstructured interview method from a 
positivist data collection approach, Jennings (2010) highlighted disadvantages as being 
a lack of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’, difficulty in replicating the context of the 
interview’s location, the mood of interviewee/ or interviewer and time of day.  
Moreover, the data may be useless if the researcher did not probe leads that may be 
uncovered during the interview process (Jennings, 2010).  Although rapport building 
was also considered a disadvantage due to its time inefficiencies, this was not 
considered to be a disadvantage for the present study as the researcher was known to the 
interview subjects and was positively welcomed by the participants since only 18 
months had lapsed since her departure from Thailand.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were deemed the most appropriate method in the current 
study due to the advantage that in-depth data were collected based on experiences, 
opinions, knowledge and attitudes within the sphere of the research topic.  The 
researcher was also confident in seeking further clarification as the interview probes 
provided more cues for exploration (Jennings, 2010).  As an example, there were 
instances when the interview subjects made contact with the researcher to provide 
additional empirical data or agreed to follow-up interviews to clarify earlier statements.  
In addition, the greater level of time efficiency and focus of this method, combined with 
the time demands on hotel management, meant that a semi-structured interview allowed 
for the most efficient use of time for the interview subjects and researcher.  With the 
semi-structured in-depth interview approach selected, the responsive interview 
technique supported the researcher’s qualitative interviewing approach which is now 
described in the next section. 
 
(iv) RESPONSIVE INTERVIEWING  
 
The responsive interview model (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) contributed to the richness of 
the present study’s findings due to its key characteristics.  Firstly, the interview is about 
obtaining the interviewee’s perceptions from their own sphere of reality which meant 
the researcher needed to be cognisant of her own opinions, experiences and cultural 
views as they could have influenced the interview.  The responsive interview also 
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depends on the personal relationship between the interviewee and interviewer.  Since 
the researcher had a previous working relationship with the interviewees at different 
levels it was vital in using the responsive interview model that the researcher met the 
ethical obligations of an interviewer’s responsibilities and assured the interviewees’ 
confidentiality.  The approach taken to ensure confidentiality is outlined in this chapter 
in Section 3.2.4, Interview Process and 3.2.6, Interview Protocol. 
 
It was also imperative to avoid imposing the interviewer’s views on the interviewees 
(Kumar, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2011).  This meant that the researcher was 
required to ask broad questions so as not to limit the responses.  The researcher had to 
engage in active listening so that further questioning could be modified based on what 
the researcher heard, rather than a prior notion about what the researcher believed was 
occurring before the interview (Saunders et al., 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Yin, 2011).  
For example, the question ‘Can you describe the training you have received with regard 
to the Crisis Plan?’ invited a descriptive response. It was the question that revealed the 
previously unknown 2010 Phuket earthquake event and provided the researcher with an 
opportunity to probe further into the phenomenon.  The final characteristic of the model 
is its flexibility and adaptability which allows for a new direction dependent upon the 
informants’ responses.  The interviewer may also be required to change or add new 
interview subjects dependent upon what new data emerges.  This approach is a 
synergistic fit with Grounded Theory’s philosophy of theoretical sampling.  
 
During the interview process, the researcher was guided by the important axiom that 
one of the key components of interview data collection is the ‘Art of Hearing the Data’ 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  Rubin and Rubin (2005) posited that “the researcher’s self-
confidence, adaptability, and willingness to hear what is said and change direction to 
catch a wisp of insight or track down a new theme are what make responsive interviews 
work” (p.37).  It could be argued that changing direction is contrary to semi-structured 
interviewing.  However, the semi-structured interview techniques provided the 
researcher with the guidelines to which the responsive interviewing style could be 
integrated, and subsequently enrich data collection. 
 
3.2.3 INTERVIEW STRUCTURE  
 
A series of semi-structured in-depth interviews provided the means to probe more 
deeply than is possible with questionnaire-based interviews or surveys (Veal 2006) and 
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were the predominant data collection approach.  Parry (1998) recommended Grounded 
Theory leadership research utilise multiple data sources to strengthen research validity, 
but interviewing should be the core data collection strategy over participant observation 
due to the “potential validity problem of researcher reactivity” (Parry, 1998, p.96).  
These data were expected to yield the information required including: the interviewee’s 
own understanding of the events and actions and a situational analysis of the decision-
making processes before and after the event (Bonn & Rundle-Thiele, 2007).  
 
Thomas (2011) noted that semi-structured questions provide the structure for the 
interview and also allowed for probing through potential questions and possible follow 
up questions, with the aim of eliciting “rich” data (Yin, 2009).  In comparison to a 
structured interview, semi-structured interviewing allows interviewees to freely discuss 
the topic in question.  This process generates more information than could have been 
expected from a structured interview plan (Evans & Elphick, 2005).  Although 
Grounded Theory is a flexible and iterative methodology, the structure of the interview 
required a methodical commitment to its design so that the research study’s conceptual 
framework and its data needs were maintained as the research priority (Veal, 2006).   
 
The overall purpose of the interviews was to elicit information with regard to 
managers’: 
 Past experience of a crisis and their crisis readiness  
 Perceptions of the hotel’s crisis management plans and crisis response 
competencies, internally and externally 
 Perceptions of what influenced the hotel’s communication capabilities, 
internally and externally  
 Perceptions of what makes a successful leader during a crisis 
 Perceptions about what, if any, organisational learning occurred from past 
events.  
 
These semi-structured interview topics were comprised of mainly open-ended questions 
based on a combination of topics by Rousaki and Alcott’s Crisis Readiness Dimensions 
(2006) as previously discussed in Section 2.2.4 and James and Wooten’s  (2004) Crisis 
Leadership competencies discussed in Section 2.4.4.  Rousaki and Alcott’s Crisis 
Readiness Dimensions (2006) that were applied to the interview questions included; 
internal functionality of the organisation (quick response, how informed, access to 
Crisis Management resources, adequate strategic crisis planning) and the perceived 
likelihood of a crisis striking the organisation. 
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The interview plan was compiled under three main topics: the organisation’s crisis 
management internal functionality, crisis management leadership capabilities, and crisis 
experience.  The interview plan is provided in Appendix 6.  
 
Veal (2006) suggested that in-depth interviews can vary from interview to interview, 
but it is the interviewer’s responsibility to ensure that the relevant topics are addressed.  
This was one of the strengths of the semi-structured interview method, which allowed 
both the interview subject and researcher to stay focused on the research question so 
that data could emerge and eventually achieve the point of data saturation.  
 
3.2.4 INTERVIEW PROCESS  
 
Prior to embarking on an intensive interview schedule in Bangkok, a pilot interview was 
conducted with one of the key informants to the study. The pilot interview was 
conducted via Skype with one of the key actors of the CCC. The interviewee was 
located in Adelaide and the researcher was on the Gold Coast, Australia.  The pilot 
interviewee had left the case study organisation approximately one year after the Red 
Shirt crisis.  The interview was recorded and the researcher immediately transcribed the 
interview in order to assess and review the flow of the questions.  As a result of this 
pilot some questions were deleted as they were considered redundant or repetitive.  
After discussing the points raised by the interviewee with the researcher’s primary 
supervisor, the interviewee was re-contacted for a follow up interview to clarify some of 
the terminologies utilised and to seek more detail with regard to specific topics. 
 
The location of the Bangkok interviews was carefully chosen in order to maintain 
confidentiality and anonymity, as well as to put the interview subjects at ease.  Although 
the corporate office of the case study organisation had meeting facilities, they were 
encased in glass walls and located at reception by the main thoroughfare.  The 
researcher believed the meeting rooms could have been a source of distraction for both 
parties and may have affected the informants’ level of comfort and the conversational 
flow of the interviews.   
 
The researcher explained to the gatekeeper the importance of a location that would 
ensure open, honest and robust discussions without distraction from surrounding ‘noise’ 
and it was agreed to utilise a hotel suite.  The hotel suite lounge space is often utilised 
by business travellers to conduct meetings and provided a layout conducive to an 
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interview discussion.  The interview was conducted next to the desk space in the relaxed 
lounge seating with the coffee table’s unobtrusive height allowing for the set-up of a 
small recording device.   
 
The interview subjects employed by the case study organisation were invited to 
participate through an email communication on November 16th, 2012 from the HR 
gatekeeper (see Appendix 7).  The email communication also included the following 
attachments: 
1. Researcher’s Explanatory Statement (see Appendix 8) 
2. CEO’s approval (see Appendix 9) 
3. Consent Form (see Appendix 10) 
 
The interview questions were also provided before the interview so that the interview 
would be time efficient due to the nature of a hotel professional’s high pressure round-
the-clock work schedule.  This enabled participants to make an informed choice about 
participation having observed the nature of the topics to be covered. 
 
The in-depth interview process required a skill set that engaged the participant with the 
researcher, but avoided a conversational tone that could have influenced the responses 
(Veal, 2006).  The researcher committed to the interview question plan, but at the same 
time allowed for flexibility and agility in the questions in cases where a topic was 
unclear or of a sensitive nature.  It was also important for the researcher to assure the 
interviewees that they were partners in this research project rather than subjects to be 
tested or examined (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).  This was further reinforced at the 
commencement of the interview with the researcher’s explanation that this study was 
designed to contribute to the body of knowledge aimed at understanding how Crisis 
Leadership influences Crisis Readiness. 
 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face and were recorded with the consent of 
participants. The recording of interviews can inhibit respondents (Veal, 2006) and 
reduce the researcher’s immersion in the data after the interview when notes are typed 
and theoretical coding and sampling occurs (Glaser, 1998). Nonetheless, it was a 
process chosen by the researcher to ensure a fluid conversational flow rather than being 
interrupted or hampered by less efficient note-taking.  It also provided a means for the 
researcher to maintain focus and concentration (Ghauri et al., 2005; Glaser, 1998; 
Saunders et al., 2009). Verbatim transcripts can provide more complete data for a 
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methodical analysis in comparison to notes (Veal, 2006).  Interviewees were asked for 
their permission to record prior to the commencement of the interview and were assured 
of the confidentiality and anonymity of their participation. All participants agreed to the 
recording. 
 
The researcher also took notes of key points as an added reference and in case of 
possible recording malfunctions.  The researcher transcribed the first pilot interview to 
understand the process and immerse herself in the data.  Thereafter, all interviews from 
Phase One interviews were transcribed by a professional transcription service.  The 
digital recordings were sent to a transcription service to be converted into verbatim 
transcripts.  Since the transcriber was unfamiliar with some terminologies, acronyms, 
names and places, the researcher reviewed all transcripts for highlighted sections that 
could not be completed by the transcriber.  This was the first phase of numerous reviews 
and analyses of the transcriptions. 
 
In-depth analysis of the interviews commenced after the transcripts were returned from 
the transcription service prior to the researcher’s return to Australia.  The efficient 
timeliness of the transcripts being completed meant that the researcher’s experience of 
the interview was still very fresh in the researcher’s mind and contributed to the memo 
writing.  Each interview provided data that stimulated the researcher’s understanding of 
the evolving thematic concepts.  As a consequence, the interview questions were 
slightly adjusted as new theoretical codes began to emerge or as incidents highlighted a 
new avenue of enquiry.  For example, the ‘bunker spirit’ concept or the staff reactions 
to the Phuket earthquake emerged.  At the same time, the process of theoretical 
memoing, detailing ideas and thoughts through the constant comparison method, 
became a vital component in contributing to robust theory development. 
 
3.2.5 INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS  
 
The profile of the participants emerged from the theoretical sampling and data coding in 
the earlier stages of analysis by qualifying the job level of potential staff for 
interviewing.  The researcher’s past experience working at a senior management level in 
the case study company provided an insight that would not normally be available to 
external researchers.  This insight ensured a theoretical sample that would contribute 
rich and compelling data for this study and sought participants who were willing to 
make a positive difference to management practices.   
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Saunders et al. (2009) suggested that managers are more likely to agree to being 
interviewed than finding time to complete a questionnaire.  Their level of interest also 
increases when the research topic is perceived to be important to their work 
environment and processes.  The interviewees held senior management and Director 
level posts within the company and were comprised of both Thai nationals and 
expatriates, with varying levels of experience and education levels. They all spoke in 
regard to a Thai context.  Participants were selected based on their employment position 
and their influence on strategic decision-making relevant to crisis situations.  
 
These criteria typically meant they were Department Heads of functional areas whose 
work processes were influenced by senior management actions.  Phase One and Two 
interviewees are listed below in Table 3.2, which describes their role and level in the 
organisation, together with their nationality. 
 
 Table 3.2: Interview Participants  
 
Interviewee Nationality Role/ Level Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
1 Malaysian Corporate Office - Director   
2 Swedish Corporate Office – Manager   
3 Thai Corporate Office - Director   
4 Australian Hotel – Executive Committee   
5 Austrian Hotel – Executive Committee   
6 Thai Hotel – Executive Committee   
7 Japanese Hotel – Director   
8 Indonesian Hotel – Executive Committee   
9 Thai Corporate Office - Director   
10 Thai Corporate Office - Director   
11 Filipino/ Thai Hotel – Executive Committee   
12 Thai Corporate Office - Director   
13 English Corporate Office – Director   
14 Australian Corporate Office – Director   
15 Swiss/ Peruvian Corporate Office – VP  
(pre crisis) 
  
16 English Corporate Office – Director   
17 Scottish Hotel – Executive Committee   
18 Thai Corporate Office – VP  
(post crisis) 
  
19 German Corporate Office – Director   
20 Australian Regular VIP Hotel Guest   
N = 29 interviews involving 20 participants 
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3.2.6 INTERVIEW PROTOCOL  
 
The interviews took place concurrently with survey data collection (see Section 3.3) and 
were conducted in two phases.  The full interview protocol which guided the data 
collection is illustrated in Appendix 6, which also includes the researcher’s introduction 
and explanation of the study’s aims which were used as a guideline.  Interview 
participants were informed that the interview would last forty-five minutes to one hour.  
Before commencing the interview the researcher confirmed with the interviewee that 
permission to record and take notes was granted.  The interviewee was also advised that 
complete confidentiality was assured as the data would not identify participants or 
specific comments of individuals to encourage open and honest feedback.  Upon 
completion of the consent form (see Appendix 10), the interview commenced. 
 
The interviewer recognised that the interviewees revived memories of a traumatic 
period and to avoid any issue of defensiveness; the interviewer encouraged a free 
exchange of views for improving Crisis Management planning in the future (Faulkner & 
Vikulov, 2001).  Faulkner and Vikulov (2001) advised their informants that their 
intention was to re-examine the events with the benefit of hindsight so as to identify 
those strategies that may have produced better results.  The same approach was adopted 
in this study. 
 
(i) PHASE 1 INTERVIEWS 
 
Following the pilot interview, fourteen (n=14) semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted in Phase One of two phases of interviews based on the Grounded Theory 
theoretical sampling method.  The majority of the interviews were then conducted face 
to face in Bangkok between November and December, 2012 with current and former 
hotel employees, who were employed during the time of the May 2010 Red Shirts Crisis 
and the 2011 floods.  A total of thirty (30) follow up telephone interviews were 
conducted for participant checking to clarify their statements and perceptions to ensure 
their views were interpreted correctly (Kensbock & Jennings, 2011). 
 
(ii) PHASE 2 INTERVIEWS 
 
Phase Two interviews utilised the Grounded Theory approach with the results of the 
first phase guiding the questions and providing an emergent theoretical concept (Hardy, 
2005).  The researcher explored participant’s perceptions of the emerging themes based 
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on a schematic that illustrated the proposed lower order, higher order and core 
categories.  A schematic with emergent themes from Phase One was shared with the 
purposively selected interviewees and the researcher sought their perceptions and 
insight about the developing theory.  The schematic for discussion is described in more 
detail in Section 3.6.3 (Figure 3.1.)   
 
Fifteen (n=15) additional interviews were conducted in Phase Two using Grounded 
Theory’s theoretical sampling principles. Twelve (12) interviews were recorded via 
Skype, with three (3) interviewees preferring to respond by email.  The sample 
comprised six new participants and nine follow up participants from Phase One.  The 
Phase One follow up participants were selected based on their detailed interviews 
during Phase One. Phase One participants who were not included in Phase Two were 
omitted because they had either left the company or the researcher was unable to make 
contact after three attempts to include in Phase Two interviews.  
 
In the new participant cohort, five were either currently or previously employed with the 
case study organisation, and of that group, one member was not in the organisation at 
the time of the Red Shirt crisis.  Phase Two participants were chosen based on their 
senior management role and responsibility for crisis management as a current or past 
employee. 
 
Phase Two questions were presented by email together with the emergent theme 
schematic (i.e. Figure 3.1), with the advice that their comments and feedback would 
remain strictly private and confidential. Any feedback would not be identifiable in the 
concluding report.  The researcher then followed up with a telephone interview with 
twelve participants with another, three participants requesting to email their responses, 
due to international time differences, work pressures or work commitments which made 
phone interviewing difficult.  The questions in Phase Two as they were presented to the 
interviewees are as follows: 
Question 1: Crisis Leadership Influencers contributed to how leadership reacted 
to a crisis event. Can you provide your thoughts on this theme and can you 
please suggest any additional influencing factors? 
 
Question 2: Experiential Learning refers to how leadership’s past experience 
contributed to preparing and dealing with crisis events. Can you provide your 
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thoughts on this theme and can you please suggest any additional influencing 
factors? 
 
Question 3: The two themes above combined to reveal Empowering Readiness 
as the main category to prepare the organisation for future events. Can you 
suggest how crisis-ready you feel, and is your organisation ready for the next 
potential crisis? 
 
Question 4: Please feel free to make comment on your feelings of what this 
study has revealed so far? 
 
The interviewees reviewed the emergent conceptual theme schematic (Figure 3.1) and 
did not have any recommendations for modification or suggestions for revisions.  One 
of the participants confirmed that he interpreted the schematic to illustrate the main 
themes of leadership and experience.  He also made the comment that he had not heard 
the term Empowering Readiness previously but he felt it was a powerful concept, 
especially when combined with leadership and experience. 
 
At the point of data saturation, when no new themes emerged, Phase Two interviews 
concluded the data collection.  One additional, new participant was also interviewed at 
this point based on her learned experience of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis.  This participant 
was a VIP Hotel guest of the city hotel property who had significant insight into the way 
the hotel operated.  The reasoning for this interviewee was to ensure the point of data 
saturation has been achieved and no further new insights could be established. Data 
saturation is explained in Section 3.5.1. 
 
The interview data constituted the core data collection method, but was supported by 
additional data sources for the purpose of data triangulation and strengthening the 
study’s findings. A total of twenty nine (n=29) interviews were conducted based on the 
purposive theoretical sampling technique.  The purpose of these interviews was to draw 
out optimal data for validity and reliability purposes.  
 
The following section outlines secondary data collection including the use of an online 
survey as an additional data source to achieve data triangulation.  The online survey 
methodology will be explained including; its design, the participants, the survey’s 
delivery and analysis, and the justification for using descriptive statistics.  The 
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respondent’s perceptions from the survey will be reported in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six with interview findings and will describe how they validate and augment the core 
interview data collection method.   
 
3.3 ONLINE SURVEY 
 
As the research design is a predominantly qualitative one, the introduction of a survey 
tool into the research mix allows for data triangulation to augment the qualitative data 
with cross-referential data.  This is expected to confirm the validity of the research 
findings (Rowland & Parry, 2009).  The online survey was used to explore the 
perceptions of the broader staff community of the company under investigation in 
relation to its organisational culture, crisis management internal functionality, and 
leadership. This group was not part of the theoretical sampling interview cohort.  
 
The objective of this survey was to elicit multiple perceptions from a more diverse 
cross-section of staff than the interview cohort and provide an additional perspective to 
enhance the richness of the data (Kan & Parry, 2004).  The company’s HR gatekeeper 
was very supportive of the study and stated in an email prior to the interview schedule 
and survey: 
“To be honest with you we don’t have the corporate safety and crisis committee 
even I try to drive the structure with (name is confidential) but not that 
happening yet. However, this survey may help people here have more awareness 
on this significant concern” (Secondary data email: 9 November, 2012).   
 
The results of the survey were explored from a Grounded Theory qualitative perspective 
to further understand the environment in which the substantive context of this hotel 
company case study exists. 
 
3.3.1 ONLINE SURVEY OF HOTEL EMPLOYEES 
 
A survey was undertaken to gather additional insights and qualitatively analyse the 
survey data.  Since this was a qualitative research study, the purpose of the online 
survey was to uncover any additional descriptive data in comparison to the 
interviewee’s perspectives.  Its purpose was not to explore correlations or undertake 
more advanced statistical analysis, but to provide a descriptive insight into the views of 
other employees in the case organisation.   
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The online survey was constructed from pre-validated instruments that combined prior 
crisis management studies and the Multifactor Leadership questionnaire.  The survey 
design is explained in more detail in 3.3.2, however the priority for this study was the 
additional insights that could possibly be gained from the survey.  Losch (2006) 
suggested that “despite its strong quantitative nature the online survey could remain 
largely exploratory and open to theory building in the sense of the overall GT approach” 
(p.137). 
 
The online survey was designed with the purpose of analysing the perceptions and 
attitudes of a cross section of the company’s management and junior staff in relation to 
Crisis Leadership in Crisis Management and the organisation’s cultural values.  The 
survey results were intended to provide an additional assessment of managerial attitudes 
towards Crisis Readiness. The advantages of an online survey included: quantifying the 
information easily, providing a transparent set of research procedures, and follow up 
surveys can be conducted with the same format for comparative analysis (Veal 2006).  
Reasons for selecting an online survey as opposed to other survey methods included the 
easy accessibility of respondents to computers twenty-four hours per day allowing them 
to complete the survey at their convenience. In addition, the level of computer literacy 
was high among the staff involved (Saunders et al., 2009).   
 
3.3.2 SURVEY DESIGN 
 
In order to triangulate the qualitative data, an online survey was designed from pre-
validated instruments.  The instruments and crisis leadership model that provided the 
components related to the statements, as applied to the online survey, are described in 
Table 3.3 below.   
 
Table 3.3 Survey Instruments  
Instrument Authors Survey Topic Question 
Questionnaire on 
Corporate Orientation  
Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin 
(2003) 
Perception of their organisation’s human 
resource, strategic and unlearning 
orientations, and crisis management, 
based on the organisational culture  
Q 1-16 
Q 24-28 
Questionnaire on hotel 
manager’s crisis 
readiness 
Rousaki and 
Alcott (2006) 
Perception of their crisis management 
readiness 
Q 17-23 
Multifactor 
Leadership 
Questionnaire (MLQ) 
Bass (1985) Intellectual Stimulation and Inspiration 
Motivation about their leader 
Q 29-31 
Q32-35 
Crisis Leadership 
Core Competencies 
Model 
James and 
Wooten (2005) 
Trust and decision-making Q 36-39 
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The survey did not adopt all statements from each instrument but selected those 
statements that would assist in exploring the research question. The statements used 
from Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin’s (2003) instrument were the key predictors of crisis 
preparedness from the corporate orientation, which was used as a proxy for 
understanding the organisation’s culture.  Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) instrument 
provided the statements that dealt with crisis readiness perceptions of hotel managers.  
The resultant perceptions were expected to either validate or rebut the primary data 
collection findings.  The MLQ (Bass, 1985) factors selected were chosen to reflect crisis 
leadership competencies and finally, James and Wooten’s (2004) model provided the 
statements on trust and decision-making.   
 
Statements which an early pilot interview of the survey revealed where ambiguous, or 
which were not entirely relevant to the current research, were excluded from the original 
survey instruments. For example; Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin’s (2003) statements that 
were excluded included: 
 “We invest a lot in identifying risks in our task environment” or Statements 
relating to “Following crises”: 
 “Media’s attention increased” 
 “Management enhanced its involvement in internal corporate activities” 
 
A staff population sample was selected to provide some insight into the emic view and 
authentic experiences of the organisation by its actors.  The survey comprised 38 items, 
which were selected to assist in setting the stage for staff attitudes in regard to the 
organization.  The key components related to the structures, human orientation and 
decision-making, together with crisis management readiness and leadership perceptions. 
The survey instrument was divided into five main sections.  
 
The first section of the survey explored staff perceptions with regard to the corporate 
orientation, which could also be described as organisational culture, based on Sheaffer 
and Mano-Negrin’s (2003) scale as noted in Table 3.3. The second section contained a 
series of statements in regard to their understanding of the organisation’s internal 
functionality and crisis management readiness status (Rousaki & Alcott, 2006; Sheaffer 
& Mano-Negrin, 2003).  The third section was made up of questions relating to their 
perceptions of their supervisor’s leadership (Bass, 1985; James & Wooten, 2004).  The 
fourth section requested information about their crisis experience and the perception of 
those who answered affirmatively of their business unit’s crisis management 
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performance.  This section also sought additional feedback with an invitation to provide 
further comment through a free text box facility. 
 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements in 
sections 1 to 4 by using a 5 point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) 
to Strongly Agree (5).  Finally, the fifth section sought to obtain some demographic 
information about participants. Participants were assured that their feedback was 
completely confidential and anonymity was confirmed. 
 
In order to ensure a parsimonious approach to the survey, the statements selected from 
prior studies were selectively chosen for their relevance to the context of the current 
study, and for their relevance in providing an understanding of the staff community’s 
perceptions and insights in regard to the research question.  The survey statements are 
shown in Table 3.4 and were selected on their applicability to the research question in 
the areas of organisational culture, crisis readiness, leadership capabilities and 
competencies.  
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Table 3.4 Survey Topics and Statements 
Authors Survey Topic Scales Statements 
Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin 
(2003) 
Perceptions on 
corporate 
orientation or 
organisational 
culture 
 
 
 
 
1-16 
 
My organisation is: 
1. Our organisational structure is decentralized  
2. Our organisational structure is centralised  
3. ‘Exploitative’ organisation (people-wise)  
4. Caring for people  
5. People above everything  
6. Profits above everything  
7. Cooperation-oriented  
8. Encourages ‘new ideas’  
9. Centralized decision-making  
10. Empowers each unit  
11. Vision and goals are carefully understood 
12. A learning organization which invests in training, 
and learns from errors and successes 
13. Adjusting well to changes in our business, cultural 
and social environment 
14. We often change our important corporate goals  
15. Emphasis on how to do things (efficiency above all)  
16. Once we have reached our business goals we rethink 
our business strategies 
Rousaki and 
Alcott (2006) 
Perception of 
their crisis 
management 
readiness 
17-23 17. I have easy accessibility to crisis management 
resources 
18. The organization has adequate budget in its strategic 
plans in case of a crisis situation 
19. The organization has an adequate crisis management 
plan 
20. I am well informed about the resources and tools 
allocated for crisis response 
21. The organization views crisis management readiness 
as a corporate goal priority 
22. The members of the organization are trained to 
handle a crisis situation 
23. The organization will recover quickly after a crisis 
situation 
Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin 
(2003) 
Perception of 
their crisis 
management 
readiness 
24-28- 24. Crisis management readiness is a luxury we cannot 
afford  
25. Since we are big enough, survival following crises 
are greater  
26. Crises have only negative effects on my firm  
27. It would be sufficient to take action once crises occur  
28. It is impossible to prepare for crises since they are 
unpredictable 
Bass (1985) Leadership  
1. Intellectual 
Stimulation  
2. Inspiration 
Motivation about 
their leader 
 
1. 29-31 
 
2. 32-35 
29. Seeks differing perspectives when solving problems 
30. Gets me to look at problems from many different 
angles 
31. Suggests new ways of looking at how to complete 
tasks  
32. Talks optimistically about the future 
33. Talks enthusiastically about what needs to be 
accomplished 
34. Articulates a compelling vision of the future 
35. Expresses confidence that goals will be achieved 
James and 
Wooten 
(2004) 
Decision making 
and Trust 
perceptions 
36-38 36. Makes decisions fast and accepts responsibility 
37. Makes decisions without thinking through all 
possible outcomes 
38. Has my complete trust to make decisions during a 
crisis 
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The Qualtrics online survey tool was the survey programme used to design and 
administer the survey due to its professional layout and presentation capabilities, 
together with its response monitoring facility and ability for SPSS data conversion 
(Snow, 2013).  A copy of the online survey is provided in Appendix 11.  
 
3.3.3 SURVEY PARTICIPANTS AND DISTRIBUTION 
 
Participants who completed the survey were selected from the company’s email 
database in consultation with the company’s e-business gatekeeper, the HR manager 
and the researcher.  The positions identified for survey included the Executive 
Committees of the five-star hotel brand in Thailand, Manila, Dubai and Cairo, as well as 
staff in the corporate head office.  The range of positions were reflective of a cross 
section of the staff population, from non-managerial staff to senior levels of 
management.   
 
Although the company has significant operations in Thailand and the majority of the 
8,000-strong workforce is Thai, the day-to-day business operations are conducted in 
English due to its international network of hotels, guests and stakeholders.  Test surveys 
were sent to the Thai HR gatekeeper of this research project and two additional Thai 
staff to ensure comprehension of the survey. They provided feedback on some 
statements with suggested rewrites, which were undertaken as advised by Jennings 
(2010).  
 
An email invitation to participate in the survey was initially sent to the selected internal 
email database (n=919) on 26 November, 2012.  Bond University was identified as the 
researching institution and the identity of the researcher undertaking the study was also 
included. The email also highlighted the support from the company’s CEO and the aim 
to improve business processes through their feedback and participation. An e-survey 
was chosen as the preferred delivery method for the survey due to its convenience for 
ease and access at any time (Jennings, 2010).   
 
A second follow up email was sent on 4 December 2012 to encourage a greater 
response rate.  From the survey distribution of 919 surveys, 130 were returned, from 
which 118 were fully completed surveys.  Therefore the effective usable rate was 
12.8%.  Schmidt and Berrell (2007) suggested that response rates for online surveys can 
be as high as 10%; their Crisis Management survey achieved 8%. Veal (2006) suggested 
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low response rates for e-surveys may be due to the increasing volume of junk emails 
and therefore ignored by the recipients.  While Saunders et al.’s (2009) examination of 
response rates to business surveys indicated response rates in the range of 10% to 20%, 
although they suggest that this lower rate may be due to questionnaire fatigue.   
 
3.3.4 SURVEY PARTICIPANT PROFILES 
 
The 118 participants comprised of 50.8% males and 49.2% females. Table 3.5 describes 
the age and position of respondents with the largest cohort being in the 30-39 year range 
(43.2%), and the 40-49 year age group making the second largest grouping (26.3%).  
The positions of the respondents comprise mainly of first tier management (47.5%), 
followed by second tier management of Directors and Vice President level (28.5%) then 
non-managerial staff (19.5%) and Vice President level (4.2%).  This range of positions 
provides an insight into the differing perspectives of staff and supports the survey’s 
objective to explore multiple perceptions within the organization. This contributed to a 
focused picture of the substantive context of this study.  
 
Table 3.5: Age and Position of Respondents 
Age Range   Position  
20-29 years 15% Non-managerial 19.5% 
30-39 years 43.2% Manager 
(1 or more staff) 
47.5% 
40-49 years 26.3% Director / 
Assistant Vice President 
28.8% 
50-59 years 15.3% Vice President 4.2% 
 
The staff tenure for this group indicated the majority of the staff surveyed had been with 
the company for three years or more and would therefore have been employed by the 
company during the Red Shirt crisis of 2010.  It also indicated relatively stable 
employment tenure for the hospitality industry which is renowned for a high turnover 
employment rate (Gruman, Chhinzer & Smith, 2011), where front line employee 
turnover rates average 60% and management level average 25% (Tracey & Hinkin, 
2008).  Table 3.6 illustrates that 62.7% of all respondents had been with the 
organisation for more than three years and therefore had a sound understanding of the 
standard operating procedures within the company. 
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Table 3.6: Employment Tenure 
Employment 
Period 
 
0-2 years 37.3% 
3-6 years 38.1% 
7-10 years 11% 
11+ years 13.6% 
 
Table 3.7 provides an overview of the respondent’s nationality.  The nationality 
statistics indicate that almost 65% of all participants were Thai, reflecting the focus of 
the research context.  
 
Table 3.7: Nationality of Respondents  
Nationality Frequency % 
Thailand 76 64.4% 
Asia (excluding Thailand) 23 19.2% 
Europe and UK 11 9.2% 
Middle East and Africa 7 5.8% 
N/A 1 .8% 
 118 99.4* 
* Some missing % due to rounding down + 
the N/A value can be excluded for incorrect classification 
 
3.3.5 SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
The data elicited from the surveys were analysed using IBM SPSS software. The survey 
was intended to enhance the exploratory nature of the research study and contributed to 
theory-building within the Grounded Theory methodology (Losch, 2006).  Frequency 
statistics were used in order to contribute to the richness of the Grounded Theory 
methodology narrative.  Due to the small sample size of this online survey, as well as 
the limitations of significance testing, it was not appropriate to analyse the data for 
statistical significance (Losch, 2006).  In addition and given the small sample size, the 
survey data were not intended to become a central part of the study’s findings (Herman 
& Egri, 2002) but were intended to provide another layer to the richness of the data.  
Furthermore, the open feedback section also enriches the study’s findings with over 750 
words of direct comments made in the survey from respondents about the organisation’s 
performance during a crisis event.  These comments will be further analysed in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
 
The two key elements in objectively evaluating a measurement instrument are validity 
and reliability (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  The survey instrument was tested for its 
reliability for internal consistency of the scale, whereby the multi-item measures of a 
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concept or a construct were tested for their interrelatedness with an index of reliability.  
The data were assessed for consistency in the respondents’ answers by employing 
Cronbach’s alpha as the reliability test (Kan, 2002) with the frequency reports.  This 
contributed further to the robustness of the emergent interview themes. 
 
The online survey resource adds another dimension to the primary interview data and 
builds a clearer picture of the substantive context of this case study organisation and 
provided additional insights into the organisation’s crisis readiness.  The online survey’s 
findings of staff perceptions will be discussed in conjunction with the primary data 
findings in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  The researcher also incorporated further 
secondary data sources into the study as will now be detailed in the following section. 
 
3.4 SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION  
 
Secondary Data can be used to triangulate findings based on other data (Saunders et.al, 
2009), such as correspondence, media reports that substantiate or refute primary data 
collection in the form of interviews.  In their Grounded Theory mantra, Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) emphasised the key to exposing variation is to collect data from a range 
of sources.  Strauss and Corbin (1998) further advocated the interplay between 
qualitative and quantitative methods whereby the qualitative should direct the 
quantitative and the quantitative is fed back into the qualitative in a circular, evolving 
process contributing to the development of theory.  An important characteristic of 
grounded theory data analysis is the constant comparison method in order to generate 
and analyse the data (Egan, 2002).  Document and media analysis will now be explained 
in detail in the following section. 
 
3.4.1 DOCUMENT AND MEDIA ANALYSIS  
 
The research also involved the analysis of the case study organisation’s secondary 
source information including the company’s Crisis Communication Plan, internal and 
external communications, and media reports.  This supplementary material provided 
further insight into the rationale for management decisions, as well as being a vital point 
of comparison (Saunders et al., 2009; Veal, 2006).  The documents collected also 
assisted in verifying and clarifying details from the interview data collection process 
(Yin, 2011) which added to the rigour and efficacy of the research study and its 
findings.  Table 3.8 provides a summary of the secondary data reviewed in order to 
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substantiate the chain of events and explore further thematic concepts and discordant 
data. 
 
Table 3.8: Secondary Data Document Analysis 
Document Type Quantity Pages Words 
Internal and External Company Emails :  
February –Sept 2010 
 
936 
 
669 
 
244,203 
Manuals and Reports:  
o Risk Assessment Reports 2008 and 2010 
o Crisis Manual + Crisis Communication Manual 
o Resort property Training documents * 
o Media Reports/ clippings/ print and online * 
o Company Annual Reports 2010 and 2011 * 
 
2 
2 
7 
55 
2 
 
117 
140 
30 
 
360  
 
26,131 
23,387 
Meeting Minutes 3 8 2,554 
Advertisements – company related * 8   
Reflections and Recollections of researcher 1 14 8,000 
Summary and Memo Highlights  1 23 12,216 
CNN TV Interviews   2,734 
* Power Point, PDF and media clippings : word count not available 
 
The researcher had access to internal and external communications from the case study 
organisation, including emails, minutes of meetings, staff announcements, 
advertisements and CNN television interviews of the CEO during the Red Shirt crisis 
period. These documents were analysed using a textually driven qualitative 
methodology and were examined to identify additional and supporting themes as the 
theoretical concepts developed.  The organisation’s February to May 2010 media report 
was also included providing media clippings and media value calculations.  Grounded 
Theory is grounded in the richness of the contextual data and the researcher found 
documents such as meeting minutes (Veal, 2006) and television interview narratives to 
be extremely descriptive and useful for emergent themes.   
 
Some concerns have been expressed about secondary data in areas such as personal bias 
where less rigour exists in news media for example than in research reports (Jennings, 
2010; Kumar, 2011).  Jennings (2010), who summarised the advantages and 
disadvantages of using secondary data, concluded that this type of data is a rich source 
of empirical data, however, because it uses the language of the contextual setting not of 
the researcher.  Jennings (2010) also acknowledged the disadvantages related to data 
accessibility and a lack of knowledge with regard to how the documents were produced.  
This was not an issue for the researcher as she had full access to the data and was a 
member of the case study organisation as the time of the Red Shirt crisis. Analysis of 
the secondary documents and media materials is reported in the findings in Chapters 
Four and Five.  
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Grounded Theory methodology directed the data analysis process.  First, theoretical 
sampling was used, followed by data coding which progressively moved from open 
coding to selective coding (lower order categories), to theoretical coding (higher order 
categories) and finally to the identification of the emergent theory in the form of a basic 
social process (BSP).   
 
The coding process adopted at the commencement of the data analysis was based on 
Glaser’s (1978) theoretical coding families.  “The Six C’s” is Glaser’s (1978) first phase 
coding process to consider and is based on the causal-consequence model or the 
equivalent of the nomothetic independent-dependent variable model.  “The Six C’s” 
consisting of causes, consequences, contingencies, conditions, covariances and context.  
It provided the road map for the data analysis trail and is summarised by Kan and Parry 
(2004) with its nomothetic equivalent in Table 3.9.   
 
 Table 3.9: The Six C’s and the Equivalent Nomothetic Concepts 
Grounded Theory Concepts Equivalent Nomothetic Concepts 
Cause Independent Variable 
Consequence Dependent Variable 
Contingency Moderating Variable 
Condition Intervening Variable  
Covariance Correlation 
Context  Context 
Source: Kan, M. M., and Parry, K. W. (2004). Identifying paradox: A grounded theory of 
leadership in overcoming resistance to change. The Leadership Quarterly, 15(4), 467-491. 
 
Having used “The Six C’s”, the researcher then progressively analysed the data with 
Glaser’s (1978) coding families, which have been summarised by Kan (2002) in Table 
3.10 and used as a guideline for this present study . 
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Table 3.10 Glaser’s (1978) Coding Families  
Coding Family Description 
1. The Six C’s Causes, consequences, contingencies, conditions, covariances and context 
2. Process Stages, staging, phases, progressions, passages, gradations, transitions, steps, 
ranks, careers, orderings, trajectories, chains, sequencing, temporaling, shaping 
and cycling. 
3. Degree Limit, range, intensity, extent, amount, polarity, extreme, boundary, rank, grades, 
continuum, probability, possibility, level, cutting points, critical juncture, 
statistical average, standard deviation etc … 
4. Dimension Dimensions, elements, division, piece of, properties of, facet, slice etc… 
5. Type Type, form, kinds, styles, classes, genre.  
6. Strategy Strategies, tactics mechanisms, managed, way, manipulation, manoeuvrings, 
dealing with, handling, techniques, ploys, means, goals, arrangements, 
dominating positioning. 
7. Interactive Mutual effects, reciprocity, mutual trajectory, mutual dependency, interactions, 
interdependence, interaction of events, covariance. 
8. Identity – Self Self-image, self-worth, self-concept, self-evaluation, identity, social worth, self-
realisation, transformations of self etc… 
9. Cutting point Boundary, critical juncture, cutting point, turning point, breaking point, 
benchmark, tolerance levels, division, polychotomy etc…. 
10. Means - goal  End, purpose, goal, anticipated consequence, products.   
11. Cultural 
family 
Social norms, social values, social beliefs, social sentiments. 
12. Consensus Clusters, agreements, contracts, definitions of the situation, uniformities, 
opinions, conflict, differential perceptions, conformity etc… 
13. Mainline Social control, recruitment, socialisation, social interaction etc… 
14. Theoretical Parsimony, scope, integration, density, conceptual level, relationship to data, 
clarity, fit etc… 
15. Ordering or 
Elaboration 
Structural, temporal, generality are the three principals to order data. 
16. Unit Collective group, organisation, situation, context, social world, society etc…and 
positional units: status, role etc… 
17. Reading Concepts, problems, hypotheses. 
18. Models Modelling one’s theory pictorially 
 
Source: Kan, M. M. (2002). Identifying paradox: A grounded theory of nurse leadership in overcoming 
organisational change resistance. (Doctor of Philosophy in Management, Victoria University of 
Wellington). 
 
The interview data were coded and analysed using NVivo, a computer-aided qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS). Rather than using a manual coding scheme, 
CAQDAS improved transparency and methodological rigour to enable key themes to be 
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detected, categorised and relationships to be explored (Saunders et al., 2009).  Please 
refer to data coding by Nvivo Nodes Parent and Child Categorisation in Appendix 12. 
 
3.5.1 DATA SATURATION 
 
As noted in Section 3.2.6, data saturation from all qualitative sources was achieved 
when it was evident that no new information emerged from the joint collection and 
analysis of data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  The point of data saturation was reached 
when the interviewees were providing similar feedback about the phenomenon and the 
data were not contributing to the generation or clarification of categories (Kan, 2002).  
Egan (2002) suggested Grounded Theory research is concluded when sufficient theory 
has emerged from the data.  The level of ‘sufficiency’ is best illustrated by Egan’s 
(2002) description of data saturation being “evident when data collection no longer 
contributes to elaboration of the phenomenon being investigated” (p.286). 
 
Kumar (2011) advocated that the data saturation point is a highly subjective one, he was 
of the opinion that the researcher decides on this point in the data collection process.  
The researcher’s decision to terminate data collection in this present study was not only 
based on sameness or replication of interviewee’s comments and perspectives, but 
rather on the consistency of characteristics at a thematic level (Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007).   
 
The benefit of Grounded Theory’s theoretical sampling allowed the researcher to 
systematically select interviewees who were knowledgeable with the research question: 
this added to the efficacy of reaching the data saturation point.  Bryant and Charmaz 
(2007) concluded that “effective and efficient sampling strategies, which change during 
the process of data collection and analysis, enable the researcher to complete the task 
with minimal waste, and without entering any conceptual blind alleys, to produce an 
excellent grounded theory” (p.243) 
 
The empirical data collection phase was finalised when the interview data no longer 
provided new insights and achieved data saturation (Saunders et al., 2009).  Although 
Jennings (2010) suggested that when collecting empirical data “the researcher decides 
when enough participants have been sampled” (p.149); however, it was the data 
collection process that revealed the point of theoretical saturation for this researcher.  
The purposive sampling employed in this study provided knowledgeable informants 
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who could articulate their views and experiences and contribute meaningful data.   In 
addition, the secondary data sources were analysed with the constant comparative 
method which elicited rich data for the research question of how Crisis Leadership 
influences Crisis Management readiness. 
 
3.5.2 DATA VALIDITY, RELIABILITY AND GENERALISABILITY 
 
The quality and integrity of an empirical research study can be established with the tests 
of validity, reliability and to some extent, generalisability, which will be explained in 
this section.  Veal (2006) described Validity as “the extent to which the information 
collected by the researcher truly reflects the phenomenon being studied” (p.41).  
Creswell (2009) posited that validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research, since 
the accuracy of the findings is reflective of the researcher and interviewee’s 
understanding of the phenomenon.  Nevertheless, Yin (2011) suggested one of the key 
quality control issues of research is the validity of a study and its findings. 
 
Validity strategies were adopted in the current research as recommended by Creswell 
(2009) to ensure accuracy of the findings and as a quality control imperative.  Parry 
(1998) also recommended multiple data sources in Grounded Theory leadership 
research to strengthen the research study’s validity. 
 
The validity strategies included firstly, the triangulation of data sources to build 
thematic concepts by using in-depth interviews, an online survey, as well as internal and 
external communications.  Secondly, the researcher shared drafts of the final thesis with 
two hotel management colleagues for their feedback and understanding.  Thirdly, a 
published peer-reviewed book chapter (a précis of the research study) was also shared 
for the accuracy of results with some interview participants and knowledgeable referees.  
Fourthly, the researcher utilised rich descriptive narrative to express the findings of the 
study and further add to its validity.  Fifthly, the researcher explained any potential bias 
throughout the study with the researcher’s self-reflection and background information 
providing an honest and credible account of the research process and how it influenced 
the findings.  Finally, the researcher also endeavoured to highlight any discrepancies or 
negative information thereby preventing any contradictory evidence, which verified the 
researcher’s commitment to the study’s validity.   
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Reliability is defined by Veal (2006) as “the extent to which research findings would be 
the same if the research were to be repeated at a later date or with a different sample of 
subjects” (p.41).  In the case of this present research design, reliability would be 
difficult to replicate as this study focused on a contextual phenomenon.  However, 
qualitative researchers can ensure a consistent and reliable approach by systematic 
documentation of the case study detailing all the steps and processes undertaken 
(Creswell, 2009). This led the researcher to undertake reliability procedures as used by 
Creswell (2009) and Gibbs (2007) and included checking transcriptions for mistakes to 
ensure error-free data.  In addition, the researcher maintained a strict process for coding 
and coding definitions to avoid any deviation from the original coding scheme. 
 
Generalisability was more difficult to apply to this research as it is a feature that is 
limited in qualitative research (Creswell, 2009).  Veal (2006) described generalisability 
as “the probability that the results of the research findings apply to other subjects, other 
groups, and other conditions” (p.117).  Although the findings of this study may be 
difficult to generalise beyond this current single case, the systematic data collection and 
analysis procedures adopted in this study could be applied to other case study 
organisations for broader theory development (Yin, 2009).   
 
Jennings (2010) suggested the terms ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ are more appropriate to 
quantitative studies.  In saying that, it does not mean that the rigour of qualitative 
research is any less.  Instead Jennings (2010) suggested alternative tests for qualitative 
research including trustworthiness, authenticity, and goodness of fit.  For the present 
study, the researcher embraced the traditional concepts of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ and 
as a consequence adopted the strategies described above to address ‘reliability’ and 
‘validity’.  The next section will explain the data coding process directed by the study’s 
Grounded Theory approach. 
 
3.6 DATA CODING  
 
This section provides a detailed explanation of the data coding using Grounded Theory 
methodology.  The focus of this section is the researcher’s methods of analysis in 
generating the study’s theoretical concepts from the empirical data.  This process 
consisted of data coding from a substantive to a theoretical level, while engaging in the 
constant comparative method throughout.  The resultant basic social process (BSP) that 
emerged comprised of the higher order category’s basic social structural processes 
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(BSSPs) and the core category’s basic social psychological process (BSPP).  These 
findings provide the basis for the following discussion in Chapter Four, Five and Six on 
the study’s contextual theoretical concepts.  The data coding process will now be 
explained. 
 
3.6.1 DATA CODING PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS  
 
Upon receipt of the interview transcriptions, the researcher reviewed the transcriber’s 
understanding of the dialogue and corrected any anomalies or misspellings by replaying 
the audio files.  This was especially evident in Thai family names or place names for the 
transcriber.  In the earliest stages of the data analysis the researcher employed a manual 
system of summarising the interview data into a Word document, with key phrases, 
words and memorable quotes titled ‘Summary and Memo Highlights’.  This process 
provided an opportunity to absorb and organise the first of many iterations of the data 
analysis.   
 
Saunders et al. (2009) recommended summarising the key points from transcripts by 
compressing statements into shorter phrases.  This allowed the researcher to “become 
conversant with principal themes that have emerged from the interview” (Saunders et 
al., 2009, p.491).  The researcher returned to this document on numerous occasions to 
refine and elaborate as thematic categories began to emerge.  It also served as an active 
reference point for follow up items and for seeking further explanation of terminologies.  
At the same time, the ‘Summary and Memo Highlights’ became an invaluable tool to 
establish what was happening in the context of this substantive phenomenon. 
 
Qualitative analysis is characterised by the search for emergent themes (Veal, 2006).  
Although the conceptual framework initially introduced the research problem and 
potential themes, the search for emergent themes was an inductive process.  Veal (2006) 
acknowledged that both inductive and deductive processes will exist concurrently in 
qualitative methods of analysis. 
 
The memo section of the summary was regularly updated based on the constant 
comparison method of Grounded Theory. This process provided the researcher with 
new insights.  For example, when comparing interview statements about the Phuket 
earthquake it was evident that the unsuccessful hotel evacuation resulted in the necessity 
of an immediate intensive Crisis Readiness regime.  The Phuket hotel’s new crisis plan 
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had not been shared with the corporate office informants, who were under the 
impression that the Phuket hotel’s earthquake evacuation was a successful operation.   
 
This was also true of the researcher’s interview memos and observations based on some 
participants’ perceptions of their General Manager (GM).  Participants who were 
previously negative and critical in their comments about their GM’s day-to-day 
management style were more complimentary and trusting of the GM’s authority and 
decision-making during the Red Shirt crisis.  This was identified as being attributable to 
his past experience with a crisis and his decisive, compassionate decision-making style 
at the time of the crisis. 
 
The researcher’s own self reflections from memos during the data collection and 
analysis also motivated her to understand why the Risk Management (RM) department 
had not been more assertive in establishing Crisis Readiness plans and systems as their 
remit.  The researcher wrote in a memo in ‘Summary and Memo Highlights’; “This is 
one of the few international hotel companies that does not have a security leader at the 
corporate office or conduct audits, which in today’s environment is irresponsible when 
hotels are soft targets for terrorism” (p.15).  The researcher utilised this memo frame to 
probe further and explain why RM failed to assume a leadership role in Crisis Readiness 
preparations.  
 
A manual visualisation assisted the researcher to explore the preliminary thematic 
categories and uncover what was happening in this temporal space.  From this 
schematic display, combined with the frequency of the free nodes, the nodes provided 
an initial overview of the thematic congruence and initially identified seven themes 
from the interview data under the headings of; (i) crisis readiness, (ii) crisis 
management, (iii) state of mind, (iv) crisis leadership strengths, (v) crisis leadership 
inadequacies, (vi) experiential learning and (vii) leadership cohort and stakeholders. 
 
In addition, triangulation of secondary data including staff emails and announcements, 
customer communiques, meeting minutes, CNN television interviews, Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP’s) and manuals, and the free form survey responses 
highlighted further opportunities to qualitatively explore thematic categories as they 
developed. 
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3.6.2 FROM SUBSTANTIVE TO THEORETICAL DATA CODING 
 
Data coding typically takes one of two forms, namely substantive and theoretical coding 
(Glaser, 1978).  Grounded Theory utilises substantive coding to demystify the empirical 
data by initially identifying what is happening.  Substantive coding is represented by 
open and selective coding.  Whereas theoretical coding takes the data to a more abstract 
level and uses the substantive coding as hypotheses to conceptualise relationships and 
generate theory (Kan, 2002). 
   
Computer aided data coding followed the manual analysis. The data were codified with 
the assistance of NVivo10 (QSR International, 2010), which is considered one of the 
most popular CAQDAS packages due to its ability to assist and shape data (Veal, 2006).  
Line-by-line, each word from the interview data were analysed.  Subsequently, 296 free 
nodes were identified to commence the arduous journey of thematic generation.  A node 
is the NVivo terminology which is defined as “A container that lets you gather source 
content relating to themes, peoples, places, organisations or other areas of interest” 
(QSR International, p.110).  To reassure the rigour of the data analysis, the researcher 
repeated this process over the following weeks and revised classification with only 
minimal adjustment to achieve a final total of 303 free nodes.  
 
The free nodes from the open coding phase were then categorised by selective coding to 
identify parent nodes.  Parent nodes are defined by NVivo as: “A node that has child 
nodes below it in the node hierarchy” (QSR International, p.110).  Concurrently the 
researcher also identified 158 memorable quotes to assist in maximising the strength of 
an observation or meaning of a developing thematic category, as well as providing 
pragmatic examples for the study’s findings and conclusions. 
 
The second phase of the data coding process involved an analysis of the free nodes in 
NVivo10 to thematically categorise and collapse into parent, child and sibling nodes.  
Appendix 12 displays the parent, child and sibling nodes.  Twenty-one (21) parent 
nodes became representative of the thematic categories from which the study’s lower 
order theoretical categories were identified.    
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The researcher was also cognisant of the challenge in micro-coding by being over-
zealous in the data coding process and micro-analysing the codes.  The concern was that 
if the empirical data is reduced to the extent that the level of abstraction is disconnected 
from the original meaning and substantive context, then the study’s direction realigns to 
a quantitative one (Jennings, 2010, Saunders et al., 2009).  The researcher therefore 
employed a coding discipline that sought to describe the meaning of the codes and 
inductively revealed the emergent themes; hence she was able to conceptualise the data 
through higher levels of abstraction (Glaser, 1998). 
 
The lower order categories provided the key iteration to categorising and unlocking the 
data and are described in terms of; Influencing Leadership (Communicating, Decision-
making, Visibility, Leading by Example, Motivating Influencers), Active Sense-making 
(Understanding the Mindset, Emotional Sensitivity, National  and Organisational 
Culture), Managing the Crisis (Responsibility, Strategising, Activating), Preparing for 
the Unthinkable (Warning Signals, Forward Planning, State of Readiness), Learning 
from Experience (Experience with Crisis Events, Organisational Learning), Learning 
Routineness (Confidence Building, Training to be Ready), and Retaining Institutional 
Memory.  The lower order categories’ properties will be described in depth in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six.   
 
3.6.3 THEORETICAL CODING: BASIC SOCIAL PROCESSES 
 
One of the key objectives of this research is to understand the basic social processes 
(BSPs) in an organisation prior to, and at the time of, a crisis event.  BSPs are described 
by Glaser (1978) as;  
“theoretical reflections and summarisations of the patterned, systematic 
uniformity flows of social life which people go through, and which can be 
conceptually ‘captured’ and further understood through the construction of BSP 
theories” (p.100).   
 
A BSP is comprised of two types of process: firstly, a basic social structural process 
(BSSP) and secondly, a basic social psychological process (BSPP).  Glaser (1978) 
further described the linkage of the two processes where the BSSP is the structure which 
facilitates the BSPP to flourish. The researcher uncovered these BSPs as the data coding 
progressed from substantive to theoretical coding. 
 
Since the current research study was focused on understanding the Crisis Leadership 
phenomenon, the BSP is also considered a Social Process of Leadership or SPL (Parry 
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& Meindl, 2002).  Parry (2002) utilised structural equation modeling to operationalise 
three higher order category SPLs: Optimising, Resolving Uncertainty, and Enhancing 
Adaptability.  These SPLs were also considered in the development of the BSPs and 
emergent theory for the present study and are briefly summarised with the following 
descriptions.  First, ‘Optimising’ is when the leader maximises the resources available 
and makes the best of the situation through three phases, namely surviving, investing or 
transforming.  Second, ‘Resolving Uncertainty’ provides for effective leadership that 
resolves uncertainty through the leaders’ behaviours and actions.  Third, ‘Enhancing 
Adaptability’ provides for the leader to influence change by enhancing the adaptability 
of followers and themselves with a number of key strategies such as consistent and clear 
communications, facilitating positive experiences for change and establishing 
complementarity of the leader and follower values (Parry & Meindl, 2002).  These SPLs 
were found to be present in the data and their properties were interrelated with the 
emergent theory. 
 
The data coding flow process then reached the theoretical level.  The data were filtered 
into the lower order categories in the next iteration to establish a deeper interpretation of 
the two main higher order categories. At this point, theoretical coding took a more 
prominent role to assist in the development of the theory’s abstract concepts.  The 
filtered higher order categories indicated further thematic congruence and were 
determined to be representative of (i) Crisis Leadership Influencers and (ii) Experiential 
Learning.  The two theoretical categories that emerged are described as BSSPs, which 
were supporting processes of the highest order core category.   
 
The final filtering process of theoretical coding uncovered the core category as the 
BSPP of Empowering Readiness which is central to the BSP and supported by the 
BSSP in the lower order categories.  Figure 3.1 provides a schematic overview of the 
data coding analysis filter which contributed to a Hierarchy of Abstraction model.  The 
components of each higher order and core category will be explained in the following 
section. 
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Lower Order Categories 
 
 Lower Order Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
Influencing Leadership 
Communicating 
Decision-Making, Visibility, 
Leading by example,  
Motivating Influencers 
 
Active Sense-making 
Understanding Mindset,  
Emotional Sensitivity,  
National and Organisational Culture  
 
Managing the Crisis 
Responsibility, Strategising,  
Activating  
Preparing for the Unthinkable 
Warning Signals, Forward 
Planning, State of Readiness 
 
Learning from experience 
Experience with Crisis Events, 
Organisational Learning  
 
Learning Routineness 
Training to be Ready,  
Confidence Building,  
 
Retaining Institutional Memory 
 
  
 
 
 
Higher Order Categories 
Basic Social Structural Processes (BSSP) 
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers 
 
 Experiential Learning 
   
CORE CATEGORY 
Basic Social Psychological Process (BSPP) 
 
 
EMPOWERING READINESS 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Category Filtration to the Basic Social Process 
 
Although the data coding process has been described above as a systematic phased 
progression, data coding did not follow a strict linear process due to the constant 
comparison method of Grounded Theory.  Instead the researcher was concurrently 
comparing experiences between interview participants and key informants, while 
detailing and analysing memos and secondary data sources in order to progress the 
emergent theory. 
 
The data analysis revealed the higher order core categories as two BSSPs namely Crisis 
Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning.  The BSSPs provided the social 
structure for the research problem and supported the emergent theoretical core category, 
which is the conceptualised BSPP identified as Empowering Readiness. 
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3.6.4 CRISIS LEADERSHIP INFLUENCERS 
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers is the higher order category that classified the Crisis 
Leadership variables which influenced the organisation’s Crisis Readiness.  This 
category evolved from these lower order categories: Influencing Leadership, Active 
Sense-making, and Managing the Crisis.   
 
A brief introduction to the lower order categories of Crisis Leadership Influencers is 
provided in this section with a more detailed explanation in Chapter Four.  In short, 
Influencing Leadership describes the leadership activities and actions that positively 
influenced the organisation’s pre-crisis to crisis recovery phases through actions such as 
communicating, decision making and visibility.  Active Sense-making is the leadership 
process for understanding the mindset, as well as the organisational and national culture 
traits that influenced the Crisis Leadership activities and engaged followers.   
 
Whereas, Managing the Crisis contributed to the BSSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers 
by exploring the areas of leadership strategising and activating crisis initiatives.  The 
lower order categories represented elements of the higher order category through 
thematic congruence with some shared relating properties.  The higher order theoretical 
category and BSSP described as Crisis Leadership Influencers accounted for Crisis 
Leadership’s actions and the influence on the case study organisation.   
 
3.6.5 EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING  
 
Experiential Learning is also a higher order category and BSSP which resulted from the 
theoretical coding analysis and will be explained in more detail in Chapter Five.  
Experiential Learning explained the variation in crisis experience levels of Crisis 
Leadership and its impact on the Crisis Readiness of the organisation.  The lower order 
categories of Experiential Learning were reflective of the BSSP and included: Preparing 
for the Unthinkable, Leading from Experience, Learning Routineness, and Retaining 
Institutional Memory, which are introduced briefly in this section.   
 
Planning for the Unthinkable explained the proactive nature required for effective Crisis 
Readiness and how any variability of this category influenced the higher order category 
of Experiential Learning.  Leading from Experience identified the Crisis Readiness of 
leaders with previous experience of crisis events.  The strength of the followers’ sense 
of trust and respect was determined by the Crisis Leadership’s previous crisis 
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experience, which added credibility to the Crisis Leadership’s directives and actions.    
Learning Routineness also contributed to the BSSP by explaining leadership’s 
commitment to prepare for a crisis with regular training programmes, manuals, standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) and the confidence that is instilled with routineness.  
Finally, Retaining Institutional Memory is a lower order category that explains 
variations in Experiential Learning through the organisation’s commitment to a culture 
of crisis event debriefing and organisational learning to enact a Crisis Readiness regime.  
Participants expressed concern about staff turnover and the subsequent loss of 
institutional memory.  Institutional memory loss has been evident as a result of the 
departure of executives who played key roles in the Crisis Management process of the 
Red Shirt 2010 crisis. New recruits have had little or no training in managing crisis 
situations. 
 
The final filtering process for this research study produced the BSPP as the core 
category which is described as Empowering Readiness.  Empowering Readiness is the 
theme that most reflected the participants’ main concern in preparing for, and having the 
confidence to deal with future crisis events from the data analysis. 
 
3.6.6 THE CORE CATEGORY 
 
The core category emerged from the data analysis as the main theme that identified the 
overall concern of the participants.  Empowering Readiness was the highest order 
category that explained How Crisis Leadership influenced Crisis Management 
Readiness in the substantive context of the case study organisation, specifically with 
regard to the Phuket 2012 earthquake.  Theoretical completeness was achieved as 
categories became saturated and the core category accounted for the behaviour that 
resolved the main concern of the participants (Glaser, 1998). 
 
By employing Grounded Theory’s constant comparison method the researcher was alert 
at all times to the detection of a core category by reconnoitering data backwards and 
forwards in search of the core variable.  One of the key objectives for the researcher in 
the coding phase was to determine the predominant theme described by Glaser (1978) 
as “the main concern or problem for the people in the setting, for what sums up in a 
pattern of behaviour the substance of what is going on in the data, for what is the 
essence of relevance reflected in the data, for gerunds which bring out process and 
change” (p.94).    
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The formulation of a core category in Grounded Theory is based on a set of eight 
criteria provided by Glaser (1978) and adopted by the researcher. First, the core 
category was central to the categorising architecture and therefore related to as many 
categories as possible.  This accounted for its contribution to the variation in the study’s 
behaviour patterns.  Second, it experienced a high rate of frequency in the data, which 
explained a stable pattern.  Third, saturation of the core category occurred after the 
lower order categories had been finalised.  Fourth, there was a meaningful relationship 
with other categories, which was realised early and reflected a richness of the data.  
Fifth, the core category was applicable to formalising development of substantive theory.  
Sixth, the core category allowed the researcher to carry-through the analysis as it 
became the key to unlock the final phase of theory generation.  Seventh, the core 
category’s relationship to other categories ensured it was completely variable, and 
eighth, the core category was also a dimension of the problem. 
 
Glaser’s (1978) conclusion in relation to the development of the core category 
development criteria was to warn researchers that they must avoid establishing a core 
category from other sources that are not grounded in the data.  These two sources are 
sociological interest or the researcher’s own personal interest (Kan, 2002) and the use of 
deductive and logical elaboration.  Glaser’s warning was attributed to the concern that if 
core categories are obtained from these sources, the result will be a core category that 
cannot satisfy the Grounded Theory test of fit, relevance or workability.   
 
Thematic concepts and core categories evolved early in the analysis and mid-way 
through the formal Phase One interviews.  It was evident that saturation was achieved as 
new categories no longer emerged.  The two main findings from this research were the 
two higher order categories that emerged early in the concurrent data collection and 
analysis stages of the study. The first finding that developed early was how Crisis 
Leadership Influencers influenced the organisation’s Crisis Readiness and its ability to 
manage the crisis event.  The second finding was based on the crisis experience of 
leadership, organisational learning and institutional memory retention to develop the 
concept Experiential Learning and how it impacted the organisation’s Crisis Readiness 
phase.  The two lower order categories provided the foundation for the final core 
category of Empowering Readiness in answer to the main research question of ‘How 
does Crisis Leadership influence Crisis Management readiness in the Thai Hotel 
Industry?”.    
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Phase Two interviews validated and built upon these findings and contributed to 
confirmation of the emergent theory.  The schematic which described the ‘Category 
Filtration to the Basic Social Process’ in Figure 3.1 was shared with interview 
participants from Phase One, and purposive sampling was once again employed to 
select new participants in Phase Two.  Purposive sampling was deemed appropriate to 
ensure participants would be intimately familiar with the case study organisation in 
order to elicit rich and meaningful data.  
 
The objective of Phase Two data collection was to tease out additional concepts and 
seek confirmation of coding categories as the theoretical concept was developing.  One 
of the new Phase Two participants, who specialised in security and risk management, 
was initially challenged to make comment on the schematic in its presented form due to 
the two column format.  He expressed his concerns both verbally and via an email that 
be believed the schematic should indicate “a series of dotted lines between the different 
columns and issues”.  This statement provided the researcher with validation that the 
developing theory with its displayed categories were indeed interrelated and further 
strengthened by these relationships.  The following section outlines the ethical issues 
related to data collection for this study. 
 
3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DE-LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The study took into account ethical considerations, characterised by the general 
principles as stated by Veal (2006) including: no harm should be caused to the research 
participants; they would participate freely; and they would participate on the basis of 
informed consent.  It was important to ensure that no harm would be caused to the 
informants by divulging any of the findings, having them feel embarrassed, or having 
the potential to lose face in front of their peers. Therefore, informed consent was 
required (Thomas 2011).  Informants signed an agreement stating that they understood 
the nature of the study and that the data would remain confidential.  
 
Participants were provided with the explanatory information in an understandable, non-
technical format.  The Explanatory Statement for Participants (refer to Appendix 8) and 
the Consent Form (refer to Appendix 10)  outlined the purpose of the study, the 
expected benefits, confidentiality and anonymity clauses, the period of time when the 
data would be held before being destroyed, as well as the researcher’s contact details.  
These documents have been introduced in Section 3.2.4.  
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Approval to conduct this research study with the case study organisation was provided 
through the office of the company’s CEO. Individual employees had the freedom to 
decide if they wished to participate or not. The nature of the consent was understood as 
implied consent with a clear explanation should they wish to opt out (Ghauri et al., 
2005; Thomas, 2011; Veal 2006). The research was approved by the Bond University 
Ethics Committee prior to proceeding with any data collection and allocated ethics 
reference number RO1574. 
 
To verify that appropriate protocols of informed consent were employed it is important 
to note that two interviewees, who were invited to participate, declined to be involved.  
One potential interviewee was uncomfortable with sharing sensitive information and 
another was of the belief that her role at the time of the Red Shirt crisis was not senior 
enough to provide substantive data.  They were not therefore involved in any data 
collection as a result. 
 
In designing the research plan for this study a number of options were considered to 
enhance the validity and reliability of the study’s selected methodological design.  The 
purpose of the study was to generate substantive theory by using Grounded Theory 
methodologies, which led the researcher to consider the intensive nature of data 
collection and analysis of the Grounded Theory approach.   
 
The main de-limitation imposed on the study was the selection of a single case 
organisation with multiple business units and locations, which was deemed sufficient to 
provide rich and compelling data in a time and cost efficient manner on the substantive 
contextual frame of reference for this study.  Since the researcher had previously 
worked for the case study organisation access to participants and secondary data was 
easily granted, whereas access to competitor organisations would have been difficult to 
obtain.  Researcher bias issues were considered at the beginning of the study and have 
been outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.7.  The final chapter of this thesis will further 
discuss researcher bias in Limitations of the Study, Section 7.3.  
 
3.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The most appropriate research methodology adopted for this study and the key 
methodological considerations were addressed in this chapter.  The Grounded Theory 
approach was explained in detail as it provided the foundation for the study’s research 
philosophy. The key principles of Grounded Theory were outlined and included the 
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constant comparative method, theoretical sampling, theoretical coding, theoretical 
memos and theoretical sorting.  While Grounded Theory was deemed most appropriate 
for the development of substantive theory and to answer the primary research question, 
criticisms about the Grounded Theory philosophy were also considered and addressed.   
 
This chapter also provided an explanation of the benefits of a single case study 
approach.  The case study organisation consisted of multi-property business units which 
contributed to the strength of the data.  Moreover, data triangulation added to the rigour 
of the investigation and, in turn, the robustness of the findings.  The different types of 
data collected from the case study organisation included semi-structured in-depth 
interviews and other secondary data document sources, including an online survey.  The 
quality and integrity of the selected methods has been explained in this chapter 
including the validity and reliability strategies that were incorporated into the research 
process.  In addition, the generalisability of this study has been considered and may be 
applied to other case studies for broader theory development.  
 
The chapter has also detailed the data collection and analysis methodologies used based 
on the Grounded Theory approach.  The main purpose of this research was to explore 
the basic social processes (BSPs) at play and identify substantive theory in the field of 
crisis leadership and crisis management readiness.  Semi-structured interviewing was 
chosen as the most appropriate technique to identify these BSPs and elicit rich detailed 
data that revealed experiences, opinions, knowledge, attitudes and perceptions on the 
research topic. 
 
The interview topics were covered mainly through a series of open-ended questions 
drawn previous studies which assisted the researcher to stay focused on the research 
questions.  The interview plan also ensured efficiencies in achieving the point of data 
saturation when new themes no longer emerged.  Theoretical sampling, as prescribed by 
the Grounded Theory methodology, also directed the researcher to interview appropriate 
participants who were able to provide the necessary data for efficient interviewing since 
Phase One interviews were conducted in Bangkok. 
 
The online survey which was employed as a qualitative secondary data source has also 
been explained in this chapter.  The survey was used to augment findings from the 
primary data source of qualitative interviews.  The survey was designed from pre-
validated instruments and sought to understand the perceptions of staff with regard to 
Chapter 3 – Research Method and Data Collection 
 
 
128 | P a g e  
their organisation’s corporate orientation, crisis readiness and crisis leadership 
competencies.  The survey was not intended as a statistically significant research 
instrument.  Instead, the survey was utilised for consistency and provided descriptive 
frequency statistics to validate the emergent themes.  The survey’s findings on staff 
perceptions will be reported in conjunction with the interview findings in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six of this thesis. 
 
This chapter also introduced how data progressed through the substantive level of 
coding and progressed to the theoretical level to produce the BSPs and eventually the 
core category of influence. These themes were reflective of the concerns of the case 
study organisation participants.  Crisis Leadership Influencers and Experiential 
Learning were the higher order categories conceptualised to reflect the participants 
concerns with the organisation’s state of crisis readiness.  The core category then 
emerged from the higher levels of abstraction utilising the constant comparative method 
and was identified as Empowering Readiness.  Empowering Readiness explained the 
basic social psychological process that Crisis Leaders require to ensure the 
organisation’s crisis readiness.  Chapter Four will describe the findings that explained 
how Crisis Leadership Influencers emerged to explain the relationships between its 
lower order categories of Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and Managing 
the Crisis.   
 
In conclusion, Chapter Three has explained the ethical considerations that were taken 
into account when conducting this study.  This chapter also concluded with the study’s 
de-limitations that describe the boundaries that have been established for this research.  
The following chapters will outline the emergent thematic concepts from the substantive 
data, commencing with Crisis Leadership Influencers in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER 4   CRISIS LEADERSHIP INFLUENCERS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will outline the findings of Phase One and Phase Two interviews and the 
secondary data sources, including the online survey results.  Thematic concepts 
emerged as a result of Grounded Theory’s constant comparative method from an early 
stage of interviews and concurrent data analysis.  The research question guiding this 
study was ‘How does Crisis Leadership influence Crisis Management Readiness in the 
Thai hotel industry?’  The data and its findings to be presented in this chapter will 
respond directly to this question. 
 
CONVENTIONS UTILISED FOR REPORTING  
 
In order to maintain the confidentiality of reporting on the findings, and the participant’s 
anonymity, quotations have not been directly linked to the interviewee listing and have 
not been labeled. This will also ensure that multiple quotes from one interviewee cannot 
be linked or identified.  The researcher has clearly documented all transcripts and can 
identify ownership of quotations should this be requested.  In addition, the following 
conventions have been adopted for this study: 
 For easy identification quotations have been transcribed directly and have been 
indented when more than two lines in length, except for when a group of quotes 
are listed, for example, fire drill comments 
 Each quotation is enclosed at the beginning and end with:“….” 
 In sections where small talk or irrelevant information to the quote intervenes, the 
section will be indicated with: ……… 
 Grammatical errors have been maintained for authenticity but [sic] is used to 
highlight these errors 
 
The first of the two higher order categories will be discussed in this chapter. To 
elaborate and discuss the findings, this chapter is presented in three main sections 
reflecting the categorisation of thematic concepts, their properties and their 
relationships.  The data will be explained as they emerged from the lower order 
categories to reveal the higher order category of Crisis Leadership Influencers as 
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previously introduced in Chapter Three.  The three lower order categories are 
Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and Managing the Crisis.  Crisis 
Leadership Influencers emerged as one of the Basic Social Structural Processes (BSSPs) 
of the emergent theory for this thesis. 
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers explained the commonalities of three lower order 
categories: Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and Managing the Crisis.  
Conversely, each of the lower order categories became the building blocks of the first 
thematic abstract concept or higher order category, namely Crisis Leadership 
Influencers.  This pillar became the foundation of the first BSSP and was built from 
securely integrated lower order categories and their interrelated properties.  The lower 
order categories were established through complex relationships from the data, which 
confirmed that each category influenced the other categories.  Crisis Leadership 
Influencers as a BSSP is presented in Figure 4.1 illustrating the lower order categories 
and their properties.  The relationships within this conceptual framework will be 
detailed in Section 4.4. 
CRISIS LEADERSHIP INFLUENCERS :  
A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Crisis Leadership Influencers: A Basic Social Structural Process  
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Based on Grounded Theory methodology, data analysis utilised interview data and other 
forms of secondary data including: the online survey, internal and external staff emails, 
company manuals, advertising and published media sources in relation to the 
substantive context of the Red Shirt crisis and the case study organisation.  Theoretical 
Coding as explained in Section 3.5 resulted in the categorisation of data and produced 
the schematic in Figure 4.1 which explained the development of the study’s Basic 
Social Processes (BSPs).  The richness of the data indicated relationships that were able 
to explain the conceptualised research problem and ultimately informed theory 
generation.  The following section provides an explanation of the data’s lower order 
categories which combined to reveal Crisis Leadership Influencers; the first of the two 
higher order categories.   
 
4.1 INFLUENCING LEADERSHIP 
 
A CEO’s influence on the organisation’s performance is deemed to have its highest 
potential impact in a crisis situation when the organisation’s strategy and operating 
environment are no longer aligned (Yukl, 2010). The extant literature refers to effective 
Crisis Leadership as being characterised by Transformational Leadership attributes 
(Hadley et al., 2011; DuBrin, 2013b; Pillai, 2013) including: inspiring followers with 
positive reinforcement, visibility, and open and honest communication.  It was evident 
from the data analysis that in the lead up to and during the Red Shirt crisis, the 
leadership role had a strong influencing effect on the organisation and its stakeholders, 
in particular the staff community.  A member of the Bangkok hotel Excom stated in 
Phase Two interviews that: 
 “If you’re a leader you can’t focus into yourself, that’s opposite to what a leader 
is, and during crisis if leaders were thinking about their own safety nobody 
would be doing anything, they’d be hiding in their home and as leaders you 
can’t do that.  You have to be visible, you have to be communicating, you gotta 
[sic] be there.  That’s what we got right at that time……. All staff knew 
someone was taking charge.” 
 
However, it was the Phuket earthquake incident that uncovered the concerns in its most 
extreme state when one of the key informants revealed the impact of the hotel not being 
crisis ready:   
“In April [2012] we had an earthquake in Indonesia which triggered a tsunami 
alert for the Andaman region ….. we were very lucky on the day that it 
happened in the day time, we were lucky it was a weekday, we were lucky that 
we had people here.  What we learnt very quickly is that something we hadn’t 
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anticipated was the human reaction and for many of the staff who were here 
when the tsunami hit in 2004, they had instinct reactions to run away and we had 
the situation where over 360 staff literally ran out of the hotel on that day and we 
were left with probably eight of us who then had to evacuate the guests and 
move them 3.2 kilometres up the road ….. and so it taught us very quickly  that 
we had to learn how to deal with a situation like this knowing that the human 
reaction of our staff will probably be, and will continue to be, is to run 
away…..” 
 
The staff and leadership reactions at the time of the Phuket earthquake reflected an 
obvious need for a systematic crisis management plan and training for the organisation, 
which was expressed at various times in the data collection phase.  The Corporate 
Office was not aware of this evacuation debacle and the researcher’s insider perspective 
and past relationship serendipitously uncovered an important comparative incident for 
this present study.  
 
In a crisis event, the contextual complexities shape the options available and the 
decisions that confront leadership.  Concurrently, Crisis Leadership behaviours and 
actions will impact on how followers’ actions are aligned to Crisis Leadership and the 
Crisis Management strategies implemented.  Conger and Toegel (2002) advanced that 
leaders are shaped by the environment, organisation and individuals, as well as leaders 
having the ability to influence them.  Leadership actions by management at the time of 
the Red Shirt crisis influenced a number of areas including the staff community, the 
case study organisation’s business continuity and the future of Thailand’s hotel industry. 
Conversely, these components also influenced leadership’s vision and goals.  The case 
study organisation’s 2010 Annual Report published with the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (and accessed on their website) stated: 
“2010 was initially expected to be a strong rebound year for (case study 
organisation) - as the signs of the global economic recovery were positive 
especially in the ASPAC region, which fared the GFC better than any other 
economic bloc. Especially after a challenging year in 2009 following the 
December 2008 airport closure in Thailand and the deepening global financial 
crisis, then the storming of the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya in April with the 
ensuing riots in Bangkok, which discredited Thai tourism and resulted in drastic 
falls in occupancies and ARRs throughout the country.  
 
The red shirt protest further worsened the outlook for Thailand in March 2010 
when they commenced their 2 month central Bangkok protest site, culminating 
in the government crackdown of May 19th....... During this period (case study 
organisation) were extremely active in rebuilding confidence in Bangkok 
through an intensive programme of CEO media interviews, including CNN, and 
e-communications to the (case study organisation) customer and partner 
databases.”  
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In the case of an extreme crisis event, the chaos and complexity of the situation creates 
a shared sense of uncertainty and unknown. Therefore, managers are challenged to 
present and articulate a strong, confident and credible strategy for the organisation’s 
future.  In describing the CEO’s actions a Corporate Office Director stated:  
“….we had a good leading person who connected every dot together.  That’s 
how I feel, and if anybody missed out, he would track that person and get on 
action.  So I think in a crisis having a good leader is very important connecting 
everyone together and that’s why I don’t think we had any problem…”  
 
A Bangkok hotel Excom member was of the opinion in his Phase Two email response 
that: 
“To deal with a crisis in any Company I think one has to first and foremost be 
able to anticipate one is about to happen, read the signs, evaluate changes and 
why are there changes, talk to people and make surveys, look for facts and not 
for rumors.” [sic] 
 
Leadership is defined by Hubbard and Beamish (2011) as; “The ability to develop and 
articulate a vision of the future for the organisation or a unit of the organisation, to 
motivate others to buy into that vision and to get it implemented” (p.358).   
 
A number of dimensions characterised the process of Influencing Leadership and 
included; Communicating, Decision-Making, Visibility, Leading by Example, and 
Motivating Influencers.  The strength of the interrelatedness of these dimensions 
reinforced the importance of this category to the BSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers.  
These dimensions are now addressed commencing with Communicating. 
 
4.1.1 COMMUNICATING  
 
One of the key components of Influencing Leadership is Communicating, which was 
expressed in both positive and negative terms by the participants.  Communicating is 
defined by the Oxford Dictionary (Stevenson, 2001) as to “share or exchange 
information” (p.133). The process of Communicating was perceived by the participants 
as a compelling indicator in the success of the Crisis Management processes.   Data 
analysis revealed that the lack of information-sharing in the lead up to the full blown 
crisis event created a sense of uncertainty and anxiety in the organisation.  A Corporate 
Office Department Head (DH) interviewee said; “personal safety should be priority and 
concern for families, but there were no communications from anyone to see where they 
could be contacted or where they were”.  An Excom interviewee from the Phuket resort 
property said: 
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“…to me during that time, it’s quite critical, we should have something like a 
daily update maybe in the morning like in the morning today what’s going on, 
what’s the update last night, blah, blah, blah.  Spot person make sure is there any 
update so we are aware of that but at that time maybe only certain people 
know……. during the crisis, there are a lot of assumptions.  What’s going on, 
how about this here, and we don’t know whether it’s true or not.” 
 
Another interviewee from the Corporate Office also stated:  
“….there was no information coming out from HR how to act in case of an 
emergency.  Or what to do if something happened while you were at the office 
or how to communicate if something happened during the night.” 
 
Communication, or lack thereof, was identified with high regularity as one of the major 
influencing factors in staff and stakeholder perceptions when evaluating leadership 
performance.  For those interview participants who were able to access information 
directly from the CEO, such as the Director responsible for corporate communications, 
there was a feeling of confidence and trust in knowing the CEO’s plans and his sharing 
of information with the unfolding events of the Red Shirt crisis.  Moreover, there were 
similar levels of confidence and trust expressed by the department heads (DHs) in 
reference to the hotel’s GM, due to daily and regular meetings on how to deal with the 
crisis on hand.   
 
Conversely, much criticism was directed at the lack of communication emanating from 
the HR Department. One of the interview participants, along with almost all 
participants, also expressed the lack of information and updates provided by HR, in 
short she stated:  
“HR sent a message, I think it was a few days earlier, but just very brief that 
we’ll let you know if you’re going to go home but then there was nothing.  They 
basically shut down.  There was nothing.”   
 
Participants referred with regularity to the HR Department’s inability to provide clear 
and precise directions to the staff population with regard to reporting for duty in light of 
the expected escalation of violent protests. Another Corporate Office executive 
interviewee stated: 
“In the beginning there was certain communications by HR about that all was 
calm and should staff choose to stay at home and work to inform their superiors, 
their supervisors or managers.  But there was no preparations in terms of what to 
do if something suddenly happens when you’re at work, how to react, how 
communication would happen.  So in terms of preparing if something would 
happen fast, there were no messages going out.”  
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As a result, the rumours generated from a lack of open and honest communication or 
concise and clear directives created an even higher level of anxiety within the staff 
population.  The participants did not receive any updates from HR and became reliant 
on social media, which added to the uncertainty as some of the messages were unable to 
be verified.  From internal emails at the time of the crisis it was evident that the HR 
department’s limited messaging was also confusing, as written in an email on May 17th, 
2010 by a Corporate DH to the VP:  
“Apologies, it’s rather tough to understand as the directions have been 
fragmented.  Now HR has sent an email stating that the Corporate Office will be 
close [sic] on Monday without stating that DH are to report to a satellite office.” 
 
This email thread followed on from a staff member asking on their Blackberry text: 
“Have u get [sic] any instruction from HR on this matter? Please share.”  Therefore, the 
feelings of frustration, fear and uncertainty were evident when there was inconsistent 
messaging or lack of communication.  Yet when the levels of communication were 
deemed high, the frustration, fear and uncertainty subsided. 
 
Meanwhile, as detailed in the researcher’s “Recollections and Reflections” the head of 
HR for one of the competitor hotel groups also based in Bangkok explained their 
communication processes. They had initiated a regular SMS update alert system to all 
staff, as well as posting updates on the company’s internal website during the Red Shirt 
crisis of 2010.  The proactive nature of this company’s HR Department was in stark 
contrast to the passive activity and lack of communication from the case study 
organisation’s HR and its perceived communication inadequacies at a time when staff 
sought meaningful advice and directions.  In Phase One the RM executive from 
Corporate Office believed more information should be forthcoming from HR and said: 
“…no-one can make a decision and wait for only one person, you know, and maybe HR 
should make a decision to protect our employees.” 
 
A Corporate Office DH in Phase Two interviews stated:  
“...there was no message delivered.  The message came out that nothing is 
happening only noting at the moment that nothing was happening but the official 
message was giving the opportunity for staff that felt uncomfortable to not have 
to come to work.  But within the unofficial communication between colleagues, 
I think there was a sense of worry because at the moment everyone was 
continuously looking at the Twitter news coming up, looking at the news 
channel for what was going to happen.  So there was an anticipation that it 
would escalate but otherwise you wouldn’t logically look all the time what was 
happening.”  
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Another Corporate Office DH stated during Phase One interviews:  
“Internally, I don’t recall anything from HR, I don’t think there was a message 
from HR, I can’t remember, nothing stood out in my mind. …… You were 
hearing different messages from different people so no-one really … the only 
way that you knew that something was really going to happen was more the 
silence if that makes any sense?  There was a lot of silence so you’d hear one 
thing and it would never happen but then total silence and whatever situation … 
it was totally different to what we were being told or heard.  That’s why I think 
everyone went on to Twitter because that was the only method of 
communication that’s not within the company.” 
 
The data exposed the need by the staff community for open and honest communication, 
which related to the levels of trust felt by the followers for the leader.  As described by 
an interviewee from the corporate office, who was concerned with the threat level of 
potential violence, the message conveyed by the CEO understated the threat level and 
she commented: 
“The CEO, actually I remember on that night before the general died, said that 
everything would be OK.  That was the message I got.  Don’t worry about it; 
everything will be OK because I questioned whether I should walk home.” 
 
Her return journey from the office to home each evening was on foot, and she was 
anxious about the military buildup between the office precinct and her home.  Her 
concerns were validated with an escalation of the violence soon after. This caused some 
distrust and disrespect for the leader’s estimation of the situation given the danger that 
she felt she had been subjected to.  Although she felt there may have been an attempt to 
reassure her that the situation would not worsen, she would have preferred open and 
honest communication.  She continued to explain: 
“On my way home I’m seeing the army being gathered in front of the 
(international hotel company) and this didn’t look fine to me and obviously it all 
blew up a few hours later.  So maybe that was more to reassure but I don’t think 
that was the right message.  HR sent a message, I think it was a few days earlier, 
but just very brief that we’ll let you know if you’re going to go home but then 
there was nothing.  They basically shut down.  There was nothing.” 
 
Trust is an extremely important component in the relationship between leadership and 
followers and will influence the level to which followers will follow (Pillai, 2013; Yukl, 
2010).  However, the CEO’s reassurances may be reflective of the Thai culture and the 
belief that the situation would not worsen, or that ‘it will all work out in the end’, a view 
echoed by many of the participants throughout the research study.  The National Culture 
aspects of the data analysis will be detailed in Section 4.2.3. 
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In support of the need for clear messaging, the Phuket earthquake incident provided the 
researcher with confirming data with regard to how the lack of prompt and precise 
communications at the time of a crisis negatively impacted the staff population.  
Unfortunately, the resultant tsunami sirens spread panic and fear throughout the staff 
and as a consequence they fled their posts to seek higher ground leaving hotel guests 
without assistance or direction. As explained by a Phuket hotel Excom in Phase One 
interviews: 
“One thing that we realized we didn’t do well was to get the message out fast 
enough which is why we’ve implemented this text message system to say to 
them you have felt an earthquake, you need to be calm and then you need to 
come to X, Y, Z point because we now have a pre-assembly point which is the 
back of the house at the loading bay where they come for information and that 
was one of the hardest things for us knowing that we didn’t handle that well.  So 
they felt the earthquake for the first time in their lives and didn’t know what to 
do and literally panicked and ran away.  The tsunami alarm is loud and scary and 
horrible and therefore the people that hadn’t run then took to the hills 
themselves.” 
 
A neighbouring hotel in the resort precinct experienced a similar result and a hotel guest 
responded on Trip Advisor with the title “Tsunami Warning and Staff Left us Behind” 
(April 22, 2012). The experience from a guest’s perspective was one of disorganisation 
and terror. Appendix 13 provides the full Trip Advisor report. 
 
During the tsunami warning, hotel staff departed without any consideration for the 
guests, who were left behind in a state of panic and despair with no direction or 
assistance in the evacuation procedures.  The normally calm Thai staff who were in 
panic mode only added to the fear levels of guests.  A Phuket hotel Excom described the 
scene:  
“...once the earthquake had been felt, we didn’t get the message out fast enough 
to our employees that there was no cause for panic and that they were to 
continue their duties.  Because that message couldn’t get out fast enough to the 
various restaurants, the guy cleaning the cars out the front, so many people to get 
a message of calm out without running around looking like something was 
wrong, therefore people were getting phone calls, staff were getting phone calls, 
people were looking at each other nervously and the cause of alarm was, as I 
said, because they didn’t know what an earthquake was, they then looked 
uncomfortable, guests could see the staff looked uncomfortable which meant 
guests feel uncomfortable.” 
 
The guests who provided the Trip Advisor critique concluded that the hotel needed to 
address the evacuation procedures. As a result of their disappointing experience from 
what had been an enjoyable holiday until that point, they departed six days early and 
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were not prepared to return.  The lack of a Crisis Management plan at this property 
reduced the guest intended repeat and referral factor and as a flow-on, reduced revenue 
generating opportunities.   
 
One of the most senior managers at the case study organisation’s Phuket hotel, and a 
key informant, described the staff reaction to the earthquake similarly to the Trip 
Advisor review of the neighbouring hotel.  He stated in the interview:  
“…guests are so confused where to go, how, there’s no such clear so we just say 
can you just go this way and after that where, what else, how many kilometres”.     
 
Due to this less than satisfactory staff reaction and the impending arrival of a major 
Chinese back-to-back incentive group of 15,000 delegates, the resort precinct hotels 
were required to urgently formulate a crisis evacuation plan.  As explained in Phase One 
interviews by the Phuket hotel Excom member: 
“Khun (owner’s name), who is the former owner of this property, called an 
investigation to be done by some experts in Singapore who came and 
interviewed us all and various people and staff and put together quite a great 
plan for an evacuation if it happens, if we ever need to again.”   
 
Upon reflection and through a debriefing process of the previous day’s failed evacuation, 
the hotel’s Excom recognised the need for prompt, clear and precise communication 
with staff and guests, which would have calmed the situation and allowed for a safe and 
orderly evacuation.  The Phuket hotel Excom member explained: 
“What we were able to do was get the guests back at about 8.30 in the evening 
by bus because (the resort complex) which is where we’re located has coaches 
which they use for staff for transportation to and from home, they therefore 
reacted with that, and consequently after this event there was a massive 
investigation done about how we handled it.  Our hotel out of the seven seemed 
to be the one that handled with the best ability even though we probably did fail 
in some areas.......” 
 
The new Crisis Management Plan developed for the resort complex as a result of the 
debriefing has incorporated a communication tree and highlighted the previous areas of 
concern and provided the Excom with a more rigorous plan to address weaknesses and 
support a more communicative Crisis Management Plan.  Communicating is not only 
about face-to-face communication but also adopting all forms of technology.  In a crisis 
event, the messages need to be sent quickly and employ all communication tools to 
assist in efficiently distributing the message to the entire staff.  The Phuket hotel Excom 
realised that all staff had multiple mobile phones and the majority had smartphone 
technology, so they implemented a text message system to direct staff to pre-assembly 
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points and instructed them to download tsunami and earthquake applications for up to 
date emergency information.  The Phuket hotel Excom member stated: 
 “They’re OK with earthquakes.  Still, the tsunami siren I would say, would make 
them run away again but we’ve had it since, we had an earthquake and they 
stood still because they know now it just means the earth moves.  We’ve talked 
to them about the Richter scale, we talked to them about the website, we’ve 
talked to them about nowadays there’s a link you can have on your iPhone 
because many people have iPhones, there’s an earthquake iPhone application so 
people are signed up for that.  Yes, they know a lot more and they know how to 
react I believe.” 
 
During Phase Two data collection in August 2013, there was yet another political 
demonstration underway and a protest camp once again set up in (name of park), which 
is located directly opposite the corporate offices and the flagship hotel in Bangkok.  
Phase Two participants expressed their concerns that HR were once again 
communicating ineffectively and were unprepared for any potential crisis event.  Some 
informants indicated that the lack of information caused anxiety and panic amongst the 
staff population as rumours were allowed to intensify unabated as evidenced by an 
interviewee in Phase One based at the Corporate Office who said: 
“....for us we are sitting in our office, we are just talking to each other whether 
that’s true or not and you really, really want to know more in a call to the 
person.  But again, I don’t know, because we always tried to look at this crisis as 
not a real crisis because we are in the hospitality industry we don’t want to make 
people panic so maybe the intention to make everything look OK.” 
 
A Corporate Office DH’s frustration was shared with the researcher by providing a copy 
of the only HR email communiqué on the possible threat during Phase Two interviews. 
The email failed to provide any directives or reassurances to staff in the case of an 
imminent breakdown of civil security as at 8 August 2013 and he stated:   
“There were [sic] no action from anyone, not from HR, not from anyone, no 
announcements, nothing.  Even with the current situation right now where we 
are still having the yellow shirts across in the (name of park), our PR 
Department sent a few links from Bangkok Post and The Nation to some of us to 
update us what’s happening.  There was no reassurance of what HR was going 
to do, what happens if the phone lines are cut off, how are we going to 
communicate, nothing from HR at all…….they should be protecting the expats 
as well and inviting us to be in contact with our own diplomatic missions, like 
the Malaysian.  Even the Malaysian Embassy sends me SMS messages, they tell 
me this is the number to call if it gets tough and we’ll come and get you, or if 
you need help or whatever.” 
 
The same participant shared a United Nations internal staff communiqué of 6 August, 
2013 in reference to the same potential crisis threat. The UN email provided detailed 
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information about preparations and directives in case of an incident and was used to 
compare and express frustration and disappointment with the case organisation’s own 
lack of communiqués.  The lack of clear communications created another wave of 
uncertainty and doubt within middle management about the capacity of the organisation 
to deal with a possible crisis eventuality. 
 
Communicating emerged in the data analysis as a highly interrelated category with the 
lower order data categories of Influencing Leadership as well as being related to all the 
components of the BSP Crisis Leadership Influencers.  Effective Communicating, 
which is characterised by an articulate and perceived credible delivery, clearly 
influenced followers in reducing their fear and anxiety and encouraged followers to 
accept their leaders’ decisions and actions.  A Bangkok hotel Excom described the 
performance of that hotel’s GM during the Red Shirt crisis: 
 “As leaders you got to be visible, you got to be communicating, you got to be 
there.  That’s what we got right at that time. All staff knew somebody was 
taking charge.”  
 
The next section will describe Decision-making in more detail and explain its 
contribution to theory development and its interrelatedness to the categories that made 
up Influencing Leadership.  
 
4.1.2 DECISION-MAKING  
 
Decision-making was identified as one of the main components of the lower order 
category Influencing Leadership as thematic categories began to develop.  The data 
elevated Decision-making to a single category based on its importance to the Crisis 
Leadership activities and its strength of interrelatedness to the other lower order 
categories.  In a crisis situation, crisis management activation is reliant on how 
leadership makes decisions and deals with an unfolding crisis situation.  The ability to 
make decisions with a strong sense of conviction and confidence positively influenced 
the followers’ understanding and acceptance of leadership directives and also 
contributed to their level of trust in the leader.   
 
Some interview participants were critical of the procrastination of the CEO in the lead 
up to the full scale outbreak of violence and the delays in deciding on staff reporting to 
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duty, closing the hotel or having an alternative location from which to operate.  The 
Corporate Office RM executive described his thoughts on the CEO’s actions:  
“I understand that the situation is no-one can decide and don’t know what’s 
going to happen next because it never happened around here actually.  So the 
one who should have given the direction should be our CEO or CFO and 
communicate down to lower level,...” 
 
One of the Bangkok hotel Excom explained his opinion of the decision making efficacy:  
“They kept on talking about closing and this is only between the owner (CEO) 
and the general manager.  As (name), my ex-wife or the mother of my son, told 
me a few times, she cannot believe that the owner would put people in danger 
just for the sake of keeping the hotel open without making even a revenue.” 
 
In response to the question on decision-making efficiency, specifically in relation to 
timeliness in the lead up to and during the crisis, a Bangkok Excom explained that; 
“some of them [staff] said the decision came quite late, why didn’t we close the hotel 
before?” Another Bangkok Excom concurred “I can say we did take too long”.  While 
the RM executive from Corporate Office also agreed; “the process of the decision 
making I think it’s too long.”  Although, further into the interview and discussing the 
potential for political protests again he believed that; “I think for sure they can make a 
decision quicker than last time I think because now we have the experience.”  
 
One of the interviewees referred to how an international banking organisation, namely 
Deutsche Bank, relocated its staff to an alternative office location many weeks prior to 
the escalation of the Red Shirt crisis violence.  This was seen as a positive decision and 
escalated staff welfare as a priority; whereas the case study CEO’s indecisiveness was 
interpreted as lacking in the resolve or foresight to make a similar decision and instead 
reduced his credibility and trust as a leader.  Loyal staff were torn between doing the 
right thing by the company and reporting to work, while their families were fearful of 
their attendance at work.  The sense of loyalty also contributed to their anxiety about 
their personal circumstances such as their safety and future work prospects and the 
company’s situation.   
 
Delays in Decision-making had a negative flow-on effect on the prevailing mood of 
uncertainty in a tense contextual crisis situation.  Decision-making is also interrelated to 
a company’s National and Organisational Culture as a reflection of the organisation’s 
adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity is described by McManus, Seville, Vargo and 
Brundson (2008) as “a measure of the culture and dynamics of an organisation that 
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allow it to make decisions in a timely and appropriate manner, both in day-to-day 
business and also in crises” (p.83).  Evaluating Decision-making efficacy based on 
adaptive capacity considered a number of issues including leadership and Decision-
making structures, information sharing and retention, and a company’s flexibility and 
agility when responding to a crisis.   
 
In a crisis event, staff look to their leadership to guide and direct them through the 
‘minefield’ of issues and priorities that challenge and test the organisation.  The Phuket 
hotel GM failed to create an environment of calm and confidence for the staff.  By 
being indecisive, he allowed the situation to deteriorate to the point that they abandoned 
their posts.  The key informant described the urgency that was required to make a 
decision after the earthquake and her encouragement for him to do so, but the GM 
wanted to know what the other hotels in the vicinity were doing.  Unfortunately, they 
did not have this information and delayed giving instructions to Department Heads. The 
pending decision was overtaken by the tsunami sirens “….which therefore meant we 
didn’t have any decision to make. We just had to go” and they had to evacuate in a less 
than professional fashion.  Another of the Phuket resort’s executives stated:   
“I end up seeing the GM running around to go to the beach, to go to this, but in 
my understanding it’s supposed to be GM stand in one place together with the 
one person, it’s not necessary to go everywhere.  At that time I saw the GM run 
to this area and going to the restaurants.”   
 
He continued by sharing his concerns that the GM was not providing any clear direction 
or delegation, this is also related to the following classification with regard to Visibility.   
 
The hotel has since implemented a Crisis Management Plan (CMP) that has been shared 
and communicated with the staff.  The Phuket hotel Excom member who managed the 
debriefings and training with the GM, provided the CMP with staff SOPs, and 
evacuation route plans to the researcher in follow up emails after the Phase One 
interview. It provides a clear road map for Crisis Leadership’s Decision-making 
processes.  As a result of this new Crisis Management Plan, the ability to make more 
timely and efficient decisions has increased the level of confidence on all levels and the 
current leadership believes that they will react in a much more positive manner should 
they experience another crisis event.  The Phuket Excom member described the staff 
reaction after a subsequent earthquake and implementation of training during Phase One 
interviews:  
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“We had another big one on the first day that the Amway Chinese Congress was 
arriving and that was also quite harrowing for the staff but they actually stood 
still.  They knew what it was and didn’t run away and they were OK so it’s one 
of those experience things and now we’re lucky we’ve had that but prior to that 
we’ve never sat down and said this is what an earthquake’s going to feel like or 
we’ve never simulated it.  .......... we did a campaign of training in the monthly 
meetings.  We attached a little kind of two jellybean men cartoon that we made 
about what to do in an earthquake and we stuck that to the payslips for a month 
and we stuck it all over the place so I think we’re cool with that now.  I think if 
we continue to do that, we’ve added it to the orientation program.” 
 
Decision-making is also reliant on information being shared so that leaders can make 
the most time-efficient decisions.  At the time of the Red Shirt crisis and working from 
the Crisis Command Centre (CCC), another participant stated his frustration about the 
lack of information dissemination and the difficulties in assessing the situation to make 
optimal decisions and stated:   
“We were trying to operate in the dark; there were so many unknowns and so 
many uncertainties. I think the thing is good reliable, truthful information never 
arrived when you needed to make those decisions.  So you were always going 
off a hunch or your best guess, that’s how I can remember feeling.”    
 
In contrast to this, during the Red Shirt crisis event the Bangkok hotel GM regularly 
held meetings with the hotel’s Excom and shared his Decision-making responsibilities.  
This allowed the hotel Excom team to discuss, accept and implement the GM’s 
directives in a time efficient manner.  Two of the Bangkok hotel’s Excom members 
detailed the GM’s consultative Decision-making style, including one Excom member 
who described the process of sound recommendations from staff being acknowledged 
and implemented:  
“And there was an open dialogue which I think is very important.  All Excom 
members whether it’s the human resource director or the security chief or the 
chief engineer, all Excoms had a voice and were able to give suggestions and a 
lot of them were very sound suggestions which helped us.  We could have had 
deaths in the hotel for example, we could have had a bullet coming through the 
ballroom glass, through the foyer window but fortunately this did not happen.” 
 
Another Bangkok hotel Excom member stated: 
“Of course individually we analyse and assess the situation on our side but I felt 
that because I was also part of the decision making process… I had some 
ownership on what was going on and I felt that whatever (GM) says isn’t right, 
but with my own analysis I found that OK, that’s probably the best thing to do, 
barricading this door, closing there, cutting the barbed wire on the back wall.” 
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This Decision-Making strategy encouraged joint ownership of the decisions and 
encouraged support and follow through of these initiatives to prepare and deal with the 
crisis situation.  The extant research has indicated that greater success outcomes for 
organisations are experienced when crisis preparation and response is managed by a 
Crisis Management team rather than an individual (Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
 
On the other hand, the corporate CEO was operating in isolation without consultation 
from his senior management team.  It was noted by a Corporate Office DH that the CEO 
should have heard opinions from all sides; he should have made his decision based on 
staff input so everyone would get on board and follow:  
“…ultimately this should have been a corporate team galvanised into action at 
that stage and it shouldn’t have been the decisions of one person trying to save 
(the) hotel, it should have been a wider decision than that.”   
 
Instead most of the Vice President (VP) level management did not report for duty prior 
to the escalation of violence or to the CCC at the height of the crisis.  This resulted in a 
number of middle management participants suggesting that senior management lacked 
accountability and ignored their responsibilities in steering the company during the Red 
Shirt crisis.  It also indicated the CEO’s inability to secure the loyalty and commitment 
of the VP management cohort.   
 
Decision-making is a key factor in Crisis Leadership efficacy and shares strong 
interrelatedness with the BSSP classification of Crisis Leadership Influencers. It is 
related to the next property of the current lower order category, which also positively 
contributed to the interconnectedness of the BSSP.  The Grounded Theory method 
allowed for concurrent data collection and analysis, which illuminated the 
classifications of Communicating and Decision-making in the formative stages of 
theoretical conceptulisation.  The classification of Visibility also emerged as a strong 
interrelated factor of the lower order category and will be explained in Section 4.1.3.   
However, first the results of the online survey with regard to the staff perceptions of the 
Manager/ Supervisor’s leadership capabilities in decision-making and problem solving 
will be reported in the next section. 
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(i) ONLINE SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGER/ SUPERVISOR LEADERSHIP 
CAPABILITIES 
 
As previously explained, data from the online survey served to evaluate qualitatively the 
findings from the primary data source.  As a follow on from the findings on Decision-
making, Section Three of the online survey explored the staff perceptions of their 
manager or supervisor and utilised statements from the Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (MLQ) relating to two relevant factors, namely Intellectual Stimulation 
and Inspirational Motivation. These were utilised in order to understand leadership 
capabilities in a crisis situation.  The MLQ questionnaire was developed by Bass (1985) 
and consists of three leadership concepts: transformational, transactional and laissez-
faire.  
 
Two behaviours attributable to transformational leadership were selected for this 
survey, since transformational leadership is considered to be the most appropriate 
leadership style to promote positive change in the hotel industry (Blayney & Blotnicky, 
2010; Tracey & Hinkin, 1994 & 1996).  The behaviours selected were Intellectual 
Stimulation and Intellectual Motivation and their corresponding MLQ statement items.   
 
Intellectual Stimulation is aimed at encouraging new ideas and challenges staff to 
question beliefs, values and assumptions so that they may be prepared to address 
problems in the future (Kan, 2002).  Intellectual Motivation is also extremely important 
especially in times of crises when staff need to overcome fear and anxiety to positively 
prepare and follow through with the organisation’s initiatives in order to mitigate any 
further negative impact from the crisis.   
 
In addition, Section Three of the online survey also included items from James and 
Wooten’s (2005) crisis leadership competencies in relation to perceptions of trust and 
decision-making.  The Cronbach alpha of .894 indicated the strength of the common 
factor reliability and consistency in respondent’s Leadership-related answers (see Table 
4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 displays the frequency of perceptions on leadership.  Managers/ Supervisors 
are seen as “extremely optimistic about the future” (77%), which is an important 
leadership trait to exhibit during a crisis when anxiety and fear can be at their highest 
levels.  However, it may diminish the ability to think the unthinkable (Mitroff, 2004b) 
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and reduces the importance of Crisis Readiness in the organisation.  The Manager/ 
Supervisor’s ability to get the employee “to look at problems from many different 
angles” cannot be considered as one of the strongest ratings (56.8%), but it does reflect 
a willingness of staff to consider the options available during a crisis event and a 
stimulating work environment.  
 
Table 4.1: Perceptions of their Manager/ Supervisor 
 
Statement 
 
Mean 
% 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree (4+5) 
% 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree (1+2) 
Α 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
MLQ : Intellectual Stimulation      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.894 
Seeks differing perspectives when 
solving problems 
3.60 64.4% 11% 
Talks optimistically about the 
future  
3.79 77.1% 6.7% 
Suggests new ways of looking at 
how to complete tasks 
3.65 67.8% 
 
10.2% 
Gets me to look at problems from 
many different angles  
3.48 56.8% 
 
11% 
Talks enthusiastically about what 
needs to be accomplished 
3.60 65.3% 
 
11% 
MLQ : Intellectual Motivation    
Expresses confidence that goals 
will be achieved  
3.69 66.9%% 6.7% 
Articulates a compelling vision of 
the future  
3.58 60.1% 7.6% 
Crisis Leadership Competencies    
Has my complete trust to make 
decisions during a crisis  
3.52 56.8%% 8.5% 
Makes decisions fast and accepts 
responsibility 
3.52 62.7% 14.4% 
Makes decisions without thinking 
through all possible outcomes. 
2.97 29.7% 33.9% 
Scale 1-5 : Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) 
Stand out results are in bold font and are in excess of other scales :  
Disagree/ Strongly Disagree 33.9% is more than double other scales.  Agree/ Strongly 
Agree 77.1% is almost 10% higher than other scales  
 
The Intellectual Motivation factors were relatively strong in agreement with 67% for 
“expressing confidence that goals will be achieved” and 60.1% for “articulates a 
compelling vision of the future”; which would combine to motivate staff at times of 
crisis and post-crisis. 
 
While the MLQ results are relatively strong in agreement for Intellectual Stimulation 
and Motivation, staff indicated with marginally less confidence that they trusted their 
Manager/ Supervisor to make decisions during a crisis (56.8%). “Making decisions 
without thinking through all possible outcomes” is reported with the highest level of 
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disagreement (33.9%), and agreement for this statement is low at 29.7%: therefore, the 
Manager/ Supervisor is perceived to be weak when considering all options in decision-
making.  Although they evaluated their manager/ supervisor as being prompt in making 
decisions and accepting responsibility (62.7%), there was a slight increase in those that 
disagreed with this statement at 14.4% in comparison to other statements. 
 
Of the 12 free text responses, decision-making efficacy was described as less than 
effective with the following statement: 
“I believe that the company has good intention to take care and provide support 
to staff during the time of crisis. However, it would be great if the decision 
making could be made faster and more prompt. The proper analysis on the 
situation and forecast on the outcome by the designated executives at the early 
stage and announced the clear direction to the staff would ensure staff 
confidence and assist staff to have clear direction how should they prepare 
themselves and to response to the situation.” 
 
In contrast, another free text response provided a different insight to the company’s 
activities during the red shirt crisis:  
“During the political unrest in Bangkok2010, my company reacted well to the 
situation. Staff’s safety was the main concern so the management had done 
everything to make sure that all staff was safe.”[sic]  
 
The online survey provided further qualitative insights into the findings on the 
classification of Decision-making and contributed to the emergent theme of Influencing 
Leadership.  The next section will discuss the role of a leader during a crisis event and 
their Visibility, which emerged as an interrelated classification to the Communicating 
and Decision-making themes that have been introduced previously.   
 
4.1.3 VISIBILITY 
 
Visibility is another important component of the lower order category Influencing 
Leadership and provided stakeholders with an opportunity to visualise leadership in 
action from which they were able to assess their leader’s performance.  It was also 
closely interrelated to the other lower order categories that made up Influencing 
Leadership.  The notion of Visibility acts to reassure stakeholders that leadership is 
dealing with the crisis situation and assists in easing the fear and anxiety of the internal 
and external stakeholders.  By having the hotel GM and other Excom visible to the staff 
and guest community, the level of confidence was heightened.  This was echoed by one 
of the middle manager Directors who said “It’s important for the rank and file staff to 
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know that we are here and not just disseminating all these instructions from a remote 
point”.   
 
The data revealed three specific contrasting examples of leadership Visibility and its 
influence on hotel staff namely: the CEO who was the spokesperson for the company 
and the country’s crisis-fatigued hotel industry sector in local and international media, 
the GM of the Bangkok hotel at the Red Shirt battle front-line, and the GM of the 
Phuket hotel during the failed earthquake evacuation. 
 
The CEO became the spokesperson for the Thai tourism industry as a result of his 
willingness to answer CNN television network’s ‘World Business Today’ questions 
during the military crackdown on 19 May and in a follow up interview on 21 May, 2010 
with the anchor, Andrew Stevens.  This was also backed up with local television news 
broadcasts and newspaper interviews.  His message was calming yet positive that the 
industry would rebuild from this crisis.  He sought to reassure business and leisure 
travellers that Bangkok and Thailand would again be safe for travel:   
“I think a lot of people in Asia, a lot of people in the world have very positive 
image about Thailand. They know that this situation is something that happened 
and shall pass. We believe it’s going to take some time maybe a few weeks 
maybe a few months but we believe the people will come back to Thailand.” 
(Stevens, CNN, 19 May, 2010).  
This broadcast provided a reassuring message to international visitors, but also instilled 
pride and encouragement to the company’s employees, suppliers and partners. 
 
The CEO was also determined to be on site at the Bangkok hotel every day, despite the 
security warnings and ongoing military action, to ensure that the skeleton management 
team staying in house were safe and well.  He also made the daily drive to the CCC 
where he worked from the Boardroom dealing with the Crisis Management issues at 
hand.  By being visible at the hotel, the CEO’s credibility was enhanced.  One of the 
Thai middle management recalled the CEO’s explanation to her that “if he’s here, it’s 
going to encourage the staff that it’s OK … because he was here”.  
 
The CEO’s Visibility was applauded by staff to the extent that once the hotel and 
Corporate Office reopened he was presented with an appreciation book of thank you 
messages.  The presentation was at a staff event celebrating the reopening with a 
Buddhist ceremony to bless the hotel and Corporate Office of the case study 
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organisation.  The CEO’s high level Visibility continued into the recovery phase and 
another of the Thai senior middle managers was encouraged and proud that when the 
Bangkok Metropolitan civic department office initiated a clean-up day, the company’s 
CEO was prominently featured for his active participation.  This provided the staff 
community with additional opportunities to visibly confirm a committed and dedicated 
leader.  The CEO engaged staff with these visible opportunities so they would trust, feel 
reassured and confident to follow his directives in the short term, and embrace his long 
term vision to rebuild the company and the country’s ailing tourism industry.   
 
One of the hotel’s DHs was of the opinion that the best companies have very visible 
CEOs, and he described the case study organisation’s CEO’s messaging through all 
media outlets as ‘powerful’. He felt that the company’s image was improved and fared 
better than other hotel groups, who refused to participate in media interviews such as 
with CNN.  He said:  
“I think that was a great example of using a crisis into an opportunity where the 
company, (CEO) actually put the company as available for interviews as 
opposed to just denying or no comments on anything and we were able to talk 
about the situation and get some PR out of it which is still being talked about. 
.....Yes, it is believable PR. Because I think at that time people wanted to know, 
just get information about the situation, the hotel after being shot at, being 
bombed, being fired at, people wanted to know anything.  It was just hunger for 
information and it was a good move to put the CEO as a spokesperson.” 
 
This is in contrast to the fact the hotel’s GM was initially approached by CNN for an 
interview on the Red Shirt crisis; however, secondary data emails referred to his refusal 
to participate because he did not have confidence in the message they were seeking.  He 
was of the opinion that CNN were negatively and fictitiously broadcasting the situation.   
 
The CEO’s decision to participate on CNN also interrelates to both the decision-making 
process and communication.  The Corporate Communications Director consulted with 
the CEO and encouraged his participation.  The decision to actively engage with the 
media was provided in a speedy time frame.  As a consequence, the CEO became a 
regular spokesperson on the highly influential CNN business news segments even 
though the original request was declined by the hotel’s GM.  The email with the subject 
header “Live Interview with CNN ( URGENT )” from the GM, dated May 18th, 2010 
stated his refusal to connect with the journalists: 
“I did not allow them into the hotel yesterday as they were the ones who said 
that the sniper came from our building. They wanted to see the rooms that were 
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damaged and the outside of the hotel I refused and did not give them any 
information. (the reporter) later emailed me for comment and I did not reply. I 
recognized the female anchor from US …..at (hotel) entrance yesterday morning 
as they wanted to sneak into the hotel without permission.” 
 
The hotel business unit leader at the Bangkok hotel was the GM.  His Visibility by 
being on duty in the pre-crisis period and then throughout the violent episode of the 
crisis contributed to his elevated status as a dedicated leader and the resulting positive 
data collected on his Crisis Leadership performance.  He made the unprecedented move 
to relocate the daily briefings to the Lobby Lounge from the Executive Boardroom once 
the hotel had been closed so that staff could attest to his presence.  This strategy 
reassured the staff and guests that he was managing the situation and provided a sense 
of calm to a high pressure crisis situation. 
 
In contrast, neither the Phuket hotel GM nor the hotel’s Excom were visible at the time 
of the April 2012 earthquake and subsequent tsunami alarms.  The lack of Visibility 
only added to the confusion and panic of hotel guests and staff.  One of the study’s key 
informants described the scene as being chaotic.  The Excom were in a meeting room at 
the time when they should have been visible to guests and staff providing directions and 
comfort in a stressful situation.  They did not have a dedicated meeting point where the 
staff could meet and obtain instructions and reassure each other that they would cope 
with the situation.  Leadership’s lack of visibility fuelled fear and anxiety that pervaded 
the crisis mood of the hotel community at the time. 
 
As a consequence, the resort precinct’s group of hotels (seven hotels) undertook an 
immediate investigation into the evacuation failure. The case study hotel identified the 
lack of Visibility as being a major contributing factor to the staff abandoning their post 
and ignoring their responsibilities.  Through their debriefing process and organisational 
learning they realised that staff couldn’t see their DHs because they were in the 
Executive Office.  They have now designated a meeting point in an open space at the 
loading bay since they recognised the need to be visible and the Phuket Excom member 
explained in Phase One interviews:  
“….you need to settle your team down, you need to make sure your team is OK 
and the gathering point was really important that the staff needed to see us, 
needed to see that we were OK in our face because that would have helped them 
a lot.  Because they couldn’t see us because all department heads were standing 
in an executive office that therefore they couldn’t see us so the meeting point has 
now changed to be a very open space which is the loading bay where they will 
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visibly be able to see us and have that assurance from that face.  OK (GM name 
and executive’s name)….. OK, they’re not crying, I’m OK, and there is power in 
numbers.…”  
 
The data highlighted the importance of a leader’s Visibility in the performance of 
positive leadership influences.  An important interrelated factor with Visibility was the 
notion of the leader’s ability to lead by example. Leading by Example provided visible 
evidence of a leader’s ability to manage the chaotic situation and as a consequence 
contributed to the level of trust and confidence that allowed followers to follow the 
leader’s actions and strategies.  The emergent category of Leading by Example is 
detailed in the following section. 
 
4.1.4 LEADING BY EXAMPLE 
 
In the context of an emergency services organisation such as a fire fighting or police 
service, the leader may be forced to send the team into a dangerous situation.  Followers 
will be more consensual to participating and accepting of the leader’s directives when 
they have seen or are aware of the leader ‘Leading by Example’. (Hannah et.al, 2009)  
 
Leading by Example emerged from the participants’ data in the earliest phase of data 
collection and analysis as a leadership influencer and contributed to building the lower 
order category of Influencing Leadership.  The notion of Leading by Example is also 
interrelated to Visibility, which emerged from the data when participants witnessed 
positive actions by management.  These positive actions reassured followers that 
leadership were dealing with the situation and they had their followers’ best interests in 
mind.   
 
International hotel establishments are a round-the-clock, three hundred and sixty-five 
day operation and senior management in many cases live in the hotel. This is especially 
true during times of uncertainty and possible crisis events.  Another one of the Bangkok 
hotel’s Excom recounted the situation of management staff staying in the hotel in the 
lead up to the crisis and after closing the hotel for eight days.  She described the role of 
management as; “most of the managers sacrificed themselves and its part of our 
responsibility to lead” to indicate the commitment during an emergency situation, even 
when their own families would have been worried for their safety and they in turn for 
their families.  She felt that if she asked her staff to report for duty she too had to be 
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there to look after them.  The notion of Leading by Example is inter-related to the 
leader’s sense of responsibility which will be further explained in Section 4.3.1. In the 
most extreme of hotel terrorism contexts, during the Mumbai hotel attacks in 2008 the 
GM of the hotel continued to manage the situation as well as the hotel staff and guests, 
through a three day siege even when his wife and two children had been killed by 
terrorists (Deshpande & Raina, 2011).   
 
In the case of the Bangkok hotel GM, the level of trust intensified with his actions in the 
lead up to and during the Red Shirt crisis and during the event.  This was a surprising 
outcome when the participating informants had been previously critical of his 
management style; yet, when they discussed his Crisis Leadership performance they 
were extremely complimentary of his Leading by Example at the time of a crisis.  The 
researcher probed this revelation further in Phase Two of the interviews and sought to 
understand why they previously held a contrary view of the GM’s leadership style.  
They had similar reactions and referred to his management style in day-to-day 
operations as micro managing and overly detailed centric, where daily briefings could 
not be considered as ‘briefings’ in the true sense of succinctness but were ‘long-winded’ 
meetings or as some described, ‘talk-fests’.  In contrast, the GM’s detailed centricity 
was appreciated in the lead up to and during the crisis event, and his common-sense 
approach was respected without exception with comments like:  
“…..his objective was security, having enough food, having a place to sleep for 
those people that stayed in the hotel and I thought this was very smart and I 
admired him for being so practical and identifying what is actually important in 
this kind of situation.  It’s not important to go out in the car park to check the 
tulips.  You don’t need heroes in this kind of situation and he also mentioned 
that, don’t try to be a hero he told the security people.  If you don’t have 
protection and you hear shooting do not go out, hide behind a pillar and don’t 
stand in front of the glass.  I think this is the fundamental thing to make sure 
people don’t get injured.” 
 
The researcher found this revelation by the GM’s Excom members an unanticipated 
factor for consideration, considering their prior negativity and made a memo note at the 
time of the interviews that:  
“(name of hotel Excom) acknowledged the GM’s leadership very positively and 
yet (researcher) had experienced his past negativity about his superior and the 
GM’s leadership style especially in regard to the way he conducted meetings, 
yet under siege and in crisis, (name of hotel Excom) was very complimentary.  
In some ways it reminded me of NY Mayor Giuliani after 9/11, whose 
popularity was low but grew stronger as a result of the crisis and his leadership”. 
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Although Rudolph Giuliani’s mayoral career was coming to an end in September 2011, 
the combined global television images of Giuliani taking a strong position against the 
terrorists and yet showing a compassionate stance towards victims evoked a leader in 
control and reignited his career as a Crisis Leader (Beirman, 2003; Boin & Hart, 2003; 
Brockner & James, 2008; James et al., 2011; Jordan-Meier, 2012; Ulmer, 2012).  The 
same has been said of the Queensland Premier Anna Bligh in the 2011 floods which 
devastated the state’s infrastructure and left much of the land mass under water (World 
Bank, 2012).  Bligh too was highly visible, open and honest in her communications, 
articulate and empathetic for a state is crisis, while displaying a strength of resolve to 
rebuild the state’s infrastructure and encourage ‘Queenslanders’ to support each other 
(Jordan-Meier, 2012).  The ‘mud army’ has become synonymous with the rebuilding 
efforts (Bohensky & Leitch, 2013) of the Queensland publics’ effort inspired by a Crisis 
Leadership who was leading with strength and positivity.  
 
The Bangkok hotel GM was also positively recognised by staff for his visible leadership 
activity while the hotel was subjected to live fire between the military and Red Shirt 
protesters.  The researcher’s probing sought to understand hotel management 
participants changed views of the GM’s leadership style from day-to-day operations to 
preparing for and managing through a crisis.  There was a clear perceptual shift from 
being frustrated by the GM’s management style to trusting and respecting his leadership 
performance as was reflected in this comment;  
“….the general manager did a fantastic job of being the example of strength and 
calm.  He stayed on even though it was getting pretty dangerous after an RPG 
attack, bombs going off everywhere but, yes, he still stayed on.”    
 
When probing one of the Corporate Office DHs on how she would operate differently 
should she need to face a crisis situation again, she indicated that: 
“I would stay more calm for sure and then more focus, what do we have to do 
and you know we can give instructions to the guests and other staff as well…… 
even though you are panicking inside but you shouldn’t show much because that 
would make the environment not very good, like a moral support for staff so you 
have to be strong.” 
 
On the other hand, the most senior VP level managers who failed to interact and lead 
their departmental constituents could not be considered in the Leading by Example 
category.  It was clear that these leaders failed to prepare and provide guidance and 
direction to their departmental staff, which led to a comment from one of the 
interviewees about her absent VP departmental leader: “he was my leader, that’s scary”.  
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Another DH made the comment that if some of the senior leadership did not report for 
duty then the expectation of their staff reporting to duty was unreasonable:  
“There was an absence of leadership.....then why should they be there if the top 
people aren’t providing the inspiration?” 
 
The online survey also uncovered lack of leadership with a free text response that stated:   
“A lack of senior support pre, during and post crisis did not contribute 
favourably.” 
 
Within the Bangkok Hotel’s Excom there were differing opinions on how the 
management team interacted in relation to their assessments of the teamwork.  One of 
the Excom stated: 
“I would say the teamwork was better than normal because when things happen 
like this, or natural disasters, just like when you experience an earthquake what 
would be the first thing you do?  You’d probably call your family, you call your 
husband, your children, you tell them that you are fine and you sort of grow 
together much closer because these are your loved ones and I felt a little bit like 
that’s what happened to us as a management team, as an executive committee 
team, that all those quarrels and animosities that are always existing a little bit 
between people, disappeared, it totally took back stage.  We grew closer 
together, we were more helpful to each other, we all took over jobs that were 
actually not our jobs and I think this is a human kind of reaction, a natural 
reaction and this is what I have experienced here.” 
 
This perspective prompted the researcher to ask this question of the next Excom 
member in Phase One interviews and her reaction implied that the teamwork had not 
improved:  
“You mean any change after this crisis in a good way?  [Researcher: yes]  Not 
really, it’s better if it didn’t happen.  Do you mean when there is trouble people 
will love each other better, team work getting better, things like that right?  I 
don’t think, no, not really, put it that way.” 
 
This was in contrast to the CCC participants, who voiced feelings of pride, 
responsibility and a sense of a job-well-done and respect for their colleagues, even some 
time after the event.  This will be further explained in Section 4.3.1 on the notion of 
how Responsibility influenced the CCC participants to Lead by Example. 
 
Leading by Example contributed to the followers’ evaluation of their leader’s and the 
team’s Crisis Leadership capabilities and was also highly interrelated to the previous 
properties of the lower order category of Influencing Leadership.  This interrelatedness 
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continued through to the final dimension of Influencing Leadership, namely Motivating 
Influencers, which is detailed in the following section.   
 
4.1.5 MOTIVATING INFLUENCERS  
 
The notion of Motivating Influencers is the final property of the lower order category of 
Influencing Leadership. This concept emerged from the data and revealed how 
leadership influences followers by motivating them to reduce anxiety, restore calm and 
confidence and accept Crisis Leadership’s directives.  Motivating themes were also 
identified as being interrelated to the other components of Influencing Leadership such 
as Communicating, Decision-making, Visibility and Leading by Example.  Throughout 
the data collection, it was evident that positive experiences in these categories 
contributed to motivating staff and engaging them in the pursuit of affirmative outcomes 
from the crisis situation.   
 
Inspirational actions by leadership are also considered as being a Motivating Influencer 
and encourage staff to undertake responsibilities outside of their normal day-to-day job 
description.  The CEO was considered to be a courageous leader by going to the closed 
hotel in the live-fire zone.  In an instance recalled by a DH, she described with much 
admiration; “I remember one day the soldiers had to escort him out because he is [sic] 
not safe to be in the hotel anymore but he insisted to be here”.   
 
She also added that by being at the hotel during such a dangerous episode added to his 
leadership credibility.  The hotel was considered the company’s iconic flagship property 
and therefore it was a strong symbolic statement by the CEO to go into the protest zone 
to make regular visits while it was closed.  This action motivated and inspired the 
skeleton staff staying in the hotel as well as those at the CCC and contributed to their 
resolve to be present at the CCC even after curfews were enforced.  It also motivated 
the CCC participants to remain calm and not display fear, even though one of the 
managers felt a sense of panic when she realised that “as a leader you shouldn’t show 
fear”. 
 
In the case of the Corporate Office executives that were motivated to establish and 
operate the CCC; they each provided through their interview responses their 
justification to report to the CCC as based on their leader acting in a proactive and 
positive manner.  Their objective was to ensure the company’s global operations 
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platform remained open and the needs and concerns of the internal and external 
customers were being addressed.  One of the DHs working at the CCC felt that their 
leader inspired them to be working in the offsite location by stating; “if my boss, my 
leader were here I would be like, why would I be at home”. This was a Motivating 
Influence to report for duty in a chaotic and sometimes dangerous environment. These 
DHs were unanimous in their sense of Responsibility to all stakeholders in the 
knowledge that the company’s survival impacted 8,000 staff, their families, suppliers 
and business partners.  This sense of Responsibility can also be explained as a 
Motivating Influence in an interrelated relationship with this category and is detailed 
further in Section 4.3.1 with the quote among others; “the people I worked with had a 
sense of responsibility.  They knew what had to be done.” 
 
The notion of pride was also expressed by other Corporate Office executives and was a 
Motivating Influence to ensure ‘business as usual’ and to report for duty when other 
managers left the city for safer locations.  Yet another Corporate Office executive, who 
had introduced the bunker spirit term to the CCC, acknowledged in a follow up 
interview after Phase One that he felt that although the CCC was only a small 
microcosm of the crisis planning efforts, he felt that they (the group on duty) were 
driving something worthwhile.  The notion of the bunker spirit is further explained in 
the next section on Active Sense-making and strengthens the interrelatedness of the 
emerging themes building to the BSSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers. 
 
The properties of the lower order category Influencing Leadership are further 
interrelated to the next category which emerged from data analysis and described Crisis 
Leadership’s ability to actively make sense of the crisis event.  Active Sense-making 
will be explained in the next section. 
 
4.2 ACTIVE SENSE-MAKING  
 
As the lower order category classifications were developed from the emergent themes it 
was apparent that categories were interrelated as was the case that effective Decision-
making required Active Sense-making.  The notion of Active Sense-making is highly 
interrelated to the categories of Decision-Making and Communicating from Influencing 
Leadership, as well as the third lower order category of Managing the Crisis.  Jackson 
and Parry (2011) suggest that Sense-making is the essence of leadership which requires 
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followers to understand the vision, take action and accept risk, as well as initiate change.  
This can only be achieved with face-to-face contact and delegation.  Through Active 
Sense-making, Crisis Leadership can engage and encourage followers to focus on the 
issues that require attention on all levels. 
 
The leadership enactment process at the time of a crisis relies on the ability of the leader 
to critically assess the situation and make time-efficient decisions based on the 
information at hand. Weick (1988) posited that a less than adequate Sense-making 
process employed during a crisis will result in the crisis situation deteriorating further. 
Weick (2010) explained Sense-making as engaging in the process of thinking about 
disorder, confusion and insecurity, so that decision-making will be efficient and timely. 
These are themes that also emerged from the data collection and analysis of the Red 
Shirt crisis and were high priority considerations for Crisis Leaders undertaking their 
Crisis Management duties. 
 
The CCC team worked closely together on the communication strategies and 
spearheaded the internal and external communications for the company, as well as 
setting up a remote global reservations office (Case study organisation’s 2010 Annual 
Report, accessed on company website).  This group were instrumental in keeping all 
stakeholders informed and establishing the recovery marketing strategies, as well as 
informing the staff community on HR related updates.   
 
Even during the curfew periods a small cohort from the Corporate Office were diligent 
and reported for duty. One of the long-time Department Heads referred to the ‘bunker 
spirit’ that prevailed at that time.  The researcher followed up with an additional 
interview and probed the meaning of this description.  He indicated that the CCC felt 
like a ‘bunker’ with its classroom seating and everyone working in together which he 
likened physically to a ‘war room’ when you are under fire. He explained further that 
the CCC group were driven out in a mini-bus each day to the site, dressed casually and 
not in the daily standard suit attire. He felt more of a team spirit at that time than at any 
other time in his long history with the company, especially since they were dealing with 
real problems that needed real solutions.  He remarked that “it was refreshing in some 
ways, as a team it tightened some bonds”. 
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However, one of the Bangkok hotel Excom who had stated complete trust in his GM’s 
decision-making in Phase One interviews, shared a conflicting view with the researcher 
during Phase two interviews in discussing the emergent conceptual theme schematic 
(Figure 3.1).  In essence, he stated that Thai members of the Excom thought the GM 
was a Red Shirt supporter. They would meet clandestinely after the daily morning 
briefings to discuss the GMs actions since they were Red Shirt opponents.  Therefore, 
there was some underlying mistrust on a political affiliation level that was not openly 
expressed previously, yet they were supportive of the GM in his decision-making 
processes in regard to dealing with the hotel operational issues.  They trusted his Crisis 
Leadership competency, yet they did not trust his political views.  
 
In contrast, the CEO was criticised on a number of occasions for his unwillingness to 
make decisions or understand the escalating tensions from the Red Shirt protest camp 
and military, as well as how the staff were feeling. Instead he attempted to portray 
business as usual.  One of the Corporate Office interviewees, who has moved 
companies since the Red Shirt crisis, felt the CEO was “blind to the severity of the 
situation.”  In Phase One a Bangkok hotel Excom interviewee stated: 
“….I’m sure the CEO had his advisers which were most probably the members 
of the board of directors which are all Thai.  But at the end of the day it’s the 
CEO that makes the decision and it came too late.  It should have come at least 
five days earlier.” 
 
He also stated in an email response follow up in Phase Two in his reference to the CEO:  
“In thinking back I strongly feel that the owner has been ignorant of the safety 
for the staff considering life [sic] bullets entered the hotel during many days.” 
 
His comments had become more negative by Phase Two. The data continued to reveal 
the perception that the CEO lacked understanding of the situation or the level of the 
staffs’ fears and concerns.  A Corporate Office non Thai Executive recalled:  
“I saw a lot of Thai staff around feeling uncomfortable and worried and 
especially parents being worried about them travelling to work as the office is 
just outside where they were camping.” 
 
In Phase Two data collection, a hotel GM from the case study group, who had been 
based previously in the Corporate Office for six years, emailed his responses to the 
request for his feedback on the emergent conceptual theme schematic (Figure 3.1) with 
the following: 
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“I believe we are prepared for most things. But there is always the people factor 
and what is planned and tests a hundred times, may not transpire due to the 
emotional influence of the people involved. We need to further explore in more 
detail the mindset/culture of our employees and the principles they will fall back 
upon when a crises hits. This is further complicated by those who are new and 
those who have been here decades, those who are baby boomers and the Y 
generation [sic].” 
 
In exploring the question of what made the participants trust the decisions of leadership, 
the interviewees responded favourably to leadership during the crisis based on their 
knowledge of the leader’s past crisis experience and their leader’s ability to frame the 
crisis through Active Sense-making. In addition, knowledge of a learned experience was 
also attributed to the followers’ trust in their leaders.  This was evident with the 
Bangkok hotel GM, but to a lesser degree with the CEO and was absent with the Phuket 
hotel’s GM.  Learning from Experience will be discussed in Section 5.2.  The next 
section will explain the categories that contributed to the Active Sense-making by 
revealing the data findings with regard to Understanding the Mindset, Emotional 
Sensitivity, National and Organisational Culture.  
 
4.2.1 UNDERSTANDING THE MINDSET 
 
In addition to the national and cultural influences which are discussed in the following 
sections of Active Sense-making, leadership also needs to understand the notion of 
individual and collective mindsets in the context of a crisis.  A leader’s ability to 
understand their follower’s mindset contributes to the concept of Active Sense-making 
and relates to leadership’s decision-making efficacy (Devitt & Borodzicz, 2008).  A 
leader’s proficiency in assessing their follower’s expectations and reactions at the onset 
of a potential crisis event will alert them to potential challenges.  This allows them to 
make sense of the situation by understanding the prevailing mindset.  This competency 
was further enhanced with their experience of past crisis events which will be detailed 
in Learning from Experience in Section 5.2, and having an understanding of the 
National Culture and Organisational Culture that existed, which will explained in this 
Section in 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 respectively. 
 
In the case of this research study, interview data revealed a reticence on the part of 
leadership to adequately assess the impending crisis. In seeking to understand the 
prevailing mindset the data identified a recurring theme about the perceived state of 
complacency that existed in the pre-crisis event period.  The collective mindset of the 
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case study organisation can be best explained by their aversion to taking the lead, 
preparing for a negative situation or confronting issues to avoid a worsening situation.  
A Corporate Office DH stated; “it was actually quite dysfunctional at the beginning 
because really no-one knew what we were doing or what was going to happen.”  On the 
other hand another Corporate Office DH suggested that:  
“The higher leadership within the Thai community at our hotel chain did have 
feelings and were very well connected to the top people in the country, they 
knew there was some more of this situation to play out, they knew that there 
would be future trouble. But it just didn’t seem to in the mentality of the 
company and nothing really filtered down I think to the rank and file so we 
could take this threat seriously and I think there was a reliance that we would 
bounce back.” 
 
Another Corporate Office DH interviewee remarked:  
“….the senior management role should be more proactive and plan in advance 
where the mid-management should be the fire fighters.  It’s usually the mid-
management that gets their hands dirty and has to manage the crisis once it 
happens.” 
 
The notion of ‘it’s not my responsibility’ or ‘it’s not in my job description’ was a factor 
that was reported in the interview data and influenced Crisis Leadership activities.  
When the researcher probed this perception further, some of the managers from the 
hotels made reference to the GM’s position being solely responsible for Crisis 
Leadership and therefore it was not their responsibility.  It was similar to the data 
collected from a number of expatriate managers who were of the opinion that the 
collective nature of Thai staff prevents them from ‘stepping up’ to assume a leadership 
role that would require them to manage the situation.   
 
This was also explained by a number of expatriate managers that the Asian concept of 
‘showing face’ and their fear of being embarrassed by making a mistake or failing is all 
encompassing.  In Phase Two interviews a participant, who was previously employed as 
a Director at the Corporate Office, provided his responses by email and referred to 
Thailand’s Buddhist culture influencing by suggesting:  
“In the case of Thailand the Buddhist culture is all pervasive, the related lack of 
willingness of the population to confront or deal with dangerous situations and 
persons overrides both past experience and the ability to deal with crisis events 
WITHOUT HELP AND SUPERVISION from a non-Buddhist entity (i.e. 
expatriate officers).” [sic] 
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These concepts contributed to the complex collective mindset that existed at a time of 
great uncertainty and impacted the subsequent Active Sense-making required by crisis 
leaders. 
 
Although cultural attributes will be addressed in the next sections, it is worthwhile 
highlighting a Thai tale that encapsulated much of the general staff mindset and their 
aversion to dealing with crises. This understanding of aversion was brought to light in 
Phase Two of the data collection.  The tale’s narrator was a previous Project Manager 
with the case study organisation who is now a consultant with an Israeli-based security 
firm.  When the researcher probed into why he thought they procrastinated in their 
planning and implementation processes he undertook to share the tale of a farmer with a 
leaking tin roof.   
 
The tale described how all through the monsoon months the farmer’s roof leaked, and as 
the rainy season intensified the leak worsened.  The farmer knew it needed to be fixed 
but kept putting it off due to cost and his belief it would get better not worse. His house 
eventually became a mud bath and everything was ruined. Then the monsoonal rains 
finished and the sun came out shining.  He forgot about the discomfort of the leaking 
roof and enjoyed the sunshine, until the next rainy season, when the cycle would repeat 
itself.  It was the opinion of the narrator that the case study organisation will ignore the 
issues that need to be addressed if they are considered too hard to deal with.   
 
Another DH also explained this complacent attitude in terms of Thai people putting 
their head ‘back’ into the sand when the ‘warning signs’ of an impending crisis event 
were evident.  He referred to the lack of debriefing from the Red Shirt crisis and 
establishing updated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs):  
 “I just don’t think they have been covered – probably not even now, maybe 
you’ll find out if they have or not.  I didn’t see any immediate evidence 
afterwards, there was relief that business was coming back, head back in the 
sand.”  
 
 
Karsaklian (2014) described the fatalistic notion of cultural decision-making in a 
country such as Thailand, which is included in the GLOBE 10 Societal Cluster of South 
East Asia.  South East Asian cultures such as Thailand value harmony and accept that 
fatalism may explain events, rather than a structured plan or readiness. 
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With this in mind, the hotel company’s leadership needed to understand the mindset 
before being able to engage staff to ‘step up’ and work through crisis preparations.  
Crisis Leadership needed to actively make sense of followers’ aversion to dealing with 
difficult situations so that calm could be restored, confusion reduced and a sense of 
security assured as quickly as possible.  Crisis Leadership Sense-making skills needed 
to be directed to managing disorder, confusion and insecurity at the onset of the crisis 
event.  They needed to make sense of the situation and provide an informed assessment 
for the way forward.  Crisis Leadership also needed to understand the mindset at the 
time of the unfolding crisis so that they could learn from the crisis and adopt measures 
to overcome the mistakes for the future.   
 
This is explained in more detail in Organisational Learning in Section 5.2.2.  For 
example, a leader at the Phuket hotel described her realisation after the failed evacuation 
that staff had never felt an earthquake before and that they needed to educate them 
about what happens.  There were a series of aftershocks, and the hotel’s management 
spent considerable time in educating staff on how to deal with earthquakes and 
tsunamis. 
 
In the case of the researcher’s former role, the interviewee responses revealed that staff 
accepted the leader’s directives and moved forward by implementing the Crisis 
Management initiatives as directed by leadership at the time of a crisis.  In this role 
during the Red Shirt crisis the researcher was concerned with staff going to the CCC 
under duress, especially as one of the DHs had a young family.  Also the majority of the 
Thai Bangkok-based management staff were unsympathetic to the Red Shirt cause and 
their families were concerned about their safety and security travelling to the CCC 
location.  Nevertheless, they were committed to strategising recovery initiatives and as 
evidenced previously, the sense of pride was a concept that was harnessed to ensure a 
seamless ongoing operation in the midst of a crisis event.   
 
Leadership created a safe working environment at the CCC to ease the tension and 
stress levels.  In addition, the use of Twitter was moderated significantly since those 
managers who relied on this form of communication became agitated and worried about 
the violent situation.  Twitter’s statements were difficult to verify and this created undue 
duress within the CCC team, as highlighted in Communicating in Section 4.1.1.  During 
Phase Two data collection, the manager who was the most active on Twitter expressed 
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his embarrassment for his reliance on this information source.  When the researcher 
probed further, he explained he has since recognised the need for accurate and timely 
information in the decision-making process. 
 
Interview data from the CCC group reflected a strong sense of pride and satisfaction in 
their activities in dealing with the crisis situation.  This was due to the trust and 
confidence in their leader’s decisions and capabilities as expressed in their knowledge 
of the leader’s past experience. Clear directives were provided by leadership in an 
honest and confident manner through regular updates which diffused the apparent fear 
and panic.  As a consequence, calm and confidence was restored into the mindset of the 
staff at the CCC.   
 
However, many participants indicated when interviewed that delays in the CEO’s 
decision-making moderated the levels of respect and trust between leadership and staff.  
Therefore, by understanding the mindset and adopting a more visible and 
communicative approach to staff concerns at the CCC could have influenced a more 
favourable perception of the CEO during the crisis event.  The mindset of the followers 
is a key dimension in Active Sense-making.  The leader’s ability to actively make sense 
of the mindset and make decisions that complemented the welfare of followers 
increased their performance and improved the organisation’s crisis outcomes.  In 
addition to Understanding the Mindset the Crisis Leadership’s ability to make sense of 
the situation also required them to have the capacity to sense the emotional traits and 
needs of all stakeholders.  The following section describes the Emotional Sensitivity 
capabilities of the Crisis Leadership team with regard to the crisis event 
 
4.2.2 EMOTIONAL SENSITIVITY  
 
The data revealed the many facets of the emotional ‘rollercoaster’ during the time of the 
Red Shirt crisis and the importance of leadership having the ability to be emotionally 
sensitised to their followers’ emotional indicators as explained in Communicating in 
Section 4.1.1.  This concept developed from data regularity in relation to certain 
negative emotive descriptions that recurred and included emotions such as a sense of 
fear, insecurity, panic, stress, worry and sadness.  This was evidenced in a statement 
from a Phase One interviewee from the Corporate Office: 
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“There were talks that the sniper that took out Sadang was nested in the hotel 
that’s why we were shot at.  There were talks that the hotel’s rooms were all full 
of military personnel ready to pounce on the Red Shirts.  So, yes, it was quite 
scary at that time but we could have been better prepared.” 
 
Whereas the more positive emotive descriptions were harnessed to assist leadership in 
counteracting negative themes and included for example: pride, spirit and a sense of 
belonging.  These emotive factors were also bound to relationships within the Active 
Sense-making category and the higher order BSSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers. 
 
Leadership operated in an extremely tense situation with a high level of uncertainty, a 
lack of preparedness.  The confusion and disorder combined to contribute to high stress 
levels for both leaders and followers.  Crises are characterised by stress and can escalate 
even further unless the stressful factors are mitigated (Weick, 1988).  In the context of 
the Red Shirt crisis, there were some instances of Crisis Leadership which displayed 
concern for the welfare of staff by employing measures to reduce the fear, insecurity 
and panic that prevailed.  In Phase One interviews a Bangkok hotel Excom explained 
how they related with staff during the Red Shirt Crisis: 
 “...communication from the top down to the bottom, we used a lot of memos, we 
make use of the staff bulletin board, we ask the department heads to do the 
meeting to the next level and whenever our staff does not feel comfortable, they 
have the right to come and talk to their superior or to the HR.” 
 
Subsequently they were able to reduce the stress levels of employees to cope with the 
crisis situation at hand.  For example, the CCC was set up where all levels of staff 
worked together in a classroom devoid of any hierarchical barriers where Crisis 
Leadership provided encouraging support, positive morale boosters and regular updates 
and their safety was the first and foremost priority at all times.  
 
As discussed previously, the data reflected the ‘bunker spirit’ or ‘war room’ 
environment where everyone worked together for the good of the company. The 
researcher probed one of the CCC staff further to understand why she was prepared to 
go to the CCC when many other staff stayed at home or had left Bangkok for safer 
locations.  She suggested:  
“I feel good.  I feel proud to be nominated as one of the team just to ensure 
business is as usual and, yes, I think working during that time it’s like a team 
spirit, getting to know colleagues better during the bad times and during the 
good times so I think we feel more connected.”   
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The researcher probed further and asked her how she felt about all of the different levels 
together.  Did she feel that the lower level staff shouldn’t have been working together?  
She responded:  
“No, no.  For me I felt great to be part of the team, to be in the classroom with 
other staff.  I feel great, yes.” 
 
Nevertheless, there were also examples of leadership inaction and the subsequent 
concerns expressed by staff.  For example, the Phuket hotel GM was perceived by his 
Excom to be panicking when the earthquake occurred and he failed to sense the 
confusion and fear in the hotel’s staff and guest communities as evidenced in quotes 
provided in Section 4.1.2 on Decision-making by one of the property’s Excom 
members.  Another Phuket Excom member stated: 
 “I said ‘(GM name), we have to make a decision we move or we stand still’ and 
he was saying things like ‘what’s (neighbouring hotel) doing’, ‘what’s the hotel 
next door’ doing and ‘what’s (another hotel GM) doing?’  I understand why 
because these managers need to talk but I didn’t have the information because I 
hadn’t called them so I said look we have to make a decision for ourselves and at 
the same time this was happening the alarm sounded which therefore meant we 
didn’t have any decision to make.  We just had to go............... You need to act 
swiftly and you need to be calm like I needed to say to the department heads, 
some of them were packing their bags, and I said you need to settle your team 
down....” 
 
When Phase Two interviews were conducted it was reported that a sense of panic and 
fear was also building in the Corporate Office based on the ‘warning signs’ of renewed 
political protests in August 2013.  At that time the staff community felt that HR in 
particular were not showing any care or concern about the staff; this is addressed in 
more detail in Section 5.1.1 on ‘Warning Signals’.  Safety and security issues were 
revealed as major concerns with high regularity in the data analysis.  An example of the 
sense of fear was expressed by a Bangkok hotel Excom during Phase One interviews:   
“…..that’s natural because when people don’t know what’s happening, what 
roads are closed or where are the checkpoints, where should I avoid, when they 
don’t know that they get scared and of course their parents get scared, their 
family gets scared.  I know my family didn’t want me to come into the office 
and I had to make stories like I’m not going to the hotel, we’re going to our 
other office and then I had to come on Silom Road past three military 
checkpoints to get to the hotel…..” 
 
Staff were also influenced by the fears of their families, which exacerbated their own 
negative perception of their CEO’s actions, an example of this consequence was stated 
in Phase One interviews by a Bangkok hotel Excom member:  
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“I have spoken during that time a lot more with the mother of my son who is 
now 18.  They’re living in Stockholm in Sweden.  I also spoke to my mother in 
Austria.  I have never told her the real extent of the problem because it wouldn’t 
have made sense anyway but what I remember is what the mother of my son, 
(ex-wife), told me a few times.  She does not understand how the owner of the 
company of the hotel would keep the hotel open so long as to endanger people 
and basically waiting until the bullets hit the hotel.  Now she said that a few 
times and I think that’s a very good point.  So I find that the main decision 
makers, the people that make the decision whether the hotel closes and 
evacuates or not, have not really had the safety and security of the staff as a 
main objective in their decision making.” 
 
The ability to recognise the concerns of staff and their emotional well-being will 
generate greater levels of goodwill and results in followers managing the tasks at hand 
and maximising effective solutions for the organisation.  Leadership’s ‘Emotional 
Sensitivity’ includes the capacity to compassionately assess the individual’s 
environment, which also relates to Understanding the Mindset category previously 
discussed.  For example, the lack of information or instruction from HR contributed to 
staff anxiety, uncertainty and fear. In Phase One interviews, a Corporate Office 
executive felt:  
“….looking back, I feel that it was handled very carelessly.  No initiation or 
looking ahead or forecasting or planning for eventual things that could happen.  
Instead it was just defining all the time to the staff nothing is happening 
somehow in a way to make staff feel that they had to come to work, giving them 
the option not to come to work but I saw around the Thai staff under me, they 
were constantly asking is it OK?  So it was not giving out a strict message that 
these are the possibilities, this is what we’re going to do.” 
 
Nevertheless, a Corporate Office DH did acknowledge some communication from the 
Corporate HR office; “They did send out the occasional notification but really it wasn’t 
anything solid like guiding people where to go or what to do during a crisis.” 
 
The art of listening also provides a window to the emotional well-being of an individual 
or a group.  One of the Bangkok hotel’s Directors recalled their commitment to staff by 
listening to their concerns and relaying this to the Excom.  This included their staffs’ 
fears about access to the hotel and returning home when the curfews were imposed, 
reduced salaries, job losses and voluntary salary cuts as had been experienced the 
previous year after the yellow shirt airport closures of December 2008.  By showing 
concern and providing open and honest feedback the staff were reassured that their fears 
were in most cases unfounded.  The hotel Director was of the belief that these fears 
needed to be controlled from an early stage so that the stress levels could be minimised 
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where possible.  This was in contrast to the HR department at the Corporate Office level 
where little two way communication was apparent. 
 
In addition to Understanding the Mindset and making sense of the Emotional Sensitivity 
of the crisis participants, leadership was required to make sense of the influence of 
national culture which subsequently impacted the lower order category of Influencing 
Leadership and its properties.  The category of National Culture will be explained in the 
next section. 
 
4.2.3 NATIONAL CULTURE  
 
Active Sense-making, as a lower order category, existed because the contextual 
environment influenced the Crisis Leadership activities and National Culture emerged 
as an important component of this category, while also being closely integrated with the 
other lower order categories.  The case study organisation managed a global operation 
with the majority of hotels located in Thailand.  Its ‘Thainess’ was used as a unique 
competitive advantage in its Vision and Mission guiding statements.  Throughout the 
data collection process references to Thai culture were prevalent as the reason for the 
beliefs and attitudes supporting and influencing the case study organisation.   
 
One of the expatriate Managers was of the opinion that the Thai culture “seeps through 
the company” and it is what defines the company as well.  This observation was 
repeated throughout the data gathering phase by both the expatriate and Thai national 
staff as a positive and negative influence on the organisation. Expatriate managers who 
had lived in Thailand for an extended period of five years or more, referred to the Thai 
mentality having been absorbed in an osmotic process and impacting their own western 
perceptions.   
 
‘Thainess” is also characterised by the Thai people’s belief in Buddhism.  One of the 
Corporate Office Directors described the Thai way of life with the statement:  
“Buddhism really plays a big role in our life and whatever happens we forgive 
and we never thought that somebody’s going to burn buildings for no reason or 
somebody is just going to shoot the hotel or innocent people just because there 
was rumour and the soldiers here....”.   
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During interviews, an expatriate manager suggested that Buddhism is an all pervasive 
aspect of business in Thailand.  The concept of ‘Feng Shui’ also influences the way of 
life and business in many countries, including Thailand.  The Thai aversion to 
confronting negative issues was also apparent when the researcher, in her capacity as 
VP Sales and Marketing, sought to prepare for the future death of the much revered 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Handley, 2006).  “Although he is a constitutional monarch, 
King Bhumibol is worshipped and adored as a demi-god here, a semi-supernatural force 
that binds the nation” (Schiller, 2011). 
 
Discussions on this topic were completely reviled by Thais as it was considered a bad 
omen to even raise the topic and Thais believe that discussing negative omens only 
encourages them.  The Thai senior Sales and Marketing leaders were not prepared to 
initiate any contingency plans for such an unimaginable event, yet his health issues and 
age indicated a shortening life span.  For the Thais this is an unthinkable event; so 
therefore, Preparing for the Unthinkable becomes a major challenge even when there 
are major business, political and social interruptions expected and reported widely by 
international media and commentators outside of Thailand. This aversion to avoiding 
negative situations was further confirmed by an expatriate staff member with her 
statement: “speaking and bringing up bad things when they don’t happen, can culturally 
be seen as creating a bad karma”. 
 
The influence of ‘Feng Shui’ was also highlighted by a hotel Excom member’s recount 
of the goldfish feeding in the gardens of the hotel.  He was disappointed that the CEO’s 
concern for staff welfare was overshadowed with his concern for the goldfish being fed 
during the hotel shutdown.   The goldfish were a symbolic ‘Feng Shui’ representation of 
the company’s success and assisted in neutralising any negative influences.  At the time 
of the crisis, the Excom member was inspired by the CEO’s ability to think of such a 
small detail. However, in hindsight, and at the time of the interview more than two years 
later, the Excom member’s opinion had changed and he has since questioned the role of 
‘Feng Shui’ at such a critical moment in the history of the hotel. 
 
Problem-solving and anticipating problems are reflected in Thai’s preference to avoid 
confrontation and ignore the problem (Holmes, Tangtongtavy & Tomizawa, 2003).  As 
one of the expatriate managers said it’s: 
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“…a culture where it’s preferred when there is a problem, it’s culturally 
preferred to look away.  So speaking and bringing up bad things when they don’t 
happen, can culturally be seen as creating bad karma and energy”.   
 
In contrast, a Thai Director compared a relative’s experience in the UK and his British 
organisation’s systematic readiness for crisis.  She expressed the view that Thais are not 
taking crisis events seriously enough and only address each case as it happens.  Instead 
she referred to the ‘sabai-sabai’ concept, which is translated with one ‘sabai’ to ‘well’, 
‘comfortable’ or ‘relaxed’ (Higbie, 1999) when it is repeated it is translated into 
‘everything’s chill’ or ‘almost beyond words happy’, the Thai’s ‘heaven on earth’ and 
illustrates the Thai mentality to life in general with its repetitive usage.  The researcher 
made a memo note that this was a surprising revelation by this Thai manager to 
recognise their Crisis Management weaknesses.  It was particularly poignant since this 
informant is normally very proud and protective of the Thai culture and heritage as well 
as being an openly staunch royalist and yellow shirt supporter.  
 
Crisis readiness requires a proactive attitude and being able to make sense of potential 
threats.  However, in the substantive context of the case study organisation there was a 
significant time delay in preparing for the escalating violent clashes.  This was often 
explained by the interview participants as a complacency that is a characteristic of Thai 
culture.  One of the expatriate DHs described the reaction after the military coup of 
2006. He was concerned about the impact on the business and daily life, but his Thai 
colleagues responded with the attitude: 
“….it was very much ‘let’s wait and see what happens’ was the mentality, let’s 
not worry about anything until we really need to, which I found very surprising 
actually. We did actually put some things into place so guests weren’t actually 
worried, but it was more let’s see, let’s not worry people, let’s just see how this 
pans out which is part a mentality of maybe Thailand, and possibly that 
company.” 
 
When the researcher probed why the decision to close the hotel during the Red Shirt 
crisis was perceived by a number of management staff interviewed as being too late 
because it put staff and guests in danger of a live-fire zone, one of the hotel’s Excom 
suggested that it has to do with Thai culture.  He explained that it is a ‘face’ issue, and 
they don’t want to be seen as the one giving up and closing a business.  
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With reference to the Deutsche Bank relocation as mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the 
Corporate Office interviewee explained that one of the reasons for the delay in 
relocating the case study organisation was the optimistic outlook of Thais. He believed 
they held the perception that the situation could not deteriorate and Thais would not 
resort to violence since it is not in their nature. He stated:  
“No-one expected that but I think in the view of Western companies maybe they 
have a proper SOP manual or standard and they get prepared for an 
event......they have a backup site for it and they moved to that backup site 
immediately.”  
 
During Phase Two interviews when the researcher probed this point further as a follow 
up to a developing theme, another Thai manager who considered himself more 
westernised than most stated that the “Thai way is to prepare for the best and expect the 
best”.  He compared this with the Western way which is commonly described as 
“prepare for the worst and hope for the best”.  A number of managers expressed their 
concern that this attitude towards Crisis Readiness pervades Thai culture and everyday 
life and therefore the organisation.  
 
Some of the interview participants referred to the Thai ‘greng jai’ whereby the sense of 
doing the right thing overrides the Thais’ individual decision-making process.  The Thai 
language uses ‘heart words’ that describe emotions or characteristics combining the 
word ‘jai’ which means heart, spirit or mind.  The Thai word for heart takes on a 
spiritual level to describe feelings and ‘greng jai’ which is a concept that does not 
translate into English easily.  ‘Greng jai’ is described in a number of ways including as 
a term that conveys indebtedness, or of feeling the need to repay a favour, or a sense of 
being fearful of causing offence (Holmes, et al., 2003).  In this crisis situation, the Thai 
staff felt indebted to report for duty even when it was not considered safe.  Therefore 
those staff who did not report were viewed as being less than loyal while those who 
attended were recognised as stars, thereby creating further tensions within the staff 
population.   
 
The researcher probed the Phuket hotel’s key informant about the differences between 
Singapore’s strong emergency readiness attitude versus the Thai’s viewpoint.  She 
explained that although they are not ‘negligent’ forward thinking is not in their 
mentality.  She suggested that; 
“…. particularly in a natural disaster, they believe that sometimes these things 
just happen because they’re meant to happen and they have a great reaction 
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afterwards where they don’t sit around and cry about it like some cultures 
would.  They’re very much they get up and they get out their broom and they 
start sweeping and try to do something useful.  But, yes, I think they could 
certainly save themselves from pain and loss and suffering if they had a 
readiness plan.”   
 
The data also indicated that a Western manager would be required to assume a 
leadership role if Thai managers stepped back from assuming responsibility at such a 
critical time.  One of the Corporate Office DHs noted about the lack of support being 
given to the Bangkok hotel GM (a non-Thai) by the hotel’s Thai Excom team:  
“We went down to a meeting one time and I felt sorry for (GM) at that time, I 
felt he didn’t have the team, from his team within his EXCOM, to really deal 
with the situation apart from maybe probably the farangs (Thai for ‘foreigners’) 
that were in place, no one else seemed to be vocal or providing any of the 
solutions, a tough game actually.” 
 
Another Corporate Office executive recalled as the crisis escalated (May 14th 2010): 
“….the next morning we came in to the office and not one single Thai staff was 
there.  HR hadn’t issued a warning or a message that I can recall and it was six 
westerners in senior management positions that were in the head office and no-
one around and the CEO came around asking if we were OK but I cannot 
remember any notice to say that no-one’s coming in for that day, etc.” 
 
An international manager undertaking a leadership role in a Thai firm needs to consider 
the influence of National Culture when the potential for a crisis event in imminent.  
National culture appears to be interrelated to the other lower order categories and a key 
thematic concept of Active Sense-making.  Since this study is exploring an international 
hotel company with a focus on its Thai based operations, the Organisational Culture is a 
highly interrelated dimension within all of the categories in Active Sense-making and 
will now be explained in the following section. 
 
4.2.4 ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
 
In the lower order category of Active Sense-making, Organisational Culture is also a 
key concept in understanding how leadership deals with a crisis situation.  
Organisational Culture has been posited by Weick (2010) to impact the Sense-making 
of a crisis event especially as the problems intensify.  Data analysis of the interview 
findings revealed a number of concerns that contributed to the category of 
Organisational Culture and it also identified shared relationships with other Active 
Sense-making properties. In addition, Organisational Culture was identified to possess a 
depth of interrelatedness with other categories of Crisis Leadership Influencers.  
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The case study organisation was perceived by some management that the CEO was 
managing the company as head of a local business, rather than a multiunit international 
hotel company.  The CEO was described as acting in isolation and not including his 
management team.  Although visible in the sense of media reports and visiting the hotel 
under siege, he worked at the CCC in a boardroom with his assistant and shared little 
information in updates.  One of the senior Directors acknowledged he was acting out of 
the right instincts for the company and its stakeholders, but he should have insisted 
more from the senior VP group and called them together and sought their counsel, 
support and delegated duties.  Instead, the VP cohort were less than diligent in their 
duties and failed to report to the CCC until instructed to do so by the CEO.  This was 
described by one of the Corporate Office DHs who participated at the CCC:  
 “There were not many senior management around when that happened at that 
time.  I have to give credit to the GM of the (hotel) at that point of time.  He was 
in-house twenty-four-seven until it was over. (CEO) was around, a couple of 
senior management staff from sales and marketing were around to lend support 
and to help manage the crisis in the hotel but apart from that, I think the rest of 
the Corporate Office disappeared.” 
 
In order to better understand the informants’ perceptions, the researcher probed further 
in follow up interviews and confirmed that slow decision-making suggested a lack of 
unity at the VP level.  Deeper problems were also evident in the organisation with a 
distinct cavernous divide of management philosophies in this business. This was 
supported by an expatriate middle manager who had worked for the company in 
different roles and described the organisation as having distinctly different management 
agendas.  He described it as a business where the CEO had a vision to grow and expand 
the business internationally and the finance head, insisted on reducing risk and limiting 
the developmental expenditure. 
 
The parent company’s organisational structure consisted of a number of divisions which 
included hotel, development, spa, education and finance (2010 and 2011 Annual 
Reports for the case study organisation as required by the Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
accessed from the company website).  These divisions operated with a silo mentality, 
whereby they were only concerned with their own operations.  There was limited 
communications between the divisions or cross fertilisation of ideas and strategies, as 
observed by the researcher and recorded as a memo on two instances in the “Summary 
and Memo Highlights” document. A silo mentality is described by Seville (2008) as 
“cultural and behavioural barriers which can be divisive within and between 
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organisations, which are most often manifested as communication barriers creating 
disjointed, disconnected and detrimental ways of working” (p.8). The effects of a silo 
mentality was also a weakness identified in the Canberra 2003 bushfire emergency 
agency management and was described by Armstrong (2008) as; “A silo mentality 
refers to the tendency for organisations to work individually and separately due to 
functional barriers and hence not work together to achieve peak performance” (p.160).  
 
At the time of the Red Shirt crisis, the silo mentality in the case study organisation 
diminished the effectiveness of Crisis Management processes.  It was observed by one 
of the senior directors that:  
“We never got information, it was a struggle to find out exactly what was 
happening, departments weren’t talking with each other, hotels weren’t being 
supported, there was no collusion, no overarching strategy.”   
 
This observation was also supported by another Manager based on the analogy that ‘no 
man is an island’ when she described:  
“...there was an island that basically turned into the company control mechanism 
or division so there has got to be cohesion.  It’s got to be collaboration between 
everyone.” 
 
The hotel division was the largest division and comprised of the following departments 
under the leadership of the Senior VP whose area of responsibility included; operations, 
sales and marketing, food and beverage, engineering and human resources.  In 2007 the 
role of Senior VP was created reporting to the CEO and was held by an experienced 
hotelier with an extensive career background with one of the world’s leading luxury 
hotel brands.  His remit was to introduce international hotel systems and operations into 
the case study organisation which was on a massive international development 
trajectory. 
 
As the group’s global expansion plans developed, the Senior VP appointed key senior 
positions to support the corporate hotel division’s organisational changes and initiated 
new processes and systems for hotel group worldwide.  His initiatives included a daily 
morning briefing for all staff to share inspirational lessons each day as well as company 
information.  These briefings were held for all staff at the corporate and hotel level, but 
were not embraced by other divisions such as Finance, Education, Development or Spa, 
reinforcing the silo mentality.    
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The Senior VP was considered by many of the staff community as a high-energy, 
charismatic, transformational leader who encouraged employee empowerment and 
innovative thinking throughout the organisation.   However, his position became 
untenable as his relationship with the CEO and the Board weakened, and their support 
for his strategies and plans became irretrievable by early 2010.  As explained in Phase 
Two interviews in an email response dated August 7th, 2013, from an interviewee who 
had previously worked for the case study organisation at the time of the Red Shirt crisis 
explaining his perception of the Senior VP’s role and subsequent demise: 
 “This brings up another untackled matter, that is that the owners continually 
appoint external management (mostly foreigners), who are then not allowed to 
manage, but merely act as figureheads whilst the ownership continues in its 
lethargy....... He/she will therefore not allow any external appointees to manage 
in an efficient and effective manner and will not allow them to make key 
decisions.”   
 
He continued to add in a follow-up interview on August 10th:  
 Looking back at the history of the company, (CEO) keeps bringing in these very 
able people like (Senior VP) and then castrates them.  Then after a year or two 
of complete frustration they give up.......(Senior VP) was completely 
emasculated and, come what may, he could not have been effective.” 
 
The Senior VP’s three year contract ended on April 1, 2010 and was not renewed; only 
a month before the Red Shirt protest camp build-up.  In addition to the staff morning 
briefings, he led regular daily VP briefings, which provided a platform for regular 
discourse between the senior hotel division management team.  These meetings were 
continued even in his absence with appointed meeting chairs. Upon his departure from 
the company these briefings ceased and the communication flow became limited in 
comparison.  Irregular weekly meetings were held by the CEO, and these became even 
more infrequent as the crisis escalated and a Senior VP was not reappointed.  This was 
highlighted by one of the Corporate Office DHs who stated in Phase One interviews:  
 “In (Senior VP)’s day, I felt there was the VP briefing on a daily basis, or on a 
frequent basis, and I felt there was a team of VPs at that point. After (Senior VP) 
left I think we tried to drive a few initiatives but ultimately there wasn’t a senior 
management committee.” 
 
Many of the management staff were aware of the infrequency of senior management 
meetings and questioned the lack of information and therefore the reliability of the 
information flow.  This lack of information sharing was identified in the data analysis, 
and the interviewees expressed high levels of frustration and uncertainty as described in 
the lower order category of Leadership Influencers in Communicating.  The ability to 
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minimise the silo mentality has been identified as a pre-requisite for organisations to 
overcome crisis situations with a seamless communication flow (McManus et al., 2008; 
Seville, 2008; Smallman & Weir, 1999; Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). 
 
The case study organisation had a Risk Management (RM) department whose remit was 
to identify the company’s risk of threats as they related to protecting the financial 
position of the company, rather than a holistic 360 degree approach that encompassed 
HR, Operations, Sales and Marketing. RM provides a framework for organisations to 
proactively consider their potential risks and prepare for those possibilities (Seville, 
2008).  Interview data indicated a lack of respect for the department’s role and it 
indicated a reluctance to address RM’s concerns that permeated the middle management 
levels in particular.  A senior DH explained that the RM team would conduct audits and 
pose theoretical questions and scenarios which were not taken seriously.  He stated: 
“We actually had the risk management guys, Khun (RM executive), and a 
couple of other guys, but that was just very superficial, there was no team thing, 
like a committee.  They were asking theoretical questions and we gave 
theoretical answers and no connection to the real risk.  Khun (CEO) had actually 
looked at risk management but I think it was seen more in terms of protecting 
the business and the finances of the business, which is obviously important but it 
really didn’t relate to the serious political consequences that we had.” 
 
The researcher probed further with regard to why the RM department’s directives and 
authority were discounted.  Some of the respondents referred to their lack of operational 
expertise and therefore credibility, and even their lack of experience due to their age 
was considered an influencing factor in the level of respect and credibility for their 
function.  A Bangkok hotel Excom member is quoted on the young age factor in Section 
5.2.1 explaining Experience with Crisis Events.  A Phuket hotel Excom described her 
experience with the RM Department in Phase Two interviews with the following: 
 “Recently we had our risk assessment done by head office which we’ve never 
had one from them before. It was really disappointing to look at or to receive 
what sort of feedback they think is a risk for the property...... the person who 
conducted the assessment didn’t have much experience or from a hotel 
background...... they weren’t really understanding of what a risk for the business 
could be...... the audit by the finance team is much better.” 
 
As a consequence the lack of support for RM eventuated in a reluctance on the part of 
staff to participate and their efforts were ignored.  This view was also supported by 
feedback from the GM at the Manila property. Upon reflection of her time at the case 
study organisation and based on the emerging data, the researcher’s memo note on this 
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subject indicated that the RM department was the ideal channel to drive Crisis 
Readiness as written:   
Memo Note: “There is an absence of leadership even in the risk management 
(RM) department, since Thailand by its history is a high risk country for political 
unrest and natural disasters – whilst I am surprised that RM are not driving crisis 
preparedness and insisting on debriefings, training and updates.  Why are RM 
not taking a leadership role on Crisis Readiness?” (p.15).   
 
One of the interviewees for the present study was a Thai RM senior manager, who 
explained that he believed Western companies were more prepared.  He concluded that 
the case study organisation was not adequately prepared for the onset of the Red Shirt 
crisis by stating; “For risk management, we didn’t pass this.  We failed for that risk 
management.”  The constant comparison method directed the researcher to consider 
RM’s attitude as being a reflection of the Thai collectivist nature.  As a result, the RM 
department did not have the resolve, experience or maturity to take responsibility, 
initiate or lead a Crisis Readiness outlook for the organisation.   
 
Moreover the RM manager did not foresee a companywide buy-in for Crisis 
Management or RM without a directive from senior leadership or a commitment from 
top management to undertake Crisis Readiness strategies.  This was also supported in 
Phase Two interviews by a hotel Excom leader who experienced a recent RM audit 
which did not focus on crisis readiness issues or recommendations; rather, they audited 
seemingly trivial egg and bread use-by-dates.  In comparison to a finance audit during 
the same period, the Manager felt the RM audit was devoid of any constructive crisis 
readiness recommendations.  The low priority level of Crisis Readiness may also be 
explained by the exclusion from the hotel’s monthly and quarterly reporting systems or 
the annual business plan financial considerations.  Pearson and Clair (1998) posited that 
ambivalent RM perceptions by executives will hinder Crisis Management preparations 
or a prioritisation for Crisis Management practices. 
 
On the other hand, the hotel business units are organised by a strict hierarchical 
structure with the Excom made up of the Director of the hotel’s functional divisions 
such as finance, HR, sales and marketing, rooms, food and beverage, under the 
leadership of the GM.  Each hotel also has a Crisis Management Team (CMT) which is 
made up of the Excom as well as the Security and Communications Directors.  These 
functional divisions cannot operate as silos as was the case of the corporate office, 
because each division is highly interrelated to each other on a day-to-day operational 
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basis.  Crisis Management teams existed in the hotel organisational structures mainly 
due to the safety and security implications of managing staff and hotel guests.  The 
Bangkok hotel’s hierarchical organisational structure and their CMT was considered a 
strength in preparing and dealing with the Red Shirt crisis.   
 
Stonehouse and Pemberton (1999) posited that a flatter organisational structure 
encourages a more conducive flow of communication and knowledge management.  
While Paraskevas et al. (2013) suggested that the tourism industry is characterised by 
hierarchical structures which can present challenges to the dissemination of information.  
Granted, the strength of the success of the Bangkok hotel’s crisis preparations and 
management can be partly attributed to the organisational chart and the hierarchical 
nature of the management levels.  However, data indicated that the GM’s Crisis 
Leadership capabilities were considered to be the main reason for the hotel’s success 
based on his Influencing Leadership including; Communicating, Decision-making, 
Visibility and Leading by Example, in addition to his prior experience. 
 
In contrast, the Phuket hotel had the same organisational structure as the Bangkok hotel 
but due to their deficiency in a number of Crisis Leadership factors, the earthquake 
evacuation uncovered the weaknesses in their Crisis Management capabilities.  The 
Phuket hotel lacked Crisis Readiness due to lack of staff training, no leadership 
visibility, ineffective communication and slow decision-making.  The Organisational 
Culture and its relationship with the other factors of Crisis Leadership Influencers 
clearly influenced the Crisis Readiness of this case study organisation.  
 
The following section validates these findings by presenting the online survey results 
with regard to the case study organisation’s staff perceptions on its corporate 
orientations, which can also be described as organisational culture as explained 
previously in Section 3.3.3. 
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(i) ONLINE SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE ORIENTATIONS 
 
Data from the online survey served to evaluate qualitatively the findings from the 
primary data source and provide further insights into the case study organisation’s 
Organisational Culture.  This section of the survey employed Sheaffer and Mano-
Negrin’s (2003) questionnaire which was used to investigate a set of common corporate 
orientations and their effect on crisis preparedness and the organisation’s ability to cope 
in a crisis. The authors based a major part of their study’s questionnaire on Richardson’s 
(1995) double-sided competency assessment with the aim to advance “the notion that 
crisis preparedness is a function of a simultaneous confluence of corporate orientations 
and strategies that bear on the wider domain of management” (p.575). 
 
Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin (2003) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on 
the original 30 independent variables from Richardson’s (1995) corporate orientations, 
and by enlisting a principal component analysis (PCA), extrapolated six factors 
covering 22 of the original 30 variables.  These included; Strategy, Human Resource 
Management (HRM), Structure, Engineering Orientation, and Unlearning.  An 
additional factor was extracted in the CFA model which explained 5.14% of the 
variance, but because this factor loaded only a single variable, it was excluded from the 
analysis.  Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin (2003) concluded that HRM, Strategy, Structure 
and Unlearning factors “significantly predicted crisis preparedness” (p.573). 
 
Table 4.2 provides a frequency analysis overview of the staff perceptions with regard to 
the corporate orientation of the organisation.  It is evident that the organisation is 
considered by the respondents to be a caring organisation for its people (67.7%), 
although the results indicate that there is some support that they are considered more of 
a profit-driven organisation (37%).   
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Table 4.2: Staff Perceptions of Corporate Orientation 
 
 
Statement 
 
Mean 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
(4+5) % 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1+2) % 
α 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Strategy  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.860 
Has vision and goals that are clearly 
understood 
3.75 73.8% 12.3% 
Is a learning organisation which 
invests in training and learns from 
errors and successes 
3.44 50.7% 12.3% 
Adjusts well to changes in our 
business, cultural and social 
environment 
3.36 51.6% 16.9% 
HRM 
 
   
One that cares for people 3.68 67.7% 9.2% 
Puts people above everything 3.27 36.9% 20% 
Is co-operation oriented 3.51 57.7% 11.5% 
Empowers each unit 3.48 58.4% 13.9% 
Structure  
 
   
Our organisational structure is 
decentralized 
2.88 27.7% 36.9% 
Our organisational structure is 
centralized 
3.63 66.9% 11.5% 
Puts profits above everything 3.32 36.9% 13% 
Engineering 
 
   
Encourages new ideas 3.55 56.2% 10.8% 
Unlearning  
 
   
Often changes our important 
corporate goals 
3.12 36.1% 25.4% 
Once we have reached our business 
goals we rethink our business 
strategies  
3.52 57.7% 10% 
 
Additional items of interest 
 
   
Has centralised decision-making 3.53 58.5% 13.1% 
Is an exploitive organisation (people-
wise) 
3.12 36.1% 22.3% 
Places emphasis on how to do things 
(efficiency above all) 
3.51 58.5% 11.5% 
Scale 1-5 : Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) 
 
The company’s vision and goals are clearly understood by the majority of respondents 
(73.8%); however training and learning (50.7%), as well as being able to adjust to 
changes in the environment (51.6%) are not considered as strong in the company’s 
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strategic makeup.  This could indicate the lack of debriefing and follow up after crisis 
events as reported during the interview phases.   In addition, more than half agreed or 
strongly agreed that the company is co-operation oriented (57.7%) and empowers each 
unit (58.4%).  When combined with a positive agreement for encouraging new ideas 
(56.2%), a fertile landscape is evident for initiating new Crisis Management systems 
and processes in order to be crisis prepared.  
 
The 16 statements used in Section One of the online survey were based on Sheaffer and 
Mano-Negrin’s (2003) questionnaire instrument, as previously described in Survey 
Design in Section 3.3.3.  The resulting frequency statistics displayed in Table 4.2 are in 
order of their PCA factor results, including some omitted statement results.  The 
Cronbach alpha of .860 indicated the strength of the common factor reliability and 
consistency in respondents answers. 
 
The respondents considered their organisational structure as being centralised (66.9%), 
which provides an opportunity to encourage greater crisis readiness participation and 
crisis event learning from a central CMT.  However, centralisation may ignore the 
organisation’s potential intellectual capital at the time of a crisis (Gruman et al., 2011), 
and fail to embrace the full spectrum of strategies available to deal with the crisis event. 
Moreover, the level of disagreement for “often changes our important goals” (25.4%) 
could suggest that the organisation’s flexibility and agility to change or unlearn non-
performing procedures and practices in times of crisis and post-crisis is limited. 
 
In the free text responses of the survey, three respondents also indicated the case study 
organisation was more concerned with restoring business and profits than staff welfare 
as stated below: 
“My company hasn't put the benefit of the staff before the guests when it comes 
to a crisis. The last flooding, for example, clearly showed this. Instead of caring 
for staff who experienced flooding at home and offered to stay in house as long 
as the staff were able to help themselves, the company offered to stay in the 
hotel for only certain period because the company wanted to reserve the rooms 
for guests.” [sic] 
 
“The process of checking in/out, the form and many more that created the 
curiosity and indefiniate announcements, answers and plans had made the staffs 
felt uncertainty as the hotels and organisation were more targeted in losing 
revenue rather than losing employees. The organisation was not ready to make 
the performance for crisis as the main concern was made to keep the 
businesses.” [sic] 
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“In General i feel that focus in my company is on financial profits with a certain 
degree of disregard to staff welfare such as a 5 days working week , adequate 
locker rooms , and other benefits like bonuses.” [sic] 
 
The online survey provided further insights into the case study organisation’s 
Organisational Culture, and indicated an apparent relationship within Active Sense-
making that also influenced the emerging themes of Influencing Leadership in regard to 
Communicating and Decision-making.   
 
4.3 MANAGING THE CRISIS 
 
In building towards the higher order category and BSSP of Crisis Leadership 
Influencers, Managing the Crisis was a key concept that emerged from the data 
categorisation process.  It was evident that Managing the Crisis also benefited from a 
close relationship with the other lower order categories and as a result the data were 
able to contribute to the study’s theory development.  Data analysis revealed the areas 
of most concern in Managing the Crisis and created the following thematic concepts 
which became the categories of interest: Responsibility, Strategising and Activating.  
Throughout the data collection, it was evident that positive experiences in these 
categories, linking to the categories of Influencing Leadership and Active Sense-making 
contributed to staff perceptions and evaluations of Crisis Leadership and their Crisis 
Readiness performance.  The sub categories of Responsibility, Strategising and 
Activating will be explained in more detail in this section.   
 
4.3.1 RESPONSIBILITY  
 
The concept of a leader’s sense of Responsibility was a factor that emerged from the 
data analysis as a characteristic of effective Crisis Management.  It is also interrelated 
across all levels of Crisis Leadership Influencers.  In Managing a Crisis, the crisis leader 
was perceived to have assumed a level of Responsibility for the actions and outcomes of 
the crisis event for the organisation’s stakeholders.  This notion has already been 
introduced earlier in a number of areas including Leading by Example where the feeling 
of responsibility to set the example for a hotel-based Director was considered an 
important factor of Crisis Leadership. Assuming Responsibility for the survival of the 
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business, protecting jobs, and the livelihoods of staff, suppliers and partners was also 
considered to be very important in the previous section on Motivating Influencers. 
 
The data revealed two contrasting views about the concept of Responsibility; first, that 
the manager’s own view was that his or her role included the responsibility to undertake 
Crisis Leadership activities and second, the view of the followers that it was the 
Responsibility of the position that dictated the level of Responsibility required.  A 
Bangkok Excom member stated that at the time of a crisis event in relation to the 2011 
floods:  
“....the communication always starts with the GM. I’m just going to the flood 
time, the GM would start giving daily updates to all Excom members with cc 
corporate office.  I wasn’t aware at the Red Shirt time but I know at that flood 
time (GM name) would send a daily update on what the situation is, where the 
water is up to, where it’s expected.”  
 
The data collected from the management staff revealed their acceptance that it was their 
Responsibility to assume leadership for their departments or division.  This was 
especially true of the hotel’s management staff and the following insight is reflective of 
the general attitude:  
“the people I worked with had a sense of responsibility.  They knew what had to 
be done.  OK, maybe the staff, we didn’t expect them to do much to put their 
safety at risk but the management knew what had to be done.  I know that 
management put in sacrifices, maybe they shouldn’t have, but they did just in 
order that the hotel would in a sense, function and be safe.” 
 
The notion of pride for assuming Responsibility for the preparation and management of 
the crisis event was a shared sense of accomplishment for the group working at the 
CCC.  A DH recalled that in her capacity to protect the company’s image, she felt proud 
to go through the Red Shirt crisis knowing that she was responsible for the corporate 
communications and stated:  
“We’ve been through the worse and we know that every crisis is not just the 
business it’s the people.  It’s the life of a lot of people that we have to take care 
of.  Every statement we issued it’s always the employees’ life in our hands, the 
reputation of the hotels, we’re responsible for everybody.  If the reputation is 
bad they might get fired, business might go down so to look in that way I think 
it’s a big responsibility for communication during the crisis.  If we didn’t do it 
effectively, it could affect the business and everybody could get affected as well.  
That’s why I feel very proud to be a part of the key leading team to handle the 
crisis at that time.” 
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She was mindful of the impact of any negative press on the business future of the 
company and felt a great sense of pride to be a part of the core CMT at that time.   
 
As a follow on from the initial Phase One interviews, Phase Two data collection 
revealed a more self-reflective interviewee who himself sought to understand why the 
Excom group felt a sense of Responsibility.  It compelled him to seek out Maslow’s 
(1943) Hierarchy of Needs’ to address the researcher’s follow up questions.  He 
compared his crisis experience to Maslow’s Hierarchical pyramid diagram and was of 
the opinion that followers were most concerned with the bottom levels of the pyramid, 
specifically the basic needs and some of the psychological needs.  
 
The ‘Basic Needs’ include the physiological needs of food, water and shelter, combined 
with the safety needs of security, stability and freedom from fear. The ‘Psychological 
needs’ that were of most importance to the followers included the belonging needs, 
which express the need to be part of the work group, family and friends.  Hackman and 
Johnson (2009) also integrate Maslow’s ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ into their explanation of 
how Transformational Leadership goes beyond satisfying the basic needs addressed by 
Transactional Leadership to satisfy the higher-level needs.  This notion of being 
responsible for the needs of staff was also supported by another hotel Excom member 
who described the actions of the GM:  
“I thought this was the right approach and also safeguarding ourselves, those 
people that stayed behind in the hotel plus he gave us the opportunity to stay or 
go…. his objective was security, having enough food, having a place to sleep for 
those people that stayed in the hotel”.  
 
On the other hand, during the Red Shirt crisis he felt that he and his Excom colleagues 
were immersed in the top section of the pyramid that encompassed the ‘Self-esteem 
needs’, which include the need for achievement, status and recognition, responsibility 
and respect.  Excom were also seeking the pinnacle of the pyramid through the self-
actualisation needs of personal growth and fulfilment in ‘doing the right thing’.  He 
explained further about how he interpreted Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs: 
 “There’s actually a separation between leaders and followers.  You know when I 
was reading this, what came to mind was Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.....  I 
tried to compare what I see happening, I see a clear separation between leaders 
having the upper part of the triangle and followers or average staff having the 
lower part, which is psychological and safety.  Like a housekeeper won’t care 
because she has more reason to care about her safety, job safety.   
 
Chapter 4 – Crisis Leadership Influencers 
 
184 | P a g e  
While being in management as leaders we don’t have that fear. What actually 
drives leaders and managers is self-actualisation and actually helping the staff, 
making sure that the staff have a place to work after the crisis ..... you know it’s 
actually focusing out for leaders in the top half of the triangle.  Coming back to 
Maslow’s thing after so long actually answers so many questions about the 
crisis.” 
 
This sense of Responsibility is what drives management as leaders and is a 
characteristic of hotel Excom roles where the leader refrains from focusing on self, but 
instead their customer orientation extends to their internal customer, or the staff 
community and their welfare.   
 
The Phuket hotel’s senior manager also expressed a sense of Responsibility for both the 
staff and guest community and was extremely mindful of the Responsibility that her 
role entailed.  She stated that “it’s lonely at the top with so much responsibility”.  She 
explained that there are nine managers in their Excom group. However, there are many 
instances in a round-the-clock three hundred and sixty-five day operation that there may 
be times only one senior manager is on duty, therefore the Responsibility may be borne 
by only a few. The failure of their previous crisis plans at the time of the earthquake 
highlighted the weaknesses in their system.  A recent bombing incident in old Phuket 
town on 1 August, 2013 motivated the hotel’s Excom to evaluate their bomb security 
preparations which she believed were inadequate at that time. 
 
The notion of Responsibility also materialised from the data in terms of the Sales and 
Marketing managers who saw their role in managing the crisis as being crucial to the 
survival of the organisation and sustaining the livelihoods of the company’s internal and 
external stakeholders.  This is also an interrelated factor with Motivating Influencers 
and explains why the managers were motivated to lead and risk their own safety to be 
present at the CCC. 
 
Conversely, data also explained an implied acceptance of the role of the hotel GM 
which established that the title also encompassed Crisis Leadership traits and therefore 
he assumed Responsibility for all aspects of the hotel’s operations and business results, 
as well as staff and guest welfare.  The GM position provided credibility and influenced 
followers to trust their Decision-making as reflected by one of the Phuket hotel’s 
Excom:  
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“....we trust the general manager because we know that the general manager is 
going to be responsible for any decision in the hotel and that time during the 
crisis … I think it’s more like position is number one.”   
 
A Bangkok hotel Excom stated:  
“We have to trust our superiors, we have to trust our boss, we have to trust that 
he was put into place because of his experience, of his knowledge, of his 
character.”   
 
Yet another Bangkok hotel Excom suggested that age was a confirming factor in his 
trust of the GM’s role and responsibility and he said:  
“What made me trust him?  First of all he was the most senior of our managers. 
He’s been in the hotel business for thirty-five at least maybe forty years.  He had 
the Bali experience.  Whatever he told us, I thought it was very well thought 
through.  He didn’t shoot out anything before he actually thought about whether 
this is the right thing for us to do.” 
 
However, there is almost a blind sense of acceptance for the position and its 
responsibility, the researcher probed further to understand why the position held so 
much influence and was provided with the explanation that:  
“…in a crisis, I may not believe my managers or whatever even though he’s 
close to those persons but at this point I just trust this person because if 
something happens I know that he’s going to be responsible.”   
 
This may also explain the aversion to making decisions as a leader in a stressful 
situation or their collective nature to avoid standing out as an individual and taking 
Responsibility.  The position of GM was implied by the followers that ‘it’s their 
responsibility’ in the data.   
 
Data analysis revealed how the Red Shirt crisis was managed by; who took 
responsibility, how and what strategies were determined and how were they activated.  
These dimensions were highly interrelated and contributed to the lower order category 
of Managing the Crisis.  As a result of the emergent notion of Responsibility, the 
following section explains Strategising. 
 
4.3.2 STRATEGISING 
 
Day-to-day decision-making dealing with routine issues is considered to be a 
methodical regular practice, whereas decisions that may fundamentally affect the 
viability of the organisation are considered strategic (Duhaime, Stimpert & Chesley, 
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2012). The ability to strategically plan, prepare and manage a crisis event emerged as an 
important component of effective Crisis Leadership and was highly interrelated to a 
number of the properties of Influencing Leadership, in particular Decision-Making and 
Communicating. In addition Active Sense-making comprising Understanding the 
Mindset and the National and Organisational Cultures set the scene for Managing the 
Crisis.   
 
In a high pressure, fast-changing, fluid crisis situation, Crisis Leadership and the CMT 
are Strategising the most appropriate decisions based on the information at hand.  Their 
aim is to secure the best outcomes, maintain business continuity and recover from the 
crisis stronger than the competitors.  In a crisis situation, strategic action is not reliant 
on all of the facts since they may be unavailable or difficult to obtain; nevertheless, the 
Crisis Leadership needs to react with urgency and avoid decision procrastination.  
Strategising is enacted from strategy, which is defined by Hubbard and Beamish (2011) 
as “Those decisions that have high medium-term impact on the activities of the 
organisation, including the analysis leading to the resourcing and implementation of 
those decisions, to create value for key stakeholders and to outperform competitors” 
(p.3).   
 
The process of Crisis Management is considered to be a strategic management activity 
and establishes a framework to assess, initiate and evaluate strategies to deal with a 
potential crisis event or an unfolding crisis situation.  Ritchie’s (2004) “Crisis and 
Disaster Management: a strategic and holistic framework” previously introduced in 
Section 2.2.3 titled ‘Crisis Management in Tourism’ explained the strategic 
management of a crisis.  The framework consisted of strategic analysis, strategic 
direction and choice (decision-making), strategic implementation and control, and 
finally strategic evaluation.   
 
The interview data revealed a lack of strategic thinking or decision-making on the 
corporate level, which can be explained to a large degree by the silo mentality of the 
organisation and the lack of credibility experienced by the RM Department. Without a 
strategic vision articulated by the organisation’s leadership, the level of proactive 
Strategising was inadequate for Crisis Management efficacy.  As confirmed by one of 
the Phase Two interviewees:  
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“There is no management strategy whatsoever.  There’s no management strategy 
in development or risk management or any of the other fields”.   
 
This was also supported by a Corporate Office DH at the time of the crisis who stated:  
“There was no strategic discussion as to what happens certainly for example 
when the King dies.  I know you can’t mention that but it’s the big 
unmentionable. There has to be a strategy for that because there’s going to be 
some more political unrest and negative – it blows up into a civil war, or 
whether it’s contained, I don’t know.” 
 
This same executive has moved to a new role in an Australian company since the Red 
Shirt crisis and compared the level of strategising in his new organisation by explaining:  
“There should be SOPs, there should be manuals, it should be as it affects each 
department, what if one department leader is away who covers that department?  
These are all the things obviously I find are in place here, we have an emergency 
response team, we have a disaster recovery afterwards, risk management in 
terms of the business element and our core principles, what’s our vision, where 
do we want to be, how do we handle the PR all those sorts of things.” 
 
However, one of the DHs at Corporate Office was actively involved in the crisis 
Strategising and was proactive in planning the communications plan by preparing a 
range of statements in advance to deal with a number of scenarios.  The Director was of 
the opinion that a 360 degree view of the situation had been considered with both a best-
case and worst-case scenario response prepared.  For example, she recalled that they 
(management) considered:  
“What was going to happen if the hotel was utterly attacked badly or what is 
going to happen if the protest ends quickly, quicker than we thought, so I think 
we were quite proactive on that.”   
 
Unlike the majority of interviewees, this was the only participant who believed 
strategies were in place from a public relations viewpoint.  However, this also confirms 
a less than optimal internal communications process and the silo mentality of the 
organisational culture. 
 
Data analysis highlighted the speed and efficiency of the setup of the CCC, although a 
Bangkok hotel Excom said; “I know the crisis office that we had was set up 
haphazardly”.  However, it had not been a plan that had been previously considered or 
shared with the management team, but as one informant suggested “it was something 
that came alive that didn’t exist”. It was a strategic decision that was deemed a 
necessary priority to ensure business continuity.  The CCC was accepted by the 
management staff as addressing the organisation’s operating philosophy of ‘business as 
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usual’, which was a notion repeated throughout the data collection phase when 
describing the CCC.    
 
Although not planned, the CCC was described for example by one of the Corporate 
Office executives as:  
“It was very effective, super-fast and very organised but there were no signs of a 
preparation before… this lastminute.com organisation, how it was organised that 
it actually became seamless.”   
 
The term ‘lastminute.com’ was an internal description used by many of the management 
staff to describe the company’s lack of planning. Therefore, the speed of Strategising at 
the pre-crisis and crisis stages also contributed to the sense of respect and acceptance of 
authority that was directed at the team managing the CCC. It was also described by one 
of the Corporate Office DHs as:  
“...the control tower that became the control focus for the company…the 
beaming point for people to communicate to and from and everyone was aware 
that (the CCC) was the new home base until further notice.”   
 
At the same time, secondary data of internal Meeting Minutes confirmed that the 
Bangkok hotel’s Excom were actively Strategising in the lead up to the height of the 
violent confrontations through regular Excom briefings.  These briefings were held 
twice daily in the morning and again in the evening with actions minuted and delegated 
responsibilities agreed upon.  The briefings were also used to analyse the situation and 
discuss options before finalising the strategy to be implemented.  This form of 
Strategising also encouraged ownership of the initiatives discussed and selected at the 
Excom briefings. This was confirmed by one of the hotel’s Excom who stated:  
“....individually we analysed and assessed the situation on our side but I felt that 
because I was also part of the decision making process… I had some ownership 
on what was going on.” 
 
In contrast the Phuket hotel’s Excom had not been actively Strategising their Crisis 
Readiness plans until the failed earthquake evacuation became a crisis ‘wake-up call’ 
that required a resort precinct wide Crisis Management plan. The seven hotels were 
under pressure with the imminent arrival of 15,000 Chinese delegates, which forced 
them to come together and as described by one of the key informants “put our heads 
together and work out an evacuation route”.   
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The integrated resort’s evacuation plan was included in the secondary data.  Once the 
group of hotels finalised an efficient evacuation, then the Phuket hotel undertook to 
strategise to ensure its future success through staff education and training, monitoring 
and evaluating the full range of new Crisis Management initiatives.   
 
However, an issue became evident to the researcher when discussing the Phuket 
earthquake with an interviewee in Phase One.  The discussion raised the question of 
what would they have done if the Chinese delegation had not been onsite.  This caused 
the researcher to reflect if they would have undertaken such a prompt and extensive 
enquiry and planning process to improve their evacuation procedures without the 
pressure and influence of an in-house client.    
 
Strategising at the pre crisis, during, and post crisis phases will influence crisis 
management efficacy.  However, Strategising will only be as effective as the Activating 
actions that follow.  The interrelatedness of these two components further strengthened 
the category of Managing the Crisis, therefore the emergent theme of Activating will be 
explained in the next section. 
 
4.3.3 ACTIVATING  
 
In Managing the Crisis, a crisis leader will acknowledge their position by assuming 
Responsibility for leading followers through the extreme context of a crisis event.  In 
assuming this Responsibility, they will also undertake Strategising activities before they 
commence Activating on those strategies; therefore, all the components of the 
dimension of Managing the Crisis share some degree of interconnectedness through the 
category relationship.  The notion of Activating strategies, which have been discussed 
and strategised within the Excom group or the CCC, displayed the leader’s leadership 
capabilities to the followers.  As a consequence, their level of trust and confidence in 
the leader was positively enhanced. 
 
Crisis Leadership is described by Mitroff (2004a) as more than reacting to the crisis at 
hand, but requires the implementation of a number of programmes before, during and 
after a crisis event.  He developed a Framework for Crisis Leadership, which dealt with 
each of these phases and formulated four main factors that influence each of these 
phases.  The four factors consisted of first, ‘crisis types’ identified the range of crises 
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that may beset an organisation and for which they should anticipate and prepare, as well 
as review the crisis portfolio after a crisis event.  Second, ‘crisis mechanisms’ includes 
signal detection capabilities, damage containment, business recovery and crisis learning 
procedures.  Third, ‘crisis systems’ comprises the formation and training of Crisis 
Management and crisis learning teams that progress through all three phases of the 
crisis and re-evaluate systems in place.  Fourth, ‘crisis stakeholders’ takes into 
consideration all the groups that need to be considered in the event of a crisis and how 
each group is differentiated.  This framework described the systematic factors that need 
to be considered in Activating Crisis Leadership and provided a blueprint to direct the 
necessary actions required to address the situation.  
 
Primary and secondary data collection identified the existence of the Crisis 
Communication Plan, which was observed to have been activated in the pre-crisis 
phase.  This plan had been compiled in late 2008 with a considerable amount of 
pressure applied by the divisional head to the Director responsible, and she remarked at 
the time of Phase One data collection that “luckily I had a leader who has international 
hotel experience dealing with the crisis who pushed me to finish the crisis plan”.  The 
Crisis Communication Plan provided the group with a blueprint that included signal 
detection and damage containment strategies and provided an immediate process of 
Activating as soon as the warning signals were evident that the crisis was in escalation 
mode.  This also reinforced to the followers that the planning process implemented by 
their leader was invaluable in mitigating the negative impacts of the crisis event.   
 
The organisation’s proactive and creative approach to the negative reports was 
supported by the leadership role that the company assumed as the industry wide 
spokesperson.  This was reflected in interviewee’s statements such as from a Corporate 
Office DH: 
 “....getting out early in to the market really it pushed our message to the 
community to a certain extent to position (case study organisation) as a leader, 
within this whole scenario ‘(name of recovery advertising campaign)’ because 
we were right at the heart of it, it really did help. It almost became spokespeople 
for the entire industry to a certain extent.” [sic] 
 
Yet another Corporate Office DH also stated the industry leadership role: 
 “...we managed to put ourselves on CNN and I think it’s good to show that OK 
even in the middle of the crisis, we still give confidence to our tourists coming in 
and who already stay in Bangkok just to ensure that OK we took care of our staff 
the best and I think it’s good for us even though it’s not a good situation to be 
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published but at least the (case study organisation) name and we ensure the 
building is on there and that represents us as a leader of Thailand.” 
 
The company’s digital and traditional advertising mediums were designed to reflect the 
iconic architecture of the flagship hotel and was titled “(recovery advertising plan 
title),” please refer to Appendix 14.  The body copy of the advertisement was also 
aimed at an emotive attachment to the reader seeking their support to rebuild the 
tourism economy with the closing paragraph:  
“Although (name of hotel) is currently closed to arrivals until May 24th, we can 
assure you that we will be back even stronger than ever and we will rebuild 
confidence in Thailand’s future. This is (name of company), this is the magic of 
Thailand.”   
 
This advertisement was also translated into Thai and Japanese and was aimed at 
reassuring the internal stakeholders of the staff population as well as the external 
stakeholders, including clients, guests, suppliers, tourism partners and the general 
public.  The data revealed a consensus of opinion on how this conveyed a positive 
message to the company’s stakeholders, which was best expressed by one of the 
Corporate Office DHs in stating; “we’re taking care and we are very understanding of 
what we are going through and as a representative of Thailand we need to be strong”.  
Another Corporate Office DH also supported this opinion on the case study 
organisation’s positive messaging with the observation in Phase One interviews that: 
 “I think leadership was strong, it was exceptionally strong. ....... I think probably 
confident knowing that there’s a group of people that were all banding together 
to be able to continue business, not showing the face of the world that we’ve just 
run away whereas other companies didn’t have any voice out there or if they did 
they started copying what (case study organisation)  were doing.  And it showed 
it’s rallying together to move forward, to keep it going.” 
 
Secondary data also reflected the positive message with examples from email 
communications such as from a PATA member to the CEO that stated: 
“Sawsdee Krup. Just wanted to let you know that I just heard you on CNN. Very 
effective message. I hope that people heard your message that we need their 
support.” Email dated 21 May, 2010. 
 
In contrast, the lack of Activating crisis mechanisms or crisis systems described by 
Mitroff (2004a) reduced the perceived leadership capabilities of the Phuket hotel Excom 
by the staff community; in particular, the GM who was described as “running around” 
rather than leading.  This was expressed in the interview data through the Excoms’ lack 
of timely decision-making, lack of communication, lack of visibility or their inability to 
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adopt Active Sense-making which ultimately influenced the absence of Activating 
initiatives.   
 
The lack of Activating Crisis Management plans at the time of the 2012 Phuket 
earthquake resulted in the Chinese back-to-back incentive management team’s demands 
to rectify their failure and provide a safe and secure environment immediately.  These 
concerns were also reflected in the guest travel blogs on Trip Advisor as detailed in 
Section 4.1.1 on Communicating.  This also reflected the interrelatedness of the lower 
order categories and their contribution to the higher order category of Crisis Leadership 
Influencers. 
 
4.4 CRISIS LEADERSHIP INFLUENCERS – THE BSSP  
 
In conclusion Crisis Leadership Influencers is comprised of integrated lower order 
categories which contribute to this recurring thematic concept.  The case study 
examples provided in this section have provided the substantive context upon which the 
near-core category has been conceptualised.  Instead of revealing effective Crisis 
Leadership behaviours the participants mainly focused on incidents in which they or 
their leaders’ ability to lead was reduced.  Crisis Leadership success outcomes were also 
shared and provided critical examples to substantiate best practices.   
 
The relationships between the lower order categories were complex and each of these 
categories were influenced by the other.  In summary, the interrelatedness is explained 
with all-encompassing circular structures where the relationships circulated in a non-
linear dynamic process in the context of an intense high pressure crisis situation.  
Analogically it can be described as a group or team of people formed in a circle where 
they can see each other and interact with each other.  It also explains that each 
component is important to the success of the other.  The conceptual framework which 
was introduced at the beginning of this chapter (Figure 4.1) is repeated in this section to 
summarise the relationships and interconnectedness that was at play. 
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CRISIS LEADERSHIP INFLUENCERS : A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Crisis Leadership Influencers: A Basic Social Structural Process 
Reciprocal relationships were formed between each of the three lower order categories; 
Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and Managing the Crisis.  The properties 
of each category clarified the main characteristics of each dimension and provided a 
rich, in-depth description of how Crisis Leadership Influencers emerged as a Basic 
Social Structural Process for theory development.  The reciprocal relationships in Figure 
4.1 describe the near-core category social process of Crisis Leadership Influencers as 
follows: 
 
 Influencing Leadership’s dimensions explained the variations in Active Sense-
making and how the leader’s influencing actions contributed to making the 
organisation crisis-ready by considering the dimensions that incorporate Active 
Sense-making. 
 
 Conversely Active Sense-making’s properties contribute to Influencing 
Leadership’s Crisis Leadership efficacies with enhanced sensitivities that allow 
management to make sense of the situation with greater clarity. 
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 Influencing Leadership’s dimensions also explained variations in how 
management undertook their role in Managing the Crisis. 
 
 Managing the Crisis actions were interrelated to the properties of Influencing 
Leadership and explained variations to how management actions enhanced or 
inhibited the success outcomes of Crisis Leadership. 
 
 At the same time, Managing the Crisis outcomes were related to the ability of 
management to make sense of the situation and therefore Active Sense-making 
also contributed to how the crisis was managed. 
 
 Finally, Active Sense-making was also influenced by the dimensions of 
Managing the Crisis in that the crisis leader’s actions influenced, to varying 
degrees, the followers’ perceptions, their mindset, emotions and the cultural 
aspects of the organisation. 
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers partially explained issues related to the organisation’s 
crisis readiness.  Therefore as Grounded Theory stipulates, the continued analysis of 
data through constant comparison encouraged further thematic conceptual development.  
It became apparent that there were additional factors that influenced the crisis readiness 
of the case study organisation.  Effective crisis leadership could not exist without 
preparation, training or using lessons learnt from past experience. This achieved 
conceptual categories that led to another higher-order category which is described as 
Experiential Learning.  The Grounded Theory approach identified the importance of 
learning from past crises to ensure crisis-readiness, which will be explained further in 
Chapter Five.  
 
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The 2010 Red Shirt Crisis highlighted the strong influencing effect of the leadership 
role on the organisation and its stakeholders.  Data revealed the complacencies that 
existed and illuminated the concerns of Crisis Leadership performance at all stages of 
the crisis event.  Although the focus of this study was the pre-crisis phase and the state 
of crisis readiness, the actions of management when the crisis event escalated reflected 
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on their state of ‘crisis un-readiness’ and contributed significantly to revealing patterns 
and behaviours that impacted on the group.  
 
However, the 2012 Phuket earthquake provided a contrasting crisis leadership 
experience for one of the organisation’s hotels and revealed a rich source of data to 
consider in the quest to answer the research question; ‘How does Crisis Leadership 
influence Crisis Management Readiness in the Thai hotel industry?’. The Grounded 
Theory methodology directed the researcher to probe into this phenomenon further 
through the constant comparative method.  Data uncovered a crisis event where the 
reactions of management and staff required a major review of its crisis management 
practices, as well as the leadership role in maintaining calm and restoring order.  The 
Phuket earthquake provided a contrasting exemplar to that of the corporate head office 
and the Bangkok hotel, and became a key opportunity to better understand crisis 
leadership behaviours and created crisis management readiness best practices. 
 
The lower order categories of Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and 
Managing the Crisis combine to explain the BSSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers.  
The properties of each of these categories and their dimensions were examined for their 
interconnectedness and these relationships contributed to the higher levels of abstraction 
as directed by theoretical coding.  The researcher’s theoretical sensitivity also 
contributed to stimulating abstract theoretical concepts as the substantive theoretical 
base developed.   
 
In summary, examples were provided of Influencing Leadership with open and honest 
communication, regular communications, confident and decisive decision-making, 
visible leadership, leading by example and motivating actions. Active Sense-making 
was illustrated with examples of understanding the mindset, emotional sensitivities, 
national and organisational culture.  The dimensions of Managing the Crisis were also 
explained using examples of management actions of responsibility, strategising and 
activating.  This data assisted in illustrating the interrelatedness of these categories in 
understanding how crisis leadership influences crisis management readiness.  
Deficiencies in these factors also illuminated the concerns and the opportunities to 
improve crisis readiness strategies. 
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The following chapter will now describe the findings that explained Experiential 
Learning which became the second of the Basic Social Structural Processes (BSSPs) for 
this thesis.  Experiential Learning established the abstract level higher order category to 
explain the relationships between its lower order categories of Preparing for the 
Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness.  Chapter Five will 
also explain the moderating influence of Retaining Institutional Memory. 
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CHAPTER 5   EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will continue to outline the findings of the Phase One and Phase Two 
interviews, together with the findings from secondary data sources.  The research 
question guiding this study was ‘How does Crisis Leadership influence Crisis 
Management Readiness in the Thai hotel industry?’  The data and the findings 
presented in this chapter will respond directly to this question. 
 
To elaborate and discuss the findings, this chapter is presented in four main sections 
depicting the categorisation of the thematic concepts, their properties and their 
relationships.  This chapter will focus on the higher order category of Experiential 
Learning, which is comprised of three lower order categories that influenced Crisis 
Leadership efficacy.  The three lower order categories are Preparing for the Unthinkable, 
Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness.  In addition, the data revealed the 
moderating influence of Retaining Institutional Memory.  Experiential Learning became 
the second of the Basic Social Structural Processes (BSSPs) of the emergent theory for 
this study and represents a major theme associated with the Basic Social Psychological 
Process (BSPP) that is Empowering Readiness.  Experiential Learning was also found 
to be interrelated to Crisis Leadership Influencers as described in Chapter Four. 
 
Experiential learning developed as a higher order category at the mid-stage in data 
gathering.  It gathered momentum after the catalytic Phuket earthquake event was 
brought to life as an illuminating example of its impact. From this point, the data 
collection combined follow-up interviews to clarify the Phuket hotel’s new training and 
educational programmes and the researcher probed further into subsequent interviews 
about this developing concept.  Experiential Learning was identified as a BSSP from 
which four dimensions evolved: Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning from 
Experience, Learning Routineness and Retaining Institutional Memory.  Figure 5.1 
illustrates the properties and dimensions of this BSSP that is Experiential Learning.  
The moderating influence of Retaining Institutional Memory on the lower order 
categories of Experiential Learning is illustrated in this diagram.  The relationships 
within the conceptual framework of Figure 5.1 will be detailed in Section 5.5. 
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EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: 
A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Experiential Learning: A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
A crisis event provides a cognitive opportunity to learn from the experience and through 
the notion of Experiential Learning contributes and builds upon both the individual’s 
memory and the organisation’s institutional memory for any future crisis events.  
Experiential Learning is the way in which experiences are processed: in particular, 
critical thinking is shaped from reflections of past experiences and provides the intuitive 
skills to address the current situation.  As described by Saddington (1992), “Experiential 
learning is a process in which an experience is reflected upon and then translated into 
concepts which in turn become guidelines for new experiences” (p.44).  The ability of 
leadership to retain the learned experience and adapt to further crises also instils a level 
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of confidence and trust in the followers who are looking to their leaders for guidance 
and solutions (Boin & Hart, 2003).   
 
Lessons learnt will not be in vain if they are incorporated into the organisations’ Crisis 
Management systems, processes, and training and development programmes across all 
levels of the organisation.  Borodzicz and van Haperen (2003) posited that in an 
experiential learning environment self-reflection also becomes an important component 
towards building on lessons learnt and requires an organisational culture that 
encourages and supports a holistic approach to learning.   
 
The following descriptions provide an insight into how the data revealed the nature of 
these dimensions and relationships of Experiential Learning. Preparing for the 
Unthinkable is the first lower order category to be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.1 PREPARING FOR THE UNTHINKABLE  
 
The data from the present research study reflected the company’s reticence to plan for 
the inevitable, let alone the unthinkable.  It is the data on National and Organisational 
Culture that identified a culture of planning avoidance and unwillingness to learn, which 
is interrelated to other Crisis Leadership Influencers as well as the various dimensions 
of the second higher order category of Experiential Learning.  One of the non-Thai 
Corporate Office executives pointed out:   
“…at that point in time I lived in Thailand for four years, it’s somehow almost 
part of the culture, the reaction.  I come from a country where a small thing gets 
taken extremely seriously.  They would close the schools; they would close 
everything if large demonstrations like this would come up.  So therefore I’m 
more sunk into more of the Thai mentality that was this is OK, nothing’s going 
to happen.  I’m not going to stress about something that hasn’t happened yet.  
That I think was the kind of consensus feeling.” 
 
A Bangkok hotel Excom member felt that the preparation phase could have been better 
handled by: 
“Taking it seriously definitely and acting faster…….. There was no talk prior to 
that.  If we had to close down the hotel, what do we do?  If we had to close down 
the office, what do we do with our reservations, what do we do with operators, 
what do we do with our land?....... if we expected the worse, we would have 
been much better prepared and we were really lucky that the hotel wasn’t 
stormed.”  
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Mitroff’s (2004a) monograph posited that unthinkable events are often ignored by 
traditional risk management practices. Since they are characterised by low probability 
and high consequences their existence requires a commitment by the organisation to 
systematically prepare for the unthinkable.  In addition to the first phase of interviews, 
Phase Two interviews provided a new source of rich data through the purposive 
sampling methodology, whereby new interviewees were selected based on their 
knowledge of the case study organisation. The researcher sought confirmation of 
emergent theory and presented the schematic describing the ‘Category Filtration to the 
Basic Social Process’ in Figure 3.1 to Phase Two participants.   
 
In response, one of the interviewees related the ‘Black Swan’ theory as a possible 
explanation for the lack of planning by the case study organisation.  The lack of 
planning was identified as a major concern from the data.  He described ‘The Black 
Swan’ theory from the book of the same name by Taleb (2007) as the theory of 
improbable events that cause huge consequences, such as the World Trade Centre 911 
tragedy which is considered an extreme outlier of possible events yet caused massive 
consequences.  Taleb (2007) defined a Black Swan event in summary as ‘a rarity, 
extreme impact and retrospective predictability” (p.xxii) and he posited that we can 
adjust to the existence of Black Swan events and be better prepared to manage them.  
The Black Swan notion was conceptualised by Taleb from the realisation that the 
improbable can exist based on the scientific community’s discovery in 1790 that not all 
swans were white.  Previously, it had been considered a high improbability that there 
were black swans. 
 
When the researcher probed the informant’s understanding of this theory and how it was 
analysed with the case study organisation, he also referenced Taleb’s (2007) narrative 
and the story of the captain of the Titanic.  He explained that the Titanic’s captain was 
appointed to captain the world’s greatest unsinkable ship due to his unblemished record 
of marine safety.  However, the world’s greatest unsinkable ship with the world’s best 
captain of the time was unable to prevent or manage the tragic outcome.  The world’s 
greatest unsinkable ship did not have enough life rafts for all its passengers and crew, it 
was never considered necessary because it was considered to be unsinkable.  In relating 
this to Taleb’s Black Swan theory, the informant posited that the case study organisation 
lacked the discipline to foresee or prepare for crisis events and assumed an attitude that 
‘it won’t happen to us’, a concern that was exposed with high repetition through the data 
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analysis, as evidenced in quotations in regard to the previous sections on Understanding 
the Mindset Section 4.2.1, and National Culture Section 4.2.3, and as components of the 
theme Active Sense-making.  One of the Corporate Office DHs described the CEO’s 
avoidance in making decisions as: 
“I think there was some hesitation for him I think.  He’s not sure.  Like before 
the Red Shirt happened, I think he thought that it’s not going to be this bad.  I 
think it’s not what he expected so even though we prepared for the worst, he still 
hoped for the best.  So hoping for the best may result in some of the delay in 
decision making I think.” 
 
In response to the researcher asking a Bangkok Hotel DH to describe how the company 
responded to the threat of a political crisis, he was perplexed that the threat seemed to 
have been ignored even though they had crisis management systems in place:  
“I wasn’t so much involved in the systems and the SOPs but I knew at that time 
that we had one somewhere.  We had a crisis manual.  We even had a system of 
risk management where the hotel, the Excom, met every month to discuss all 
sorts of different risk factors and how to better prepare for it. 
 
However, interestingly, the Red Shirt crisis was not discussed in detail so it was, 
looking back now, it was kind of like why didn’t we discuss it and why didn’t 
we better prepare for it.  We had crisis manuals for fire, for floods I believe in 
the hotel but not of having the hotel under siege and not being able to get to and 
from the hotel.  So it was quite perplexing why that didn’t go around.” 
 
Ulmer (2012) also referred to Taleb’s (Second Ed., 2010) analogous Black Swan theory 
by describing how leadership often perceive crises as rare abnormal events and 
therefore believe they are too exceptional to be concerned about or prepared.  The 
organisation is focused on day-to-day operations with little consideration for the 
potential crises, however, Ulmer (2012) argued that: “By considering, planning and 
preparing for crises, organisations are better able to consider not just the urgent day-to-
day operations but also the scenarios that are outside of the norm” (p.533). 
 
By Preparing for the Unthinkable or a Black Swan event, an organisation can reduce the 
negative effects by actively making sense of the Warning Signals, strategising and 
activating Forward Planning, and creating a State of Readiness.  The first of these 
dimensions, Warning Signals will be explained in the next section. 
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 5.1.1 WARNING SIGNALS  
 
Warning Signals are the indicators or signals that prompt management to assess the 
situation and initiate appropriate counter measures to alleviate or mitigate any possible 
negative crisis developments (Mitroff, 2004b).  A Warning Signal in the case of natural 
disasters can be heavy rainfall, rising water levels and therefore the potential for 
flooding. In Thailand’s case, a political crisis Warning Signal was the build-up of mass 
protests against the ruling government.  A terrorist event Warning Signal can be 
identified by national security agencies’ threat levels. Warning Signals can be apparent 
to all levels in the community, or be indicators that may only be recognisable by a few.  
When Warning Signals are ignored or the organisation is caught unaware due to its lack 
of signal detectors then the negative impacts can be extremely harmful (Pearson & Clair, 
1998).   
 
The company’s Crisis Communication Plan (Case Study Organisation, 2008) described 
the role of the PR executive at hotel level and corporate head office as being: 
“to recognise the danger signals that might lead to an unfavourable situation in 
the company. One must be on the alert for an event or a series of events that 
could jeopardise the organisation’s reputation, its financial stability, its position 
in the industry, or its role in the community.” (p.3) 
 
Warning Signals are related to Active Sense-making and require a situational 
assessment be undertaken by leadership to mitigate any negative impacts or even seek 
new business opportunities.  When those indicators were obvious to the staff 
community and leadership ignored the signals, then they were considered by staff to 
have failed in their duty of care.  The data revealed a high level of uncertainty in the 
pre-crisis event stages, which fuelled the fear and anxiety experienced by the staff 
community.  The interrelatedness of this factor affected the leaderships’ Decision-
making and influenced the level of trust and respect that followers retained for the 
leadership role.  One of the key informants suggested that the airport closures of 
November-December 2008 were a ‘wake-up’ call and that “we all knew at that stage 
there was more to come through”.  One of the hotel’s Excom recalled the lead up to the 
hotel being under siege: 
“When the crisis was brewing before the hotel was put under siege – under siege 
is quite a negative word [researcher: it was]  It was but if you weren’t in the 
hotel at that time you couldn’t imagine walls of bamboo spears just metres away 
from the hotel but that was how it was.  As the crisis was growing, I felt that the 
hotel management was more on a ‘they wouldn’t come this way’, they would 
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stay at the Hyatt intersection and we would more or less be safe.  ...........so when 
they came over to the intersection that’s when we really felt it’s bad.  That’s 
when we started to have, if I remember correctly, that day we started to have our 
Excom stay in-house.  We had a high level management person staying in-house 
twenty four hours.  So that was exactly when the hotel woke up.  I like to use the 
words ‘woke up’.” 
 
Although, another hotel Excom member felt the hotel was aware of the threat and had 
started preparing by describing the situation in a different light:  
“.... this conflict was taking such a long time and building up actually from a 
small little camp in a park by a few hundred people, adding to it every day more 
and more people, we actually had a lot of time to sit down and discuss and 
follow the media, everything was covered on Thai TV later on as it became 
bigger.  ............  We were told they’re on full standby so we knew in a way that 
the army was there.  We felt quite protected.  We had meetings every day with 
our executive committee with the general manager, we talked about possibilities. 
............ So we were aware of the threat, we also realized that the threat is 
becoming more and more serious.”   
 
The ‘wait-and-see’ attitude that prevailed in the case study organisation contributed to 
the unease, anxiety and uncertainty of the staff community in the pre event phase of the 
2010 Red Shirt crisis.  In 2009, the case study organisation implemented mandatory 
leave-without-pay for six months reducing management and staff salaries by twenty-
five percent.  The leave-without-pay was introduced after substantial business level 
decreases resulted from the airport closures in December 2008.  The new political 
protests created tension and uncertainty in the staff community that leave-without-pay 
may need to be implemented once again.   
 
It was evident in the Phase Two follow up interviews that the new round of political 
protests in Thailand in August 2013 once again created a level of fear within the 
community.  The lack of response to the Warning Signals had staff concerned about 
their own personal safety and the business continuity.  This prompted one of the 
informants to share his concerns making a comparison between the UN’s staff alerts, 
compared to the lack of advice from the case study organisation’s HR department.  He 
also made reference to the fact that his Embassy was providing updates and yet his own 
organisation has failed in their duty of care towards his welfare or that of other 
expatriate managers. He stated: 
“I think there should be more HR announcements internally as well to update the 
staff of what’s happening and what action should be taken, what are the do and 
don’ts during the crisis which we saw very little of actually in our company.” 
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The researcher was contacted on July 8, 2013 by email by a Senior VP of the case study 
organisation with a request for financial Crisis Management advice. He was aware of 
this research study being undertaken on his organisation.  It is also important to note 
that this key leadership position was not a part of the management team in 2010 and he 
had therefore not experienced the Red Shirt crisis event.  He requested in the email for 
the following advice to prepare for a possible political crisis event:  
“Our concern is that…as in 2010 we faced this situation of Red Shirt in 
Bangkok and luckily it did not turn much worst for us then. And now if we see 
what is going on in Turkey and also in Egypt…we can see that we do live in a 
very challenging time.  So the advices I am seeking from you is…if there is a 
‘political problem’ in Thailand, similar to what happened as in 2010…but 
instead of for a couple of month…what happens if this last for a year or two. 
Then what we should do to prepare now so that we will have less financial 
damage and problems. If we have ‘political problem’ and Thailand is closed off 
or with so little tourist…then what will be the situation and what should we do 
now to prepare ourselves…? Would be appreciated if you could provide me an 
idea of your advice.” [sic] 
 
Therefore it was evident that ‘Warning Signals’ were apparent from the most recent 
2013 protests but leadership failed to reassure the staff community or key stakeholders 
that they were prepared for a crisis.  The researcher probed Phase Two follow up 
interviewees to seek clarification about the mood within the staff community and tease 
out their concerns about the potential new political crisis on the horizon.  The Bangkok 
hotel had received significant cancellations and booking patterns had decreased with the 
build-up of the August 2013 political protests as clients relocated to alternative hotels 
away from the potential danger zone.  The data overwhelmingly indicated that the 
organisation is not prepared should a crisis situation eventuate with comments from the 
interviews that included a Bangkok hotel Excom member: 
“So, no, there has not been in my view neither any talk or action plan or 
financial funds made available or some kind of master plan if there’s a next 
crisis to be better prepared.” 
 
A Corporate Office executive was of the opinion that should a crisis event occur: 
“The same thing would happen again.  There would be one natural leader will 
stand up and again shoot off in pronto crisis management.  To be honest, it 
slowly died out like with the trend of the media talking about it, and so did it die 
inside (case study organisation) as well and now it’s just spoken of, you know, 
not officially inside the company except for you doing your PhD in it, if 
anybody wants to read the results.” 
 
Since the email request for advice from the Senior VP mentioned above, an email 
communication from a Corporate Office DH to the researcher also indicated that from 
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July to November of 2013 little had been done to mobilise any form of crisis 
management planning. He was seeking the actual document and requested from the 
researcher: 
 “We are wanting to review and revamp your (case study organisation) crisis 
management manual, but can’t find it.  Would you happen I [sic] have yours still 
somewhere, please.” Email dated 15 November, 2013.  
 
Although, the current GM of the Bangkok hotel, who is a new GM since the 2010 Red 
Shirt crisis event, is of the opinion that the CMT and plans are in place.  The majority of 
informants in the Phase Two interviews, similarly to Phase One interviews, expressed 
their concerns that Warning Signals are being ignored by the organisation’s senior 
leadership group. 
 
 5.1.2 FORWARD PLANNING 
 
Proactive crisis planning has been shown to advantage an organisation in managing a 
crisis and is a proven success factor in Crisis Management efficacy, in comparison to a 
company that fails to plan.  Jaques (2007) stated: “If senior management is not 
committed to planning it will not happen” (p.152). Although it is not possible to identify 
all unthinkable acts that could cause damage to an organisation, the Crisis Management 
Team should identify a range of possibilities and create a framework of procedures to 
manage the potential threats.  This will provide a tool kit for Crisis Leadership and instil 
a higher level of confidence within the Crisis Management team to deal with a crisis 
event (Mitroff, 2004b) and provide followers with the assurance that their leaders are in 
control of the situation.  Lagadec (1993) on the other hand focused on the organisational 
structures and posited that; “the ability to deal with a crisis situation is largely 
dependent on the structures that have been developed before chaos arrives” (p.54). 
 
Santana (2004) argued that Crisis Management is only a peripheral activity in an 
organisation’s day-to-day operations.  He argued that managers are unprepared to deal 
with a crisis in not only the technical but also the psychological and emotional aspects.  
Forward planning will only occur when hotel organisations recognise that the global 
travel environment is more volatile than ever before (Wilks, Pendergast and Leggat, 
2006); thus, they need to prepare for the unthinkable.  
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In the context of the present research study, the interview data suggested that senior 
management were concerned with the myopic view of day-to-day operations and 
implementing the most cost effective initiatives to meet the annual budgetary goals of 
business.  Data indicated that Crisis Management Forward Planning was not a priority 
for the organisation’s leaders.  As suggested by a Bangkok Hotel Excom member:  
“… of course we had meetings on crisis management.  We have a crisis 
management team, we have the manual and of course if you had a manual that is 
60 pages long and you have a meeting, even if you have it once a week for one 
hour, will this really make you ready for a crisis – I don’t think so.  And in 
practice in a hotel operation, a busy hotel operation, crisis management meeting 
would not be on the top agenda, let’s put it this way.   
 
The top agenda nowadays is always business.  It’s sales, it’s staff issues, it’s 
purchasing issues, it’s renovation issues, it’s budget issues, crisis management 
because it is a big subject is always put a little bit on the back shelf I must say 
unless it is shrunk down to a couple of pages.  But how can you cover a big area 
of potential problems coming up in five pages?  You cannot do that either, 
impossible.” 
 
They were under pressure to claw back the losses of the previous years of crises events, 
including the military coup in 2006, the yellow shirt airport closures in 2008, the red 
shirt ASEAN clashes of 2009, as well as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and H1N1 
pandemic fears.  These events reduced the company’s profits and stifled business 
growth (case study organisation’s 2010 Annual Report); as a consequence staff annual 
bonuses were reduced.  
 
The 2010 Red Shirt crisis created tension and unease in the staff community. They were 
concerned that mandatory leave without pay may need to be implemented once again as 
it had been after the airport closures of 2008.  Moreover, the hotel industry is 
characterised by a reliance on short term annual goals rather than a long term outlook of 
three, five or ten year plans.  This was clearly evident in the case study organisation 
where the CEO and senior management VP group did not operate with a formal, or even 
an informal, strategic plan which encompassed all of the company’s divisions as 
previously discussed in the section titled Strategising, Section 4.3.2.  One of the 
Directors at the Corporate Office suggested that: 
“They should be spearheading this, reminding the other senior management 
where resources can be found in case of a crisis management.  Maybe have 
regular meetings once every … quarterly, a brief on it and if we are lucky 
enough to be pre-warned of a forthcoming crisis, be prepared for it way in 
advance and this is again where I think PR plays a very, very big part because 
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they can always turn it into something very positive for the company, not always 
a crisis should have a negative impact on a company.” 
 
In the pre-crisis phase of the Red Shirt crisis, there was no CMT in the corporate head 
office so the ability to plan and manage the crisis was immediately perceived as a 
weakness.  This added to the confusion, fear and anxiety that built up within the staff 
population as the violence escalated.  The failure on the part of senior leaders to 
communicate effectively, make prompt decisions, actively making sense of the situation 
and the inability to understand the mindsets of the participants contributed to the high 
levels of uncertainty being experienced at that time. The data identified the lack of 
Forward Planning and its interrelatedness to the dimensions described in the higher 
order category of Crisis Leadership Influencers.   
 
In comparison to the Corporate Office, the Bangkok hotel’s Crisis Management Team 
met regularly, the Excom members were active in the decision-making process, the HR 
Director was proactive in addressing the staff concerns, and the GM’s leadership 
capabilities were all factors that ensured their Forward Planning reduced the uncertainty 
of the extreme context in which they were operating.  Their Forward Planning also 
encompassed scenario planning in order to assess a range of possibilities and outcomes, 
while at the same time preparing contingency plans.  A Bangkok hotel Excom member 
explained in Phase One interviews: 
 “With the key person, we meet in person in the room, we set up the room and we 
have the necessary equipment like a torch, the mask, walkie-talkie because we 
were thinking at that time if communication was cut off, you can use this, and 
first aid box in our regular meeting room and every time we set a quick meeting, 
everyone came to the designated place.  So this is at the key person level, they 
have to get involved in the decision making like do we close the bookings, do 
we continue, how should we assign the other side of the building because when 
they see the light they will shoot our building.......  
 
Talking about another level of the staff, we have to rely partly in the daily 
briefing of the department heads, the managers concerned, to their respective 
staff, we made use of the email system, we made use of the staff bulletin board 
as we mentioned earlier.  And also in action we coordinated with the telephone 
network system at the time, we use the DTAC system.  We coordinated with 
them because if we have to text to our staff that they don’t have to come – mass 
SMS – and we can do this through the computer system.  So from HR 
perspective, I have to test the system because at the time we have to update all 
the mobile phone numbers and I think at that time it’s only four or six people for 
the entire hotel that does not have a mobile phone.” 
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Secondary data that included Minutes of Meetings held at the Bangkok Hotel in the 
crisis incubation stages indicated risk scenario discourse, with delegation of 
responsibilities to the hotel’s Excom and corporate head office management.  The data 
presented a business unit that was recognised as effective in garnering follower support 
based on confidence and trust in leadership’s Forward Planning actions.  For example, 
one of the meeting attendees was minuted as recommending guests to be familiarised 
with evacuation procedures:  
“(Hotel Excom) suggested that someone should walk through the evacuation 
rooms with them, show them where to meet, which elevator to take, etc. in order 
to prepare them in case they need to evacuate.  It is important to show them that 
all our staff are very confident in what they are doing in case of evacuation.”   
(14 May 2010, Minutes of Early Bird Meeting) 
 
A Corporate Office DH felt the hotel management performed well in face of the crisis 
event: 
“I must say I was proud of the staff in this hotel, at (Bangkok hotel), they stood 
firm.  Nobody deserted the post.  They are very dedicated; that much I have to 
say about them actually.”   
 
On the other hand, the Phuket hotel also had a CMT, which they believed combined 
with their Forward Planning had set them up for success should a crisis event occur.  
However, data analysis of interview responses and online guest feedback secondary data 
produced a different picture. Even with an established Crisis Management Team and a 
level of Forward Planning, the lack of Crisis Leadership dimensions identified in Crisis 
Leadership Influencers resulted in a disorganised crisis situation with no visible 
leadership.  It was clear that even with the existence of a Crisis Management Team and 
Forward Planning; the organisation did not cope with the staff evacuation and 
abandoning guests.  The hotel’s key informant stated:  
“I always thought we would be ready for it but knowing what the human 
reaction was after what happened, the fact that the staff just ran, it was quite 
jarring to us and we didn’t do things perfectly that day.”   
 
The Phuket hotel used this failure to learn, re-educate and adopt a business unit wide 
systematic organisational learning approach.  The steps that have been employed will be 
detailed further in the interrelated lower order categories from Experiential Learning 
including; Learning from Experience, Learning Routineness and Retaining Institutional 
Memory.   
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It was during Phase One data gathering that the strength of the core category and BSPP 
of Empowering Readiness began to emerge. It was confirmed with the Phuket hotel’s 
failed response, and their subsequent evaluation and implementation of new Crisis 
Management procedures.  The emergent theory reflected the statement by the key 
informant: “I feel we’re empowered more than we were because we have information, 
we’ve shared that knowledge and we’ve put it into practice.”  Whereas, the data 
indicated that the senior management team at the corporate head office had not 
implemented any Forward Planning; except for the Crisis Communications Plan and the 
Operational Crisis Manual.  During Phase Two of the data collection, it was obvious 
that the notion of Crisis Management Forward Planning still remained a low priority 
and contributed to respondents fearing the worst and feeling unprepared for future crises 
events.  Therefore the State of Readiness was identified as a major concern for 
respondents in both Phase One and Two of the data collection and will be discussed in 
the next section.    
 
 5.1.3 STATE OF READINESS 
 
The notion of Readiness was classified as a dimension of the lower order category of 
Preparing for the Unthinkable, and the researcher sought to understand the perceived 
State of Readiness from within the organisation.  The State of Readiness occurs when 
Forward Planning has been implemented with the set-up of initiatives such as a Crisis 
Manual, Crisis Management Teams or Committees, training or equipment, and the 
organisation and its members feel that they will be able to cope with a crisis event as a 
result of their Forward Planning. The extant literature indicated that few companies are 
prepared to face a significant crisis event (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008; Grant & 
Mack, 2004) and prolong the crisis due to their unpreparedness.  High Reliability 
Organisations (HRO) such as emergency services and the armed forces are regarded as 
well trained and characterised by the highest levels of readiness for extreme events 
(Hannah et al., 2009; McConnell & Drennan, 2006; Paraskevas et al., 2013).   
 
In contrast Hannah et al. (2009) suggested naive organisations such as hotels suffer 
from the naivety that ‘it won’t happen to us’ and therefore do not allocate the funds for 
training or the resources to prepare for the unthinkable or even to ensure a State of 
Readiness exists.  The naivety of the organisation hinders its ability to foresee the 
Warning Signals and Manage the Crisis.  This contributed to increasing levels of 
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uncertainty and anxiety in the staff community during the Red Shirt crisis incubation 
period.     
 
The data overwhelmingly suggested that the Corporate Office of the case study 
organisation is far from ready to deal with a crisis event and their State of Readiness is 
considered less than adequate.  One of the Corporate Office DHs stated at the time of 
renewed political protests in November 2012 and in Phase One interviews:  
“In all honesty I think the same thing would just repeat itself because if there 
were going to be any changes that I can see, we would have had meetings and 
planning and putting a committee together already by now”.    
 
This was also confirmed by another Corporate Office executive: 
“......they kept on talking about safety, security and safety and still I feel after the 
Red Shirt if it will happen again tomorrow, the only thing we can lean on if we 
have someone strong to take the lead and re-invent the wheel of what happened 
last time, as there is nothing planned.  I would not know what my role is if 
something happened.  As in charge of my department, I have no instructions 
what my role is.  We only have fire evacuation drills.” 
 
In addition, a Corporate Office DH responded to the question about the potential for 
political demonstrations in November 2012, more than two years after the Red Shirt 
crisis and the case study organisation’s readiness by stating: 
“There has to be a committee represented by at least one division from each 
department or each division....... No, it doesn’t exist and they should be on call 
24 hours.  Each of them should have contact information of each other and staff 
from their own division as well.” 
 
The lack of a Crisis Committee was reconfirmed by most of the informants with a 
similar understanding that it did not exist and therefore they felt that the company was 
unprepared.  When asked to validate the study’s thematic development, a Bangkok hotel 
Excom stated, in response to the question specifically on if he felt his organisation was 
crisis-ready:  
“No crisis team with new instructions has been formed as far as I know, though 
there is a Risk Assesment team existing, with manuals that might be good for 
Europe or America but I see no tailor made action that would suit a Thai 
situation.” [sic] Email dated 24 August, 2013. 
 
However, a Corporate DH in Phase Two indicated that there is a Safety Committee, 
comprising RM, Engineering, Food and Beverage, reporting to the VP Operations.  He 
argued that this is considered to be a Crisis Committee, although he acknowledged that 
the key divisions required in a crisis situation of HR and Sales and Marketing are not 
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included in the Safety Committee.  The data indicated there is an obvious breakdown in 
communication about the existence of this committee or knowledge about its 
responsibilities and scope of inclusiveness across all functional divisions.  
 
In comparing the case study organisation with another international hotel group that 
shared the mixed use development site, one of the Phuket interviewees recognised the 
state of readiness of the neighbouring hotel group in regard to their crisis readiness 
practices and stated:  
“They have a dedicated risk assessment guy, for lack of a better word, who’s 
based in Singapore head office, the  (international hotel group), and he actually 
went and reviewed all the  (international hotel group) properties including the 
ones … they have three in the Maldives, and literally all the ones that were 
affected by this earthquake.  So I think there was Maldives, India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Bintan. He therefore included all Laguna properties but also the 
(international hotel group) ones and he assessed how each of them responded 
and it was very well done and I can see they had a great commitment to keeping 
to their readiness for that sort of event.” 
 
At the same time, the participants’ self-reflection about the State of Readiness indicated 
that they felt that they were not ready should a crisis event occur. For example, a 
Bangkok hotel Excom member recalled the importance of the client and guest databases 
during the Red Shirt crisis and the challenges with the lack of data cleanliness for 
communication efficacy.  However, day-to-day operational concerns have taken 
precedence and she is concerned that this communication aspect will be even worse 
some two and a half years later.  There is no sense of task routineness in updating this 
extremely valuable tool and resource, which is one of the indicators for State of 
Readiness in the case study organisation.  Task routineness will be further detailed in 
Section 5.3. 
 
On the other hand, the Phuket hotel’s State of Readiness is considered at a much 
improved level as a result of the reviews and the new Crisis Management plan.  The 
Excom key informant believed that the preparation, training and new initiatives, such as 
mandatory staff orientation, pay slip reminders, smartphone tsunami and earthquake 
warning applications, practice simulations, as well as an expanded Emergency Response 
Team (ERT) and First Aid Support Team (FAST) have combined to create a better 
informed and more confident staff community.  They have also set up the Emergency 
Response Room with better equipment and more resources than prior to the earthquake, 
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with items such as for example, water, non-perishable dry food, walkie-talkies, 
raincoats and plastic shoes. 
 
In the company’s head office, the Corporate Director of Engineering is responsible to 
ensure fire and life safety (FLS) systems are operating on the hotel level.  Although FLS 
systems are a legal prerequisite of a hotel operation based on local safety regulations 
and international travel operator standards, he explained in Phase Two interviews that 
many of the systems at the Thai based hotels were inoperable, as well as at the Manila 
and Dubai hotels.  He had spent the past two years certifying and educating the hotels 
about their responsibilities and is confident that they can minimise asset damage as well 
as ensure staff and guest safety should a fire incident occur.  This State of Readiness in 
FLS systems is monitored by the Corporate Director and it is through a strict protocol of 
standards, audits and training that ensures compliance. 
 
As explained previously in the section on Warning Signals, a Senior VP and the RM 
team detected signs of further political unrest and had taken some steps to prepare; 
however, when the researcher sought the opinion of the Senior VP on the State of 
Readiness.  He wrote in an email dated 5 August, 2013, more than three years after the 
Red Shirt crisis:  
“We had RMC (Risk Management Committee) meeting on last Monday 
(29JUL13), chaired by Khun (CEO).  What Khun (CEO) mentioned and was 
worried very much is about financial management if we had political crisis, like 
red shirt last 2 years, and had to close our major hotels in Thailand for long 
period i.e. 6-12 months.  Many questions and homeworks were raised and asked 
by Khun (CEO) for RMC to find the best solution and preparation for Corporate 
side. 
 
For the time being our RMC had done the plan to handle the crisis and presented 
to Khun (CEO) and it seems okay to Khun (CEO) for the moment.  However 
your kind advice/ recommendation, for some bullet points, are more than 
welcome and would be greatly appreciated.” [sic] 
 
The researcher followed up with a telephone call the following week with the Senior VP. 
He explained the above email that he did not feel confident that they were ready and 
identified some initiatives that he believed would counteract his concerns.  For example, 
he believed that they needed to establish a Crisis Management team so that everyone 
will know who is doing what and what their roles and responsibilities will be should the 
political protests escalate. This reflects his uncertainty about how the organisation will 
handle the situation, especially since he was not a part of the organisation during the 
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Red Shirt crisis.  In addition, he felt that they needed to implement training and 
simulation exercises to prepare staff for the ‘unthinkable’.   
 
Budgetary inadequacies were also identified as a barrier to creating a State of Readiness 
and this theme was repeated by a number of informants who felt the pressure to restore 
business levels after the crisis event precluded any form of formalised learning. As 
highlighted by a Bangkok hotel Excom member: 
“To be very honest with you, there has not been any additional resources in 
terms of hardware, in terms of software like surveillance cameras, in terms of 
extra protection for the hotel like fencing, in terms of a wire fence that our own 
security could use to protect our property, in terms of a real serious training for 
not only the Excom but the general staff which are the ones that actually are 
most at risk because they are the frontline and because they come and go to 
work every day.” 
 
In response to one of the interview questions; Is there a budget or resources in place for 
another crisis event? A member of the RM department responded that: 
“I don’t think they have a budget just an ad hoc event perhaps like when they 
come to talk to like a board.  Like last time the flood is coming and we don’t 
know the situation here in (hotel), it’s just that the water will come.  Do you 
know our CEO just talked to the board that we need a boat, something to prepare 
for the flood – no budget before or set, I suppose.” 
 
The lack of budget readiness or allocation was also noted by another Bangkok hotel 
Excom member who responded to the budget question: 
 “Not specifically for the crisis or any crisis but at that time, of course, when they 
were already on our front door, we had to pull in resources from somewhere.  
I’m not too familiar with the financial part of that but I didn’t feel that there was 
any specific monetary budget set aside, no.” 
 
A Phuket Excom member related the issue of a complimentary dinner provided to all 
guests after the earthquake evacuation of 2012 as an example of non-budgeted items for 
crisis events:  
 “.....after we send them back to the hotel, the hotel give free food for all guests.  
It just came up, it’s not our form, it’s nothing to do with the hotel but it was just 
a courtesy to all the guests to make them calm down but I don’t think we have 
this budget.  It’s like maybe we put it under miscellaneous but I don’t think we 
put this is a budget for crisis, whether we use it or we don’t use it, but we have 
to put it aside.  So I don’t think we really have … I’m not saying we don’t take 
this seriously but maybe we just say oh if this has happened, we do it.”[sic] 
 
In addition, one of the informants explained that although middle management actively 
recommended security and risk management initiatives, the CEO and Board did not 
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comprehend the financial versus risk ratio and rejected these initiatives due to budget 
constraints.  A financial commitment for initiating Crisis Management practices as a 
result of learning from the crisis would also encourage a greater level of confidence, 
respect and trust within the staff community that the organisation is prepared to deal 
with any potential crises.   
 
The budget constraint theme prompted the researcher to return to the Phuket hotel 
Excom and follow up on Phase One (November 2012) data that revealed a new Public 
Address (PA) System was to be installed the following month. Following Phase Two 
interviews, the researcher sought clarification on the PA installation and was advised 
that this initiative has been postponed until the 2014 budget.  Confirmation was 
provided to the researcher as per the email response on 1 September, 2013 that stated: 
“Re PA: this was postponed until 2014, however (FLS Manager) is here to 
check what progress we have made as we have down [sic] a lot of work to 
improve the former fire system”.   
 
This was an initiative that was identified after the April 2012 earthquake as an urgent 
resource required to assist in better managing a crisis situation, especially in a resort 
property with an expansive layout and where the communication process at the time of 
the crisis was identified as inadequate.  Therefore, the budget dilemma has reduced the 
State of Readiness for the Phuket property and as a consequence negatively influenced 
the interrelated components of Experiential Learning and the Crisis Leadership 
Influencers, in particular Communicating, Decision-making, Visibility, and Managing 
the Crisis.   
 
These findings are also validated by the online survey results that suggest staff perceive 
the organisation’s state of crisis readiness is below expectations of the staff due to a lack 
of training despite an obvious willingness of staff to learn and be crisis ready.  Section 
5.1.3.1 will explain the online survey results with regard to staff perceptions about 
Crisis Readiness. 
 
 5.1.3.1 ONLINE SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS OF CRISIS READINESS 
 
This section explains the findings of the survey designed to elicit staff perceptions about 
their company’s crisis management readiness.  These findings validate the emergent 
theoretical concepts.  The survey statements were based predominantly on the work of 
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Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) study combined with some additional statements from the 
aforementioned Sheaffer and Manno-Negrin (2003) study. 
 
Rousaki and Alcott (2006) based their questionnaire instrument on Reilly’s (1987) 
empirical evidence of Crisis Readiness, which reflected three dimensions.  The survey 
for this study used the resulting component on internal functionality, which was 
operationalised as a subscale into Section Two of the survey.  The factor analysis 
resulted in the Crisis Readiness scale loading the organisation’s internal functionality as 
Factor 1 and supported Rousaki and Alcott’s (2006) hypothesis that the perceived Crisis 
Readiness “increases as long as they believe in their organisation’s internal 
functionality” (p.35).  This factor explained 32.4% of the variance.   
 
Section Two also included five statements from Sheaffer and Manno-Negrin’s (2003) 
crisis management subscale, which were of a similar vein to the crisis management 
readiness set of statements and were designed to gauge how crisis prepared or prone 
their participants were in terms of crisis management.  The Cronbach alpha of .867 
indicated the strength of the common factor reliability and consistency in the 
respondents’ answers. 
 
 (i) INTERNAL FUNCTIONALITY 
 
Table 5.2 indicated from the online survey’s frequency analysis that a large proportion 
of the staff disagreed (37.9%) that all members are trained to handle a crisis situation 
(only 28.6% agreed), or are well informed about the resources or tools available in the 
company should a crisis occur (35% disagreed to being well informed).  This reflects a 
negative perception about Crisis Readiness within the organisation.  The statement that 
the organisation will recover quickly after a crisis situation indicates strong agreement 
(42%) and may explain the attitude that was prevalent in the primary data, that the case 
study organisation would ‘bounce back’ easily and therefore there was not an urgency 
for Crisis Readiness. 
 
In comparison to the first section on Corporate Orientation, the mean scores are lower 
with less agreement for the statements on Crisis Management internal functionality. 
This would indicate staff support for the notion that there is a lack of Crisis 
Management readiness.     
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Even though almost half of the respondents (45.4%) acknowledged the organisation has 
Crisis Management plan training on an annual basis, there is still more than one quarter 
of respondents (26.9%) who did not agree with this statement.  This indicated that Crisis 
Management plan training is not provided systematically throughout the company.  
There is also a lack of consensus or significant difference with regard to the belief that 
the organisation views Crisis Management readiness as a corporate goal priority, as only 
39.5% agreed with it being a corporate goal priority while 25.2% disagreed.   
 
Table 5.2: Perceptions of Crisis Management Readiness 
 
 
Statement 
 
Mean 
% 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree (4+5) 
% 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1+2) 
α 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Internal Functionality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.867 
I have easy accessibility to crisis 
management resources 
3.03 37% 27.7% 
My organisation has adequate 
budget in its strategic plan in case 
of a crisis situation 
3.15 39.5% 22.6% 
My organisation has crisis 
management plan training on an 
annual basis 
3.15 45.4% 26.9% 
I am well informed about the 
resources and tools allocated for 
crisis management 
3.03 43.7% 35% 
My organisation views crisis 
management readiness as a 
corporate goal priority 
3.09 39.5% 25.2% 
All members of my organisation 
are trained to handle a crisis 
situation 
2.82 28.6% 
 
37.9% 
My organisation will recover 
quickly after a crisis situation 
3.25 42% 
 
15.2% 
Crisis Readiness 
 
Crisis management preparations 
are a luxury we cannot afford 
2.74 15.9% 37% 
Since we are big enough, the 
probability of survival after a crisis 
is high 
3.19 42% 19.3% 
Crises have only negative impacts 
on my company 
2.75 21.9% 42.9% 
It is sufficient to take action once 
the crisis has occurred 
2.97 39.5% 33.6% 
It is impossible to prepare for a 
crisis since they are unpredictable 
2.56 22% 49.5% 
Scale 1-5 : Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5) 
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A lack of Crisis Management training and therefore Crisis Readiness was also described 
in the survey’s free text responses from two different respondents: 
 “A lack of data, training and crisis readiness contributed to a sluggish address of 
the issue. Had we been better prepared through training and clear documentation 
we would have been able to handle the issue in a more positive fashion.” 
 
 “There should be an SOP on crisis management” 
 
 (ii) CRISIS READINESS 
 
The Crisis Readiness statements provided even more useful insights as illustrated in 
Table 5.2 above.  These results reflect that 37% of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement: “crisis preparations are a luxury we cannot afford”.  This indicated that staff 
are aware of the importance of crisis preparations and understand the need for 
incorporating them into the organisation’s strategic and operational activities.  In 
addition, there were high levels of disagreement to the statement that “crises have only 
negative impacts on the company” (42.9%).  As a result there appears to be an 
opportunity for the organisation to learn from crisis experiences and rebuild the 
company with improvements and create new best practices.   
 
Furthermore, there appears to be some consensus that since the organisation “is big 
enough, the probability of survival after a crisis is high” (42% agreed), which may 
contribute to the complacency for crisis readiness and lack of crisis preparation.  
Finally, the majority of respondents disagreed that “It is impossible to prepare for a 
crisis since they are unpredictable” (49.5%), and this reflects a willingness of staff to 
participate more readily in Crisis Management training and preparations.   
 
However, the survey revealed some respondents who felt the company was adequately 
prepared and two respondents stated in the free text responses: 
 “During the political crisis in Bangkok. Our organisation located in central of 
the city, where exactly the politicle crisis began around 3-4 years ago but our 
organisation had immediate plan and continually operation.” [sic] 
 
 “Since the crisis in April 2012, we are 100% more ready for the event when it 
happens again, however the humn [sic] reaction is not possible to predict.”  
 
The online survey provided further qualitative insights into the findings on the 
classification of the State of Readiness and contributed to the emergent higher order 
category of Experiential Learning.  The next section will discuss Learning from 
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Experience, which emerged as an interrelated lower order category of Experiential 
Learning due to its influence on Crisis Readiness efficacy.   
 
5.2 LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
 
The BSSP of Experiential Learning is built upon a number of key categories including 
Learning from Experience which was identified as a major contributing influence on 
Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning Routineness and Retaining Institutional 
Memory. These categories reflected a relationship with the first BSSP, Crisis 
Leadership Influencers.  The classification of Learning from Experience emerged from 
the data gathering and analysis with the frequency of follower trust and acceptance 
based on the leader’s learned experiences as a Crisis Leadership competency.  Moreover, 
the Phuket earthquake internal review provided an example of Learning from 
Experience to establish best practice processes.  The category of Learning from 
Experience provided evidence that learning from a crisis can help an organisation 
develop precautionary norms which generate a greater resilience to crisis events in the 
future (Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
 
The ability to detect crisis Warning Signals, refined and enhanced by the learned 
experience of the past, enables leadership to identify vulnerabilities, engage in rapid and 
wise decision-making, take informed action and encourage learning that promotes 
positive change. Learning from Experience establishes a systematic approach to Crisis 
Management based on past experiences and encourages strengthening bonds of trust and 
respect from the key stakeholders of the organisation, staff, clients and partners, as they 
view leadership with higher levels of confidence.  Data analysis of staff responses 
suggested a high level of trust and confidence is placed in leadership when their past 
crisis experience is evident in their decision making.  For example, a leader’s SARS 
experience and her crisis communication initiatives encouraged a sense of credibility 
with her follower group.  In Phase One interviews a Corporate Office DH explained: 
“....But overall I think we did the best we could because for me it was the first 
time of a crisis.... it might be like SARS and all that stuff and luckily I had a 
leader who has international hotel experience dealing with the crisis who pushed 
me to finish the crisis plan.  I was frustrated for just a week.  I had so many 
things to do but I knew it was very important.  Even I look back at the crisis plan 
myself and say OK…” 
 
Chapter 5– Experiential Learning 
 
219 | P a g e  
The category describing Learning from Experience encompassed two main dimensions: 
Experience with Crisis Events and Organisational Learning, which will be described in 
the following sections. 
 
 5.2.1 EXPERIENCE WITH CRISIS EVENTS 
 
Management who have Experience with Crisis Events have a heightened awareness of 
the situation, which is suggested by one of the hotel GMs of the case study organisation 
as being “latent or even subconscious” as will be elaborated upon further in this section.  
Leaders who have experienced a crisis incident are more agile to react quickly to a new 
crisis than those who are experiencing it for the first time.  The findings from the 
present study also reflected the notion that leaders with crisis experience are considered 
to be better prepared to manage a crisis, as explained by a Bangkok hotel Excom 
member: 
“For a lot of us who didn’t have much experience handling crises, we felt that, 
you know, well he kinda [sic] knew what to do and that was quite important to 
us as department heads.” 
 
They have learned lessons from the past and can avoid past mistakes; therefore, they are 
able to react faster.  They were believed to be less confused or shocked when faced with 
a crisis situation, which allowed them to analyse the situation and activate counter 
measures more time-efficiently than non-experienced leaders. They also expressed clear 
and believable messages when speaking from a learned experience viewpoint. A leader 
who has experienced a crisis event is better equipped to handle the fast-changing crisis 
landscape.  Moreover, exposure to a previous crisis enhances the adaptability of the 
leader to deal with different situations (Parry, 1999).  
 
Data classified under ‘experience’ and ‘experience learned’ developed compelling 
evidence for the fact that followers’ levels of trust and confidence in their leader who 
had previous Experience with Crisis Events was stronger than for leaders without 
experience.  When the researcher probed into understanding why staff trusted their 
leader, respondents referred to their past crisis experiences.  Followers were confident 
that their leader’s Experience with Crisis Events would mean that they could manage 
the situation in a more efficient way than a leader without any crisis experience as 
described in Managing The Crisis is Section 4.3.  The followers’ willingness to follow 
directives was based on their assessment of the leader’s credible past experience and 
ability to minimise risk and negative outcomes.  The Bangkok GM was deemed a 
Chapter 5– Experiential Learning 
 
220 | P a g e  
credible crisis leader for his Experience with Crisis Events, specifically with his 
experience as a GM at the time of the Bali bombing in 2002, as explained by one of the 
Bangkok hotel Excom:  
“....we had a general manager that went through the Bali bombings and he had a 
lot of experience.  He had a lot of very good advice, for example, like stocking 
up food, like always emphasizing on taking care of our safety first and of the 
guests’ safety and he was then also intelligent enough to stop the bookings for 
the safety of any person that still wants to come here.” 
 
In contrast, the effects of the Phuket earthquake had not been experienced in the lifetime 
of the hotel; therefore, the fear and panic that it caused was attributed to the previous 
retained memories of the devastating 2004 Boxing Day tsunami.  Furthermore, the 
hotel’s GM and senior expatriate leaders had not been in Phuket during the 2004 
tsunami crisis; as a consequence they were not proficient in actively sensing the extreme 
levels of fear and anxiety within the staff and guest population alike.  In learning from 
this experience, the hotel Excom took the panicked staff reaction into consideration and 
built upon the 2012 experience to retrain and re-educate the staff population about 
specific earthquake evacuation strategies in conjunction with their tsunami training.  
The Crisis Management team are confident that the perceived levels of fearfulness have 
been reduced as a result of their experience, a sense of familiarity and the organisational 
learning processes employed to prepare for similar future crisis events.   
“The tsunami alarm is loud and scary and horrible and therefore the people that 
hadn’t run then took to the hills themselves.  I think part of it was we’ve now 
spent a lot more time about educating them on what an earthquake is, they’ve 
felt it first hand and we had the aftershocks for one month afterwards so they felt 
them regularly.” 
 
In acknowledging their incompetencies, the Phuket hotel’s senior management solicited 
feedback from all stakeholders and have since established a CP that has empowered 
staff to react with confidence and professionalism. The sharing of information has given 
the staff community the knowledge to deal with future crisis events in a confident and 
systematic approach.  Hence avoiding negative customer feedback while increasing 
repeat business.  In answer to the researcher’s question, ‘what makes you feel you’ve 
got everything in place (for a crisis event)?’ the hotel’s key informant was of the 
opinion that “we’ve learnt a lot more and obviously this knowledge has to be practiced 
and we’re pretty committed to that so I think for that we’re ready”.  The Phuket hotel 
Excom member also added: 
“I think that not to be afraid to talk about it even when you do things not well.  
We had to accept the fault of what we did in that event and accept that we were 
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very fortunate that there was no harm to anybody and that our guests and the 
recovery process by the hotel was very smooth and that we truly had done the 
best that we could knowing that all our staff had run away.” 
 
The 2011 nation-wide flood crisis once again severely impacted business levels in 
Thailand and threatened to flood the flagship hotel and corporate head office.  Staff 
were unable to report to duty, so the central reservations office was relocated to Pattaya 
where it continued to operate for a month.  The senior manager responsible for the 
central reservations office suggested that since the staff had relocated to the CCC during 
the Red Shirt crisis, they were prepared and less stressed about this relocation activity.  
As a matter of fact, he suggested that they experienced a sense of relief that they would 
be accommodated in conjunction with their job activity since their homes were flooded.  
The experience of relocating the central reservations for the second time in eighteen 
months made the transition a more acceptable option for the followers.  One informant 
also explained:  
“We learned how to have contingency plans.  Like when the flooding happened 
and we had to move the central reservations office to Pattaya, it was much easier 
because we know how to divert the phone lines.  We know what equipment to 
set up there, what could be moved and what could not be moved because we had 
done it before so that was much easier.” 
 
The phone line diversion and hardware requirements were based on the Red Shirt crisis 
set up.   The ease of the operation was attributed to having done it before and was 
considered a positive outcome of having Experience with a Crisis. 
 
However, Experience with Crisis Events can result in a level of complacency towards 
impending crises and the notion that the organisation will ‘bounce back’ became 
prevalent in the data collection.  A Phuket hotel Excom member raised a concern that 
staff may be too confident after twenty five years of operation with a number of crises 
that have already challenged the hotel. There was a perception that the hotel is resilient 
and will always ‘bounce back’ and continue to operate so there is nothing to worry 
about.  She stated in Phase Two interviews more than a year after the Phuket earthquake: 
 “The staff feel confident and maybe too confident that, you know, we’ll handle 
everything, it’s going to be OK.  I think that the hotel, that some of the staff have 
been here so long that they’ve seen the hotel, how it’s resilient and how it keeps 
bouncing back.  It’s the same about the business, the business will just come. 
 
People when they only see one way when they’ve been in a place so long, they 
can almost be a bit blinded, with shutters on.  So, we’re still, one year on, we’re 
still, that readiness is there, the understanding, talking about it much more, what 
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the signs are, knowing the response, talking about it in briefings, attaching 
things to payslips still, we still do that, so I think everybody is aware.  The only 
thing I’d be worried about is the staff turnover so when somebody does change 
how to bring them up to speed quickly.” 
 
The crisis-fatigued Thai hotel industry is also a contributing aspect to the community’s 
attitude that they ‘take for granted’ that it’s just another crisis and everything will be 
OK and the industry will ‘bounce back’ (World Bank Report, 2012).  Once again data 
indicated highly interrelated relationships with the lower order categories of Crisis 
Leadership Influencers, in particular National and Organisational Culture and the belief 
of expecting only the best in outcomes.  
 
A Corporate Office DH, who had been based on property at the time of the Thaksin 
coup d’état in 2006, highlighted the lack of Crisis Readiness in the company even when 
he had already experienced the staff reaction.  He stated:  
“….we were really unprepared as a company, as a company-wide, I was based 
on property. For the first sniff of trouble when the coup took place and the 
military took power. I went running down to reception as soon as I found out 
and was greeted by everybody with, this always happens and don’t worry about 
it and everything will be fine, and the actual fact in that first instance, it was.  
Everything passed off peacefully, there was a bit of negative press which was 
quickly turned around with holidaymakers looking at tanks.  It all went off and 
everybody was relieved there was no bloodshed.  That should have been a 
warning signal to say that systems should be put into place and what if it hadn’t 
gone so well.” 
 
Phase Two follow up interviews validated the confidence that is instilled when a 
manager assumed the position of leadership in a crisis and is acknowledged to have 
Experience with Crisis Events.  A hotel GM used his own personal experience as an 
example by retelling a story of a car accident that he encountered in 2004 when he was 
the first person on the scene.  He felt he “muddled” his way through the emergency by 
blocking the road and providing first aid.  Eight years later he encountered a similar 
situation but on this occasion he felt “less muddled”, in that he knew what he was doing 
and was perceived by onlookers as the leader of the situation until the emergency 
services took over.   
 
Learned experiences do not need to be from one’s own personal experience; they can 
also be formulated from the experience of others or similar events.  These accounts can 
also provide a learned experience if it has been studied or referenced to the current 
context.  For example, one of the Bangkok Hotel Excom referred to his learned 
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experience from the Mumbai 2008 hotel bombings and the proactive approach adopted 
by the Taj group immediately after the November 26-29 terrorist attacks.  The Taj 
Mahal Palace Mumbai is an iconic Indian hotel and their award-winning advertising 
campaign launched on Dec 5th, a week after the tragic loss of life and destruction to the 
national landmark, described the spirit of India and how the hotel, just like the country, 
would never bow to the pressure of terrorists (PATA, 2009), please refer to Appendix 
15 as this advertising message provided the basis for the case study organisation’s 2010 
post crisis advertising.  In Phase One interviews, a Corporate Office DH recalled: 
 “(case study organisation) provided leadership in terms of going out with a 
strong message based on what we’d learnt from the Taj episode and their 
bombing and how they handled and how we came out with a ‘we shall not be 
beaten’ kind of message with the (recovery advertising campaign tagline)”.  
 
This learned experience from another’s tragic event gave credibility to the iconic-style 
campaign launched for the Bangkok hotel titled “(recovery advertising campaign title)”.  
It evoked an emotive pull strategy for internal and external stakeholders, locally and 
internationally. The campaign also sought to inspire a sense of national pride and 
acknowledged the ‘never give up’ attitude of the entire tourism industry.  The data 
suggested that this was a very successful strategy which continues to instill a level of 
pride three years after the campaign.  A Bangkok hotel Excom member stated: 
“...everybody still remembers, remember that (case study organisation) ‘Strong 
as Ever’, ‘(recovery advertising campaign tagline)’.  That message was so 
strong.  It wasn’t selling, it wasn’t promoting the hotel, they were just saying 
we’re strong, we’re there.  That message still some of our customers talk about 
it, it was saying that we are there, we are here, and that was the biggest 
communication and it was in a press release as well so being innovative while 
being in a crisis, communicating to the customers because it’s not only 
customers in Thailand but it’s around the world and sending that out was huge.” 
 
A number of participants noted that Mumbai’s Taj Mahal hotel recovery campaign was 
an invaluable learning experience for their own Red Shirt recovery strategies.  Although 
no two crises are the same, the preparation, planning, management and recovery stages 
will provide cognitive learning opportunities for application to other crisis situations. 
 
Data also revealed that unsuccessful strategies also become learned lessons, which was 
exemplified by one of the key informants who had been representing the Massachusetts 
Port Authority owner of the Boston Logan International Airport at the time of the 
September 11th, 2001 World Trade Centre terrorist attacks.  He recalled how the 
international marketing funds were cancelled and their marketing efforts became 
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domestic centric which he believed delayed their destination’s recovery.  He suggested 
that:  
“It was a good example of how really not to deal with it, I think if I have learnt 
anything, you’ve got to face these things and try and be as honest as possible and 
just keep restating your messages and keep being positive and active and getting 
things in the market, and if nothing else, it will speed the recovery.” 
 
A new participant during Phase Two data collection further highlighted an important 
training tool that reinforces the learned experience from other crises.  He used the recent 
resort fire at the Adaaran Select Hudhuranfushi Resort in North Male’ atoll of the 
Maldives archipelago on 21 July 2013 as an example to engage his on-site engineering 
reports with the importance of FLS systems and to learn from this incident.  Sixteen 
villas were destroyed and fortunately only minor injuries were reported, especially since 
the villas were not equipped with smoke alarms (Merrett, 2013).  The case study 
organisation opened a similarly designed water villa resort in 2012, and the informant 
referred to this incident as “it could have been us”, which would have “been bad news 
...(and as a consequence) bad PR”. 
 
Another Phase Two informant stated in an email response dated August 24th, 2013: 
“Learning from experience is a clear factor in dealing with a crises [sic]. After 
living through tsunami, earthquakes, terrorism, in my own experience, there is a 
heightened (all be it latent or maybe even subconscious) awareness of one’s 
surroundings and in a way a preparedness.  I think this is what is key. People 
having experience a crises before are more quick to step into preparedness than 
those who are experiencing them for the first time and can react quicker (they do 
not have it won’t happen to us mind set and are therefore less shocked or 
confused when a crises occurs). They even may be subconsciously conditioned 
to be in a better prepared location or position should it occur. They have learnt 
from the good and the bad behavior and therefore do not need to go through this 
testing process again.” [sic] 
 
On the other hand, the data also revealed concerns by many of the respondents that with 
staff turnover new management are perceived not to have Experience with Crisis Events. 
The informants were concerned that they will not be able to react effectively should the 
2013 political protests escalate. In addition, a Bangkok Hotel Excom member felt that 
the age group, and therefore lack of crisis experience, of the Risk Management team 
from Corporate Office impeded an efficient response to a crisis by claiming: 
“I mean it’s nothing against young people with a masters degree but for this kind 
of people doing something that would be practically useable in a crisis, you 
would really have to have some committee members that have been through a 
crisis, have experience and maybe somebody that comes from the army, from 
the police.” 
Chapter 5– Experiential Learning 
 
225 | P a g e  
Phase Two data gathering confirmed the emergent themes and lack of confidence for 
the current corporate head office management, whose experience with crisis events does 
not appear to have been authenticated by staff.  The recent request for advice to the 
researcher to deal with a potential crisis from the most senior finance VP, also indicated 
a lack of confidence and uncertainty.  It is also important to highlight that he had only 
been with the company during a crisis-free period.  The interrelatedness of the BSSP 
Experiential Learning category’s Learning from Experience will be further addressed in 
the section on Retaining Institutional Memory.   
 
Experience with Crisis Events is a key property in Learning from Experience and 
strengthens Experiential Learning as a BSSP.  However, Learning from Experience is 
enhanced when Organisational Learning is encouraged and new systems and processes 
are undertaken to address any deficiencies or issues after a crisis event.  Organisational 
Learning will be detailed in the following section. 
 
 5.2.2 ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING  
 
Utilising a crisis experience knowledge base through a systemic Organisational 
Learning approach also benefits the organisation because it provides a comprehensive 
tool kit to ensure sustained business continuity.  The role of Organisational Learning is 
acknowledged as an important element in the growth, development and sustainability of 
an organisation (Madsen & Desai, 2010).  Whereas the failure to learn from these 
experiences reduces the organisation’s ability to Prepare for the Unthinkable, detect 
Warning Signals or Forward Plan.  An active Organisational Learning philosophy will 
also positively impact on the Decision-making processes (Lerbinger, 2012) and 
strengthen Crisis Leadership efficacy. 
 
Organisational Learning is defined by Madsen and Desai (2010) as “any modification of 
an organisation’s knowledge as a result of its experience” (p.453).  The lessons learnt 
and adapted from a crisis event, to improve skills and expand capabilities, are 
invaluable even if such an event is not expected to reoccur (Lampel et al., 2009).  
However, in the case study organisation the data described an organisation at head 
office level that dealt with the immediate crisis event, recovery, and then resumed day-
to-day business activities as evidenced in comments about the lack of debriefings as 
reported previously in the sections on Forward Planning and State of Readiness,  
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Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 respectively. In response to the researcher’s question on what 
learning or debriefing occurred as a result of the crisis event? A Corporate Office 
Director recalled: 
 “I wasn’t privy to any senior management discussions if there were any.  There 
was I think a thank-you that came out from Khun (CEO) for all the efforts that 
were made and to continue the business and to uphold the company’s identity 
out into the world and the market.” 
 
Another Corporate Office DH responded to the same question about debriefings being 
held after the Red Shirt crisis:  
 “I don’t think that’s happening because we meet during the crisis all the time but 
after the crisis we were really busy doing the post-crisis actions trying to fix 
whatever happened.” 
 
However, in the secondary data, Corporate Office Excom Meeting Minutes of May 18th, 
2010, indicated the CEO’s insistence to learn from the Red Shirt crisis events by 
minuting his directives: 
 (CEO) stressed that we need to develop a much better plan and since we learn 
from this experience. We will need to compile everything we are doing now and 
have a proper plan including the drill. 
 We have to push forward and not giving up, we need to plan well for once the 
situation is return to normal.  
 
In a CNN interview the following day on May 19th, 2010, the CEO reiterated the need 
to learn from the Red Shirt crisis by stating: 
“Last year we thought it was difficult but this year is worse and that’s why I 
think right now the Thai people we have to find a way so that we can as a 
country moving forward together and we have to learn from this and we have to 
make sure this will not happen again.” 
 
In an email announcement three days after the Corporate Office Excom meeting on 21 
May, 2010, the HR head also indicated that the organisation needed to document 
lessons learned by stating: 
“The past one week has been a trying time for all and once again we do 
apologize to our colleagues in the field for the inconveniences caused by the 
work disruption. We do, however, thank everyone for their concerns and 
understanding. This is what being a “family” is all about and it goes right to our 
core values. We have weathered the crisis together and have come out stronger, 
ready to face the challenges ahead with renewed energy and vigour to build our 
paradise on earth : (company name). Valuable lessons have also been learnt in 
crisis management and we ask all department heads to document these lessons in 
writing so that we can share them among ourselves. .............Enjoy your 
weekend but do take care. Remember, night curfews are still on for today and 
tomorrow. See you back in the office on Monday.”   
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Although there appeared to be some rhetoric from the CEO and HR on debriefings and 
lessons learnt; the interview data highlighted the absence of Organisational Learning 
activities by management at head office with no debriefing or reviews of the 
organisation’s actions during the Red Shirt crisis.  As stated by one of the Corporate 
Office DHs:  
“....there was really no attention into looking at the crisis and evaluating what we 
would have done better.  I don’t think that but I think there should be.  Turning 
back time, there should have been a crisis evaluation workshop or something.”  
 
In contrast to this lack of debriefing and subsequent loss of organisational learning atthe 
Corporate Office level, the contrasting Phuket hotel’s earthquake evacuation debriefing 
will be explained later in this section.   
 
It appeared that this is what Lerbinger (2012) described as ‘Maintenance learning’ 
which is learning that upholds and maintains an existing system, where traditional 
managers use processes and methods to deal with existing norms and practices.  
However, this form of ‘non-learning’ does not meet the expectations of an 
Organisational Learning driven company which seeks continuous improvement through 
double-loop learning so that they influence the events rather than be influenced by them.  
Garvin (1993) suggested a learning organisation is one where it’s “skilled at creating, 
acquiring and transferring knowledge and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new 
knowledge and insights” (p.80).    
 
The data suggested participants were concerned about the corporate head office 
managements’ ability to handle another crisis given that no analysis of previous events 
occurred through debriefings after the Red Shirt crisis, nor were there any reviews and 
updates of the Crisis Management plans.  When probed for post Red Shirt crisis 
debriefings, a Bangkok hotel Excom stated: 
“If you talk about some kind of a post-mortem about our actions and how we 
handled the situation, a real document that is well thought through that could be 
a help for any repeat of any such incident, I have to say no.  I haven’t seen one.” 
 
The lack of debriefing and organisational learning was confirmed as the data collection 
continued.  The perception held by many was that should another political crisis event 
present itself, the organisation had not learnt from the past and mistakes could be 
repeated.   
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A Bangkok hotel Excom member recalled a post Red Shirt crisis meeting being held 
where he witnessed an attitude that permeated the management group of ‘fingers 
crossed it won’t happen again’, rather than a proactive learning experience about what 
worked and what didn’t work.  He recalled in Phase Two interviews: 
 “We did have the post event, you know, meeting, but I think that was about it.  
Fingers crossed it doesn’t happen again, which is a very Thai thing.  Prepare for 
the best and expect the best.” 
 
Another Hotel Excom member who has left the company recalled: 
“There wasn’t an effort to collect all the information, what happened, there 
wasn’t a learning process, yes, there wasn’t a debrief but there were just talks 
later on.  The crisis team, OK, we did good here, we did bad there, we could 
have done better here but there was nothing so that in the future the new 
management wouldn’t know what to do from experience.  Whatever we learned 
it seemed like we take it with us, that’s it.” 
 
This perception was reconfirmed by the actions and email correspondence of the Senior 
VP who made contact with the researcher for advice on potential political crisis 
preparedness as mentioned in Section 5.1.1 on Warning Signals. 
 
The ‘post mortem’ initiative was suggested by the Bangkok hotel Excom member as the 
best way to prepare for a future crisis.  He was of the view that a plan should be 
prepared based on answers to a post mortem since he believed that experience is often 
better than ‘theoretical’ manuals.  He listed the questions that needed to be asked of 
their Red Shirt crisis performance in a responding email of August 24th, 2013, which 
included:  
“A post mortem after any crisis would be in my view the best way to prepare for 
any future crisis. Be it political clashes like seen right next to our Hotel, 
flooding, closing of Airports, Coups or a serious world spanning financial down 
turn.  
a) What have we done right in our decision-making during such a crisis? 
b) What have we done wrong?  
c) Why have we made wrong decisions? Wrong judgment? Overreaction, 
panic? 
d) What negative results have been directly caused by our wrong decisions? 
e) What right decisions have helped us during the crisis and why were they 
helping us to weather the storm?” 
 
These questions posed by the hotel’s Excom member are similar to the US Army’s 
‘After Action Review’ (AAR) process which is a systematic process of debriefing after 
every military action and has now been widely adopted in the private sector (Garvin, 
Edmondson & Gino, 2008).  The AAR process exemplifies how learning-embedded 
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organisations utilise learning processes and practices to continuously improve.  
Unfortunately, the data from the present study indicated that the case study organisation 
cannot be considered a learning organisation.  Phase One and Two participants from 
both the corporate head office and the Bangkok hotel were unanimous in their 
agreement that the lack of formalised learning from the Red Shirt crisis has set the 
organisation up for failure should a similar event occur.   
 
In contrast, the Phuket hotel has taken a more disciplined learning approach and its 
leadership encouraged a robust, open, and honest analysis of what went wrong with the 
earthquake evacuation.  They created an environment without fear of reprisal that 
stimulated staff feedback to assist in revising systems and procedures and create a more 
efficient Crisis Management plan.  The key informant from the Phuket hotel explained:  
“We have acknowledged what we didn’t do well and it kind of hurt but it’s 
allowed us to be one hundred million times stronger for the next time.  Because 
we solicit feedback from everybody in our hotel, the good, the bad, the ugly, we 
were very truthful about it and we’ve put something into practice”. 
 
One of the biggest challenges to Organisational Learning is how a company deals with 
failure and their desire to refrain from highlighting the failure (Madsen & Desai, 2010) 
and the embarrassment that it may cause through reviews and debriefings.  The 
organisation may have missed an opportunity to learn and improve systems so that they 
are better prepared for the future.  Well-prepared organisations have been identified as 
those companies where employees and management have learnt from previous crises 
and utilised this learning to improve roles and responsibilities.  They also regularly 
update Crisis Management manuals and procedures (Pearson et al., 1997).   
 
The apparent unwillingness to learn in the case study organisation may be attributed to 
their concern that it may expose the flaws and weaknesses of the organisation.  As 
previously described in Section 4.1.2 the aversion to confronting problems, making 
decisions or acknowledging failure also influenced their inability to undertake a process 
of learning from the Red Shirt crisis event at the corporate head office and Bangkok 
hotel. 
 
Receptiveness to Organisational Learning is also influenced by the length of tenure by 
staff and this was evidenced with the challenges of updating and making the FLS 
systems fully operational at all the hotels.  When the researcher probed the Corporate 
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Director of Engineering on why the FLS systems were inoperable when it is a basic 
legal requirement, he responded by suggesting that many hotels’ engineering executives 
had been in the position for a long time and were resistant to change.  He described 
these executives as living in a ‘dream world’ where nothing bad ever happens so why 
invest and spend money to fix when it hadn’t worked for so long anyway?  His 
programme of FLS system certification has also included the appointment of new 
engineering executives, who he believes are more open to being educated about new 
systems than long term staff who may be reluctant to change their ways.  
 
The researcher’s probing questions continued and sought clarification as to how he had 
been able to make all hotels understand the importance of the FLS systems.  He was of 
the opinion that education and training of staff at all levels and making the GMs 
responsible for the FLS systems legal, moral and ethical operability was paramount to 
its company wide acceptance.  The researcher also noted in an email from the Corporate 
Director of Engineering that his email signature included the quotation; “Unless we 
learn from the past, we are condemned to repeat it, Albert Einstein”.  When questioned 
about this he explained that this quote is one of his tools to reinforce the importance of 
the system.  The FLS training will be detailed further in Section 5.3 on Learning 
Routineness. 
 
In contrast, the Phuket hotel’s earthquake experience has been one where Organisational 
Learning practices have been positively embraced across all levels of the staff 
population.  Although the Excom at this hotel were pressured to review their evacuation 
procedures by the in-house client for the impending arrival of 15,000 Chinese delegates, 
a key informant perceived this as an opportunity to be better prepared and ready for any 
future crises.  The Phuket hotel Excom explained:  
 “....the organizers were staying at a neighbouring hotel which at that time was 
called the (hotel name) but has since changed name, and on that very day when 
it happened they were at an area within (resort location) but at an outdoor area 
and they had not been briefed in any way prior to their arrival about (resort 
location)’s evacuation plan was in the event of any threat and some of them were 
running up the road for their lives following the sirens and their reaction was to 
ask the next day to all relevant hotels that they wanted a meeting and a strategy 
put in place as to how we would move 5,000 Chinese people.   
 
So we had to act very, very quickly collectively about the information given to 
the guests on arrival about what was going to happen in the event of an 
evacuation day time/night time, Chinese or English and we all had to come 
together, put our heads together and work out an evacuation route because it’s a 
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lot of people out of one small artery so we actually divided up into two access 
points.  So we were put under pressure to react very quickly for the imminent 
arrival of this massive group. 
 
Once they came in on the day of our first arrival, we had another aftershock and 
the guests were about to get off the bus so they decided to put them back on the 
bus and just drive around the town but we were ready obviously for an 
aftershock, we already had a strategy therefore that’s why it was agreed to get 
back on the bus, drive around the centre of town and then the bus can come back 
so we were lucky we had a plan.  But we only had a plan because we were put 
under pressure.” 
 
However, if it had not been for the Chinese group’s insistence to improve their 
evacuation procedures, the hotel may have ignored this opportunity to learn given that 
their Organisational Learning practices had not been previously formalised. A sense of 
gratitude was expressed by the key informant to the point that she ‘feels lucky’ to have 
had the experience of the 2012 earthquake as it allowed them to review everything that 
they did and she feels that “we’re so much wiser and we are committed to practicing.”  
Although in Phase Two interviews this same informant questioned their current crisis 
readiness capabilities; “Have we considered all the elements, rain, hail or shine, I don’t 
know.  Have we considered public holidays very well? For example today? No.” 
 
However, the Phuket hotel’s new evacuation plan, crisis training programme and 
training materials were not shared with the head office, and head office were unaware of 
the failed evacuation in April 2012.  The researcher probed head office participants in 
follow up telephone calls and meetings to see if they were aware of staff fleeing their 
posts in Phuket.  Head office were under the impression that the hotel had managed the 
crisis efficiently and effectively even suggesting that the complimentary dinner supplied 
to all the hotel guests was an excellent service recovery idea.  Since the hotel Excom 
were aware of their failure they did not bring undue attention about their incompetence 
to the head office and unfortunately, this resulted in a lost opportunity to share with 
other hotels in the group on how they learnt from the incident and set up new Crisis 
Management procedures.  It also perpetuates an unwillingness to share information and 
the lack of an organisational learning culture. 
 
Organisational Learning not only involved the adaption of the organisation’s knowledge 
base but also included the ability to share and disseminate information through the 
organisation’s systems (Stonehouse and Pemberton, 1999). Therefore, Organisational 
Learning shared interrelated properties with a number of the lower order categories 
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from the BSSP of Crisis Leadership Influencers and was influenced by the properties of 
Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-making and Managing the Crisis.  The exemplars 
of where Organisational Learning was considered a success were examples that also 
adopted Learning Routineness in their Crisis Management plans.  Learning Routineness 
also emerged from the Experiential Learning theme as a concern of the participants with 
its interconnectedness to Preparing for the Unthinkable and Learning from Experience.  
This will be detailed in the following section.   
 
5.3 LEARNING ROUTINENESS 
 
Task routineness is a vital component of the operating procedures in emergency service 
organisations, such as fire rescue, ambulance and health services and it is the regularity 
of the training, simulations and operational procedures that prepare emergency workers 
for a crisis event.  However, the naivety of the hotel industry (Hannah et al., 2009), 
appears to influence low prioritisation in the company’s strategic outlook, and the “it 
won’t be so bad” or “it won’t happen to us” mentality appears to steers leadership away 
from instilling a state of routineness in crisis preparation.   
 
Data analysis indicated familiarity with regular fire drills and a depth of knowledge 
from the routineness of this activity, whereas testing a Crisis Management plan’s 
preparedness did not receive any attention or commitment from the organisation’s 
management.  The following examples demonstrate how fire drill references were made 
by a number of interviewees during Phase One interviews: 
“There was no training.  I think the only training we had, if I remember correctly 
I could be wrong, is fire training, fire drills and evacuation.  That was about it.” 
 
“You have to do it like fire drill.  You know that there’s a system but you know 
the fire is not happening every month but as the company you always do fire 
drill but why are we not having crisis management drill?  We have a fire drill, 
fire drill is a crisis also but more internal but we always do it once a month to 
test the system if it works or not.” 
 
“We always do a fire drill, fire drill, fire drill.” 
 
In every hotel there is a fire drill training at least once a month or once every 
quarter.  It’s simple, it’s to make sure it works; the people know where to run, 
where the evacuation is. 
 
“...we do a lot for the fire evacuations and fire extinguishing and we do all that 
training, fire, police, everything but it’s always based on fire.  I think that’s for 
any other hotels.” 
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“I think we had the plan in place but we don’t have like a fire drill practice on 
this crisis management.  So it would be good to have one.” 
 
As these quotes allude to, there is no formal or informal crisis debriefing process or 
organisational learning employed.  A debriefing process analyses crisis response actions 
and assists in identifying areas for improvement and builds more effective Crisis 
Management capabilities (Robertson et al., 2006). Leadership’s commitment to Crisis 
Readiness is reflected in legitimising a fully integrated educational programme that is 
embedded throughout the organisation’s day-to-day operations.   This has never been 
more evident than in the Phuket example, where the new crisis plan has been 
implemented, and a senior manager stated in an email follow up to the researcher on 22 
November, 2012; “Compare to April 2012 we are miles more ready, but still some 
things to be done which we continue to work on as no doubt it will happen again.” [sic]    
 
A Crisis Management Manual that is lived and breathed in all aspects of the daily 
operations, from training workshops, regular updates on staff noticeboards, educational 
tips on pay slips, town hall meetings, to new hire orientations has the ability to create a 
higher level of readiness for future crisis events when shared as best practice.  However 
in reality, outside of the Phuket property, the data indicated that the Crisis Management 
manuals are left on the shelf and are not incorporated into any training or updated and 
shared with the employees or managers.  One of the Corporate Office DHs suggested: 
“The crisis management manual for one should not be just left on a shelf.  
Everybody should be reminded of it every now and then.  It should be updated 
every now and then.”   
 
This finding suggested the need to develop a Crisis Management manual that is fully 
integrated and embedded into the organisation’s work processes as a priority.  The data 
from the Phuket event revealed a new crisis plan that was initiated as a result of learning 
from the experience and was seen as an opportunity to “recap and review what we did 
well and what we didn’t.”  Lampel et al. (2009) posited that research has indicated that 
routines established based on learned experiences contribute positively to the cognitive 
templates that facilitate Sense-making.  This research confirmed the interconnectedness 
of routineness and leaderships’ ability to actively make sense of the situation at all 
levels. 
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Thailand’s history has recorded extreme political crises with a regularity that is 
unsurpassed by its Asian neighbours.  However, as pointed out by a number of 
interviewees, Thai companies should be better prepared to deploy Crisis Management 
strategies as soon as the Warning Signals are detected.  The researcher sought the 
opinion of the respondents about how the organisation would deal with future crises.  
This statement from the data collection was reflective of the views of many;  
“....if the same thing happened now, we would be in no better place, which 
Thailand now should be the absolute specialist on disaster recovery or crisis 
management, but I’m sure the lessons haven’t been absorbed or learned”.   
 
The notion that lessons haven’t been learnt was repeated throughout the data gathering 
process.  The case study organisation data is characterised by a resistance or even 
ignorance to implement Organisational Learning from the Red Shirt crisis event.  Smith 
and Elliott (2007) posited that one of the barriers to Organisational Learning from crisis 
is that after the confusion of a crisis event, the intensity of activities required to restore 
normality may be a “major factor in constraining effective learning after the event” 
(p.520).  However, the Phuket hotel was pressured into improving their Crisis 
Management plans by the Chinese group client and the neighbouring hotels in the resort 
precinct.  They believe that they have effectively implemented a Crisis Management 
readiness that is ‘lived and breathed’ on a daily basis throughout the operation.   
 
The lower order category of Learning Routineness is comprised of a number of 
dimensions that are interconnected to the higher order BSSP of Experiential Learning.  
These dimensions are described through the properties of Training to be Ready, and 
Confidence Building which combine to strengthen Learning Routineness and its 
influence on Crisis Leadership capabilities.   
 
 5.3.1 TRAINING TO BE READY 
 
Learning Routineness is built upon a repetitive framework supported by the 
organisation’s SOPs, which detail procedures, resources, roles and responsibilities. 
SOPs reduce ambiguity and build confidence levels for both leaders and followers.   
Pearson et al. (1997) posited that the best responses to a crisis event are in organisations 
where all staff levels have had the opportunity to think through the challenges of a crisis 
beforehand.  This thought process combined with consistent and regular training 
programmes will assist in bringing clarity and more composed decision-making in the 
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light of a stressful crisis situation.  Whereas, the State of Readiness occurs when 
Forward Planning has been initiated and includes crisis management plans and training 
activities.  The interrelatedness of the lower order categories was evident when the level 
of the State of Readiness increased when crisis training programmes and improved 
communications were employed. 
 
Data revealed a consensus that Crisis Management training would help develop 
awareness and reduce anxiety amongst all levels of the staff community and that 
currently fire evacuations are the only routine emergency procedures understood.  
Regular training programmes as exemplified in twice-yearly fire drills created a 
knowledge base from which staff could draw upon in the case of such an extreme 
context.  The notion of the importance for training regularity was expressed by one of 
the Corporate Office DHs that:  
“I think first they know what they have to do when this kind of incident 
happens.  Again, I think practice makes perfect for me so they wouldn’t freak 
out when it comes to the real incident and then there will be calm and know 
what they have to do to ensure the guests’ safety and also the staff’s safety.” 
 
Another participant from the Phuket hotel expressed concern that “if we don’t do it 
regularly it’s easy to forget”.  It was clear from another Corporate Office interviewee 
that crisis training was non-existent when she stated; “...we don’t have any training for 
the crisis management”.  One of the Bangkok hotel’s Excom further stated: 
“Training would have been good, prior assessment how to barricade the hotel 
maybe would have been good but at that time it was just a group of us top 
management just throwing ideas on the table and crossing them off one by one.  
So training was inadequate.” 
 
Lagadec (1993) suggested that the direct effect on stress levels in a crisis event is 
increased when the organisation has not prepared staff with the resources, tools, systems 
or training to deal with often complex situations.  Moreover, he suggested that negative 
reflexes are almost immediate and can only be reduced with a commitment to 
determined training.  Twenty years ago Lagadec’s (1993) seminal work was ahead of its 
time at the nascent stage of Crisis Management research.  Nevertheless, he identified 
business continuity was reliant on the ability to deal efficiently with critical situations.  
Although a crisis may not be a frequent event, rigorous training and simulations should 
become a vital component of the organisation’s strategic management and will enhance 
its readiness and ability to manage a crisis (Borodzicz & van Haperen, 2003). 
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The researcher used the Phuket mass staff evacuation as an example to probe for more 
clarification from other participants to better understand what may have caused staff to 
desert their posts. One of the Bangkok Excom related this to the level of training and 
suggested that hotels don’t receive the training of a flight cabin crew. He explained that 
you wouldn’t expect the cabin crew to take the emergency parachute slide before 
passengers since they are highly trained and drilled in evacuation procedures and 
understand their roles and responsibilities.  He felt that training for staff in how they 
should react could have prevented their failure to assist guests.  He stated:  
“....it must be the lack of training and readiness and clear SOPs for the staff how 
to react if this kind of thing happens because if they would have received this 
training they would not have run away, maybe 20% out of 100 but certainly not 
all of them.”  
 
When actions are non-routine, the formal structure will collapse and when leadership is 
not visible, then the crisis situation will escalate out of control (Weick, 1993).  Parry 
(1999) suggested that by committing training and development resources an 
organisation will be able to adapt better in a turbulent environment.  Although an 
employee’s longevity with an organisation often translates to a low level of adaptability, 
Parry (1999) argued that training and development of followers is a positive influence 
on resolving uncertainty and it will assist long tenured staff to adapt.  Although the 
Corporate Director of Engineering has found training on new systems to be a challenge 
within the long tenured cohort of hotel-based engineers, the Phuket property has a high 
proportion of long tenured staff who have positively embraced the new Crisis 
Management readiness training.  
 
It is important to note at this point that the online survey’s open text data also provided 
further insight into the case study organisation’s lack of readiness for the Red Shirt 
crisis.  Responses to the open ended question; ‘Please provide any further comments in 
regard to the crisis readiness performance of your department or your organisation that 
you would like to add’; suggested that the company was ‘sluggish’ in addressing the 
crisis due to a “lack of data, training and crisis readiness” as described in the full 
quotations reported in Section 5.1.3.1 (i).  One survey respondent was of the opinion 
that “had we been better prepared through training and clear documentation we would 
have been able to handle the issue in a more positive fashion”.  This was a sentiment 
that was repeated in the survey’s open text comments and clearly reflected the concerns 
of staff and management that training was clearly inadequate and would have been an 
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advantage to Managing the Crisis in an efficient and prompt manner.  In addition, the 
majority of respondents from the head office were unaware of their roles and 
responsibilities should another crisis occur; therefore, the lack of role clarity also 
influenced the levels of confidence.  This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
Data suggested that there was a strong acceptance of the Corporate Office ‘PR Crisis 
Communications Management Plan’ as a valuable tool for the hotels to follow in 
communicating with internal and external stakeholders. In Phase One interview a 
Phuket hotel Excom stated: 
 “One thing that’s very good about (case study organisation) is that a few years 
ago, PR in head office issued a document about how to … actually maybe in 
2008 or 2009, they issued a huge manual about how to talk to the various parties 
about what is happening if there is a crisis and therefore my PR manager here in 
the property uses that resource about how we communicate.” 
 
The purpose of the plan was described as to assist staff, board members and 
management in making quality decisions during a crisis and to ensure business 
continuity (Case Study Organisation, 2008).  The developer of the plan explained that 
annual workshops were held to review, discuss and assist PR executives and Marketing 
leadership. The Corporate Office DH explained: 
 “So right after we issued the crisis communication plans, we had the PR 
information training for all the PR managers at all (case study organisation) 
hotels.  We also had the workshop, crisis communication workshop before the 
crisis happened, not after I think if I remember correctly and I remember we 
hired a Singaporean guy who was very good, not just how to respond to crisis 
but how to communicate effectively during the crisis as well.  We trained the 
spokespersons up at each hotel as well how to respond to the crisis situation.” 
 
Through these training workshops she was able to instil the importance of the manual so 
that they were able to easily identify the steps to follow should a crisis situation occur.  
A number of participants stated that this document was invaluable for a range of crisis 
situations including resort staff strikes and flooding crises. The corporate 
communications director expressed her relief that she had been pressured by her leader 
to have this document in place in readiness for further crises.   
 
Alexander (2004) posited that when cognitive mapping is employed as an emergency 
training exercise it reveals a person’s ability to cope under duress with a crisis.  He 
described cognitive mapping in terms of how the environment is perceived, memorised 
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and depicted in its spatial relationship.  His study concluded the importance of training 
exercises in assessing emergency management competencies which included: focusing 
on solvable problems, prioritising through time efficiencies, delegating responsibility, 
clear and rational communications, and maintaining a level head in the face of a crisis. 
 
An organisation that adopted a Training to be Ready mindset established a routineness 
that provided the necessary protocols, systems and procedures for leaders and followers 
to assume at all levels of the crisis.  Active Sense-making of the situation became 
magnified as the crisis progressed (Weick, 2010) and without the appropriate training 
Crisis Management efficacy is reduced.  The data revealed evidence of increasing levels 
of confusion, uncertainty and anxiety without the appropriate training to cope in a crisis 
event, as evidenced in quotations provided in State of Readiness Section 5.1.3.  This 
was further exemplified in the time lag between the Red Shirt 2010 crisis and the 
‘simmering’ political protests in November 2012 and again at the time of the Phase Two 
interviews in August and September 2013.  During this period of time no Crisis 
Management training programmes were implemented at the corporate head office.   
 
In contrast, the Phuket hotel’s earthquake incident resulted in the creation of new 
systems and protocols that are included in new staff orientation, evacuation simulations 
and ongoing ERT and FAST Committee monthly meetings and scenario discussions.  
There is a heightened awareness at the Phuket hotel of how Preparing for the 
Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness has influenced the 
confidence levels of leaders and followers.  When Learning Routineness is adopted by 
an organisation it has a positive influence on Building Confidence which is an important 
dimension of the lower order category.  This will be explained in more detail in the next 
section.  
 
 5.3.2 BUILDING CONFIDENCE 
 
Knowledge acquisition through Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness 
helped to build-up an organisation’s armoury to defend itself in the event of a crisis.   
As a consequence, it creates an organisation that is committed to Building Confidence 
so that its leaders and followers are able to deal with a high pressure crisis event.  The 
interconnectedness of Experiential Learning’s lower order categories indicated that 
when followers have the appropriate training that incorporates past experiences into the 
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knowledge base, they had a higher degree of confidence to follow leaders’ actions 
through the crisis phases.  The Crisis Leader’s own confidence levels were also shown 
to be stronger when they drew on their past experiences and training to deal with the 
crisis.  Training creates confidence as expressed by the majority of interviewees in 
regard to fire drills and detailed in the introduction to this section on Learning 
Routineness.  In Phase One interviews a Bangkok hotel Excom responded when asked 
about the importance of crisis management training by stating; “I think it’s good to have 
because we can have the confidence, we can build the confidence for our staff....”. 
 
Rudolph Giuliani is widely recognised as one of the world’s most renowned Crisis 
Leaders (James et al., 2011).  He had completed and reviewed his autobiography titled 
‘Leadership’ in the summer months just prior to the tragic September 11th, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.  He recalled the experience of 
reviewing his past leadership experiences and philosophies in the process of finalising 
the book.  Giuliani saw this as a summary training exercise and a key factor that 
prepared him for the September 11th events, and it gave him the confidence to meet the 
demands of what could have been an overwhelming situation (Giuliani & Kurson, 2002).  
The researcher read his book soon after it was published and was initially cynical about 
its objectives so soon after such a tragic event, and considered it to be another US 
celebrity’s sensationalist revenue-generating publication.  However, it became the 
catalyst for the researcher’s passion in the field of Crisis Leadership and Crisis 
Readiness based on the fact that it was written prior to the events of September 11th and 
was Giuliani’s blue print that directed him to confidently manage the unravelling crisis.  
 
The notion of Building Confidence related also to the followers’ level of confidence. 
The data indicated that most of the participants were reassured and confidence grew 
from the emergent crisis leadership at the time of the escalating Red Shirt crisis.  From 
an insider’s perspective, the VP Sales and Marketing was not the dedicated Crisis 
Leadership in a formalised sense, the VP assumed the role and the informants felt 
confident that the Crisis Management issues were being addressed as stated by a 
Corporate Office executive: 
“…strong leaders appeared who were driving it without boundaries.  So 
somehow the regular leadership switched into a state of emergency 
leadership…” 
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Pearson et al. (1997) argued that the best prepared organisations are characterised by a 
corporate culture of shared convergent values on the importance of Crisis Management 
preparations.  Employees in these organisations have attained a sense of their roles and 
responsibilities.  They have refined these roles through training which has given them 
the ability to react efficiently, confidently and with agility dependent upon what the 
situation presents.  Moreover, Pearson et al. (1997) suggested that the process of 
organisational learning for continuous improvement from previous crisis events 
encouraged a greater level of confidence within the staff community.  As a result, the 
organisation will be in a far better position to work together to manage the crisis.  
However, the case study organisation operated in a “silo” structure and clearly has 
divergent views on the importance of Crisis Management practices.   
 
The low priority placed on Crisis Management has influenced the decreasing levels of 
confidence in the head office, since data indicated confidence is extremely low for the 
company’s ability to deal with future crises.  In Phase Two after a telephone interview 
one of the interviewees expressed his opinion in an email on 11 August 2013:  
“The organization is NOT READY for either current or future crises due to a 
lack of both financial and intellectual commitment at the CEO and Board 
Levels. I remain convinced that at a Middle Management and Employee level 
there is a willingness to commit to whatever steps are necessary to ensure the 
safety of the hotels, staff, suppliers and guests. However, senior management as 
well as CEO and Board Level leadership must encourage this willingness on an 
ongoing basis. Without this CEO and Board Level commitment, the enthusiasm 
and related commitment of senior and middle management will quickly dissipate 
and inertia will set-in at all operational levels (as currently exemplified 
throughout the company).” 
 
Earlier interviews also highlighted the lack of training and preparation and this was 
highlighted by the RM executive: 
“First of all to set up the SOP has to be done, to be consolidated and they have to 
communicate to everyone in the company, not just keep it on the shelf.  I’ve 
never seen it, it maybe exists, but no-one knows and no-one is trained for it so 
no-one is alerted, it’s just as it is for now I think.  So senior management have to 
make a commitment also and pay attention on that, communicate that down to 
everyone and train some, especially the hotels that are in the risk area” 
 
A Bangkok hotel Excom member also expressed her concerns when the researcher 
probed for how confident she felt if there was another crisis:  
 “....I feel really now that we need training on it.  We have to do a scenario that 
something happened.  What would my statement be?  .....  I’ve got to practice 
now with my PR … we have strong people there.  OK, today something 
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happened what are you going to do?  What am I going to do?  What is my 
responsibility?” 
 
One of the Phuket hotel’s key informants believed that there is a renewed sense of 
confidence in the ability of their hotel to cope with its revised Crisis Management plan, 
which is best articulated with this statement from Phase One interviews:  
“Fast forward to today, I’ve had … I and (GM name), the general manager, have 
had a lot of time to review what we have in place and therefore we’ve 
implemented what we feel is a much stronger crisis plan and we remind people 
about their responsibilities and duties and what to do, we’ll talk about it, we live 
it now.  I think it used to be in a folder on a shelf somewhere in the engineer’s 
office but now we actually live it and, yes, it was forced upon us and I’d say we 
were lucky.  I say that because we had this opportunity to make it right for the 
next time.” 
 
Another of the Phuket hotel Excom members suggested that: 
“....that’s what we all tried to create because it’s different probably in another 
kind of business but because we are doing the hospitality business, our business 
is depending on people’s confidence so we tried to make people confident.  
Every day was OK, everything was fine, we are OK in the office that was the 
message we always give to our clients.  But actually even we are the ones who 
give the message, I actually also felt a bit worried.” 
 
When the researcher probed further on this statement, the participant explained that the 
hotel business required a confident message be projected to its stakeholders that the 
situation was calm and secure.  If the staff are feeling calm and secure then negative 
business levels will be minimised.   
 
Building Confidence is influenced by regular training programmes, especially with case 
study experiences, simulations and scenario conditions. This was evident at the 
Bangkok hotel where the HR Director suggested that by rehearsing the use of a staff 
mobile telephone SMS alert system, they were better prepared for a crisis event and she 
felt that: 
“....because we didn’t use it often, we have to rehearse before time to make sure 
we understand this aspect because when it came to the crisis happening, we may 
get panic and forget the spec, so we have to review.” 
 
A learned routine is more difficult to forget and becomes second nature when 
confronted with intense and complex crisis situations.  It brings clarity of mind to 
prioritise and concentrate on the key tasks at hand.  The data for Building Confidence 
was clearly evident in the case study organisation in the event of a fire since fire drill 
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emergency procedures are conducted on a regular basis and are widely practiced 
throughout the organisation.  Data also indicated a concern that Crisis Management 
training should become a regular training requirement similar to the regular fire 
evacuation simulations which was expected to build confidence in the staff community.  
As stated by a Corporate Office DH:  
“There was no training at all.  The only training we get is emergency evacuation 
in the event of a fire.  That’s the regular training we get that’s closest to crisis 
management.”  
 
An example of the confidence that resulted from learning from a past experience was 
explained in Phase Two interviews by a Corporate Office DH, after the flood crisis of 
2011 that: 
 “It was very much easier, we knew what to do, we know how to communicate, 
the staff knew what to do.  We knew which areas needed to be improved on 
especially in terms of the communications, in the phone lines, the servers.  The 
staff were ready for it, they’d been through it before, it wasn’t anything new for 
them, a lot of doubts were removed, they were more confident.” 
 
Building Confidence was also interrelated to the Decision-making processes of Crisis 
Leadership and the inclusive practice of consulting with colleagues. For example, the 
Bangkok hotel GM sought suggestions from the Crisis Management Team which 
brought a sense of ownership to the Decision-making and subsequently increased 
confidence levels within the management.  Increasing management confidence had a 
flow on effect to followers’ confidence levels.  At the same time Building Confidence is 
also influenced by Communicating, which was reflected in the organisation’s internal 
and external PR messaging.  The data indicated that the head office PR was considered 
extremely positive by interview participants and was described by one interviewee as 
trying to “contain the fear”, the Corporate Office DH explained in Phase One 
interviews: 
“What I can recall was that we were pretty active to try and contain the fear 
because the hotel was just right across where the Red Shirt rally was being held.  
We spent some advertising money as well to show to the public that we are 
recovering, there’s nothing to be fearful of, (case study organisation) stands 
proud.” 
 
The secondary data staff letter from the CEO on 19 May, 2010 (which was written in 
Thai and English) carried a similar message to the recovery advertising campaign 
tagline and evoked a sense of pride and strength within  the staff community and aimed 
at Building Confidence (please refer to Appendix 16).  On the other hand, the lack of 
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HR communication, advice or direction in the crisis incubation phase and during the 
crisis, influenced low levels of confidence, with high levels of fear and anxiety, as was 
reported frequently in the data.    
 
Moreover, in the case of Thailand’s state of crisis ‘norm’, there was a concern expressed 
in the data that there may be a level of over-confidence that the tourism industry always 
‘bounces back’ and suggested a complacency in Preparing for the Unthinkable.  One of 
the informants, who has since left the company, expressed the opinion that: “I doubt if 
there are any provisions in place even now, a couple of years down the track”.  He also 
made reference to his current employer and made the comparison that in his new role he 
stated with apparent confidence that:  
“…in this position each department has a role to play and we have an executive 
committee and we’re all involved in every decision and what’s good about that 
is that Finance will be looking at the bottom line and how that affects, Marketing 
is looking at branding and how the imaging is portrayed, Operations is looking 
at what physically can be done and how we can get people from here and there.” 
 
The researcher confirmed with a number of participants currently employed at the case 
study organisation that no systems or IT back-up facilities have been established almost 
three years after the Red Shirt crisis, for example in Phase One Interviews a Corporate 
Office DH stated:   
“In terms of systems, we still need to have a backup.  Actually we don’t have a 
backup system right now in case anything happens to the HQ.” 
 
Experiential Learning was identified as a BSSP early in the concurrent data collection 
and analysis of this research study with its lower order categories of Preparing for the 
Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness.  The properties of 
these categories also exhibited strong interconnectivity with the properties of Crisis 
Leadership Influencers.  Retaining Institutional Memory emerged as the final category 
of Experiential Learning; however, it reflected a moderating influence on the two 
BSSPs as will be detailed in the following section.    
 
5.4 RETAINING INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY 
 
In the final concurrent phase of data collection and analysis it had become apparent that 
rather than being a lower-order category of crisis leadership, Experiential Learning 
seemed to influence the impact that Crisis Leadership had upon Crisis Readiness.  It 
was evident that institutional memory loss was occurring with the turnover of 
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management staff and concerns were expressed by a number of participants on the 
negative impact that this will have on future crisis events.  Leaders with learned 
experience in crisis events are perceived to be more effective than those without.  It was 
at this stage that the moderating influence of Retaining Institutional Memory was 
detected and its influence on the lower order categories that included: Preparing for the 
Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness. 
 
Although there was a sense of frustration and despondency that the organisation did not 
conduct crisis debriefings or follow up training after the Red Shirt Crisis, there was an 
obvious concern amongst the staff interviewed that the experience that had been gained 
was being lost as staff left the company and they were losing valuable knowledge in 
dealing with a crisis.  A staff member expressed his concerns about the limited 
leadership foresight during the floods of 2011.  There had been senior management 
changes and there was a lack of internal and external communication programmes for 
all stakeholders in comparison to the internal and external communiqués following the 
2010 Red Shirt crisis. He stated in his comparison of the Red Shirt crisis of 2010 and 
the floods of 2011:  
“...I think as the company should have prepared much, much better than before, I 
think so.  However, one thing that we should know also as a company, there’s 
also a lot of change in the company because, yes, we have a system but this 
system is run by people but people change and how can we make sure that this 
… I’ll give you an example......” 
 
He then described the activities of PR in the previous crisis and the lack of activities in 
comparison during the latest flood crisis. Even though they had learnt from the Red 
Shirt crisis, the current decision maker to drive these activities had changed so he was 
therefore of the opinion that:  
 “Maybe I can make suggestions but I’m not the decision maker so even when I 
experienced before it cannot be.  So again people no matter how good the crisis 
management in place, it doesn’t work because the system is not a machine.  It’s 
a system but the ones who run it are people.” 
 
Another example of the loss of crisis experience ‘Institutional Memory’ are the past 
communiqués and checklists implemented by past managers that have been held in case 
of another crisis event by a manager who said “you know why I kept this because I can 
use [it] as an example if something happened.  If no-one is proactive I will do it”.  A 
Corporate Office DH believed that with the change of management since the crisis 
event, relationships with media have also been lost by suggesting: 
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“....they should have learnt more but the thing is they’ve changed the entire 
organization.  I don’t know whether the new people experienced what we have 
experienced.  If it’s the same group of people who experienced that and had to 
do it again, I think it will be very, very quick because we know dah, dah, dah, 
[sic] what’s going on, what we have to do, we have contacted the media already, 
we can just call and everything else and the media already know.  It’s taken six 
months until the media stop calling me about (the company) because they are so 
familiar with us especially in the crisis.  They just remember this name on the 
press releases and all the calls but right now they don’t know who to call.  It 
would be different.” 
 
During the final iterations of concurrent data gathering and analysis, the data indicated 
that leadership’s crisis experience will always have a modest impact upon the crisis 
readiness of an organisation.  However, when experiential learning from crisis situations 
was present, crisis readiness appeared to be a strategic priority and much more effective.  
By contrast, when experiential learning was allowed to subside over time, or overlooked 
by leadership, then ongoing levels of crisis readiness were reduced considerably.  These 
findings suggest a clear moderating effect of Retaining Institutional Memory upon the 
relationship between Experiential Learning and Crisis Leadership Influencers and will 
be discussed in further detail in Chapter Six, which presents the core category of 
Empowering Readiness. 
 
As explained in Section 5.2.2 on Organisational Learning the data indicated an absence 
of any formalised debriefings after the Red Shirt crisis, rather the focus was on 
reopening the damaged hotel and head office buildings, restoring business levels and 
reducing costs to ensure the organisation’s sustainability.  A Bangkok hotel Excom 
member described there being an urgency to focus on cash flow management rather 
than Crisis Management, he explained: 
 “But basically business wise, again you start from scratch, almost from scratch.  
You start from a 5% occupancy of 500 rooms and then you work yourself up so 
this was always the main objective, the main urgency.  Of course, it’s urgent 
because you talk about cash flow management, which cash flow management 
has taken over the crisis management, the first few months anyway.” 
 
This resulted in the lost opportunity to formalise learned experiences.  In contrast, much 
soul searching and organisational learning occurred from the well-publicised disasters 
of for example US Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Garcia, 2006) and Canberra’s 2003 
bushfires (Armstrong, 2008).  Both these examples were catastrophic in their damage or 
loss of life; however the ensuing investigations into the failures have provided an 
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insight into better levels of readiness for future events and a renewed confidence that 
those potential events will be managed more effectively. 
 
A Bangkok hotel Excom shared with the researcher that a colleague who works for 
another hotel company had just returned from a week-long Crisis Management training 
workshop in Hong Kong.  He was of the opinion that there are some hotel companies 
investing in readiness for crisis events whether they be natural disasters or man-made 
events.  He explained: 
 “I have a good friend; he works for another hotel company.  I had a conversation 
with him, a correspondence with him, and he just came back from Hong Kong 
doing a one week crisis management workshop for all the general managers 
within this company.  So there are some companies that take this very seriously 
and if it’s a one big workshop in Hong Kong that means there’s a lot of money 
going into it and people certainly do try to get ready for whatever crisis they 
face, political, natural disaster, economic world recession, whatever.” 
 
Whereas the case study organisation has not implemented any debriefing, training or 
master plan to ensure a Crisis Readiness status.   
 
The notion of hindsight was also a consideration by some of the participants and gave 
them an opportunity for self-reflection on how they may have done things differently. 
For example, a hotel Excom felt that the journalists staying in house should have been 
moved to the back wing of the hotel to avoid being targeted by live fire.  He suggested: 
“that would be a new lesson if it ever happened again”.  However, this ‘lesson’ is not 
part of any official discourse or debrief and with his impending departure from the hotel 
in 2013 will act against the conceptual dimension of Retaining Institutional Memory. 
 
In contrast, the Phuket hotel immediately implemented a debriefing to plan for the 
possibility of any future crisis evacuation.  As a result, they believed they have built a 
more confident and prepared staff community.  However, in Phase Two interviews, the 
Phuket key informant expressed concern that new management will not be focused on 
Retaining Institutional Memory and the focus of Crisis Readiness will be lost.  The 
Phuket Excom member stated:  
“I’m very confident with the current team that we have here now but it’s 
important that if any of those key personnel changes or joins us through 
opportunity or whatever, we have to update them the minute they get on board 
and we have done that.” 
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With that being said, she was also of the opinion that some of their new initiatives will 
‘outlast’ their management tenure and become a current management legacy.   
 
Experiential Learning as a Basic Social Structural Process explains the variations in 
lessons learned between the differing locations of the organisation, from the corporate 
head office, the Bangkok hotel and the Phuket hotel.  The relationships within the 
conceptual framework of Figure 5.1 will now be explained. 
 
5.5 EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING – THE BSSP  
 
In conclusion Experiential Learning is comprised of the integration of lower order 
categories which contributed to this recurring thematic concept.  The case study 
examples provided in this chapter have provided the substantive context upon which 
this near-core category has been conceptualised.  The research participants expressed 
their concerns that lessons have not been learnt and that their organisation will repeat 
the mistakes of the past.   
 
It was evident that senior management lacked the foresight in understanding how Crisis 
Readiness can reduce negative impacts of a crisis and reduce the recovery period.  Yet, 
there was a willingness of the staff community to engage in post crisis debriefings, 
training and crisis management teams. At the same time, Retaining Institutional 
Memory emerged as an underlying factor affecting Experiential Learning based on fears 
from staff that new inexperienced management will not cope in the face of a crisis after 
significant management turnover.  The conceptual framework which was introduced at 
the beginning of this chapter (Figure 5.1) is repeated here to summarise the relationships 
that were at play for this BSSP.  
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EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING : 
A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Experiential Learning: A Basic Social Structural Process 
 
As with Crisis Leadership Influencers, the relationships between the lower order 
categories of Experiential Learning were complex with each category influencing the 
other.  However, variances in learning were also evident with influencing linkages to 
management retention levels in the organisation, which ultimately affected the 
outcomes of the lower order categories of Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning from 
Experience and Learning Routineness.   
 
Retaining Institutional Memory’s moderating influence also explained the resultant 
variations in these lower order categories. In summary, as explained previously in 
Section 4.4, the interrelatedness of categories is illustrated in circular arrangements 
whereby each component is important to the success of the other, similar to a circular 
gathering of a group or team.  Experiential Learning also exists as a non-linear, dynamic 
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process in the context of a high pressure intense crisis situation and the aftermath of the 
crisis event. The three-sided triangular position of Retaining Institutional Memory is 
related to all three lower order categories of Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning 
from Experience and Learning Routineness.   
 
Similar to Crisis Leadership Influencers, relationships were formed between each of the 
three lower order categories, specifically Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning from 
Experience and Learning Routineness.  The properties of each category clarified the 
main characteristics of each dimension and provided a rich, in-depth description of how 
Experiential Learning emerged as a Basic Social Structural Process for theory 
development.  The relationships in Figure 5.1 describe the near-core category social 
process of Experiential Learning as follows: 
 
 Preparing for the Unthinkable was influenced by the properties of Learning from 
Experience and contributed to the varying levels of how management prepared 
for a crisis, their ability to acknowledge warning signals, plan ahead and ensure 
a state of readiness within the organisation.  
 
 Preparing for the Unthinkable in turn influenced variations in the organisation’s 
Learning from Experience and how they approached staff engagement in 
organisational learning and developing their ability to utilise their learned 
experiences to react positively at the time of a crisis event.  
 
 Learning from Experience properties also contributed to the organisation’s 
Learning Routineness. Previous crisis experiences positively influenced 
management priorities by incorporating double-loop learning practices that 
initiated training programmes and repetitive crisis-ready practices to build 
confidence for all stakeholders.  This was evident in Phuket’s critical incident 
and established potential new best practices for the organisation.  Whereas in the 
Bangkok hotel and Corporate Office contexts, no organisational learning appears 
to have occurred other than for regular fire drill training.  
 
 Conversely, Learning Routineness contributed to variations in Learning from 
Experience specifically in the organisation’s commitment to organisational 
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learning from past experiences, unlearning redundant practices and introducing 
more efficient crisis management practices. 
 
 Preparing for the Unthinkable also impacted the intensity of Learning 
Routineness and reflected the organisation’s commitment or, in most cases, lack 
of commitment and investment in the development of their human capital. 
 
 Learning Routineness was interrelated to the properties of Preparing for the 
Unthinkable and explained variations in the organisation’s ability to detect 
warning signals, levels of forward planning and state of readiness. 
 
 Finally, while Retaining Institutional Memory was identified as a dimension of 
this near-core category, its underlying influence contributed to the varying 
degrees of each of the components of Experiential Learning.  Management 
turnover and its subsequent institutional memory loss raised concerns for the 
organisation’s ability to prepare for the unthinkable, use learned experiences to 
improve current processes, implement new strategies, and reinforce these 
activities by ensuring the highest levels of routineness.  Institutional memory 
loss was evident and consequently reduced the intensity of Experiential Learning 
being utilised to establish a sense of Crisis Readiness in the organisation. 
 
Retaining Institutional Memory contributed to expanding the tacit knowledge 
base by using the lived experiences of past crisis events and adopting an 
Organisational Learning culture.  An organisation that engages in learning from 
past mistakes and successes uses its Organisational Learning culture to inform 
the notion of Learning Routineness.  Just as in High Reliability Organisations 
(HROs), Learning Routineness is a key training strategy to create a crisis 
resilient culture where training regularity builds confidence and familiarity with 
the required processes and activities. However, the staff turnover that has 
occurred since the 2010 Red Shirt crisis has significantly diminished 
institutional memory and reduced the perceived importance of Crisis Readiness 
within the organisation. 
 
At the same time, Retaining Institutional Memory also influenced the cognitive 
learning behaviours of management and staff whose lived crisis experiences 
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increased their ability to activate Preparing for the Unthinkable.  Their foresight 
in detecting Warning Signals, and committing to Forward Planning contributed 
to an increased State of Readiness for potential crises.  These factors also 
influenced the importance that they placed on Learning Routineness.  Whereas 
new recruits or management without previous crisis experience did not seek 
crisis training programmes with any sense of urgency or routineness. Their 
cognitive biases ignored the potential negative ramifications of the lack of Crisis 
Readiness. 
 
Experiential Learning explained issues related to how an organisation incorporates past 
experiences into strategic priorities for a confident crisis-ready mindset.  However, 
Retaining Institutional Memory played an important role in the organisation’s ability to 
prepare and became an underlying factor in Crisis Readiness success outcomes.    
 
The study had by now revealed the interconnectivity of the two BSSPs of Experiential 
Learning and Crisis Leadership Influencers and led the researcher to a higher abstract 
level that conceptualised and generated the study’s substantive theory.  The researcher’s 
theoretical sensitivity for the social processes at play contributed significantly to the 
emergent core category which was identified as Empowering Readiness.  Chapter Six 
will describe the core category and the proposed theoretical model. 
 
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Experiential Learning emerged as a BSSP and a higher order category to explain the 
importance of lessons learnt in preparing individuals and organisations for Crisis 
Readiness. By retaining learned experiences and adapting lessons learnt to the 
organisation’s systems and processes, the organisation instils greater levels of 
confidence and trust for both management and staff in dealing with potential crisis 
events.  
 
The 2012 Phuket earthquake emerged as a catalytic event in the context of the case 
study organisation’s crisis experiences and became an exemplar of the dimensions that 
describe Experiential Learning.  Even though the 2010 Red Shirt Crisis provided the 
context of this study, the serendipitous discovery of the Phuket earthquake during Phase 
One data collection allowed the researcher to compare an event that adopted intensive 
Chapter 5– Experiential Learning 
 
252 | P a g e  
organisational learning strategies and advanced the study’s understanding of 
Experiential Learning.  In contrast, the corporate head office and Bangkok hotel, have 
ostensibly failed to adopt an organisational learning culture.  
 
In summary, this chapter provided examples of Preparing for the Unthinkable with 
detecting warning signals, forward planning and assessing the state of readiness. 
Learning from Experience was illustrated with examples of management with previous 
crisis experience that instilled trust and confidence in their followers, as well as the 
importance of organisational learning, specifically double-loop learning.  The 
dimensions of Learning Routineness were also explained and examples relating to 
training and routines that build confidence to meet the demands of future crisis events 
were provided.  These data assisted in illustrating the interrelatedness of these 
categories in understanding how crisis experience influences crisis management 
readiness.  Deficiencies in these factors also illuminated the concerns and the 
opportunities to improve crisis readiness strategies.   
 
Experiential Learning was also found to share a direct relationship to the properties of 
Crisis Leadership Influencers. The data indicated that improved crisis leadership 
efficiencies resulted when Experiential Learning dimensions were encouraged.  Finally, 
this chapter explained the moderating influence of Retaining Institutional Memory on 
the organisation and the concerns of participants that learned experiences are lost with 
management turnover.   
 
Chapter Six will now draw together the higher order categories of Experiential Learning 
and Crisis Leadership Influencers with an explanation of the study’s core category, 
Empowering Readiness.  
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CHAPTER 6   EMPOWERING READINESS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In-depth data analysis detailed in Chapters Four and Five has revealed that the main 
factor of how crisis leadership can positively influence crisis readiness is through 
Empowering Readiness in the staff community.  This section will provide an 
explanation of the core category and the basic social psychological process (BSPP) of 
Empowering Readiness will be addressed in this chapter.  The core category integrated 
the two higher order categories or basic social structural processes (BSSPs), Crisis 
Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning.   
 
Empowering Readiness explained the social process that can positively influence crisis 
management outcomes.  For example, it was evident from the data that a hotel’s state of 
readiness, and in turn levels of confidence, were significantly increased by empowering 
its management and staff with crisis management skills and resources.  In contrast, data 
from the case study organisation’s head office and city hotel revealed that the main 
concern of staff is that they cannot readily identify the crisis management leader, team, 
roles, or responsibilities.  They also acknowledged that the organisation had not 
conducted any debriefings or training after the Red Shirt crisis. Most respondents 
believed that they would not be able to manage future crisis events effectively.   
 
The notion of Empowering Readiness is derived from the term ‘empowerment’ and is 
the core social process that accounts for the variation in crisis readiness of an 
organisation.  This chapter will conclude with a proposed substantive theoretical model 
for this core category.  
 
6.1 EMPOWERMENT 
 
‘Empowerment’ is described by Yukl (2010) to be where members of an organisation 
perceive that they have the opportunity to be involved in determining their work roles, 
participating in meaningful work and have the ability to influence important events.  
Yukl (2010) suggested ‘Guidelines for Empowering’ that includes; involving members 
of the organisation in decisions that affect them, delegation of responsibility and 
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authority for important activities, information sharing, resource allocation and 
appropriate remuneration for increased responsibilities, removing bureaucratic systems 
and encouraging an organisational culture that supports empowerment, conveys 
confidence and trust in its members, provides coaching, nurtures and support initiative 
and problem-solving and celebrate successes and contributions.   
 
Organisations that equip their staff with a sense of empowerment can expect that they 
will react in a competent and confident manner, rather than panic and lose sight of the 
organisation’s vision required to deal with the crisis situation (Wooten, James & 
Parsons, 2013). Adopting empowerment strategies can also maximise the experience, 
expertise and execution capabilities of their employees (Wooten et al., 2013) and add 
value to the employee’s self-worth and confidence.  At the same time, empowerment at 
all levels encourages staff to experiment with new innovative ideas and processes and 
develop their knowledge base (Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999).   
 
The analysis of the data revealed one of the main concerns of the hotel company staff 
was the lack of crisis readiness due to the absence of an empowerment culture within 
their organisation, in particular within the Corporate Office.  For example, a senior 
manager from head office responded to the researcher’s probing about the level of 
empowerment in the head office that “nobody knew obviously their roles in the crisis 
management and we have never simulated nor got any information about it before”.  
  
A Bangkok hotel Excom member at the time of the crisis, who has since left the 
organisation, felt that: 
 “.....the hotel should have learnt much more from the crisis and how to prepare, I 
don’t know if they have a manual and if the hotel is under siege again it’s going 
to be a big problem because the people that were there are no longer there except 
for (name of executive). Not the GM, HR, security, engineer, if it happens again, 
I don’t think they’re prepared.”  
 
This observation was confirmed by all participants who noted that the crisis 
management manuals were not made available or discussed at any time, up until Phase 
Two interviews in August and September, 2013. During this period, the escalating 
tensions of recurring political demonstrations were apparent and one of the Corporate 
Office DHs stated: 
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 “....there was no reassurance, what should they do if it escalated, what should 
they do if not able to get to the office, if they’re afraid to get to the office what 
should they do, what are the options and so forth, but nothing.” 
 
The lack of crisis readiness was evident when the researcher was contacted by the 
Corporate Office for SOPs as explained in Section 5.1.1 on Warning Signals.  Yet the 
crisis management manuals were in existence both as hard and soft copies at the time of 
the researcher’s departure from the case study organisation in mid 2011, and is an 
indicator that reviews or crisis readiness action plans had not been initiated.  
Empowerment cannot exist without providing some direction or guidance by 
management. It was apparent from the institutional memory loss of past management 
that the organisation’s state of crisis readiness was negatively impacted. The case study 
organisation was unprepared and appeared to be attempting to gather the required crisis 
management tools, which had previously been established to deal with a crisis but was 
ignored by the new management.   
 
Living and breathing crisis readiness through daily operations requires management to 
ensure crisis manuals are not left on the shelf but become a living breathing document 
that energises the staff community to be empowered for any crisis event.  A Living 
Manual is recommended as a necessary crisis management tool and will be further 
explained in Section 7.4 on Recommendations and Implications for Management 
Practice. 
 
One of the Corporate Office managers kept the email communications and directives 
from the Red Shirt crisis so that she can enact crisis management strategies herself since 
she believed her current leaders would not be able to implement.  This was reflective of 
the absence of any formal empowerment strategies and the state of crisis un-readiness in 
the Corporate Office operations.   
 
On the other hand, a Corporate Office DH was of the opinion that the PR function and 
PR managers were able to function easily with the resources and training of the Crisis 
Communications Plan. Therefore, the researcher concluded that a level of empowerment 
pervaded the PR discipline and increased their level of confidence in relation to dealing 
with crisis situations.  This Corporate Office DH was one of the few participants who 
felt confident at all stages of the crisis (pre-crisis, during and post crisis).  Her guiding 
compass in a highly stressful situation was the Crisis Communications Plan and she 
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described the preparation they had made for all eventualities.  Her level of confidence 
was reinforced by having all the information and working very closely with the decision 
makers so that she knew the steps being considered and subsequently adopted.  At the 
same time, she was not fearful of questioning decisions or seeking further clarification 
or justification of the decision.  She was confident in the decision-making process and 
appreciated the responsibility and expressed a form of being empowered to learn and 
develop.  However, she has since left the company and she explained the importance of 
the Crisis Communications Plan and the requirement for reviews:   
“I think it has to be reviewed regularly as well otherwise we just forget I think.  
Like our crisis plan, we say the workshop has to be done every year and that’s 
why it’s called crisis, we never know what’s going to happen but I doubt 
whether the new management would do it.  So that’s why I say if the crisis 
happened again, I’m not sure whether this company can handle the crisis the 
way we [the department] handled it.” 
 
Another Corporate Office DH also felt a sense of empowerment existed.  He felt 
empowered to make decisions, for example in relocating the reservations department of 
the CCC at the time of the Red Shirt crisis as explained in Experience with Crisis 
Events in Section 5.2.1.  However, he added that this was necessary as: 
“Again there were not many senior management around to throw their opinions 
in..... to discuss and decide on a decision or something to that effect.” 
 
So his perception of having empowerment was as a result of there being no other 
choice. Nevertheless, he felt confident in making decisions and implementing initiatives 
that he would not be reprimanded for those actions.  This could, in part, also be 
attributable to his extensive experience in hotel management throughout the South East 
Asian region.   
 
When asked to comment on the organisation’s state of crisis readiness during Phase 
Two interviews, he was of the opinion that they would not be any better off if a crisis 
event occurred and at the moment he felt that they were in ‘limbo land’ and he 
explained: 
 “There should be a committee set up with HR and the VPs to say who’s going to 
do what, or who would be responsible for what, and this is what we should be 
doing if it reaches this stage and the first stage, second stage.  Like when I was 
in (international hotel company) they had orange, green, yellow, red or whatever 
and then you know what to do every time somebody says it’s a red alert, orange 
alert, this is a blue alert or whatever........ and that would involve HR, sales and 
marketing, operations, FandB and everything else...... nobody’s called for this 
meeting, discussed, or anything like that.”  
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Yet another hotel Excom felt that if there is no direction from management, then 
empowerment cannot exist anyway.  A similar response was recorded by a Bangkok 
Hotel Excom member, who suggested that to Empower Readiness, infrastructure is 
needed and suggested: 
“People come and people go, it has to be infrastructure or a set of procedures put 
into place that the people who come in are able to learn from that experience and 
be empowered to deal with it .....Otherwise they’ll be blind and head for the 
hills”. 
 
In contrast, a hotel GM who was previously based at the Corporate Office, believed that 
the staff are empowered and he responded in an email to the Phase Two question; ‘can 
you suggest how crisis-ready you feel and is your organisation ready for the next 
potential crisis?’ by stating: 
“Good question. I feel the following………..We are prepared, organised, 
trained, experienced and empowered. We have gone through a significant range 
of crises as a hotel and company level in the last 10 years. We have a significant 
range of people who have been involved in these crises; we have hotel plans, 
department plans, security plans and a whole range of recovery platforms. But 
crises generally deal with natural disasters, civil unrest or matters which arise 
quickly and dramatically.” 
 
This same respondent went on to explain that even when staff prepare and practice, they 
cannot prepare totally for the staff reaction as has been explained in the case of the 
Phuket hotel’s staff reaction to the earthquake.  Another Phase Two respondent who had 
been employed by the case study organisation, but left a month before the Red Shirt 
crisis was asked how he would have managed the Red Shirt crisis at the corporate office 
and he explained: 
“There would have been a Crisis Management Team made up of the VP group 
with continuous daily communications, face to face is best because emails may 
provide information but they’re not communicating. I think empowerment can 
be achieved but you cannot expect all to practice it.”  
 
He continued with examples of the case study organisation’s disregard for discipline 
which included; low attendance at morning briefings to communicate and exchange 
information, and a lack of commitment to training.  He compared his experience of the 
previous week in Hong Kong and the efficiencies of their typhoon warnings. Typhoon 
alert levels were clearly understood by all staff, their roles and responsibilities, which he 
observed had been communicated through repeated and consistent training.   
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Even though there were some instances of empowerment existing at the Corporate 
Office, they operated in a ‘silo’ type environment.  During Phase Two interviews the 
Corporate Director of Engineering described a “ rift or gap” existed between the third, 
fourth and fifth floors of the corporate head office, suggesting that each floor and 
individual division operated independently of each other.   
 
When the researcher probed for information due to his technical capacity about the 
information technology systems and the IT Division’s state of crisis readiness in regard 
to offshore backup facilities, he responded that “IT is a bigger secret than the CIA”.  
The silo mentality was even more apparent between the corporate office and the hotel 
operation, although this had not been considered previously as an issue during the 
researcher’s tenure with the case study organisation. The researcher’s memo note 
described this acknowledgement: 
“(interviewee)’s interview highlighted the difference in knowledge levels/ 
communication between 2 buildings side-by-side ….  Hotel operation seemed to 
be much more proactive in its planning/communication and this was evident 
from hotel staff.  Corporate office staff seemed to be in the dark, this seems to 
contradict the lack of information being shared through the corporate offices/ 
and reflects the “silo mentality” of the hotel versus corporate office 
communication.” 
 
The data identified a lack of crisis readiness and a lack of training as outlined in State of 
Readiness in 5.1.3 and Training to be Ready in Section 5.3.1. As a consequence, there 
was an apparent lack of trust in Corporate Office leadership to be able to deal with any 
future crisis events.  Whereas the Phuket hotel staff felt they are empowered as 
described in Learning Routineness in Section 5.3 with the key informant’s comment in 
Phase One that: 
“I feel very confident and I think I said that yesterday about where we’re at in 
the event that we need to mobilise and I do think that one day it may come again 
and I feel we’re empowered more than we were because we have information, 
we’ve shared that knowledge and we’ve put it into practice.”  
 
Although the Phuket hotel believes they are more empowered as a result of the 
organisational learning undertaken for crisis readiness after the earthquake, there is still 
some doubt in the researcher’s mind that organisational learning would have occurred 
under different circumstances as stated in the researcher’s memo note:  
 “I must question that if the Chinese delegation had not been staying in house, 
would the new plan have taken on the sense of urgency that it created, or have 
ever been put in place?  ….”   
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However, in follow up interviews, a key informant acknowledged that it was only 
through Experiential Learning of the earthquake failure that they have been able to 
establish an Empowering Readiness culture.  Also interrelated to Learning Routineness 
was evidence that staff responses to the on-line survey that free text reflected a desire 
for Empowering Readiness through training and documentation, which would have 
allowed a greater level of crisis management efficacy.  
 
6.2 THE EMERGENT CORE CATEGORY 
 
As a result of an in-depth examination of the data, the researcher identified that a basic 
problem of crisis management efficacy was the level of empowerment for crisis 
readiness within an organisation.  Due to the varying levels of readiness, the confidence 
levels of the staff fluctuated.  As the data were examined further and the emerging 
concepts became apparent, the lower order categories were identified and explained the 
variance in the capacity to deal with a crisis event in the pre-crisis phase.  
 
The dimensions that characterised the lower order categories and contributed to the core 
category of Empowering Readiness will be summarised in this section. This basic social 
psychological process (BSPP) explained a key factor in crisis leadership success 
outcomes by integrating the higher order categories of Crisis Leadership Influencers 
with Experiential Learning.  These higher order categories were determined through the 
process of theoretical coding, which included interrogating the data for causes, 
consequences, contingencies, conditions and co-variances of each category (Glaser, 
1978).   
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers comprised of interrelated lower order categories that 
contributed to this recurring thematic concept including; Influencing Leadership, Active 
Sense-making and Managing the Crisis.  The leadership behaviours identified in these 
categories also reflected the reciprocal relationships that were formed and added 
strength to the emerging BSSP.  The researcher had to first understand the effect of 
crisis leadership on a crisis event before considering what were the lessons learnt.  
These three dimensions of Crisis Leadership Influencers assisted in identifying the 
efficiencies and deficiencies in crisis leadership and its impact of crisis management 
outcomes. 
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Reciprocal relationships existed within Crisis Leadership Influencers and were based 
partly upon the components of Influencing Leadership, which included Communicating, 
Decision-Making, Visibility, Leading by Example and Motivating Influencers. These 
factors explained the variation in Active Sense-making and how the crisis leader’s 
influencing actions impacted crisis readiness in the organisation.  
 
Conversely Active Sense-making properties, which included Understanding the 
Mindset, Emotional Sensitivity, National Culture and Organisational Culture, 
contributed to the efficacy of Crisis Leadership with enhanced sensitivities that 
explained the variances in their level of Influencing Leadership capabilities.  In 
addition, Influencing Leadership capabilities also explained variation in the dimension 
of Managing the Crisis and how management were perceived to manage or mismanage 
the crisis.  The properties exhibited in Managing the Crisis, which included 
Responsibility, Strategising and Activating were also interrelated to both Influencing 
Leadership and Active Sense-making and explained how management actions were 
perceived to either enhance on inhibit crisis management efficacies.  
 
While Crisis Leadership Influencers explained to some degree the issues involved in the 
level of crisis readiness within the organisation, there were additional factors at play that 
supported the need for the researcher to continue exploring further thematic concepts.  It 
was apparent that Crisis Leadership was also influenced by lessons learnt from past 
crisis events, as well as the level to which the organisation prepared and trained staff to 
deal with the next crisis.  These factors resulted in the conceptualising of the second 
BSSP described as Experiential Learning. 
 
Experiential Learning comprised of interrelated lower order categories that contributed 
to this recurring thematic concept including; Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning 
from Experience and Learning Routineness.  A perception prevailed amongst the 
participants that lessons have not been learnt and the organisation will repeat the 
mistakes of the past since they have seemingly failed to prepare for the next crisis.  
Whereas the business units that have learnt their lessons and believe they are crisis-
ready, feel confident that they can manage a crisis situation more efficiently than 
compared to previous crisis incidents.   
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The willingness of the staff community to engage in post crisis briefings, training and 
crisis management teams were ignored and reinforced the perception that management 
lacked foresight in understanding the benefits of Crisis Readiness.  Another factor that 
influenced Crisis Readiness was Retaining Institutional Memory, which proved to 
highlight that crisis-inexperienced management failed to understand the importance of 
crisis preparation or training.   
 
Preparing for the Unthinkable, which included the dimensions of Warning Signals, 
Forward Planning and State of Readiness, was interrelated to Learning from 
Experience.  Learning from Experience comprised of; Experience with Crisis Events 
and Organisational Learning, and influenced Preparing for the Unthinkable by 
contributing to the varying degrees of how management prepared for a crisis.  
Management with prior experience were more familiar with the Warning Signals and 
were more proactive at planning ahead and establishing their readiness for crisis 
eventualities.  Whereas, Preparing for the Unthinkable influenced the organisation’s 
Learning from Experience and impacted the variation in their level of Organisational 
Learning from past crisis events, and how their Experience with Crisis Events 
contributed to their level of Crisis Readiness. 
 
At the same time, Learning from Experience contributed to the organisation’s capacity 
to implement a culture of Learning Routineness, which comprised of the following 
properties; Training to be Ready and Confidence Building.  Management who had 
experienced a crisis event previously appeared to have a greater level of understanding 
and commitment to training programmes that built a sense of confidence within the staff 
community and the external stakeholders.  The interconnectedness continued to 
strengthen with Learning Routineness dimensions influencing Learning from 
Experience by unlearning redundant processes and implementing new crisis ready 
business practices.  
 
The interconnectivity between Preparing for the Unthinkable and Learning Routineness 
was also apparent whereby the level of Learning Routineness increased when 
management was prepared to invest in Preparing for the Unthinkable.  Moreover, 
increased levels of Learning Routineness intensified Preparing for the Unthinkable by 
focusing management’s ability on detecting the Warning Signals, Forward Planning and 
in turn their State of Readiness.  
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The moderating impact of Retaining Institutional Memory on the lower order 
dimensions of Experiential Learning influenced the varying degrees of commitment by 
an organisation to Preparing for the Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and 
Learning Routineness.  The underlying influence of Retaining Institutional Memory 
cannot go understated as it plays an important role in crisis management success 
outcomes. Staff who have previously experienced crises activate their learned 
experiences with a greater sense of confidence and urgency than staff who are new to 
the organisation or who have not experienced a crisis event.   
 
The final filtering process of the theoretical coding produced the BSSP for this study.  
The core category, Empowering Readiness, explained the BSSP that identified the 
overall concern for the study’s participants.  This core category resolved the main 
concern of the participants in regard to crisis readiness and is explained further in the 
next section on Empowering Readiness in Section 6.3 and 6.4. 
 
6.3 EMPOWERING READINESS: INFLUENCING CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
SUCCESS OUTCOMES 
 
An organisation’s Crisis Readiness will improve when management initiates a 
company-wide focus on Crisis Management planning and preparation.  Integral to Crisis 
Management planning, there needs to be a shift in crisis paradigms from relying on a 
small Crisis Management Team or risk management department to introducing a new 
crisis-ready thinking culture where the entire staff contributes to the organisation’s 
Crisis Readiness.  This can be achieved through a multi-level approach of empowering 
management and staff with the tools and resources that build confidence through a 
learned routineness and a positive acceptance of organisational learning and double-
loop learning practices.  
 
A crisis-resilient organisation cannot necessarily be considered crisis-ready since their 
cognitive biases act to screen management from a culture of organisational learning.  
They believe their resilience is based on the outcomes of past experiences, ‘they’ve 
survived before, they will again’ and in the case of an Asian organisation, they believe 
that ‘they will be looked after’ whether it’s their family, company or government 
(Holmes et al., 2003).  Ignoring the learned experience and avoiding the causes of inept 
crisis management processes will create a culture that accepts ‘normalisation of 
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deviance”, where over time the negative practices are accepted (Tinsley, Dillon & 
Madsen, 2011).  A sense of complacency, management mediocrity and acceptance of 
past failure avoidance builds higher levels of distrust in management and confirms 
perceptions that leadership is inept in preparing or managing a crisis. 
 
Organisations that fully integrate crisis management planning and training into both the 
strategic and day-to-day business operations are recognised by staff as being reliable 
and are trusted with their welfare.  Management cannot be expected to plan, prepare and 
manage a crisis without the assistance of staff. In the case of a hotel business, they are 
reliant on all actors on stage and how the actors perform to the wider stakeholder 
audience such as guests, suppliers and business partners.  Confident and well trained 
staff are perceived by stakeholders as dedicated professionals of their craft.  
 
Therefore, staff on all levels require routine training, regular updates and two-way 
communication between management and staff so that they feel a sense of 
empowerment to react in the best interests of the business in the lead up to, during, and 
after a crisis.  Just as emergency service organisations or High Reliability Organisations 
train and prepare for the ‘unthinkable’, the hotel and tourism sector which is described 
as ‘soft targets’ or Naïve Organisations (Hannah et.al., 2009), needs to also adopt a 
similar crisis-ready mindset. 
 
Human capital investment is at the heart of Empowering Readiness.  This is not purely a 
reference to a monetary investment, but an investment in the organisation’s strategic 
priorities.  An organisational culture of Empowering Readiness starts at the top from the 
Board of Directors to the CEO and then cascades through the entire organisation. 
Empowering Readiness becomes a mandatory reporting indicator for business units and 
is seen by all stakeholders as a priority for the company’s sustainability and long term 
future.   
 
The core social process of Empowering Readiness engages management and staff at all 
levels and becomes a strategic reality building confidence and proactive mindsets as it 
permeates the organisation’s culture.  Empowering Readiness is achieved through 
various activities with a multi-level approach including; regular programmes of auditing 
and assessing crisis management capabilities, appointing a crisis management team with 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, workshops and training programmes, a 
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company-wide crisis alert programme, updated manuals and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), a crisis-ready toolkit for individuals and modified for each business 
unit, debriefings and post crisis event analysis.   
 
6.4 EMPOWERING READINESS: THE PROPOSED MODEL 
 
Empowering Readiness emerged as a theme in the early data analysis, when exploring 
the 2012 Phuket earthquake crisis incident and subsequently became the core category 
through theoretical coding and the hierarchical abstraction of data.  Grounded Theory 
techniques identified Empowering Readiness as a basic social process that responded to 
the concerns of management and staff to ensure a state of Crisis Readiness in the case 
study organisation.   
 
The proposed theory from this study relates to the substantive context of the 2010 Red 
Shirt crisis for a Thai based international hotel group with multi-level and multi-location 
business units.  Therefore, the theory generated from this study is a substantive theory 
that cannot be generalised; however, Yin (2009) argued that a research study’s 
systematic data collection and analysis could be applied to other case study 
organisations for broader theory development. 
 
The core category for the emergent theory was achieved from the study’s Grounded 
Theory theoretical sampling approach that provided the most informative participants 
for the research topic.  The various lower order categories identified the most important 
properties that the participants considered to be key to being crisis-ready.  These inter-
related dimensions were then categorised into the two higher-order categories of Crisis 
Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning that made up the core category of, 
Empowering Readiness.  
 
The two higher-order categories were instrumental in explaining the basic social 
structural processes existing in the case study organisation and its business units.  Crisis 
Leadership Influencers is the social process that accounted for the various components 
that result in Crisis Leadership efficiencies and also highlighted the deficiencies that 
were raised by the study’s participants.  Whereas Experiential Learning focused on the 
organisation’s foresight to prepare for crises and their organisational learning 
capabilities.   
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However, the variation in Crisis Readiness levels was influenced by the organisation’s 
ability to retain institutional memory in regard to lessons learned.   This was a concern 
expressed by participants since management turnover has resulted in fewer staff being 
knowledgeable in maintaining crisis readiness practices.  The study’s findings suggest a 
clear moderating effect for Retaining Institutional Memory upon the relationship 
between Experiential Learning and Crisis Leadership Influencers as illustrated in Figure 
6.1.   
EMPOWERING READINESS 
 
  CRISIS READINESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Empowering Readiness Core Category Theory Development  
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Readiness focuses on the interconnectedness of the BSSPs within the substantive 
context of a crisis event.  Figure 6.1 summarises the answer to the research question of 
how Crisis Leadership generates effective Crisis Readiness through Empowering 
Readiness within this emergent substantive theory. 
 
The researcher found that by using Grounded Theory methodology, the main challenge 
of crisis readiness in the case study organisation’s multi-unit, multi-location operation is 
the lack of empowered staff to deal with a crisis.  Empowering Readiness represents the 
most comprehensive explanation of the perceptions and behaviours of the organisation’s 
participants to improve crisis management outcomes. Therefore, Empowering 
Readiness is the most plausible explanation as the core category and the strategy that 
ensures an organisation’s Crisis Readiness meets the challenges during the Crisis 
Prevention and Planning phase of Ritchie’s (2004) Crisis Management framework.   
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the components of the Empowering Readiness model which has 
been conceptualised from Grounded Theory’s hierarchical abstraction process.  In 
summary, the lower order categories are represented by the interrelatedness of the 
connecting non-linear relationships that explain the two higher order categories namely; 
Crisis Leadership Influencers consisting of, Influencing Leadership, Active Sense-
making and Managing the Crisis, and Experiential Learning consisting of, Preparing for 
the Unthinkable, Learning from Experience and Learning Routineness.  The moderating 
effect of Retaining Institutional Memory is indicated by its influence on the two higher 
order categories.  The study’s findings contributed to the emergence of a social process 
of Crisis Leadership and explained the model’s core category and its all-encompassing 
basic social process of Empowering Readiness.  
 
6.5 VALIDATING THE CORE CATEGORY  
 
Phase Two interviews sought to gather feedback on the data coding and categorisation 
of thematic concepts.  The interviewees were provided with the schematic that 
explained the lower order, higher order and core categories, titled ‘Category Filtration 
to the Basic Social Process’ as illustrated in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.5.3 on Theoretical 
Coding.  The aim of this phase was to draw upon interviewees’ reflections as they 
recalled the relationships and enactments within the context of a crisis event to ensure 
the explanation of the findings seemed plausible and made sense to them (Kempster & 
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Parry, 2011).  This phase also guided the theoretical sampling methodology in order to 
identify new interviewees who would be able to validate the emergent theory and 
provide even richer in-depth data. 
 
A new interviewee identified for Phase Two was previously employed by the company 
at a Director level and is now a security consultant.  He was interviewed regarding the 
emergent thematic concepts.  He agreed to participate in a recorded interview and then 
wanted to follow up with his own written comments on the data’s categorisation.  He 
felt that this would allow him to contemplate the questions further and he provided 
extensive comments that validated the researcher’s emergent themes and relationships.  
However, before we embarked on the interview, which he followed up with his emailed 
perceptions; he first made comment on the BSSP’s interrelatedness in an email on 7 
August, 2013 in reference to Figure 3.1.  This assisted the researcher to confirm the 
developing theoretical concepts and their interrelatedness;   
“I feel that you cannot separate the two columns and feel that maybe you should 
also have a series of dotted lines between the different columns as the issues are 
related.” 
 
He responded to the question about how the case study organisation activated 
Empowering Readiness by suggesting that middle management and employee levels are 
willing to embrace crisis ready procedures and training so that they can ensure the 
safety of all stakeholders.  However, he was of the opinion that the CEO, Senior 
Management and Board levels did not have the commitment or enthusiasm to initiate 
Crisis Readiness, which he believed had resulted in crisis inertia on all operational 
levels.  He provided a detailed recommendation in an email of 11 August, 2013 that: 
 
“CEO and/or Board Members must be able to comprehend the financial vs risk 
ratio and to commit the company to a path of long term implementation at all 
operational levels for the programmes to be effective.  This means commitment 
on a financial basis as well as the creation of EMPOWERED Security and Risk 
Management Committees who will WORK TOGETHER with the hotels to 
ensure that these structures and related programmes will be introduced at all 
operational levels and in all required areas of the hotels (and Corporate Offices).  
 
The relevant committees and officers will ensure ongoing commitment at the 
hotel and department levels on an ongoing basis (and not just as a one-off burst 
of energy that burns out within weeks or a few months through lethargy or 
inability to implement due to lack of support by senior management).  The 
Corporate Security and Risk Management Committees will prepare a quarterly 
summary review of the activities undertaken by each hotel and present the 
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results to senior corporate management. The hotel GM must include a monthly 
summary and review of these activities in the GMs Report.” 
 
Middle management and their employees’ willingness to learn and initiate crisis-
readiness strategies were clearly evident throughout the data, yet the current leadership 
has maintained a healthy complacency toward Crisis Readiness.  A Bangkok hotel 
Director responded in Phase Two interviews to the question about how crisis-ready he 
felt based on the core category of Empowering Readiness with the following statement: 
“I do not feel in any way more prepared for a future crisis, no postmortem or 
conclusion of what we did right and what we did wrong has been made public 
among the employees. No recognitions have been given to those that stuck it 
out…..  In thinking back I strongly feel that the owner has been ignorant of the 
safety for the staff considering life [sic] bullets entered the hotel during many 
days.” 
 
At the time of Phase Two interviews in August and September 2013, political protests 
were once again underway in Bangkok.  One of the interviewees who had relocated to 
Australia in a senior management position commented on how surprised he was that the 
hotel company is not more ready for another crisis event as Thailand had been through 
crises so many times.  He also reflected on the ‘Category Filtration to the Basic Social 
Process’ that was provided and described the concept of Empowering Readiness as 
being “very powerful, especially when combining experience and leadership”.  He also 
commented that Crisis Readiness is the responsibility of all staff on “every single level”.   
 
The data indicated varying responses about how interview participants felt Thai staff 
would react when empowered to react to a crisis.  There were some expressed concerns 
that even with preparation and training the ‘human element’ reactions cannot be 
foreseen.  A Thai VP who had not been in the company during the Red Shirt crisis was 
asked to respond to a question if Thai staff would accept empowerment to be ready for a 
crisis.  He responded “Frankly speaking, no” that they would not accept empowerment.  
He was of the opinion that Thais “do things by being ordered” as was also the case in 
his previous company, although he felt that if trained “they will feel more confident and 
empowered and may accept the empowerment better”.   
 
Another Thai staff member, who held a Director position and has since left the case 
study organisation, is now working in a multi-national organisation based in Bangkok. 
The new organisation has crisis procedures in place, and she is aware of these 
procedures; and therefore, she feels confident and “ready to handle any future crisis”.  
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She also explained that they have a dedicated crisis committee to manage unexpected 
crises that meet on a regular basis.  In contrast and as already detailed, head office staff 
within the case study organisation expressed feelings of frustration about being 
unprepared. They believed that crisis management procedures, roles and responsibilities 
were unclear, warning signals were being ignored, HR was inactive and failed to 
communicate with staff while rumours and mixed messages prevailed.   
 
Management by complacency or ‘learned ignorance’ (Paraskevas et al., 2013) appeared 
to direct this organisation.  One of the managers who sought guidance from past 
documents in order to be prepared for a crisis stated: 
“…we deal case by case and then case by case, which is we’re not looking into 
the future and then protect [sic].  It’s happened already and then you just fix it 
but you’re not protecting it.  This is what we should look into in my opinion.” 
 
Therefore, it is clear that management and staff are not only willing but actively want to 
participate in training and crisis planning.  The security consultant highlighted the 
internal challenges of middle management in recognising crisis planning priorities 
versus senior management’s complacency to the point that he suggested that middle 
management are “bashing their heads up against a brick wall”.  Data analysis as 
provided in Chapters Four and Five confirmed that the organisation’s CEO and senior 
management have not committed to a crisis-ready culture.  They have chosen to ignore 
any form of organisational learning or institutionalisation of learned experiences, even 
though this was articulated as a necessary process after the crisis by HR and the CEO in 
a CNN interview and in internal company-wide emails, as described in Section 5.2.2 on 
Organisational Learning.  While management verbalised the need to learn from the 
experience, their actions were contradictory and failed to subsequently engender 
confidence for crisis readiness. 
 
In Phase Two the researcher probed one of the original interviewees for her opinion 
about the head office’s state of crisis readiness and she felt that if there been some form 
of discourse and analysis on what had happened after the Red Shirt crisis then “we 
would have learnt from the experience”.  Instead, she explained that debriefings never 
occurred and there seemed to be a ‘black hole of silence’ with the organisation focused 
on short term, not long term strategies.  This is a business continuity opportunity that 
cannot be ignored.   
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In contrast, the Phuket hotel’s Excom undertook an in-depth review and implemented 
new strategies that have empowered their managers and staff to react in a more positive 
manner through Empowering Readiness.  They now ‘live and breathe’ their crisis 
readiness through their Emergency Response and First Aid Support Teams with 
systematic procedures, new technology, and training and learned routineness.  This has 
built a stronger more resilient staff community.   
 
Finally, the researcher also shared Chapter One of this thesis with a Corporate Office 
DH from the case study organisation to ensure the background assessment was a 
balanced account and she replied in an email on 22 January, 2013: 
 “I have read your introduction background with a heavy heart (feeling omg 
we’ve been though that).  Of course we have been through it as horrible as it 
was; it hits me (strangely) that this could happen again.... maybe not this bad, 
but I sense it is happening anytime soon....Your background is perfectly accurate 
and neutral.” 
 
In summary, Empowering Readiness was considered the core category in this study 
which integrated the two highest order categories, Crisis Leadership Influencers and 
Experiential Learning.  The interrelatedness of the lower order and higher order 
categories strengthened the emergent core category and provided an explanation to the 
research question of ‘How Does Crisis Leadership Influence Crisis Management 
Readiness in the Thai Hotel Industry?’  The basic social psychological process of 
Empowering Readiness is a key influencing factor for crisis readiness of individuals and 
the organisation in crisis situations as discussed further in the next section.   
 
6.6 CONTRIBUTION TO NEW KNOWLEDGE 
 
The findings from the present study contribute to a growing body of knowledge about 
crisis management.  The significance of this study lies in its contribution to the field of 
Crisis Leadership research and the social processes that have been identified to increase 
Crisis Readiness efficacies.  This research documented the perceptions, actions and 
strategies undertaken in the substantive context of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis in Thailand.  
As an in-depth descriptive case study, the analysis of data has produced a substantive 
new theory within the field of Crisis Leadership.  Substantive theory provides the 
foundation from which to build more formal theory (Glaser, 1992) and is the major 
contribution of this study. 
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Carmeli and Schaubroek’s (2008) study examined the link between learning from 
failures and crisis preparedness. They argued that “the process of learning from failures 
is critical to an organisation’s crisis preparedness” (p.189). However, the present 
research has taken the notion of learning from failures further by identifying how 
empowering staff with crisis management training will strengthen their crisis leadership 
capabilities.  Moreover, this study also identified the moderating influence of 
institutional memory retention on organisational learning and crisis readiness. 
 
Zhang, Jia and Gru (2012) focused on how and when transformational leadership affects 
leadership effectiveness by analysing the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China.  While 
Zhang et al.’s study contributed to leadership studies in the context of a crisis, its main 
contribution was to demonstrate “how transformational leaders’ emotional control 
influences the way they are perceived to be leaders form the theoretical perspective of 
affect transference” (p.4102). Zhang et al. posited that transformational leaders can 
motivate followers through self-sacrificial behaviours and by undertaking a Sense-
making approach.  However, Zhang et al.’s study focused primarily on the crisis event 
and failed to apply their findings to either the post crisis or pre crisis phases of the crisis.  
In contrast, the present study has focused on post crisis learning and, in turn, the 
readiness of the organisation for future crises as applied during the pre-crisis phase. 
 
Ritchie et al.’s (2011) findings on crisis planning in the hotel sector were limited to how 
an organisation’s size influences crisis readiness.  Their study concluded that there was 
a need for further research into additional factors that influence crisis preparedness: past 
crisis experience and knowledge and attitudes and perceptions of management with 
regard to crisis planning.  This present study acknowledged the limitations of Ritchie et 
al.’s study and has itself contributed new knowledge about how Crisis Leadership can 
influence a crisis-ready culture by Empowering Readiness across all levels of an 
organisation. 
 
Hadley et al. (2011) developed the C-LEAD (Crisis Leadership Efficacy in Assessing 
and Deciding); a self-assessment survey instrument which measures and predicts crisis 
leader decision-making and confidence.  However, self-assessment reporting may result 
in self-reporting bias and therefore fail to incorporate the perceptions of the staff 
community on the crisis leadership decision-making process.  This research has 
addressed the knowledge gap in relation to how the participants would use their learned 
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crisis experiences and their Crisis Leadership abilities to improve their organisation’s 
Crisis Readiness.   
 
Crisis Leadership competency models (James & Wooten, 2004; Wooten & James, 
2008) and Crisis Management frameworks (Jacques, 2007; Ritchie, 2004) while 
relevant have been deficient in identifying the importance of the critical pre-crisis 
phase.  This is the stage at which an organisation can mitigate the negative impacts of a 
crisis.   The present study has focused on an organisation’s pre-crisis readiness and 
identified factors designed to ensure more successful Crisis Management outcomes.  
 
In terms of a methodological approach, this study has made a contribution to Crisis 
Leadership research by using Grounded Theory to explore, in-depth, the real-life 
experiences of this crisis event.  The researcher’s unique and open access to the case 
study organisation provided a large amount of data that would not otherwise be 
available to external researchers.  The researcher’s intimate knowledge and close 
working relationship with the case study organisation was able to expose critical 
incidents such as the Phuket earthquake experience. This incident became a comparative 
focal point for data analysis. Glaser (1992) suggested that the researcher’s professional 
and personal experiences assist in developing substantive sensitivities, which are 
essential to category and property generation.  He also noted that this is predicated on 
the researcher possessing a skill set that includes the ability to conceptualise. 
 
In terms of a theoretical contribution, this research has contributed to tourism Crisis 
Management literature in developing substantive theory by modelling social processes 
at play within the Crisis Leadership phenomenon.  The generation of substantive theory 
was aimed at rectifying the lack of academic research in this increasingly important 
aspect of Crisis Management and specifically in the crisis prevention and planning 
phase.  Empowering Readiness is the substantive theoretical model that has been 
established and is particularly significant given the increasing incidence of crises and 
their impact on the global tourism network. 
 
From its inception, the aim of this study was to contribute to the academic body of 
knowledge in gaining a greater level of understanding of how Crisis Leadership 
influences an organisation’s Crisis Readiness.  This study addressed a number of issues 
and gaps in the extant literature including a lack of focus on the role of leadership in 
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tourism Crisis Management frameworks, specifically in the Crisis Prevention and 
Planning phase.  It also explored the role of leadership in a crisis and identified key 
success factors of Crisis Leadership in the context of an international hotel group in 
Thailand. In addition, this study has provided an Asian context to the nascent literature 
on Crisis Leadership as opposed to the predominantly US-centric research available.   
 
6.7 DEVELOPING SUBSTANTIVE THEORY 
 
This study proposes a framework for substantive theory on Empowering Readiness for 
the Crisis Prevention and Planning phase of Ritchie’s (2004) Crisis and Disaster 
Management: a Strategic and Holistic Management Framework.  The theoretical model 
derived its formulation from data analysis and the construction of lower order 
categories, higher order categories and finally the core category of Empowering 
Readiness. 
 
The purpose of presenting theory in a graphical context is to provide a visual image of 
categories and their relationships (Veal, 2006). Charmaz (2006) recommended diagrams 
to illustrate the relative power, scope and direction of categories, as well as the 
connections between them.  A graphic display of the categories and their relationships 
also makes the data more understandable in comparison to relying solely on a narrative 
explanation (Yin, 2011).  Figure 6.2 illustrates the Theory Development Research 
Process. 
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Theory Development Research Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Theory Development Research Process 
 
The recurring theme within this research was the influence of Crisis Leadership and 
how lessons learnt from past experiences positively influences a crisis-ready 
organisation.  Empowering Readiness has provided a key strategy to drive the 
importance of Crisis Readiness throughout the organisation. However, institutional 
memory retention poses a challenge to organisations as learned routineness, learned 
experiences and cognitive biases diminishes the importance of Crisis Readiness.  
Further research will assist in identifying how organisations can implement strategies to 
retain institutional memory and maintain a sense of Crisis Readiness and strengthen 
business continuity in the face of a crisis event. 
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6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter Six sought to draw together previous chapters in order to propose a conceptual 
framework that clarified the substantive theory generated.  The study’s core category 
explained the Basic Social Psychological Process of Empowering Readiness and was 
explained in this chapter by first discussing the notion of ‘empowerment’.  The concept 
of empowerment was illustrated with real life examples that provided comparative 
incidents between the hotel company’s corporate head office and the Bangkok and 
Phuket hotels.  
 
The researcher sought validation and discussion from participants that the emergent 
theory was plausible and made sense to them.  The aim was to validate the findings and 
probe for further feedback on the proposed theory.  The consensus of opinion was that 
the hierarchical abstraction of categories revealed thematic concepts that were 
congruous with the organisation’s social processes.  With this validation, the researcher 
was then able to move forward and posit how Empowering Readiness influences Crisis 
Management success outcomes.   
 
Empowering Readiness requires a multi-level approach so that management and staff 
can swiftly mobilise crisis management procedures to minimise negative impacts and 
restore confidence and reinstate business continuity.  Management should harness the 
loyalty and commitment of staff in their willingness to participate in Crisis Readiness 
programmes and build a stronger organisational learning culture.  The power of 
Empowering Readiness cannot be underestimated and will ultimately add value to the 
organisation’s human capital. 
 
In summary, the substantive theory generated from this study can be applied to other 
organisations in the context of a crisis event for broader theory development.  Chapter 
Seven will provide a summary of the research process, key recommendations and study 
limitations.  The final chapter will also address the important practical implications for 
management practice and further research. 
 
Chapter 7– Summary, Recommendations and Implications 
 
276 | P a g e  
CHAPTER 7   SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter will summarise the previous chapters by reviewing the research process, 
identifying limitations of the study, providing recommendations, and offering 
implications for management practice and further research.   
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS  
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the phenomenon of Crisis Leadership within 
the substantive context of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis in Thailand. Grounded theory 
methodology was employed to establish the basic social process and explain the 
underlying concerns of an organisation’s readiness for future crisis events.  This study 
addressed the need to understand the relationship between Crisis Leadership and Crisis 
Readiness and how Crisis Leadership Influencers and Experiential Learning impacted 
one organisation’s ability to prepare for a future crisis event.   
 
As outlined in Chapter One, Section 1.3, the following gaps were identified in the extant 
research in relation to Crisis Leadership and Crisis Readiness within the hotel industry: 
a lack of detail about, or an underestimation of, the importance of the Crisis Readiness 
or Preparation phase; little attention given to Crisis Leadership considerations in 
previous crisis management frameworks; research primarily with a Western or US 
centric context; and no clear identification of  the learned lessons from previous crisis 
events in relation to crisis readiness. 
 
As explained in Chapters Four and Five, the data collection and analysis process 
established the thematic concepts and theoretical categories. Chapter Six concluded the 
findings with the core category of Empowering Readiness. 
 
A key characteristic of grounded theory design is the constant comparative analytical 
method.  Constant comparison of primary and secondary data allowed the researcher to 
explore and develop thematic concepts as new phenomenological insights emerged.  
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Using an inductive process, the hierarchical abstraction of categories emerged through 
the data coding process as depicted in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
Lower Order Categories 
  
Lower Order Categories 
  
Influencing Leadership 
Communicating 
Decision-Making, Visibility, 
Leading by example,  
Motivating Influencers 
 
Active Sense-making 
Understanding Mindset,  
Emotional Sensitivity,  
National and Organisational Culture  
 
Managing the Crisis 
Responsibility, Strategising,  
Activating  
Preparing for the Unthinkable 
Warning Signals, Forward 
Planning, State of Readiness 
 
Learning from experience 
Experience with Crisis Events, 
Organisational Learning  
 
Learning Routineness 
Training to be Ready,  
Confidence Building,  
 
Retaining Institutional Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher Order Categories 
Basic Social Structural Processes (BSSP) 
 
Crisis Leadership Influencers 
 
 Experiential Learning 
   
CORE CATEGORY 
Basic Social Psychological Process (BSPP) 
 
EMPOWERING READINESS 
 
Figure 7.1: Category Filtration to the Basic Social Process  
 
7.2 SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS 
 
To recap, the primary objective of this study was to explore how the Crisis Leadership 
capabilities of one hotel company’s senior management influenced the organisation’s 
Crisis Readiness.  The primary research question was derived from this objective and 
guided the study by seeking to answer; “How does crisis leadership influence crisis 
management readiness in the Thai hotel industry?” 
 
Primary and secondary data provided a rich source of understanding of what happened 
and how the case study organisation’s Crisis Leadership capability was perceived at the 
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time of the 2010 Red Shirt crisis and subsequent 2012 Phuket earthquake. Table 7.1 
provides an overview of the research questions and related key findings.   
 
Table 7.1: Research Question’s Key Findings 
 
Primary Question : Key Findings 
 
 
How does crisis leadership 
influence crisis management 
readiness in the Thai hotel 
industry? 
 Transformational leadership attributes gain 
confidence and commitment from staff 
 Sense-making enhances crisis leadership 
decision making  
 Staff confidence and trust increases when 
management identifies warning signals and 
prepares for impending crises 
 Experiential Learning cognitive behaviours 
improves crisis management readiness and 
efficacy of management and staff 
 Retaining institutional memory reduces loss of 
human capital and key crisis leadership success 
elements 
 Empowerment through learning will prepare an 
organisation at all levels to deal with crises  
Secondary Sub-Question  
1. What level of importance do 
hotel managers place on crisis 
management planning, response 
and evaluation? 
 
 Day-to-day operations take priority over crisis 
readiness 
 Managers with prior crisis experience are more 
committed to organisational learning and crisis 
readiness 
 Confident and prepared crisis leaders gain 
greater levels of trust from peers and followers 
 Willingness of staff to engage in crisis planning 
to ensure business continuity and job security 
2. How does organisational culture 
influence crisis management 
planning and response? 
 
 Silo mentality restricts company-wide crisis 
management programmes 
 Cognitive biases impede organisational learning 
and reinforces complacencies 
 Management turnover influences institutional 
memory loss 
3. How applicable are Western 
based Crisis Management 
frameworks to the Thai Crisis 
Leadership context? 
 
 Cultural beliefs and practices need to be 
considered to engage a readiness mentality 
 Readiness phase needs to have greater focus in 
comparison to Western frameworks due to 
cultural beliefs and fear of inviting a negative 
incident if planning for its potential (bad omens) 
 In a society dependent on rote learning, learned 
routineness is an important factor in crisis 
readiness and can assist in overcoming cultural 
myths 
 
In summary, this research has found that Crisis Leadership is a multi-faceted social 
process that can be enhanced by embracing the learned experiences from past events.  
While the situational context of the present study was the 2010 Red Shirt crisis, an 
interview with a manager disclosed the impact of the April 11th 2012 Phuket earthquake 
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and the lack of Crisis Readiness at the Phuket hotel.  The hotel’s senior management 
had previously experienced the 2004 tsunami, but the 2012 earthquake and subsequent 
tsunami was a completely new experience for the hotel employees.  As outlined 
previously, due to a lack of a readiness plan, the hotel staff panicked and left the 
property without assisting guests or colleagues. While it may not diminish employees’ 
fears and anxieties in the event of a crisis, empowering a sense of readiness in the staff 
community can be expected to reduce those anxieties and tensions. 
 
(i) Crisis Leadership efficacy is enhanced by crisis experience and experiential 
learning  
 
It is clear that Crisis Leadership characteristics within the extant literature have 
provided commonalities with the findings of this study in relation to Crisis Leadership 
competencies and processes.  Chaterjee and Pearson (2008) advocated a leadership 
culture that encourages knowledge based Crisis Management preparedness.  In contrast, 
the mentality that “it won’t happen to us” or “it can’t get that bad” permeates the 
Corporate Office leadership of the case study organisation.  However, the Phuket 
earthquake crisis event is clear evidence that Experiential Learning, as embraced by the 
hotel’s senior management, created a best practice crisis plan.  Similar to a pilot 
managing a crisis on a plane, by embedding routineness within a crisis management 
training program has created a more competent crisis-ready organisation in the Phuket 
hotel through the notion of Empowering Readiness.   
 
(ii) Crisis Readiness will reduce the impact of negative outcomes 
 
Whilst the extant literature has provided an extensive road map of tourism crisis 
management frameworks and studies to follow in the event of a crisis (Faulkner, 2001; 
Ritchie, 2004; Wang & Ritchie, 2010), little attention has been given to the initial phase 
of crisis readiness, a phase that can be addressed more effectively when senior 
management dedicates the resources to a systematic crisis planning regime.  This study 
has shown that the lessons of the Red Shirt crisis of 2010 have yet to be incorporated 
into the company’s overall strategic planning.  Nonetheless, during the floods of 2011 
one department demonstrated Crisis Readiness by proactively relocating their central 
reservations outside the flood area so that they could continue to provide a service.   
 
Chapter 7– Summary, Recommendations and Implications 
 
280 | P a g e  
(iii) Experiential Learning needs to be lived and breathed 
 
The findings of this study reinforce the importance of the cognitive strengths of crisis 
experience and subsequent Experiential Learning gained from participation in crisis 
phenomena.  In effect, a crisis becomes not a crisis but rather a learning experience.  
When applied to developing a crisis plan, the experiential factor creates a robust three 
hundred and sixty degree perspective on addressing the needs of all parties during a 
possible crisis event in the future.   
 
Moreover, a crisis plan must not be ‘left on the shelf’ or allowed to ‘gather dust’.  
Instead, the organisation that has the vision to plan ahead, engage stakeholders and 
embrace the learned routineness of a crisis plan through simulations and scenario 
workshops will result in an effective Crisis Leadership process.  By ‘living and 
breathing’ the crisis plan, and using routineness to build confidence and familiarity, the 
entire organisation will be in a stronger position than its competitors should a crisis 
occur.  This finding will be further discussed in Section 7.4, Recommendations and 
Implications for Management Practice. 
 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
The researcher acknowledges the study’s key limitations.  First, there is the issue of 
generalisability.  This case study focused on one Thai international hotel group; 
however, it did encompass multiple business units and locations. Nevertheless, the 
results may not replicate in other contexts. Second, Grounded Theory methodology is a 
complex and detailed qualitative research approach that challenged the researcher to 
meet its exacting requirements.  Throughout the various iterations of data collection and 
analysis, the researcher sought clarification from the extant literature on the divergent 
views of Grounded Theory.  However, the decision to predominantly follow the 
Glaserian approach brought clarity and direction to the study from an early stage.  
Nevertheless, the study relied heavily on the researcher’s theoretical sensitivities and 
insider approach to reach the highest levels of abstraction towards constructing a 
substantive grounded theory.  
 
Third, researcher bias was considered as a potential limitation of this study and as such 
the processes adopted to mitigate the risk of bias impacting the study were addressed in 
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Section 1.7 of Chapter One.  Even though the researcher was a part of the case study 
organisation’s senior management team at the time of the Red Shirt crisis, the data 
collection and findings uncovered new world views to the researcher. Moreover, while 
the researcher had been a participant in the Red Shirt crisis event, the data collection 
revealed actions and perceptions previously unknown to the researcher.  Data collection 
also serendipitously discovered (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Glaser, 1998) the 2012 
Phuket earthquake which became the catalyst to compare crisis ready and non-crisis 
ready subunits of the case study organisation.  The researcher’s past relationship with 
participants created a safe and trusting environment for the respondents to share new 
knowledge; knowledge which had not been previously shared with the corporate head 
office senior management. 
 
Furthermore, the study’s Phase One interviews were conducted more than two years 
after the 2010 Red Shirt crisis event, therefore some misinterpretation of actions and 
events may have occurred or they may have been imbued by the participant’s own story 
telling.  However, a key principle of Grounded Theory is data saturation.  Data 
saturation became apparent through concurrent data collection and analysis, which 
identified the key themes in the early stage of the study with recurring clarity. By also 
employing the constant comparative method, the key emergent themes were validated 
using primary and secondary sources of data.  
 
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
 
The hotel sector is a major sector within the global tourism industry and is asignificant 
contributor to the economic sustainability of developing countries (UNWTO, United 
Nations World Tourism Organization, 2013).  The United Nations Global Assessment 
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2013) along with Crisis Management scholars 
(Anderson, 2006; Avraham & Ketter, 2006; Beirman, 2003; Boniface & Cooper, 2009; 
Henderson, 2007; Henderson & Ng, 2004; Pforr & Hosie, 2008, 2010; Prideaux, 2009) 
predict increasing crisis events whether man-made or as a result of climatic changes.  
Hotels have been identified as ‘soft targets’ in a world of increased terrorist activity 
(Jenkins, 2009).  They have already become the handiwork of violent terrorist groups to 
highlight their social and political agendas.  Hotels are not immune to the impacts of 
natural disasters such as flooding and earthquakes. 
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With renewed political protests occurring in Thailand in late 2013 (The New York 
Times, 17 Nov, 2013) and the subsequent military coup on 22 May, 2014 (Fisher, BBC, 
2014); our understanding of Crisis Leadership is even more important and timely.  A 
key objective of this research was to determine how Crisis Leadership impacts Crisis 
Management workflows and success outcomes, and in so doing establish substantive 
theory.  The Category Filtration to the Basic Social Process, Figure 7.1, can be 
considered universal and generalisable, but is expected to be moderated by local cultural 
characteristics and contexts; although, it cannot be assumed to occur in all 
organisational contexts.  Nevertheless, the generalisability of this concept model 
encompasses two elements for consideration.  Firstly, organisations cannot be crisis-
ready without a CMP, as has been discussed throughout this study.  Secondly, 
leadership positions in any organisation needs to encourage and instil organisational 
learning and a mind-set of preparing for the unthinkable. 
 
The primary recommendation based on the findings is that it is imperative that the hotel 
sector embrace a Crisis Readiness culture to reduce potential risks and mobilises 
resources without delay to ensure effective and efficient Crisis Management 
deployment.  There is a strong willingness of staff to participate in training and 
contribute to an organisation’s crisis-readiness so that they are able to detect and 
confidently deal with potential crises.  It also strengthens staff behaviours in aspects 
such as self-esteem, self-worth, innovation, a sense of belonging and pride towards their 
employer, while minimising absenteeism, errors and reduced productivity levels.   
 
Management cannot ignore the increased power of a company-wide inclusive 
empowerment programme which provides clear directions, and allocates roles and 
responsibilities. A sense of loyalty to the organisation and its stakeholders, as well as 
the need to confirm business continuity and therefore job security, also strengthens staff 
commitment to Crisis Management objectives and goals.  This commitment should be 
harnessed by empowering staff with the necessary procedures and resources to enact 
upon their Crisis Readiness training.  The alternative is an organisation that decreases 
the value of their single greatest asset, their people, and increases the costs of managing 
and rebuilding their business after a crisis event. 
 
Creating a fully integrated crisis management strategy that is embraced by all 
departments and understood at all levels is another form of empowerment.  The ‘No 
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man is an island’ adage highlights the importance of deconstructing the silo mentality so 
that crisis management planning can cascade systematically throughout the 
organisation.  Learned routineness of crisis management SOPs further strengthens the 
sense of empowerment and develops embedded routines which mobilises the 
organisation faster and more efficiently.  Crisis Readiness key performance indicators 
(KPIs) that require monthly or at minimum, quarterly reporting, also provides an 
opportunity to gauge Empowering Readiness levels within the organisation.  The KPIs 
can also be enhanced by multi-level certification programmes for Crisis Readiness, yet 
another tangible commitment to an empowered workforce that is crisis-ready. 
 
Providing honest, up to date regular communications in the lead up to, and during, a 
crisis event establishes a more trusting environment that empowers staff with relevant 
information and reduces tensions and anxieties.  While a high pressure crisis situation 
will not be devoid of some fears and concerns, shared information results in a sense of 
clarity and understanding about the unfolding events and provides an informed 
knowledge base in a fluid high-frequency decision-making environment.  However, 
uncertainty avoidance and an Asian culture that accepts the cultural notion of bad 
omens emanating from negative issues, requires an organisation to invest in its human 
capital to inculcate the importance of being crisis-ready.  This will avoid stakeholders 
experiencing panic and stress and positively contribute to a sense of trust and 
confidence in Crisis Leadership.   
 
The framework of Empowering Readiness can be accessed and applied by hotel 
management practitioners to real-life situations in the form of a Living Manual that will 
empower staff to be crisis-ready.    
 
The Living Manual – Practical Implications 
 
The routineness derived from an Experiential Learning process can be forgotten.  In an 
industry such as hospitality which is characterised by high staff turnover rates, the 
learned experiences that create institutional memory will also be lost (Weick, 1988).  It 
is recommended that a Living Manual is given priority by senior management to be 
incorporated into the organisation’s day-to-day operations as discussed in Section 6.1 on 
Empowerment.  It needs to engage staff on all levels, and provides a reliable toolkit in 
the event of a crisis.  A Living Manual is ‘lived and breathed’ and builds upon an 
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environment of organisational learning that seeks continuous improvement.  Although 
Gallagher (2001) suggested Crisis Management Plans are living documents continually 
evolving, the author does not prescribe its enactment, rather a process for regularly 
updating.  Whereas this study recommends a Living Manual that includes important 
information including a set of crisis management procedures, key performance 
indicators that monitor Crisis Readiness levels, communication strategies modified for 
each stakeholder group, simulation exercises and training and certification programmes.  
Crisis Management Committees need to be established with regular meeting schedules 
and a work environment that encourages open and honest discourse on crisis readiness. 
 
In a country such as Thailand where the education system has been reliant on rote 
learning practices, it is even more important for management to encourage routineness 
in Crisis Management training.  A crisis incident by its nature occurs outside the normal 
day-to-day operations and its unfamiliarity contributes to heightened stress levels, fear 
and anxiety.  A Living Manual does not reside on the shelf gathering dust but is put in 
the hands of the entire staff community and becomes part of the day-to-day operations.   
Roles and responsibilities are detailed and reflect the differing levels of responsibility 
within the organisation.  While all scenarios cannot be covered in a single document, the 
Living Manual provides guidelines and checklists to deal with a wide typology of crisis 
events and is updated regularly with new versions that reinforce a constant improvement 
mindset. 
 
In the complex environment of a crisis event the learned routineness of Crisis 
Management activities instils a greater sense of confidence.  Regularity of training and a 
‘practice makes perfect’ mindset avoids deterioration of skill levels and tests the 
competencies, plans and resources in place.  The Living Manual will also contribute to 
encouraging an organisational learning philosophy throughout the organisation.  Staff 
gain respect and confidence with the knowledge that their opinions and suggestions are 
seen as an important contribution to the company’s business survival.  Their loyalty and 
commitment to the organisation is further enhanced when the Living Manual is seen as a 
tangible example of the organisation’s concern for staff welfare, safety and security.  In 
an international hotel environment, where staff are also responsible for the well-being of 
hotel guests and clients, a calm and confident staff community will positively influence 
guest and client reactions.  Even when the language factor may be an impediment to 
Chapter 7– Summary, Recommendations and Implications 
 
285 | P a g e  
efficient management of the crisis, a calm confident tone of voice and manner will ease 
the crisis situation and increase Crisis Management efficacy. 
 
In the Asian context where a collectivist group mindset influences the day-to-day 
business environment, a Crisis Management Living Manual will set an organisation up 
for success by channelling management and employees’ sense of loyalty and obedience 
as a positive strength to deal with crises.   The Living Manual will also assist in critical 
decision making when time efficient decisions are of the essence and not reliant on 
traditional hierarchical decision work processes that has the potential to slow the 
reaction to a crisis situation. 
 
A Living Manual will allow Crisis Leadership to assume their roles and responsibilities 
with confidence in the knowledge that the organisation is aware of its duties and 
obligations and that it will not waste time with inactivity and indecision.  Critical tasks 
will be identified and assessed, and assist in sound decision-making under pressure.   A 
Living Manual that engages at all levels of the organisation and is ‘lived and breathed’ 
will also reduce the effects of institutional memory loss.  As new recruits join the 
organisation, they will be introduced to an organisational structure that empowers staff 
to deal with crisis eventualities.  The importance of Crisis Readiness will outlive staff 
turnover and create a culture that values its employees and the role of organisational 
learning.  The Living Manual becomes interwoven into the fabric of the organisation 
and strengthens its DNA thread and the sense of empowerment for its employees. 
 
Management and staff are more confident of their Crisis Readiness for future events as a 
result of a number of initiatives including training and familiarising staff with 
emergency procedures, understanding the need for leaders to be visible and providing 
prompt and clear directions, regular simulations and communication, even downloading 
smartphone applications for earthquakes and tsunami alerts to assist in educating and 
updating staff.  
 
A crisis-ready organisation will stand the test of a high pressure negative impact better 
than one that ignores crisis planning at their peril.  An informed organisation will be 
able to meet the crisis event head on with the knowledge and confidence that their Crisis 
Leadership capabilities will reduce the negative outcomes and ensure sustained business 
continuity.  The researcher recommends that a Crisis Management Team of senior 
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management be established and that they develop a comprehensive organisational Crisis 
Plan as a matter of urgency. 
 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In a field of limited empirical research in Crisis Management Leadership, this research 
proposes a substantive grounded theory that provides the foundation for broader theory 
development.  Researchers to date have neglected to address Crisis Leadership and 
Crisis Readiness theory in tourism Crisis Management studies; therefore, this study 
offers implications for further research in leadership ontology. 
 
While this study has achieved its aim to examine and identify how Crisis Leadership 
influences Crisis Readiness by positing Empowering Readiness as the key basic social 
process, its results also stimulates the need for even more research in the future.  
Considering the debate on Grounded Theory’s generalisability, future research should 
aim to seek a more generalisable approach so that the theory from this study can be 
examined and substantiated. 
 
Furthermore, the emergent Grounded Theory from this research is not limited to the 
case study organisation but can be applied to other similar hotel companies in Thailand 
or in other Asian countries.  Its findings can also be used to study the differences 
between Asian and Western countries or even for comparing the effects of Empowering 
Readiness in small regional companies versus large multi-nationals. 
 
It would be rewarding to compare and contrast the findings by extending the study to 
larger international hotel groups to ascertain the level of their crisis-readiness based on 
their crisis management practices.  One of the aims for further research could be to 
explore if by incorporating routine crisis training, staff will feel more confident to deal 
with a crisis event.  Broader theory development will be achieved by comparing with 
hotel groups that have dedicated crisis management teams and practice crisis readiness 
to ascertain crisis management success outcomes in other crisis events.  
 
The theoretical concept of Empowering Readiness can and should be further tested by 
using a comparative multiple case study, or another type of natural or man-made 
disaster using both a Western and non-Western context.  While some studies have 
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investigated empowerment in crisis management decision-making (Borodzicz & van 
Haperen, 2003; Mitroff, 2004a; Paraskevas et al., 2013, Stonehouse & Pemberton, 
1999), the state of Empowering Readiness to build confidence and resilience to deal 
with crises has been limited. 
 
Future research should also explore the impact of institutional memory loss on an 
organisation and how organisations perform during a crisis in comparison to 
organisations that retain a formalised library of institutional memory through updated 
SOPs, manuals, workflows, roles and responsibilities.  We need to understand if 
retained institutional memory enhances the crisis readiness capabilities of an 
organisation.  Furthermore, whether this capability reduces the recovery time frame for 
an organisation compared to another without this capability should be explored. 
 
Another opportunity that has emerged for future research is comparing how different 
industries approach crisis readiness. For example, this research was focused on the hotel 
industry, but it would be useful to understand if there are similar expectations for crisis 
readiness in the cruise-ship, airline or other tourism related transport industry sectors.  
Contextually, this Grounded Theory approach to crisis management research can also be 
applied to other industries, in particular, service-related industry segments such as 
banking and finance, education, healthcare and retail.  At the same time, it is also 
important to consider the effects of Empowering Readiness on different stakeholder 
groups such as clients, guests, suppliers and business partners.  The implications for 
further research provide a myriad of options to the researcher in the quest for greater 
knowledge in understanding the Crisis Leadership process for a crisis-ready 
organisation.   
 
7.6 FINAL WORDS 
 
Tourism is a key growth industry for many economies throughout the world, especially 
in Asia (Robertson et. al., 2006; United Nations, 2013).  However, the beginning of the 
twenty first century has witnessed increasing crisis events that have negatively impacted 
global travel patterns and the tourism sector.  While Crisis Management research has 
gathered some momentum in recent years, there has been limited attention directed 
towards Crisis Leadership specifically in the Crisis Readiness phase. 
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The aim of this study was to contribute new knowledge about Crisis Leadership in the 
context of the Thai hotel industry.   The research findings have produced a substantive 
theory on Empowering Readiness, which is a powerful Basic Social Process that can 
enhance Crisis Management success outcomes by ensuring an organisation is crisis 
ready.  Crisis Leadership efficacy will be improved when management and staff have 
been empowered through systematic work processes and training programmes to make 
decisions and activate crisis management strategies. 
 
This study suggests a Living Manual to address the need for Empowering Readiness and 
strengthen the strategic capacity for organisations to prepare for and manage crises.  It is 
critical that the lessons learned from past crisis events are incorporated into the strategic 
planning activities of the tourism industry so that the negative impacts of future crises 
are minimised.  In closing, this case study has contributed to the ongoing research of 
Crisis Management and opened the door to further research opportunities and broader 
theory development.  At the same time, important implications have been established 
for management best practices that can apply to the tourism sector and beyond.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1  A MODEL OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
Source : Mitroff Ian I., Shrivastava Paul and Udwadia Firdaus E. (1987). Effective crisis management. 
Academy of Management Executive, 1(3), 283-292, p.284  
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APPENDIX 2  TOURISM DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
Source : Faulkner, B. (2001). Towards a framework for tourism disaster management. Tourism 
Management, 22(2), 135-147. doi: 10.1016/S0261-5177(00)00048-0  
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APPENDIX 3  CRISIS LEADERSHIP MODEL  
 
 
 
Source : Schoenberg, A. (2005). Do crisis plans matter? A new perspective on leading during a crisis. 
Public Relations Quarterly, 50(1), 2-7. (p.4) 
 
APPENDIX 4  LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS 
 
Source : James, E. H., and Wooten, L. P. (2005). Leadership as (un)usual: How to display competence in 
times of crisis. Organizational Dynamics, 34(2), 141-152. (p.145).  
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APPENDIX 5  PROCESS OF BUILDING THEORY FROM CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
 
Source : Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 532-550. (p.533) 
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APPENDIX 6 INTERVIEW PROTOCOL – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PLAN 
 
Introduction to the interviewee: 
Thank the interviewee for participating and explain that this study is being conducted on 
behalf of Bond University, and will contribute to the body of knowledge aimed at 
understanding how leadership and past experience with crises impacts the crisis 
readiness for future crises events at an individual and hotel level. 
 
The data collected from the interviews will be analysed and a report of the findings will 
be presented to Bond University.  Please be assured that the data will not identify 
participants and specific comments of individuals will not be identified to ensure 
complete confidentiality.  Participation is completely voluntary. 
 
The interview will take from 30 minutes to one hour and will focus on your awareness, 
attitudes and perceptions of experience with crisis events and the crisis readiness for 
future events.  Confirm with the interviewee: 
 Permission to record 
 Confidentiality 
 Note taking through the interview 
 Consent form to be signed 
 Request for follow up should further clarification be required (phone/email/ 
face-to-face preference) 
 
Organisation’s Internal Crisis Management functionality: 
1. Can you describe how your company responds to the threat of a political or 
natural crisis such as the 2010 Red Shirt Crisis or the 2011 floods, in terms of 
the systems or standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are in place? 
2. Can you describe the training you have received in regard to the Crisis Plan? 
3. What budget and resources are in place to deal with a possible crisis event? 
4. How does the internal communication network operate at the time of a crisis 
event? 
5. How do the different levels of management perform before and during a 
crisis? 
(cont.) 
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Crisis Leadership Competencies: 
6. Can you describe the information made available to all stakeholders when a 
crisis is identified and how are they kept appraised (Stakeholders = clients, 
employees, suppliers, partners, media) and describe how the company/hotel’s 
GM address each of their constituencies? 
7. Can you provide examples of proactive strategies by Senior Management in 
providing information on the strategies to deal with the crisis? 
8. What makes you trust in the decision making of the company/ hotel’s leaders 
at the time of a crisis, can you provide any examples? 
9. Can you describe an example of a crisis event that could have been better 
handled by the company/ hotel’s GM (be specific to business unit)? 
10. Can you describe the decision making process during a crisis event and its 
timeliness in your opinion?  
11. What learning, or de-briefing has occurred as a result of a crisis event? 
12. What is your opinion of the likelihood of future crises in the next 5 years and 
why? 
 
Crisis Experience: 
13. Have you personally experienced a crisis event such as the Red Shirt crisis and 
when? 
14. To your knowledge, has your hotel experienced a crisis event and can you 
describe how they performed in relation to the crisis management processes? 
15. If your hotel did not experience a crisis type event, can you provide a 
description of your other experience from the city, state or most proximate 
location of such a crisis, eg ASPAC? 
 
 
The interview will close with demographic and organisational information type 
questions: 
16. What year were you born? 
17. How many years have you held a managerial position? 
18. What is your highest level of education attained? 
19. What is the room count of your hotel (if hotel based)? 
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APPENDIX 7  HR GATEKEEPER EMAIL COMMUNICATION  
 
Emailed to prospective interviewees 16 November 2012 
Please allow me to introduce the PhD Research under the topic of “How does crisis 
leadership impact crisis management in the Thai hotel industry?” by Khun Chanin 
Cronin (previous VP-S&M) who is now completing her PhD at Bond University and 
she has received a kind approval from Khun Chanin as attached.  
Please kindly see the attachments to understand the request for an interview and 
acknowledge the agreement to participate. 
1. Explanatory Letter for the interviewees 
2. Consent Form for the interviewees (to be handed to the interviewer on the day) 
3. Semi Structured Interview Plan 
Important Note about this research 
• Voluntary 
• Completely confidential and anonymous, only known to the researcher 
• Participants cannot be identified and most importantly 
• Dusit will not be identified to protect the anonymity of participants/ the 
company and allow for robust discussion and in depth understanding of crisis 
management. 
The following staff are requested to be interviewed by Khun Jennifer  on 21-23 Nov. 
The actual interviewing participants will need to have been in BKK during the Red Shirt 
crisis (or based at DTDU / DTMN) and I would appreciate if she can interview the 
following list kha: 
(12 staff listed) 
If you confirm to participate, please highlight your convenient time/date for the 
interview below, the interview will take approximately 45 minutes – one hour:  
Once you confirm, I will send you the calendar invitation with time and place to 
meet her at DTBK kha.  
21 Nov 9am 11am 2pm 4pm 
22 Nov 9am 11am 2pm 4pm 
23 Nov 9am 11am 2pm 4pm 
  
Thank you and Best regards,  
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APPENDIX 8 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT FOR PARTICIPANTS 
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APPENDIX 9 CEO’S APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX 10 CONSENT FORM 
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APPENDIX 11 ONLINE SURVEY DESIGN 
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APPENDIX 12 NVIVO NODES: PARENT AND CHILD CATEGORISATION 
 
Parent Child  Parent Child 
 
Business 
Impacts 
Bottom Line  
Business 
Neutral 
Problem 
  
Crisis in 
Motion 
Act 
Action 
Active 
Adapt 
Attacked 
Bloodshed 
Bombing 
Civil war 
Crisis 
Danger Zone 
Disaster 
Dispute 
Earthquake 
Escalate 
Military 
Political  
Political Unrest 
Possibilities 
Quickly 
Reacting 
Red Shirt 
Serious 
Siege 
Situation 
Violence 
War 
 
 
 
 
Communicating 
Internally and 
Externally 
Business as Usual 
Communication  
Communication – lack of 
Contact 
Dark 
Dialogue- open 
Discuss 
Image 
Information 
Information – lack of 
Informed 
Media 
Media – negative 
Negative 
Power 
PR  
Proud and Strong 
Rumour 
Strong Message 
Together for Thailand 
Updated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis 
Management  
Fire fighters 
Initiative 
Initiatives 
IT 
Marketing 
Obligated 
Perform 
Priority 
Proactive 
Relationships 
Respond 
Scope 
 
  
Crisis 
Management 
Tools and 
Resources 
Budget 
Crisis Communication 
Plan 
Crisis Office 
Crisis Plan 
Emergency Response 
Room 
Lack of funds 
Left on a shelf 
Manuals 
Perplexing 
Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) 
Systems 
Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis Post 
Recovery 
Crisis – Post 
Promote 
Recovery 
 
 
 
Crisis 
Readiness 
Back-up 
Comfortable 
Commitment 
Contingency 
Crisis in Future 
Expectation 
Fire Drills  
Foresight 
Ignoring 
Opportunity 
 Crisis 
Readiness 
(cont.) 
Plan 
Prepared 
Risk Management 
Unmentionable 
Unprepared 
Unresolved 
Wait and See 
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Appendix 12 NVivo Nodes: Parent Child Categorisation (cont.) 
Parent Child  Parent Child 
 
Cultural and 
Organisational 
Attributes 
Accountability 
Attitude  
Buddhism 
Complacency 
Consensus 
Cultural 
Mentality 
Resilience 
Thai 
Thai community 
Thai company 
Thailand 
Western or International 
  
Emotional 
Responses 
Calm 
Comforting 
De-sensitised  
Emotional  
Fear 
Feel 
Frustrated 
Happy 
Heart 
Hesitant 
Home 
Instinct 
Loyal  
Panic 
Proud 
Sad 
Safety or Safe 
Scared or Scary 
Sense of belonging 
Surreal 
Worry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision-
making 
Processes 
Agenda – different 
Collectively 
Complicated 
Consequences 
Decision-making 
Directed 
Effectively 
Efficiency 
Evaluate 
Execution 
Failed 
Fast 
Flexibility 
Inactive 
Instructions 
Opinion 
Ownership 
Timeliness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Leadership 
Group 
CEO 
Committee 
Corporate Team 
Emergency Response 
Team 
Executive Committee 
(Excom) 
Expats 
GM 
Leader 
Management 
Mid Management 
Senior Management 
Spokesperson  
VP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experience in 
Crisis Events 
Experience – limited  
HR 
Management 
Fire Fighting 
HR 
Welfare 
 
 
  
Leadership in 
Action  
Briefing 
Bunker Spirit 
Credit 
Emergent Leadership 
Good Job 
Involved 
Isolation 
Manage 
Natural 
Personal  
Responsibility 
Sales and Marketing 
Sense 
Strategising 
Strategy – lack of 
Support 
Institutional 
Memory 
Memory 
Memory Loss 
Turnover 
 
 
 
Leadership 
Inadequacies 
Disappeared 
Leadership – absence 
Uncertainty 
Unclear 
Underestimate 
Unknown 
Visibility – lack of 
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Appendix 12 NVivo Nodes: Parent Child Categorisation (cont.) 
Parent Child  Parent Child 
Leadership 
Influencers 
Admired 
Cares 
Character 
Confidence 
Confidence – lack of 
Control 
Credible 
Driven 
Encourage 
Explain 
Follow  
Guiding 
Honesty 
Inspiration 
Leader – natural 
Positive 
Practical 
Reassure 
Reliable 
Respected  
Strength 
Strong 
Trust  
Truth 
Understand 
Visibility 
 Team Spirit Cohesive  
Collaboration 
Divided 
Representative 
Spirit  
Team 
Team – limited or nil 
Unify 
Unity – Lack of 
Willingness 
Work closely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Organisational 
Learning  
Debriefing 
Emergency Evacuation 
Empowerment 
Experience learned 
Knowledge 
Knowledge – lack of 
Lessons 
Regularly 
Rehearse 
Self – reflection 
Training  
Training – No 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Pre Crisis 
Situation 
Bounce Back 
Monitor  
Threat 
Trouble  
Wait and See 
Wake-up call  
Warning Signals 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Stakeholders Community  
Company 
DTBK 
Family 
Involved – Non 
Perceptions 
Reservations 
Staff 
Wedding Group 
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APPENDIX 13  TRIP ADVISOR 
 
“Tsunami Warning and Staff Left us Behind” 
3 of 5 stars Reviewed April 22, 2012 
 
We were booked to stay 12 nights a [sic] the Angsana Laguna in April 2012, but ended up 
checking out 6 days early, after our Tsunami Warning/ Evacuation Experience. We stayed in 
two Angsana Suites; the rooms were dated, more like 4 star, weird bathrooms, with a funky 
shower/bathtub thing. The kids club in the resort is amazing, huge, and the staff were very 
active and sweet with the kids. Their Easter Program was out of the is world, a full day of fun, 
games, and elephant visiting, a treasure hunt, a memorable day. The Gym is really nice and big, 
nice equipment, much bigger than the Banyan Tree Phuket Gym, gorgeous view overlooking 
the Laguna. The have a variety of classes, Yoga, Pilates, that seemed really popular with 
guests. I did private yoga with Dr. Prem the Yoga Instructor, he was excellent, very 
knowledgable[sic], and attentive. It is a bargain to do do [sic] Private Yoga for 800 TH Baht an 
hour, with such an experienced instructor. The Spa is also nice, we loved how they had lots of 
family oriented treatments, Mommy and Daughter, Family Time. It was a treat to be pampered 
side by side with our daughters. The new restaurant Baan Talay was outstanding, really fresh 
tasty food. The Bodega Grill made a great steak, the Pool Bar has a great Wholesome Salad. 
Room Service was average, nothing special, we tried to eat out of the room as much as 
possible. The Loy Kraythong Bar is nice, live music, a big menu of drinks, and nice snacks. We 
were a bit put off one night, as they layed out a bunch of appetizers and then people started 
helping themselves, and then when we went up, they said "sorry this is only for Owners" We sat 
and watched a few other people give it a try, and get embarrassed while they were turned away. 
I think they should have put a sign or something, it wasn't very welcoming for us that weren't 
"Owners". We chartered a Laguna Boat a couple of days, and it was the highlight of our holiday. 
Excellent staff toured us around the islands. The food served during the trip, below average, the 
restaurant we stopped at near Phi Phi island, not very wonderful at all, deep fried everything, 
prawns not cleaned, an experience.  
 
The low point of our trip was definitely [sic] when the Tsunami sirens sounded, 
and we were told to evacuate the hotel. As we gathered our passports and 
money, and left the hotel, we watched all of the staff take off on their 
motorcycles, leaving the guests to stand at the end of the hotel driveway. There 
was absolutely no organization, no guiding guests to the Evacuation Route. It 
was a bit terrifying as we all stood there, looking around, where should we go, 
people crying, people looking for family members, and the staff just took off, 
didn't show us where to go. Luckily our tour guide, our Guardian Angel, Mr. Alex 
from Laguna Tours, came and found our family. He had just dropped us off, and 
came back to show us the way out. He ended up leading us and all of the rest 
of guests down the road, following the Evacuation Route, and eventually ending 
up in the High School, an evacuation meeting point. If it wasn't for Mr. Alex, I'm 
not sure how long we would have stood on that driveway. It was a bit shocking 
to firstly see the Thai people scared, normally they are so calm, and secondly to 
see them leave us all behind. They could have just told us, go straight, turn 
right, we weren't expecting them to stay with us, just a little guidance would 
have been nice. The hotel definitely [sic] needs to work on their evacuation 
procedures. It has left a sour feeling for us, and I don't imagine that we would 
ever return to the is [sic] hotel in the future. 
 
    Stayed April 2012, travelled [sic] with family 
 
 
Source : http://www.tripadvisor.com.au/ShowUserReviews-g297937-d304521-r128328806-
Angsana_Laguna_Phuket-Thalang_District_Phuket.html 
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APPENDIX 14 ‘RECOVERY PLAN’ ADVERTISEMENT  
 
 
  
HOTEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recovery Plan Advertising Theme 
Hotel Picture  
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APPENDIX 15 THE TAJ MAHAL PALACE MUMBAI ADVERTISEMENT  
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APPENDIX 16 STAFF LETTER FROM CEO 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Photos of CEO & Staff 
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